il'ii!' 


i'ililllil^ 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 
LOS  ANGELES 


Social  Justice 


A  Message  to  Suffering  Humanity 


By 

Percy  Vivian  Jones 


Cochrane  Publishing  Company- 
Tribune  Building 
New  York 
1910 


Copyright,  1910,  by 

PERCY  VIVIAN  JONES. 


ENTERED  AT  STATIONERS'  HALL, 
LONDON,  ENGLAND. 


PRINTED  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA. 


1 1  n 


CONTENTS 

Publisher's   Preface 5 

Introduction 7 

CHAPTER  I 
Privileges 33 

CHAPTER  n 
Instinct 62 

CHAPTER  III 
Human  Nature ...       72 

CHAPTER  IV 
Human  Nature  (Continued) 82 

CHAPTER  V 
Knowledge  —  Its  Relation  to  Human  Nature  and 
Conduct 93 

CHAPTER  VI 
Altruism 108 

CHAPTER  VII 
Free  Will 123 

CHAPTER  VIII 
The  Law  of  Justice 130 

CHAPTER  IX 
Rights       165 


15i:.18o3 


CONTENTS  (Continued) 

CHAPTER  X 
Rights  (Continued) 180 

CHAPTER  XI 
Rights  (Continued) 193 

CHAPTER  XH 
The  Philosophy  of  Conduct  Illustrated  by  Social 
Phenomena 231 

CHAPTER  XIII 
Philosophy  and  Civilization 255 

CHAPTER  XIV 
Philosophy  of  Human  Progress 267 

CHAPTER  XV 
Labor  Unions 278 

CHAPTER  XVI 
Class  Consciousness 292 


PUBLISHER'S    PREFACE. 

WiiKN  the  manuscript  of  this  book  came  first  into  my  hands, 
I  thought  1  was  destined  to  peruse  a  mass  of  (\vy  arguments 
that  would  leave  unsolved  tlie  momentous  problem  of  social 
justice.  In  common  with  all  the  wt)rld  1  had  recognized  that 
our  institutions  were  wrong  somewhere,  and  that  most  j^eo- 
ple's  lives  were  failures — doomed  so  to  be  from  birth.  I  had 
read  volumes  on  social  economics  and  1  had  heard  ])oliticians 
prophesy  the  good  that  was  coming  to  the  masses ;  but  the 
philosophy  of  all  the  economists  failed  to  satisfy,  just  as  the 
promises  of  the  office-seekers  failed  of  realization. 

Therefore  I  began  reading  Jones'  "Social  Justice"  with  the 
feeling  that  there  was  nothing  in  it — that  it  would  fail  to  sat- 
isfy, fail  to  even  suggest  any  remedy  for  the  wrong  condi- 
tions that  harassed  me,  in  common  with  the  rest  of  the  toiling 
millions  of  the  earth. 

I  listlessly  followed  page  after  page,  and  at  the  end  of  the 
first  chapter  said  to  myself,  "This  man  Jones  at  least  writes 
sense.  I  cannot  disagree  with  anything  thus  far.  He  proves 
every  point  made."  So  I  read  on,  and  gradually  it  dawned 
upon  me  that  a  new  fundamental  principle  had  been  found, 
that  the  correct  thinking  and  patient  plodding  of  Percy  Vivian 
Jones  had  enabled  him  to  fathom  the  causes  of  the  wrongs 
which  civilization  has  develoi)ed,  and  to  point  out  a  reasonable 
remedy. 

I  am  naturally  skeptic.  I  view  everything  new  with  distrust. 
I  expect  nothing  good  in  a  new  book,  and  I  seldom  find  it. 
Yet,  Jones'  theories  of  social  justice  have  captured  me  com- 
pletely. I  endorse  the  book  from  cover  to  cover.  I  believe  it 
will  appeal  to  all  thinkers  everywhere,  and  those  who  will 
studiously  and  critically   follow  the  thread  of  his  argument, 


6  PUBLISHER'S    PREFACE 

chapter  after  chapter,  will  be  amazed,  as  I  was,  that  from  an 
unknown  recluse  should  come  a  message  of  value  to  all  of  us, 
a  key  to  real  liberty,  an  open  pathway  to  happiness,  a  prac- 
tical means  for  establishing  social  justice. 

We  have  been  taught  that  mankind  is  a  mixture  of  good 
and  bad,  and  that  only  by  cultivating  the  good  can  the  world 
progress.  Jones  demonstrates  that  we  are  necessarily  human, 
being  governed  under  all  circumstances  by  our  understanding 
of  our  self-interest,  regardless,  apart  from  self-interest,  of 
the  consequences  of  our  conduct,  and  that  whenever  our  con- 
duct is  justly  censurable,  the  cause  is  not  any  defect  of  human 
nature,  but  solely  a  misunderstanding  of  our  true  self-interest. 
And  hence  is  reached  the  inevitable  conclusion,  that  the  only 
means  by  which  right  conduct  may  be  induced  is  to  so  arrange 
social  matters  as  to  make  it  to  the  evident  self-interest  of  all 
normal  persons  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  moral  law.  The 
social  fabric  requires  to  be  woven  anew,  with  justice  as  the 
warp  and  self-interest  as  the  woof. 

As  we  read,  theories  develop  into  facts,  and  every  man 
who  will  study  "Social  Justice,"  as  I  have  done,  will  find  that 
it  points  the  way  to  his  personal  advancement  as  well  as  to 
the  escape  of  the  whole  race  from  the  industrial  slavery  which 
now  enchains  the  masses. 

Jones  contradicts  all  writers  on  social  topics.  Where  all 
others  have  failed  to  convince  he  convinces.  This  is  the  book 
that  has  been  looked  for  by  the  political  dreamers  of  all  ages. 
It  will  convince  open  minded  Democrats,  Republicans,  Social- 
ists, Single  Taxers,  Populists,  Prohibitionists,  Anarchists — all, 
for  it  is  founded  on  truth,  and  truth  can  never  die. 

At  the  request  of  the  writer  the  chapter  on  Privileges,  which 
is  properly  the  eleventh  chapter  of  the  book,  has  been  placed 
first,  to  give  the  reader  a  foreglimpse  of  Mr.  Jones'  theories. 

Charles  H.  Cochrane. 


INTRODUCTION. 

WnKNKVEK  \vc  (leal  with  natural  laws,  and  it  must  be  liornc 
in  mind  that  whatever  we  do,  and  whether  we  will  or  not. 
we  must  deal  with  them,  if  we  would  get  good  results,  we 
must  conform  our  actions  to  the  requirements  of  the  natural 
laws  involved.  The  laws  of  nature  are  omnioperative,  om- 
nipotent and  inexorable.  We  can  neither  add  to  them  nor 
subtract  from  them.  We  must  strictly  observe  them  or  we 
must  suffer  the  consequences,  always  harmful  to  the  degree  in 
which  we  have  transgressed  the  law. 

There  is  a  right  for  every  wrong.  Nothing  in  nature  is 
wrong,  immoral  or  unjust.  All  wrongs,  which  mar,  demoral- 
ize, or  destroy  the  lives  of  substantially  all  the  people,  are  due 
to  the  transgression  by  man  of  nature's  laws,  or  to  the  per- 
version of  that  order  of  things  which  the  beneficent  operation 
of  natural  laws  has  made  imperative.  All  the  social  evils,  all 
the  harassing,  demoralizing,  destructive  social  conditions,  all 
the  harrowing,  discouraging  injustices  which  scourge  the  peo- 
ple, as  if  by  a  malignant  disease  perennially  epidemic,  are 
caused  by  actions  of  men  at  variance  with  the  requirements 
of  the  natural  order  of  things.  Therefore,  all  social  or  econ- 
omic injustice  and  all  attending  evils  may  be  remedied  by 
simply  adjusting  our  social  arrangement .  to  meet  the  require- 
ments of  natural  laws. 

That  all  known  systems  of  social  arrangements  work  mon- 
strous economic  injustice  to  a  large  majority  of  the  people, 
and  cause  an  intolerable  inequality  in  the  economic  relations 
between  individuals,  is  recognized  by  all  men  who  have  given 
the  subject  serious  consideration.  Mill  expresses  his  opinion 
of  the  then  existing  social  arrangements  in  England,  which 
do  not  differ  in  principle  from  the  system  now  in  vogue  in 


8  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

England  or  in  the  United  States,  in  the  following  forceful 
language : 

"If,  therefore,  the  choice  were  to  be  made  between  Com- 
munism with  all  its  chances,  and  the  present  state  of  society 
with  all  its  sufferings  and  injustices;  if  the  institution  of 
private  property  necessarily  carried  with  it  as  a  consequence, 
that  the  produce  of  labour  should  be  appropriated  as  we  now 
see  it,  almost  in  an  inverse  ratio  to  the  labour — the  largest 
portions  to  those  who  have  never  worked  at  all,  the  next 
largest  to  those  whose  work  is  almost  nominal,  and  so  in  a 
descending  scale,  the  remuneration  dwindles  as  the  work 
grows  liarder  and  more  disagreeable,  until  the  most  fatiguing 
and  exhausting  bodily  labour  cannot  count  with  certainty  on 
being  able  to  earn  even  the  necessaries  of  life;  if  this,  or 
Communism,  were  the  alternative,  all  the  difficulties,  great  or 
small,  of  Communism,  would  be  but  as  dust  in  the  balance." 

Now,  this  recognition  of  the  fact  that  all  known  systems 
of  social  arrangements  inflict  great  injustice  on  a  majority 
of  the  people,  and  are  therefore  themselves  grossly  wrong, 
implies  that  there  must  be  some  conibination  of  social  ar- 
rangements which  would  work  ju^lice  for  all  individuals, 
establish  and  maintain  equitable  economic  relations  between 
individuals,  and  would  therefore  be  in  itself  just.  For,  there 
is  no  doubt  about  it,  there  is  a  right  for  every  wrong  as 
surely  as  there  is  an  up  for  every  down  and  an  in  for  every 
out. 

To  deny  that  the  discovery  of  a  system  of  social  arrange- 
ments which  would  produce  equitable  economic  relations  be- 
tween individuals  is  possible,  is  to  assert  that  either  the 
principles  of  human  nature  and  the  nature  of  things  in  general 
were  ill-contrived  and  unsuited  as  a  means  to  the  desired 
end — the  promotion  of  the  well-being  of  mankind — or  that 
the  discovery  by  men  of  their  true  economic  self-interest  is 
an  insolvable  problem. 


INTRODUCTION  9 

The  purpose  of  this  work  is  to  ekicidate  the  principles 
or  laws  whicli  deterniine  the  economic  relations  of  the  several 
members  of  the  society  to  each  other — to  point  out  the  cri- 
terion by  which  all  ^governmental  institutions  and  laws  may 
be  rightly  judged,  and  to  discover  what  combination  of  social 
arrangements  would  establish  and  maintain  just  economic 
relations  between  the  divers  members  of  the  society. 

What  are  the  principles  or  laws  which  determine  the 
economic  relations  between  the  individual  members  of  a  com- 
munity? They  are  none  other  than  the  principles  or  laws 
which  govern  individual  economic  conduct,  the  principles 
which  determine  whether  the  economic  dealings  between  the 
individuals  will  be  just  or  unjust. 

These  principles  or  laws  are  as  invariable  and  persistent 
in  their  operation  as  the  law  of  gravitation  or  any  other 
natural  law.  Whether  their  operation  will  produce  just  or 
unjust  economic  relations  between  individuals,  depends  en- 
tirely upon  the  character  of  the  existing  governmental  insti- 
tutions and  laws — that  is  to  .say,  whether  the  institutions  and 
laws  are  adapted  to  the  benehcient  operation  of  the  natural 
laws,  or  otherwise. 

Economic  conduct,  like  all  conduct,  is  always  engendered 
by  the  operation  of  the  fundamental  principle  of  human 
nature  which  impels  every  one  to  pursue  self-interest,  and 
the  mode  of  economic  conduct  is  determined  by  the  state  of 
knowledge  respecting  self-interest,  under  any  given  system 
of  social  arrangements. 

For  example,  under  the  present  system  of  social  arrange- 
ments in  the  United  States,  the  great  majority  of  the  people 
are  denied  their  natural  right  to  work  for  themselves.  They 
must  therefore  work  for  others  on  the  best  terms  they  can 
make;  while  others  have  the  work  to  give  or  withhold,  they 
must  have  the  work  in  order  to  live. 

The  result  of  the  bargain  made  under  such  circumstances 


10  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

will  naturally  be  that  the  employer  gets  the  services  of  the 
employe  for  less  than  those  services  are  worth ;  that  is  to  say, 
the  employers  will  work  their  employes  at  a  profit.  It  is  an 
inevitable  condition  of  this  so-called  free  contract,  that  the 
worker  must  yield  to  his  employer  a  considerable  part  of  the 
produce  of  his  labor,  in  order  that  he  be  permitted  to  live. 

Here  we  have  an  example  of  grossly  immoral  conduct,  of 
the  denial  of  natural  rights,  and  consequently  the  subversion 
of  property  rights,  all  committed  while  acting  in  strict  con- 
formity with  the  institutions  and  laws  of  the  country. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  principles  and  laws  which  govern 
economic  conduct,  operating  under  faulty  institutions  and  laws, 
result  in  immoral,  unjust  economic  conduct. 

It  is  the  chief  purpose  of  this  work  to  demonstrate  that 
these  same  principles  and  laws,  operating  under  governmental 
institutions  and  laws  of  a  certain,  definitely  prescribed  char- 
acter, will  produce  just  economic  conduct,  and,  consequently, 
just  economic  relations  between  individuals. 

It  would  be  preposterous  to  infer  from  the  fact  that  the 
operation  of  these  principles  under  certain  conditions  pro- 
duces an  unjust  distribution  of  wealth,  that  the  operation  of 
these  principles  under  any  circumstances  must  produce  unjust 
results.  There  is  not  the  slightest  evidence  that  any  natural 
law  or  principle  was  so  contrived  that  by  its  very  nature  it 
would  bring  about  undesirable  consequences. 

These  principles  and  laws  pertain  exclusively  to  human 
nature,  the  acquired  characteristics  of  men,  the  state  of  their 
knowledge  of  what  constitutes  their  self-interest,  and  the 
influence  which  these  things  severally  and  conjointly  exert 
in  determining  human  conduct.  In  other  words,  questions 
of  right  and  wrong,  of  justice,  involve  only  human  beings 
and  the  principles  which  govern  human  conduct. 

These  principles  consist  in  the  single  instinctive  law  of 
human  nature  which  invariably  impels  every  human  being  to 


INTRODUCTION  11 

pursue  self-interest,  and  the  truth  tliat  to  every  one  his  self- 
interest  is  nothing  but  liis  un(lcrstan(Hng  as  to  what  will  pro- 
mote his  well-being;  and  the  further  truth,  which  compre- 
hends the  other  two,  that  the  state  of  knowledge  as  to  what 
will  best  promote  one's  welfare  determines  the  course  of  his 
conduct,  which  will  result  in  good  or  evil  for  him  accordingly 
as  his  knowledge  of  what  will  be  good  for  him  to  do,  be  cor- 
rect  or   faulty. 

While  the  acquirement  of  knowledge,  like  the  doing  of 
anything  and  everything  else  which  is  conducive  to  our  wel- 
fare, depends  ultimately  upon  the  irresistible  impulse  to  serve 
self-interest,  we  may  properly  say  that  the  immediate  cause 
of  all  human  progress,  which  means  above  all  things  advance- 
ment toward  social  justice,  is  the  acquirement  of  better  knowl- 
edge of  what  will  subserve  self-interest. 

Than  all  the  knowledge  of  the  truths  of  nature  which  man- 
kind have  thus  far  attained,  a  true  knowledge  of  human 
nature  is  inestimably  more  important. 

The  coming  recognition  of  the  simple  natural  law  that 
every  human  being,  everywhere,  at  all  times  and  under  all 
circumstances,  does  that  which  he  conceives  to  be  to  his  self- 
interest  to  do,  will  cause  a  greater  transformation  in  the 
ideas  of  men,  and  therefore  in  all  human  affairs,  than  all 
discoveries  that  have  been  made  during  the  last  hundred 
years,  the  pre-eminent  era  of  invention. 

I  say  that  the  mere  recognition  of  this  truth  will  cause  an 
undreamed-of  transformation  of  civilization,  for  the  reason 
that  its  recognition  will  render  the  adjustment  of  social 
arrangements  to  its  requirements  subject  to  the  self-interest 
of  the  people,  and  therefore  make  such  an  adjustment  un- 
avoidable. 

Since  to  do  that  which,  according  to  the  understanding, 
will  serve  self-interest,  is  the  fundamental  law  of  human 
nature,  a  knowledge  of  that  law  is  of  the  first  importance; 


12  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

for,  we  would  not  know  how  to  proceed  to  so  order  our  affairs 
that  they  may  comport  with  the  law,  until  we  have  appre- 
hended the  law  itself.  Having  once  grasped  the  law,  the 
remainder  of  our  work  will  consist  simply  in  the  adjustment 
of  things  to  its  requirements. 

Now,  since  every  individual  must  always  act  in  accordance 
with  his  understanding  as  to  his  self-interest,  and  cannot  pos- 
sibly act  otherwise,  whatever  his  individual  environment  or 
the  social  system  under  which  he  lives  may  be,  we  are  con- 
fronted point-blank  by  the  momentous  proposition  that  there 
can  never  be  good  conduct,  just  relations  between  men,  nor  a 
state  of  real  civilization,  until  matters  are  so  arranged  as 
to  make  good  conduct  and  self-interest  identical. 

The  only  thing  needful  to  be  done,  therefore,  in  order  to 
bring  about  social  justice,  is  to  fix  things  so  that  the  pursuit 
by  everyone  of  his  true  self-interest  will  result  in  just  rela- 
tions between  men. 

The  pursuit  of  their  welfare  is  the  only  conceivable  object 
of  the  existence  of  reasoning  human  beings.  Therefore, 
we  must  conclude  that  whatever  ministers  to  their  well-being, 
is  right,  and  we  must  further  conclude  that  any  social  arrange- 
ments which  will  best  subserve  the  interests  of  human  beings, 
are  in  the  nature  of  things  right.  Hence,  what  we  mean, 
when  we  speak  of  the  natural  order  of  things,  is  that  order 
under  which  the  free  play  of  human  nature,  the  pursuit  of 
self-interest,  will  produce  the  most  beneficial  results.  Our 
problem,  therefore,  is  to  discover  the  natural  order  of  things 
respecting  social  arrangements. 

Pursuing  this  object,  concerning  governmental  power  and 
authority,  we  find  that,  in  the  nature  of  things,  all  power,  and 
consequently  all  authority,  resides  ultimately  in  the  will  of 
the  majority,  and  that  therefore,  in  order  to  get  good  results, 
the  will  of  the  majority  must  govern.  The  very  fact  that  the 
majority  naturally  have  the  power  to  do  whatsoever  they  will, 


INTRODUCTION  13 

leaves  open  to  us  no  other  conclusion  than  that  the  majority 
ought  to  rule  absolutely.  For  no  other  condition  will  har- 
monize with  the  natural  fact  that  the  majority  ha^e  the  power 
to  rule. 

Justice,  therefore,  can  only  bo  brought  about,  and  the  best 
interests  of  mankind  in  all  respects  subserved,  by  the  majority 
of  the  people  assuming  and  exercising  directly  all  power  and 
authority  over  all  social  arrangements. 

In  perfect  agreement  with  the  fundamental  truth  that  the 
majority  naturally  have  the  power  to  rule,  nature  has  so  con- 
trived matters  that  if  the  majority  of  a  society  act  in  strict 
accordance  with  their  true  interests,  severally,  the  inexorable 
consequence  will  be  justice,  not  only  for  themselves,  but  for 
every  member  of  the  society. 

And  because  the  minority  have  not  been  vested  by  nature 
with  the  power  to  rule,  by  that  very  fact  she  has  ordained  that 
nothing  but  injustice  can  come  from  the  rule  of  the  minority. 
Therefore,  it  is  impossible,  in  any  event,  for  justice  to  result 
from  minority  rule,  and  representative  government  is  always 
minority  rule. 

Justice  can  come  from,  and  only  from,  majority  rule,  and 
then,  only  when  the  majority  have  learned  what  is  their  self- 
interest  concerning   social   arrangements. 

So  we  are  brought  to  the  conclusion  that  a  just  and  ben- 
eficial state  of  affairs  can  never  be  wrought  by  the  agency  of 
representative  government ;  that  the  least  particle  of  official 
authority  is  an  obstruction  to  justice,  and  that  the  attainment 
of  justice  finally  depends  upon  the  acquirement  by  a  majority 
of  the  people  of  an  accurate  knowledge  as  to  their  self-interest 
respecting  social  arrangements — that  is,  a  knowledge  of  what 
social  arrangements  will  be  perfectly  compatible  with  the 
nature  of  things. 

Hence,  it  may  be  laid  down  as  a  general  proposition  that 
the  precise  conformation  of   all   social   arrangements   to   the 


14  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

nature  of  things  will  yield  a  true  answer  to  every  social 
question. 

Self-interest  is  the  mainspring  of  human  progress.  It  is 
also  the  incentive  to  the  acquirement  of  knowledge.  Knowl- 
edge directs  conduct  along  the  right  course.  False  beliefs  or 
a  lack  of  knowledge  are  the  only  impediments  to  progress 
along  the  roads  which  lead  to  higher  attainments  in  any 
direction. 

While  the  understanding  of  self-interest  molds  the  conduct, 
and  therefore  a  better  knowledge  of  self-interest  is  pre- 
requisite to  any  human  progress,  yet,  but  for  the  principle 
of  human  nature,  which  imperatively  impels  the  pursuit  of 
what  the  understanding  presents  to  the  ego  as  self-interest, 
human  life  itself  could  not  be  maintained,  and  much  less 
would  any  sort  of  human  progress  be  possible.  For,  where 
human  beings  are  possessed  of  ever  so  little  knowledge  of 
what  may  subserve  their  self-interest,  it  is  only  because  they 
always  must  act  in  accordance  with  what  knowledge  they  may 
have  as  to  their  self-interest,  that  it  is  possible  for  them  to 
maintain  life  at  all.  Knowledge  contributes  to  the  fullness 
of  life.  The  principle  self-interest  is  the  mainstay  of  life 
itself. 

A  perfect  system  of  social  arrangements  must  be  such  that 
the  free  play,  under  that  system,  of  the  factors  which  con- 
trol economic  conduct  will  automatically  produce  the  follow- 
ing economic  conditions: 

The  absolute  economic  independence  of  every  person  who 
is  able  to  work;  the  perfect  freedom  of  each  individual  to 
pursue  his  own  self-interest,  which,  of  course,  excludes  the 
doing  of  injustice  to  others;  the  life-long  opportunity  of  each 
to  exercise  his  faculties  toward  the  satisfaction  of  his  desires 
to  the  best  of  his  ability,  the  most  efficient  methods  being 
available  to  him ;  and  that,  under  such  freedom  of  individual 
action,   it  will  be   impossible   for  any  individual   to   acquire 


INTRODUCTION  15 

economic  advantages  or  benefits  at  the  expense  of  others, 
which  is  etiuivalent  to  the  statement  that  each  will  get,  econom- 
ically, what  he  pro«luces,  and  nuisl  produce  what  he  gets, 
unless  by  free  gift  or  be(|ucst. 

Writers  on  political  economy  have  observed  that  the  dis- 
tribution of  wealth — which  is  the  subject  about  which  we  are 
most  concerned — is  dependent  on  the  laws  and  customs  of 
society,  and  have  held  that  the  rules  by  which  distribution 
is  determined,  are  what  the  oijinions  and  feelings  of  the  ruling 
portion  of  the  community  make  them.  lUit,  unfortunately, 
they  have  confined  their  efforts  to  the  explanation  of  the 
operation  of  those  rules  as  they  found  them,  accepting  the 
opinions  and  feelings  of  the  rulers  merely  as  facts  behiml 
which  they  were  not  called  upon  to  go.  On  the  contrary, 
they  have  assumed  that  the  consideration  of  the  jjrinciples 
which  govern  the  opinions  and  feelings  of  those  who  make  the 
rules  by  which  wealth  is  distributed  is  outside  the  province  of 
political  economy. 

Mill  clearly  asserts  this  notion  as  follows: 

"The  opinions  and  feelings  of  mankind,  doubtless,  are  not  a 
matter  of  chance.  They  are  conse<iucnces  of  the  fundamental 
laws  of  human  nature,  combined  with  the  existing  state  of 
knowledge  and  experience  and  the  existing  conditions  of  social 
institutions  and  intellectual  and  moral  culture.  But  the  laws 
of  the  generation  of  human  opinions  are  not  within  our  present 
subject.  They  are  a  part  of  the  general  theory  of  human 
progress,  a  far  larger  and  more  difficult  subject  of  inquiry 
than  political  economy.  We  have  here  to  consider  not  the 
causes,  but  the  consequences,  of  the  rules  according  to  which 
wealth  may  be  distributed." 

I>et  us  see  what  tiiis  declaration  of  Mill  really  means.  He 
says  that  the  rules  by  which  wealth  is  distributed  are  always 
what  the  opinions  and  feelings  of  the  ruling  portion  of  the 
community  choose  to  make  them,  and  that  the  opinions  and 
feelings  are  the  consequences  of  the  operation  of  natural  laws. 
That  is  to  say,  the  natural  laws  which  generate  the  opinions 


16  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

and  feelings  of  men  primarily  determine  what  the  rules  by 
which  wealth  shall  be  distributed  shall  be.  But,  says  he, 
political  economy  (whose  only  rational  object  is  to  discover 
what  rules  will  cause  a  just  distribution  of  wealth)  has  noth- 
ing to  do  with  the  sources  of  the  opinions  and  feelings  which 
make  the  rules  which  determine  the  manner  in  which  wealth 
shall  be  distributed,  which  i^  equivalent  to  saying  that  it  is 
altogether  foreign  to  the  object  of  political  economy  to  inquire 
into  the  means  by  which  may  be  engendered  the  sort  of 
opinions  and  feelings  which  would  cause  to  be  made  the  par- 
ticular rules  which  would  result  in  a  just  distribution  of 
wealth.  It  amounts  even  to  an  assertion  that  it  is  not  the 
province  of  political  economy  to  solve  social  questions. 

To  this  conception  of  the  scope  of  political  economy,  and 
to  the  failure  to  inquire  into  the  laws  of  the  generation  of 
human  opinions,  which  are  the  cause  of  the  rules  by  which 
wealth  is  distributed,  that  is  to  say,  the  fundamental  cause 
of  the  manner  in  which  wealth  is  distributed.  I  propose  to 
show  that  the  utter  failure  on  the  part  of  economists  to  solve 
social  problems  is  ascribable. 

In  this  connection  Mill  refers  to  the  opinions  and  feelings 
of  the  ruling  portion  of  the  community  only.  He  makes  no 
reference  to  the  vastly  important  circumstance — the  opinions 
and  feelings  of  the  portion  of  the  community  who  are  being 
ruled,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  those  who  are  being 
ruled,  everywhere,  with  rare  exceptions,  greatly  outnumber 
the  rulers. 

Mill  merely  recognized  the  fact  that  the  opinions  and 
feelings  of  the  ruling  portion  of  the  people,  whether  large 
or  small,  make  the  rules  by  which  wealth  is  distributed. 

In  a  country  like  the  United  States,  where,  according  to 
the  general  belief,  every  man  enjoys  the  right  to  express  his 
will  tlirough  the  ballot,  it  would  be  supposed  that  a  majority 
of  the  people  would  actually  rule,  and  that  their  opinions  and 


INTRODUCTION  17 

feelings  would  ni.ikc  such  rules,  by  which  wealth  were  to  be 
distributed,  as  would  redound  to  their  interest.  Yet  we  find 
the  contrary  to  be  the  fact.  We  find  that  even  in  this  c(»untry 
the  overwhelming  majority  arc  ruled  by  a  paltry  few ;  that 
the  oi)inions  and  feelings  of  the  few  actually  make  the  rules 
by  which  wealth  is  distributed,  and  that  they  make  rules 
which  enable  them  to  api)ro[)riatc  the  produce  of  the  labor 
of  the  larger  class  to  the  value  of  several  thousand  million 
dollars    annually. 

What  then  is  the  matter  with  the  opinions  and  feelings 
of  the  majority  who  are  shamefully  cheated  throui^h  the 
operation  of  these  rules,  since  the  nature  of  each  of  the 
majority  unfailingly  prompts  him  to  vote  in  accordance  with 
what  he  understands  to  be  his  self-interest,  as  the  nature  of 
each  of  the  ruling  class  promi)ts  him  to  exert  his  influence 
respecting  governmental  affairs  in  accordance  with  what  he 
conceives  to  be  his  self-interest? 

Why  does  it  happen  that  the  opinions  and  feelings  of  a 
few  make  the  rules  by  which  wealth  is  distributed  in  the 
interest  of  the  few  and  against  the  interest  of  the  many, 
when  the  many  have  the  power  to  make  rules  so  as  to  sub- 
serve their  own  interest? 

That  is  the  question  which  must  be  answered  before  we  can 
hope  to  fmd  a  way  by  which  an  equitable  distribution  of 
wealth  will  be  realized.  And  how  can  that  question  be  an- 
swered, unless  we  know  the  principles,  pursuant  to  the  opera- 
tion of  which  the  opinions  and  feelings  of  both  the  minority 
and  the  majority — the  rulers  and  the  ruled,  the  exploiters  and 
the  exploited,  those  who  profit  by  privilege  and  those  who 
suffer  from  privilege — are  determined  ? 

For,  without  an  understanding  of  the  nature  and  of  the 
operation  of  the  principles  which  cause  the  opinions  which 
determine  the  rules  by  which  wealth  is  distributed,  we  have 
for  our  task  the  solution  of  a  problem,  where  the  very  thing 


18  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

which  must  be  known  in  order  to  make  the  solution  possible, 
is  left  unknown.  If  there  are  principles  which  generate  the 
opinions  which  determine  the  rules  by  which  wealth  is  dis- 
tributed, and  we  find  that  everywhere  the  distribution  of 
wealth  is  grossly  inequitable,  how  can  we  hope  to  find  the 
means  by  which  the  distribution  may  be  rendered  equitable, 
unless  we  know  these  principles  and  understand  their  opera- 
tion? For  through  such  knowledge  alone  will  it  be  possible 
for  us  to  so  shape  conditions  as  to  cause  the  operation  of 
these  principles  under  those  conditions  to  engender  opinions 
and  feelings,  not  on  the  part  of  the  rulers  (the  minority) 
alone,  but  on  the  part  of  a  majority  of  the  people,  which  will 
determine  the  rules  by  which  wealth  will  be  justly  dis- 
tributed. 

The  sufferers  from  wrong  social  arrangements  always  com- 
prise by  far  the  larger  proportion  of  the  people,  and  prece- 
dent to  any  improvement  in  their  condition,  their  opinions 
and  feelings  must  be  so  modified  as  to  cause  them  to  make 
rules  which  will  better  subserve  their  interests,  and  prece- 
dent to  the  establishment  of  a  perfectly  just  system,  a  suf- 
ficient number  at  least  of  those  who  suffer  by  the  present 
order  of  things  to  constitute  a  majority  of  the  people,  must 
learn  what  their  true  self-interest  is  concerning  social  ar- 
rangements, and  act  accordingly. 

Since  to  do  that  which  the  understanding  apprises  the  con- 
sciousness it  is  to  the  self-interest  to  do,  is  the  first  law  of 
nature,  and  since  to  do  that  which  will  perfectly  serve  self- 
interest  is,  in  the  nature  of  things,  right,  it  follows  that  to 
do  anything  which  is  essential  to  the  well-being  of  the  in- 
dividual is  a  natural  right. 

Thus,  from  the  general  proposition,  that  in  order  that  jus- 
tice may  obtain,  matters  must  be  so  arranged  that  each  mem- 
ber of  the  society  may  always  act  in  accordance  with  his  real 
self-interest,  the  several  natural  rights  of  the  individual  arc 


INTkOnUCTION  19 

deduced.  And  then,  by  devising  a  set  of  social  arrangements 
which  will  remler  it  possible  for  each  and  every  member  of 
the  society  to  freely  exercise  all  his  natural  rights,  we  find 
the  solution  of  our  problem. 

Nov/,  we  are  led  to  the  conclusion  that  all  social  injustice 
is  caused  by  the  denial  in  some  degree  of  one  or  more  of 
natural  rights.  When  we  examine  into  the  matter,  we  find 
that  the  denial  of  natural  rights  is  invariably  accomplished 
by  the  acts  of  government  which  directly  or  indirectly  cause 
the  existence  of  economic  privileges. 

For  the  rea.son  that  all  economic  injustice  arises  from  the 
existence  of  law-ma<!e  privileges,  and  since,  in  the  nature 
of  things,  as  will  be  fully  explained  elsewhere,  i)rivilegcs 
may  be  enjoyed  by  a  small  portion  of  the  ])eople  only,  and 
the  efTects  of  privileges  must  necessarily  be  detrimental  to  the 
larger  portion  of  the  i)cople,  it  will  be  to  the  interest  of 
the  larger  portion  to  abolish  privileges  and  to  guard  against 
their  revival. 

Now,  the  abolition  of  all  privileges,  the  removal  of  the 
causes  of  economic  injustice,  would  establish  justice.  Hence, 
it  will  be  seen  that  in  the  nature  of  things  the  true  self- 
interest  of  a  majority  of  the  people  coinci(!es  with  economic 
justice. 

The  sole  means  by  which  some  members  of  a  society  are 
enabled  to  enjoy  economic  advantages  at  the  expense  of  other 
members,  is  through  the  agency  of  governmental  institutions 
an!  laws,  which  either  directly  confer  some  form  of  privilege 
upon  individuals  or  groups  of  indivirjuals.  or,  on  account  of 
their  character,  make  the  development  of  privilege  possible. 
If  the  institutions  and  laws  render  the  inauguration  and  de- 
velopment of  privileges  possible,  the  self-interest  of  some 
indivirhials  will  induce  them  to  discover  the  means  which 
will   ena1)le  them  to  exerci-^c   such   privileges. 

And   because  the   existence  of   privileges   is   the   exclusive 


20  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

cause  of  an  unjust  distribution  of  wealth,  if  we  would  remove 
the  cause  of  the  inequitable  distribution  of  wealth,  we  must 
of  course  discard  all  institutions  or  laws  which  either  con- 
fer privileges  directly,  or  which,  by  their  nature,  make  the 
existence  of  privileges  possible  through  the  operation  of  the 
principle  of  human  nature  under  those  institutions  and  laws. 
Or,  conversely,  the  institutions  and  laws  must  be  so  accommo- 
dated to  the  law  of  human  nature,  that  the  free  pursuit  of 
self-interest  by  all  individuals,  under  that  system,  will  result 
in  equitable  economic  relations  between  the  several  members 
of  the  society. 

The  educated  portion  of  any  society  have  always  been 
able  by  reason  of  their  superior  education  to  rule  the  less 
educated  or  less  intelligent  portion  of  the  community,  and  it 
has,  until  very  recent  times,  been  the  policy  of  the  ruling 
classes  to  keep  the  masses  in  a  degree  of  ignorance  which 
rendered  them  incapable  of  doing  much  thinking  on  their 
own  account. 

In  this  country,  at  the  present  time,  the  tendency  is  to 
compel  every  child  to  take  at  least  a  rudimentary  education, 
and  to  provide  a  high  school  education  free  to  those  who  are 
able  to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity.  In  the  larger 
cities  there  are  free  night  schools  for  children,  who,  on  ac- 
count of  our  poverty  breeding  social  system,  are  compelled  to 
work  in  the  daytime.  Besides  the  free  schools,  almost  every 
village  has  its  free  library,  which  affords  those  who  hav^ 
acquired  in  the  schools  an  elementary  education  only,  the  facil- 
ity for  considerably  increasing  their  knowledge.  We  have 
cheap  books,  many  free  lectures  on  all  sorts  of  subjects,  and 
the  newspapers  and  magazines  are  daily  pumping  into  the 
people  education,  on  some  matters  of  a  very  good  quality. 

Since  the  advent  of  cheap  printing,  it  has  been  impossible 
for  a  few  rulers  to  monopolize  knowledge  by  keeping  the 
masses  illiterate;  a  larger  and  larger  number  of  people  were 


INTRODUCTION  21 

educating  tliemsclvcs.  Realizing  that  fact,  and  lest  a  con- 
sideraJjle  number  of  tiie  people  might,  if  left  alone,  evolve 
ideas  inimical  to  tlie  interests  of  the  rulers,  the  rulers  con- 
cluded that  it  woidd  be  wise  to  supervise  and  control  the 
education  of  the  masses. 

Particularly  were  they  solicitous  as  to  the  sort  of  educaticjn 
the  masses  should  have  respecting  governmental  affairs. 
They  wanted  the  masses,  the  workers,  truly  educated  in  the 
physical  sciences  and  the  arts,  because  the  more  proficient 
they  became  in  those  branches  of  knowledge,  the  greater 
would  be  the  productive  power  of  their  labor,  and  the  greater 
would  be  the  margin  above  the  cost  of  the  customary  standard 
of  living  which  could  be  appropriated  by  the  ruling  class,  the 
privilegists. 

But  when  it  came  to  governmental  afTairs,  that  is  a  differ- 
ent story.  The  less  proficient  the  people  were  in  reasoning 
out  what  their  self-interest  was  concerning  social  arrange- 
ments, the  better  for  the  privilegists.  The  more  wrong  ideas 
that  could  be  put  into  the  people's  minds,  the  more  incom- 
petent they  would  become  to  understand  and  to  guard  their 
own  interests.  Hence  the  incessant  industry  of  the  ruling 
class  to  instil  into  the  minds  of  those  whom  they  desire  to 
rule,  all  sorts  of  false  ideas  and  beliefs  which  would  tend  to 
make  political  idiots  of  the  people  and  create  a  national  poli- 
tical lunatic  asylum  with  a  large  majority  of  the  jicople  the 
inmates,  and  the  few  rulers  their  keepers. 

In  societies  where  there  are  but  few  relatively  educated 
and  intelligent  men.  the  educated  and  intelligent  class,  no 
matter  how  small,  have  been  able  to  rule  the  mass,  and  make 
the  rides  bv  which  the  distribution  of  w^ealth  was  to  be 
determined. 

Now,  the  reason  why  the  educated  and  intelligent  class  has 
desired  to  rule  the  mass  of  their  fellows,  has  always  been 
simply  that  they  might  make  the  rules  by  which  the  distrib- 


22  SOCIAL    JUSTICE 

ution  of  wealrh  was  to  be  determined.  If  the  power  to  rule 
did  not  carry  with  it  enormous  economic  privileges  and  ben- 
efits, there  might  be  a  desire  among  the  more  intelligent 
portion  of  the  community  to  senr  their  fellow  men,  but  there 
would  be  no  motive  to  rule  them. 

In  all  history  there  will  not  be  found  a  single  instance  where 
tlie  ruling  portion  of  a  society  has  not  enjoyed  great  economic 
benefits  at  the  expense  of  the  masses. 

Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  a  majority  of  the  people 
have  the  power  to  make  institutions  and  laws  Vvdiich  will  be 
compatible  with  their  self-interests,  and  that  their  nature 
causes  them  to  favor  or  oppose  governmental  arrangements 
accordingly  as  they  regard  the  effects  of  the  institutions  and 
laws  on  their  self-interests  as  good  or  evil,  yet  we  find  under 
all  systems  of  government  with  which  we  are  acquainted, 
a  small  minority  of  the  people  economically  exploiting  the 
great  majority.  Why?  The  obvious  reason  is  that  the  ruling 
classes  have  had  a  sufficient  knov/ledge  of  the  dependence  of 
the  distribution  of  wealth  upon  the  social  arrangements  to 
enable  them  to  contrive  institutions  and  laws  which  would 
give  them  the  power  to  exploit  their  fellow  men,  while  the 
large  majority  of  the  people  who  are  exploited,  not  only  lack 
the  knowledge  of  what  their  interests  are,  respecting  social 
arrangements,  but  believe,  as  they  have  been  taught  to  be- 
lieve by  their  rulers,  that  the  institutions  and  laws  which 
were  made  for  the  very  purpose  of  subverting  their  interests, 
and  wliich  actually  do  them  incalculable  harm,  are  in  harmony 
with  their  interests. 

And  because  of  these  beliefs,  v.diich  have  been  systema- 
tically instilled  into  their  minds  by  the  rulers,  most  of  the 
greatest  sufferers  from  bad  social  arrangements  stoutly  and 
aggressively  uphold  them,  and  are  inclined  to  regard  any  one 
who  proposes  any  consequential  change  in  the  institutions  and 


INTRODUCTION  21 

laws,  and  particularly  in  the  institutions,  with  snsijicion,  if 
not  aversion. 

When  the  workers,  who  constitute  the  all-powerful  majority 
in  every  society,  once  realize  that  their  degraded  and  a|)par- 
cntly  helpless  condition  is  due  entirely  to  their  own  ignorance 
of  the  cause  of  their  sorry  plight  and  of  the  means  hy  which 
they  may  enjoy  their  rights,  their  self-interest  will  urge  them 
to  (Hligcntly  seek  the  wanting  knowledge. 

So  long  as  the  people  believe  that  they  know  what  their 
interests  are  respecting  governmental  arrangements,  and  yet 
are  in  dense  ignorance  of  their  interests,  they  will  have  no 
incentive  to  seek  the  knowledge  win'ch  alone  will  enable  tbcin 
to  secure  and  enjoy  economic  justice. 

The  rapidity  with  which  the  demand  is  now  spreading  for 
the  initiative  and  referendum,  direct  control  of  all  govern- 
mental affairs  by  the  majority,  in  the  place  of  government  of 
all  the  people  by  a  few  so-called  representatives,  is  the  most 
important  change  in  the  opinions  of  the  masses  of  the  people 
in  this  country  since  they  concluded  that  they  should  be  gov- 
erne;l  in  all  events  by  resident  representatives  instead  of  non- 
resident representatives,  and  threw  off  the  English  yoke. 

The  peo])le  are  fast  coming  to  understand  that  it  is  im- 
possible for  them  to  make  the  instilutiiMis  and  laws  as  they 
derire  to  have  tlicm.  until  they  abolish  the  jn-ivilege  of  gov- 
ernment by  rcjM-esentatives  plenipotentiary,  and  exercise 
tlicir  right  to  make  such  governmental  arrangements  as  they 
jilease  regardless  of  the  opinions  and  feelings  of  those  who 
ihoul  1  be  their  servants  but  who  generally  are  in  reality  sym- 
pathizers with,  if  not  accomplices  of  the  privilegists. 

So  obviou.sly  is  the  adoption  of  direct  legislation  in  tin- 
interest  of  most  persons,  that  the  wit  of  the  rulers  has  been 
bp.rfie  1  to  conjure  up  any  argument  which  would  deceive  the 
people  concerning  its  advantages  to  them.  Never  has  a  ma- 
jority of  any  community,  in  this  country  at  least,  voted  tliat 


24  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

they  were  less  capable  of  judging  what  their  own  interests 
were,  and  less  apt  to  care  for  their  own  interests,  than  were 
a  handful  of  politicians  with  interests  of  their  own  and  dif- 
ferent from  the  interests  of  the  people.  Therefore,  when- 
ever a  community  has  succeeded  in  getting  the  initiative  and 
referendum,  which  are  a  long  step  toward  direct  legislation, 
submitted  to  popular  vote,  those  measures  have  been  adopted 
by  overwhelming  majorities. 

No  argument,  however  ingenious,  will  convince  any  sane 
person  that  he  will  be  better  able  to  guard  his  own  interests 
respecting  governmental  arrangements,  when  he  has  no  voice 
in  determining  what  those  arrangements  shall  be,  than  when 
he  has  a  direct  voice,  and  his  voice  counts  for  as  much  as  that 
of  any  other  member  of  the  community. 

Had  the  initiative  and  referendum  been  incorporated  in  our 
federal  constitution  when  this  government  was  established, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  economic  condition  and  rela- 
tions of  the  people  would  be  infinitely  better  than  they  are. 
Yet  the  people  have  been  so  saturated  with  the  superstition 
that  our  system  of  government  is  as  nearly  perfect  as  it  is 
possible  for  the  genius  and  wisdom  of  men  to  contrive,  that 
only  within  the  last  decade  has  there  sprung  up  an  effectual 
demand  for  the  institution  of  the  initiative  and  referendum 
in  some  of  our  states. 

But  now,  that  the  efficiency  of  these  instruments  as  a  means 
by  which  a  majority  of  the  people  may  promptly  write  their 
will  into  the  institutions  and  laws  is  being  practically  de- 
monstrated in  several  states  and  cities,  and  information  as  to 
their  operation  is  being  systematically  spread  abroad  by  or- 
ganized bodies  of  intelligent  men,  nothing  can  long  delay  the 
advent  of  direct  majority  rule  in  aM  governmental  affairs,  from 
national  down  to  township  or  school  district. 

When  the  people  have  acquired  the  means  by  which  they 
may   promptly   put   their   will   in    effect,   they   may   be   confi- 


INTRODUCTION  25 

(lently  depended  mxui  to  make  such  changes  in  the  institutions 
an<l  laws  as  their  iniderstaiKhng  of  tlieir  self-interest  will 
dictate. 

It  will  only  remain  then  for  them  to  learn  what  changes 
will  bring  the  desired  results,  and  the  consciousness  of  their 
power  to  make  any  changes  in  social  arrangements  they  please, 
and  when  they  please,  will  furnish  the  incentive  to  acquire 
that  knowledge. 

Thus  it  is,  by  the  play  of  human  nature,  self-interest  and 
knowledge  on  each  other,  that  rdl  i)rogress  toward  social 
justice  must  be  made. 

But  how  can  the  mass  of  the  male  members  of  the  society 
ever  hope  to  get  justice  for  themselves  while  they  ignorantly 
and  brutally  deny  to  a  full  one-half  of  the  society  their 
natural  right  to  an  equal  voice  in  social  affairs?  The  very 
first  thing  which  every  man  must  learn  is  that,  if  he  would 
enjoy  justice  himself,  he  must  accord  justice  to  others.  And 
is  it  not  a  more  hateful  and  shameful  injustice  that  women  anrl 
their  children  are  ruled  and  robbed  by  a  small  minority  of 
the  men,  while  being  denied  the  right  of  self  defense,  than 
that  a  large  majority  of  the  men  permit  the  small  minority  to 
despoil  them  through  sheer  ignorance,  while  being  possessed 
of  the  power  to  demand  and  get  all  their  rights  whenever  they 
see  fit  to  do  so? 

As  has  already  been  stated,  justice  will  never  come  but 
through  majority  rule,  and  there  never  can  be  majority  rule 
until  the  female  half  of  the  society  exercise  the  same  right 
to  a  direct  and  equal  voice  in  social  affairs,  as  the  male  half 
may  now  exercise  at  will. 

P>ut,  it  may  be  asked,  if  the  majority  of  men,  who  have 
the  franchise,  do  not  use  their  power  to  enforce  and  jirotect 
their  rights,  what  reason  is  there  for  assimiing  that  women 
will  make  any  better  use  of  the  ballot  toward  safeguarding 
their    rights    than    the    men    have    made    of    the    franchise    in 


26  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

taking  care  of  everybody's  rights,  their  own  included?  The 
answer  is  that  the  franchise  as  a  promoter  of  justice,  a  pro- 
tection of  rights,  is  of  no  use  whatever,  except  when  and  to 
the  extent  the  majority  are  guided  in  its  exercise  by  an  ac- 
curate knowledge  of  their  natural  rights,  which  accord  with 
their  self-interest. 

The  chief  purpose  of  the  advocates  of  woman  suffrage  at 
present  seems  to  be  only  to  put  women  on  the  same  footing 
respecting  rights  as  the  men  nov/  occupy.  They  assert  that 
women  have  the  same  rights  as  men,  but  not  knowing  what  the 
rights  of  men  are,  they  content  themselves  with  the  demand 
that  they  be  allowed  the  same  rights  as  men,  no  matter  how 
many  of  their  rights  the  majority  of  the  men  may  be  deprived 
of. 

The  ballot  is  a  weapon  with  which  one  who  does  not  know 
how  to  use  it  is  certain  to  inflict  on  himself  great  injury. 
And  it  is  because  most  women  realize  that  they  would  not 
know  what  to  do  with  the  ballot  if  they  had  it,  that  the  women, 
practically  as  one  mass,  do  not  now  enthusiastically,  aye 
furiously,  demand  it.  The  strength  of  the  desire  for  the  fran- 
chise depends  upon  a  knowledge  of  the  benefits  to  be  secure-1 
by  its  use — that  is,  a  knowledge  of  how  to  use  it  to  good  pur- 
pose. The  strength  of  the  demand  for  the  initiative  and  ref- 
erendum depends  upon  the  same  condition.  The  reason  that 
from  tvv'enty  to  twenty-five  per  cent,  of  the  voters  fail  to  ex- 
ercise their  right  is  obviously  because  they  do  not  see  how 
they  may  cast  their  vote  to  their  own  advantage. 

In  the  contents  of  this  work  the  great  mass  of  the  people, 
men  and  women,  will  find,  I  trust,  such  enlightenment  on  tlieir 
self-interest  concerning  social  arrangements  as  will  teach  them 
the  inestimable  benefits  which  will  certainly  result  from  the 
w'ise  use  of  the  ballot,  and  inspire  them  with  a  burning,  im- 
patient desire  to  turn  the  ballot  to  good  account  ?t  once. 

In  determining  the  destinies  of  mankind,  truth  is  mightier 


INTRODUCTION  27 

than  all  other  torccs  combined.  The  Mippoii  of  all  tUe  wealth 
and  armaments  that  can  be  piled  U[)  will  avail  nothing  when 
confronted  with  the  simple  truth. 

A  realization  that  the  ])resent  order  of  things  works  ter- 
rible injustice  has  engendered  a  restless  discontent  and  a 
spirit  of  revolt  v,hich  is  world-wide.  The  people  have  reached 
a  state  of  intelligence  which  will  no  longer  permit  thcin  to  be 
fooled  into  satisfaction  b)'  sham  reforms.  That  radical 
changes  in  the  governmental  alTairs  of  coimtries  in  several 
quarters  of  the  globe  will  ere  long  be  made  is  a  foregone  con- 
clusion. The  only  question  is,  what  the  nature  of  those 
changes  is  to  be. 

The  i)eople  may  be  contented  in  the  non-possession  of  a 
right,  but  only  when  they  are  ignorant  that  it  is  their  right. 
Whenever  the  people  discover  a  right  which  had  been  denied 
them  and  which  they  had  not  known  belonged  to  them ;  when- 
ever they  learn  that  they  have  been  deprived  of  something 
which  it  is  good  for  them  to  have  and  which  they  may  enjoy 
without  depriving  anyone  else  of  what  belongs  to  him,  their 
enlightened  self-interest  gives  them  no  rest  until  they  have 
laid  secure  hold  of  their  newly  discovered  right. 

And  wdiat  is  more,  their  enjoyment  of  one  more  right  never 
dulls,  but  always  shari)ens  their  appetite  for  the  next  right 
they  recognize.  Discontent,  arising  from  a  knowledge  that 
the  present  order  of  things  is  wrong,  is  ever  the  precursor 
of  a  change  in  that  order.  It  is  doubtful  if  ever  before  in  the 
history  of  the  world  has  there  been  such  general  dissatisfac- 
tion with  the  social  order  as  that  now  being  loudly  proclaimed 
from  the  four  quarters  of  the  earth.  The  people  have  become 
wise  enough  to  want  their  rights,  and  they  are  going  to  have 
them  as  soon  as  they  find  out  what  they  are  and  a  way  to 
get  them. 

The  philosophy  of  social  alTairs  expounded  in  the  following 
pages  was  not  constructed  around  and  made  to  fit  a  precon- 


28  SOCIAL    JUSTICE 

ceived  notion  or  belief.  In  superficial  appearance,  nothing  in 
nature  is  more  complex  and  bewildering  than  the  interplay 
of  the  conrluct  of  masses  of  men,  and  nothing  seems  so  ob- 
scure and  inscrutable  as  the  principles  which  result  in  that 
particular  series  of  actions  peculiar  to  each  individual,  which 
constitute  his  life. 

I  confess  that  the  apprehension  of  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples, the  natural  laws,  the  nature  of  things,  from  which  the 
philosophy  radiates,  involved  very  great  difficulties  and  con- 
sideration covering  a  long  period  of  time.  But  when  I  had 
once  found  the  few,  simple  but  profoundly  momentous  prin- 
ciples which  govern  human  conduct,  the  philosophy  became 
an  open  book — I  had  merely  to  reduce  to  some  order  the  in- 
evitable deductions  from  the  principles. 

This  new  philosophy  is  so  simple  and  so  obviously  true  that 
there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  its  spread  among  the 
masses  of  the  people  will  be  far  more  rapid  and  its  reception 
by  seekers  for  the  truth  more  enthusiastic  than  that  accorded 
to  any  former  theory  of  social  affairs. 

The  two  leading  parties  in  this  country  are  disintegrating 
from  their  own  rottenness  and  paucity  of  principles.  The 
masses  of  the  people  keep  within  the  lines  of  one  or  the  other 
of  those  parties,  not  because  they  indorse  the  conduct  of  their 
own  party,  but  because  they  loathe  the  conduct  of  the  other 
party  and  do  not  want  it  entrusted  with  power,  and  there  is 
no  other  party  which  proposes  to  do  wdiat  they  would  like  to 
have  done  and  whose  program  appeals  to  their  sense  of 
justice.  Similar  conditions  prevail  in  nearly  if  not  quite  all 
European  countries.  The  hour  has  struck  when  principles 
must  supersede  policies,  when  justice  must  take  the  place  of 
expediency,  and  true  morality  must  drive  pharisaism  into 
everlasting  disgrace. 

There  are  innumerable  evidences  that  the  common  people 
all  over  the  world  are  anxiously  and  impatiently  waiting  for 


INTRODUCTION  29 

a  true  soliitinn  of  social  (|Ucstions.  Tlicrc  can  be  but  one 
solution,  riic  cause  of  injustice  is  everywhere  the  same,  the 
non-compliance  wilh  the  laws  of  nature,  the  denial  of  natural 
rii^hts.  The  only  remedy  is  to  make  social  arrangements 
conform  to  the  re(|uirements  of  nature.  A  program  which 
will  establish  justice  in  the  United  States  will  also  establish 
justice  in  Russia,  China,  England,  Chili.  Turkey,  or  any  other 
country,  and  no  other  i)rogram  could,  since  natural  laws  and 
natural  rights  deducible  therefrom  are  universal. 

Having  subjected  the  principles  laid  down  in  this  book  to 
every  test  known  to  me,  including  the  theories  of  the  best 
writers  on  moral  philosophy,  i)sychology,  law  and  sociology, 
as  well  as  social  phenomena,  I  have  as  good  reasons  for  know- 
ing that  these  principles  arc  natural  laws  as  Newton  had  for 
knowing  that  he  had  discovered  the  law  of  gravitation,  and 
until  someone  is  able  to  refute  them,  existing  opinions  and 
beliefs  on  the  subject  which  are  incompatible  with  them  will 
not  be  able  to  survive  in  their  atmosphere.  I.et  it  be  clearly 
understood  that  I  am  not  pitting  my  ofyinions  against  the  opin- 
ions and  beliefs  of  others,  but  that  I  am  opposing  only  their 
wrong  oi)inions  and  beliefs  with  natural  laws  and  their  neces- 
sary implications. 

It  will  come  of  ill  grace  for  those  who  stand  for  the  pre- 
vailing^ opinions,  beliefs  and  interests  to  disparage  tiie  teach- 
ings of  this  book;  for.  the  damnable  injustice  which  char- 
acterizes every  fibre  of  the  economic  fabric  is  the  direct  con- 
sequence of  those  ojiinions.  beliefs  and  interests. 

Let  those  who  now  profit  by,  those  who  only  think  they 
profit  by.  or  those  who  hope  they  will  profit  by  injustice,  not 
waste  their  time  in  denouncing  or  ridiculing  me  or  my  grand- 
father or  my  dog.  Such  attacks  will  avail  them  nothing,  for 
they  are  self-con  lemnatory — a  confession  of  turpitude.  But 
let  them  turn  their  attention  to  the  principles  and  the  philos- 
ophy founded  on  them,  to  be  found  in  these  writings. 


30  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

If  any  man  can  show  that  the  principles  are  not  true,  or 
that  any  of  the  conckisions  adduced  are  not  necessary  deduc- 
tions from  the  principles,  I  will  promptly  and  publicly  ac- 
knowledge my  error.  As  an  inveterate  seeker  of  the  truth, 
I  long  since  acquired  the  incorrigible  habit  of  repudiating  and 
casting  out  from  among  my  belongings  any  idea  the  moment 
I  could  discover  that  it  was  erroneous.  If,  however,  those 
whose  understanding  of  their  self-interest  wall  cause  them  to 
object  to  putting  this  philosophy  into  practice,  are  unable  to 
prove  that  it  is  not  true,  they  will  be  forced  either  to  ac- 
knowledge the  truth  and  abandon  their  position,  or  to  shame- 
lessly and  brutally  take  their  stand  for  injustice,  immorality 
as  against  justice  and  morality.  The  issue,  the  question  of 
the  right  or  wrong  of  social  arrangements,  can  neither  be 
ignored  nor  disposed  of  by  flippant,  ignorant  ridicule  or  by 
sophistry,  however  cunning. 

Now,  for  the  first  time,  have  all  social  questions  been  re- 
duced to  simple  questions  of  right  and  wrong,  and  an  in- 
fallible criterion  provided  by  which  they  may  be  rightly  settled. 

The  inevitable  consequence  must  be  the  precipitation  of 
such  a  conflict  between  right  and  wrong,  justice  and  injustice, 
morality  and  immorality,  as  the  world  has  never  v/itnessed. 

The  contest  will  be  inaugurated  by  the  formation  of  a  new 
political  party,  founded  on  fundamental  principles  of  morality, 
^nd  having  for  its  platform  a  program  comprehending  all  the 
essential  features  of  a  just  social  system. 

Naturally  the  party  of  justice  will  assume  an  aggressive 
attitude  from  the  start.  As  the  contest  goes  on  and  the  ranks 
of  the  just  swell,  as  they  surely  Avill,  the  conflict  will  grow 
fiercer  and  fiercer.  It  is  to  be  understood  that  those  who 
live  by  the  labor  of  others  will  not  surrender  their  unjust 
advantages  without  first  resorting  to  every  means  within  their 
power,  fair  or  foul,  to  retain  them.  But  it  must  also  be 
understood  that  in  a  realignment  of  the  people  on  principles 


INTRODULTIOX  31 

of  justice  into  two  opposing  parties,  the  one  standing  for 
economic  justice  and  the  other  for  economic  slavery,  the  self- 
interest  of  a  great  majority  of  the  people  will  inij^el  them  to 
join  the  ranks  of  those  who  contend  for  justice,  just  as  the 
self-interest  of  the  small  minority,  or  what  they  conceive  to 
be  their  self-interest,  will  induce  them  to  join  hands  in  oppo- 
sition to  justice.  It  will  be  the  true  self-interest  of  the  many 
with  justice  as  an  ally,  against  the  supposed  self-interest  of 
the  few,  handicapped  by  the  injustice  of  their  cause. 

That  the  contest  will  result  in  complete  victory  for  justice 
there  can  be  no  doubt.  The  duration  of  the  struggle  will 
depend  altogether  on  how  long  it  will  take  the  mass  of  the 
people  to  become  acquainted  with  their  self-interest. 


SOCIAL  JUSTICE 


CHAPTER    I. 
PRIVILEGES. 

It  is  shown  in  the  chapter  on  Rights  that  the  coexistence 
of  natural  rights  and  privileges  is  impossible ;  that  the  enjoy- 
ment of  complete  natural  rights  precludes  the  existence  of 
any  privilege,  and  that  the  presence  of  a  privilege  involves 
the  absence  of  a  part  or  the  whole  of  some  natural  right. 

Having  clearly  defined  and  demonstrated  in  Chapters  VIII, 
IX  and  X,  what  are  the  natural  rights  of  the  individual,  from 
the  scientific  point  of  view  it  should  not  be  necessary  to  give 
privileges  any  special  consideration,  since  when  the  individual 
is  in  possession  of  all  his  natural  rights,  he  has  all  that  justly 
belongs  to  him  or  that  his  well-being  requires ;  he  can  lay  no 
valid  claim  to  any  artificial  right  or  privilege.  Ikit  the  pop- 
ular misconception  of  rights  and  privileges  renders  it  desirable 
to  enumerate  various  forms  of  privileges,  and  to  show  how 
they  severally  affect  the  natural  rights  and  consequently  the 
well-being  of  the  people. 

Now,  it  is  exceedingly  important  that  we  get  a  clear  and 
comprehensive  understanding  of  what  constitutes  an  economic 
privilege.  For  until  we  have  such  a  thorough  perception  of 
what  a  privilege  is,  and  are  able  to  unerringly  discern  a  priv- 
ilege in  whatever  guise  it  may  be  presented  to  us.  we  will  be 
ill  fitted  to  judge  whether  or  Tiot  any  institution  or  law  creates 
directly  or  indirectly  some  form  of  privilege.  \\'hcn  we  once 
clearly  understand  what  are  our  natural  rights,  and  that  when 
society  takes  any  other  action  respecting  rights  tlian  to 
adopt    such    rules   as   are   necessary    to   the   conservation   of 


34  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

natural  rights  it  must  necessarily  abridge  or  abrogate  some 
natural  right  and  consequently  commit  an  injustice,  we  will 
be  equipped  with  all  the  knowledge  needed  to  recognize  on 
sight  any  unjust  institution  or  law  and  to  point  out  wherein 
the  injustice  lies. 

All  we  have  to  know  is  whether  an  institution  or  law  enables 
any  person  or  set  of  persons  to  do  in  the  economic  field  what 
they  could  not  do  by  the  free  exercise  of  their  natural  rights, 
or  hinders  any  person  in  the  doing  of  anything  he  has  a 
natural  right  to  do. 

Yet,  since  the  giving  to  some  of  more  than  their  natural 
rights  and  the  depriving  of  others  of  their  natural  rights  is 
invariably  accomplished  simultaneously  by  the  same  act,  the 
granting  of  a  privilege,  it  may  help  some  to  see  the  true  rela- 
tion between  rights  and  privileges,  to  detect  any  injustice 
which  may  lurk  in  any  social  arrangement,  and  to  know  pre- 
cisely the  nature  of  the  injustice,  if  the  matter  is  considered 
from  its  privilege  side. 

Fortunately,  in  undertaking  to  formulate  a  clean  cut  defini- 
tion of  the  term  privilege,  as  used  in  the  discussion  of  econ- 
omics, we  do  not  encounter  the  difficulties  which  have  thwarted 
the  efforts  of  all  political  economists  to  draw  a  line  which 
would  set  ofif  and  distinguish  "capital"  from  "wealth." 

For  privileges  are  but  the  reverse  of  the  same  truth  of 
which  natural  rights  are  the  obverse.  Therefore,  privileges 
may  be  as  easily  and  clearly  defined,  as  may  natural  rights. 
In  truth,  when  we  have  defined  natural  rights,  we  have  also, 
by  implication,  defined  privileges.  Considered  economically 
and  morally,  the  doing  of  any  act  which  it  is  not  a  natural 
right  to  do,  is  to  exercise  an  economic  privilege  and  to  com- 
mit a  moral  crime.     Rights  and  privileges  are  antipodes. 

If  I  shall  succeed  in  giving  to  the  people  a  comprehensive 
understanding  of  the  distinction  between  rights  and  privileges, 


PRIVILEGES  35 

one  of  the  chief  objects  in  writing  this  book  will  have  been 
attained. 

In  the  discussion  of  the  science  of  sociology,  as  in  dealing 
with  any  scientific  subject,  a  definite  terminology  is  of  the 
first  importance.  Where  there  are  distinctions  to  be  made, 
they  should  be  clearly  drawn ;  but  the  neglect  to  make  neces- 
sary distinctions  is  no  more  harmful  than  the  attempt  to  make 
distinctions  where  none  exist,  as,  for  example,  the  labored 
attempt  of  the  political  economists  to  point  out  a  diflference, 
in  economics,  between  some  products  of  labor  which  arc  called 
capital,  and  other  products  of  labor  which  arc  called  wealth. 
When,  in  fact,  in  so  far  as  the  things  called  capital,  or  the 
things  called  wealth  enter  into  any  question  of  true  economics 
— just  relations  between  men — there  is  between  "capital"  and 
"wealth"  no  distinction  whatever.  Drawing  false  distinctions, 
using  the  simile  and  false  metaphor,  reasoning  by  analogy, 
and  giving  things  wrong  names,  are  what  have  dismalized 
political  economy. 

So  far  as  I  have  been  able  to  discover,  no  political  economist 
has,  up  to  the  present,  even  suspected  that  the  mere  ownership 
of  the  things  called  capital  or  wealth  is  under  existing  social 
arrangements,  and  has  been  under  all  social  arrangements  of 
which  we  have  any  knowdedge,  nothing  more  nor  less  than  a 
privilege  created  by  government,  as  all  privileges  are  and  al- 
ways have  been  created. 

It  is  because  the  institutions  and  laws  enable  some  to  accu- 
mulate the  things  called  capital  at  the  expense  of  others,  and 
thereby  prevent  the  others  from  accumulating  things  called 
capital,  that  the  mere  ownership  of  so-called  capital  becomes  in 
effect  a  privilege — that  is  to  say,  institutions  and  laws  which 
create  privileges,  which  make  it  possible  only  for  a  small  por- 
tion of  the  community  to  accumulate  capital,  indirectly  but 
effectually  create  the  pri-'ilcgr  of  the  ownership  of  capital. 

And  since  the  use  of  the  things  called  capital  is  indispensable 


36  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

to  the  carrying  on  of  any  kind  of  business,  institutions  and 
laws  of  that  character  make  the  carrying  on  of  any  sort  of 
business  a  privilege. 

I  refer  to  this  remarkable  fact  in  this  connection  and  in 
advance  of  an  exhaustive  treatment  of  capital  and  wealth,  for 
the  purpose  only  of  pointing  out  how  little  has  been  known 
of  the  true  nature  and  extent  of  economic  privilege,  and  to 
give  the  reader  an  inkling  why  so  little  progress  has  been  made 
toward  the  establishment  of  a  system  of  just  social  arrange- 
ments. 

While  the  professors  and  all  sorts  of  reformers  have  in  gen- 
eral terms  denounced  all  privileges  as  unjust,  they  have  at  the 
same  time  upheld  and  advocated  some  of  the  most  omnivorous 
and  obnoxious  of  privileges. 

We  can  account  for  this  inconsistency  by  no  other  theory 
than  that  the  professors  and  reformers  have  been  ignorant  of 
what  an  economic  privilege  is,  and  without  a  knowdedge  of 
what  is  an  economic  privilege,  which  knowledge  is  derived 
from  an  understanding  of  natural  rights,  the  discovery  of  a 
system  of  social  arrangements  wdiich  will  result  in  just  econ- 
omic relations  between  man  and  man  is  simply  out  of  the 
question. 

For  there  is  nothing  the  matter  with  the  institutions  and 
laws  under  which  we  now  live,  except  that  they  confer,  di- 
rectly or  indirectly,  divers  forms  of  economic  privilege.  But 
for  the  reason  that  the  people  do  not  recognize  many  privileges 
as  privileges,  and  because  they  have  been  unable  to  see  the 
connection  between  even  those  privileges  which  they  do  recog- 
nize as  such  and  their  inevitable  evil  consequences,  they  vainly 
rail  at  the  natural  and  inevitable  effects  of  the  privileges,  while 
they  regard  the  privileges  themselves,  at  the  worst,  as  mixtures 
of  good  and  evil  which  are  essential  to  social  progress. 

The  evil   effects   of  privileges   are  vehemently   denounced. 


I'R1\  ll.i-XiES  37 

while  tlic  institutions  and  laws,  which  engender  the  privileges, 
are  held  to  be  a  blessing. 

All  of  the  economic  evils  of  which  we  complain  are  due  to 
the  fact  that  some  members  of  the  community  enjoy  economic 
advantages  at  the  exjiense  of  their  fellows,  which  it  would 
be  impossible  for  them  to  possess  except  by  the  aid  of  govern- 
ment. Therefore,  the  economic  problem  is,  to  devise  a  system 
of  social  arrangements  under  which  the  free  play  of  human 
nature  will  result  in  no  species  of  privilege. 

A  privilege,  in  the  sense  in  which  that  term  will  be  used 
throughout  this  treatise,  is  any  economic  advantage  which 
some  members  of  the  society  enjoy  at  the  expense  of  other 
members  by  reason  of  the  institutions  and  laws  of  that  society. 

The  meaning  of  the  word  privilege  t^iven  here  is  no  coined 
definition  invented  for  s])ccial  plcailing.  It  is  the  true  and 
only  adequate  definition  of  that  term  when  used  in  economic 
discussion.  It  is  deemed  necessary  to  give  a  comprehensive 
definition  of  the  term,  because  so  few  persons  conii)reliend 
what  constitutes  a  privilege.  If  they  understand  its  academic 
meaning,  they  do  not  understand  its  application  to  social  ar- 
rangements. 

For  example,  it  is  habitual,  in  the  common  understanding 
of  the  people  as  well  as  throughout  the  literature  of  law.  to 
draw  a  distinction  in  their  moral  and  economic  efTect,  as  well 
as  in  their  merely  abstract  definition,  between  a  "privilege" 
and  a  "special  privilege."  A  law-given  privilege  is  generally 
regarded  as  legitimate  and  harmless  so  long  as  it  is  not  in 
terms  made  specifically  a  special  priHlcgc.  Although  the 
phrase  "general  privilege"  is  seldom  used,  the  general  use  of 
the  a'ljective  "special"  to  qualify  the  meaning  of  the  word 
l^rivilege,  implies  the  existence  of  the  idea  that  there  is  such 
a  tiling  as  a  gcucrol  privilege'. 

Privileges  which  are  conceived  to  be  general,  even  though 
they  be  profitable  to  those  who  avail  themselves  of  such  priv- 


38  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

ileges,  are  regarded  not  only  as  harmless  but  actually  advan- 
tageous to  all  members  of  the  community,  or,  as  the  idea  is 
generally  stated,  the  community  at  large. 

To  illustrate,  it  is  sufficient  to  cite  the  notions  held  by  a 
majority  of  the  people  concerning  the  economic  effect  of  the 
supposed  general  privileges  created  by  the  protective  tariff  or 
the  institution  of  the  unrestricted  traffic  in,  ownership  and 
engrossment  of  land  or  natural  resources,  the  privileges 
granted  in  the  form  of  bank,  railroad,  gas,  electric  light,  water 
supply,  patent  right  and  other  similar  charters,  and  by  licenses 
and  taxes,  such  as  saloon  and  peddlers'  licenses  and  taxes  on 
liquor,  tobacco  and  oleomargarine. 

Some  privileges  are  special  in  form.  Charters  are  granted 
to  particular  persons  or  corporations.  These  are  generally 
recognized  as  special  privileges.  Generally  their  object  is  to 
put  into  operation  some  public  utility.  But  because  the  public 
services  to  be  performed  by  such  chartered  concerns  are  in 
themselves  desirable,  the  injustice  involved  in  the  method  of 
obtaining  those  services  is  either  overlooked  or  condoned. 

Privileges  pertaining  to  public  utilities  are  considered  a 
public  benefit  even  by  those  who  recognize  them  as  special 
privileges,  because  it  is  erroneously  believed  that  through  such 
grants  by  government  public  utilities  are  brought  into  being 
which  could  not,  at  least  so  well  or  so  cheaply,  be  established 
in  any  other  way.  Yet,  any  of  the  persons  who  hold  this 
opinion  and  who  understand  the  rudiments  of  arithmetic, 
could,  from  ascertainable  facts,  demonstrate  that  such  public 
utilities,  operated  as  the  private  property  of  individuals,  in 
the  course  of  a  few  years  invariably  cost  the  community  sev- 
eral times  the  cost  of  their  creation,  over  and  above  the  actual 
expense  of  operating  them. 

Most  persons  fail  to  apprehend  that  the  economic  advan- 
tages which  some  persons  enjoy  at  the  expense  of  others,  as 
a  result  of  the  protective  tariff,  are  in  effect  as  purely  "special 


PRIVILEGES  39 

privileges"  as  they  would  be  li.id  the  governinent  conferred 
those  privileges  on  tiiose  indivicUials  hy  name. 

The  fact  that  the  protective  tariff  law  does  not  specify  the 
persons  who  shall  profit  by  the  economic  advantages  it  bestows, 
does  not  alter  the  ctTect  of  the  law,  which  is  to  create 
economic  advantages,  by  which,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
some  profit  at  the  expense  of  others. 

The  granting  of  economic  advantages  by  law  in  general 
terms,  without  respect  to  persons,  does  not  deprive  them 
of  their  sting.  That  the  law  permits  anyone  who  can  to 
exercise  the  power  to  rob  his  fellowmcn,  which  is  the 
essential  principle  of  the  protective  tariff,  does  not  change 
its  pernicious  character,  nor  its  unjust  effects,  because  only 
a  comparatively  few  persons  can  grasp  the  opportunity. 

If  the  effect  of  the  protective  tariff  were  to  enable  each 
member  of  the  community  to  rob  every  other  member  to 
exactly  the  same  extent,  it  might  be  said  that  the  protective 
tariff  resulted  in  robbery  in  form,  yet  there  would  be  no  rob- 
bery in  effect,  and  the  protective  tariff  could  not  be  con- 
demned as  a  creator  of  privileges.  Each  individual  would 
be  left  in  the  same  economic  relation  to  others  as  he  was  be- 
fore the  protective  tariff  law  was  enacted. 

But,  if  that  were  its  effect,  there  would  be  no  demand  for 
a  protective  tariff  law  from  any  quarter.  There  would  be  no 
advantage  to  be  gained  by  anyone.  Men  do  not  seek  or  want 
merely  nominal  privileges.  They  want  what  is  called  in  par- 
lance of  slang,  "the  real  thing."  They  want  the  government 
to  give  them  the  power  to  rob  their  fellows  in  a  manner  in 
which  they  would  be  unable  to  rob  them  without  the  help  of 
the  government.  And  when  a  certain  set  of  persons  clamor 
for  the  grant  of  a  certain  so-called  general  privilege,  one  may 
be  certain  that  they  are  the  persons  who  expect  to  profit  by 
the  privilege  to  the  disadvantage  of  others. 

All  licenses,  in  effect,  create  privileges.     They  always  in- 


40  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

crease  the  price  of  the  commodities  handled  under  the  license, 
to  a  much  greater  extent  than  the  amount  of  the  license. 
Some  individuals  reap  these  additional  profits  which  they 
could  not  gather  but  for  the  license. 

Taxes  levied  on  any  object  produced  by  labor  act  in  a 
similar  manner.  They  increase  the  price  of  the  commodity  to 
the  amount  of  the  investment  in  the  tax,  plus  the  usual  profit  of 
capital  on  the  amount  of  the  tax. 

All  privileges  are  monopolies,  in  character  and  effect, 
whether  they  be  bestowed  on  single  individuals  or  on  large 
numbers,  or  whether  they  are  free  for  all. 

A  patent  right  is  a  privilege,  strictly  exclusive  in  form. 
It  confers  special  legal  rights  on  one  or  more  specified  persons. 
That  right,  once  conferred,  becomes,  like  a  natural  property 
right,  subject  to  purchase  and  sale.  A  corporation  is  fre- 
quently formed  to  exploit  the  privilege.  This  right,  created 
by  law,  is  sometimes  capitalized  for  several  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  dollars  and  the  shares  are  sold  to  hundreds  of  per- 
sons. But  that  fact  does  not  change  the  character  or  effect  of 
the  privilege.  The  patent  right  is  none  the  less  a  monopoly 
if  it  falls  into  the  possession  of  a  thousand  persons,  than  it 
would  be  if  it  remained  in  the  possession  of  the  original 
grantee. 

The  laws  which  give  to  everyone  the  privilege  of  getting 
and  owning  all  the  land  he  can  legally  acquire  make  a  mon- 
opoly of  land  ownership,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  there 
are  several  millions  of  land  owners  in  this  country.  If  the 
land  were  distributed  among  twice  as  many  owners,  the  land 
would  still  be  monopolized.  There  would  still  be  millions  who 
owned  no  land,  who  must  pay  tribute  to  others  for  the  use  of 
land,  without  the  use  of  which  they  could  not  exist. 

The  essential  and  distinguishing  character  of  a  privilege  is 
the  power  to  take  the  proceeds  of  the  labor  of  some  persons 


I'kI\'lLEGES  41 

against  their  will,  without  compensation,  and  give  it  to  other 
I)ers()ns. 

A  privilege  is  in  essence  and  effect  the  jx^wer  given  to 
private  persons  by  law  to  tax  their  fellowmen.  Such  taxes 
consist  of  rent,  interest  and  profits.  There  can  be  no  lK)j)e 
of  the  inauguration  of  justice  until  rent,  interest  and  profits, 
sanctioned  by  the  written  law  tlKnigh  they  be,  have  come  to 
be  regarded  as  no  less  reprehensible  a  form  of  theft  than 
pocket-picking,  and  far  more  harmful. 

If  pocket-picking  were  legalized,  and  rent,  interest  and 
profits  were  inhibited  by  law,  judged  by  the  eternal  principles 
of  right,  rent,  interest  and  profits  would  be  none  the  worse 
nor  pocket-picking  none  the  better.  Privilege  and  monopoly 
are,  in  economics,  .synonymous  terms.  The  granting  of  any 
sort  of  privilege  by  law  is  the  making  of  a  monopoly  by  law. 

In  order  to  establish  a  monopoly  by  law  it  is  not  necessary 
for  government  to  confer  a  privilege  on  one  or  only  a  few 
persons  by  name.  A  privilege,  no  matter  how  general  its 
form,  always  results  in  a  monopoly,  more  or  less  exclusive, 
but  a  monopoly  nevertheless. 

A  saloon  license  and  heavy  taxes  on  liquors  are  a  privilege 
in  disguise.  They  result  in  the  monopoly,  more  or  less  ex- 
clusive, of  the  traffic  in  liquors.  Without  the  taxes  and 
license  fee.  other  conditions  remaining  unchanged,  there  would 
be  many  more  saloons,  but  the  individual  saloon  keeper  would 
not  make  as  much  money  as  he  does  under  the  high  license 
and  taxes.  The  result  of  high  license  and  taxes  is  to  con- 
centrate the  Inisincss  in  the  hands  of  fewer  persons,  to  more 
completely  monopolize  it,  and  to  increase  the  price  of  liquors. 
This  truth  accounts  for  the  fact  that  so  large  a  number  of 
saloons  are  now  owned  1)y  the  breweries  and  are  run  by 
persons  who  arc  practically  the  selling  agents  of  the  1)rewers. 

Therefore,  if  any  institution  or  law,  any  social  arrangement 
whatever,  enables  some  members  of  the  society  to  take  econ- 


42  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

omic  advantage  of  other  members,  that  institution,  law  or 
social  arrangement  creates  an  economic  privilege  consisting 
in  the  power  to  appropriate  the  produce  of  the  labor  of  others. 

If,  for  example,  the  manufacturer  of  watches  in  this  country- 
is  enabled  by  the  protective  tariff  to  charge  and  get  a  higher 
price  for  a  watch  than  he  sells  the  same  watch  for  in  Europe, 
or  a  higher  price  than  he  would  be  compelled  to  sell  the 
watch  for  in  this  country,  if  there  were  no  tariff  on  w-atches, 
that  single  fact  brands  the  tariff  on  watches  as  the  creator 
of  a  privilege  and  condemns  it. 

And  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  watches,  though  a  great 
many  persons  may  be  engaged  in  that  business,  is  nevertheless 
a  privilege  so  long  as  the  tariff  on  w^atches  makes  it  possible  to 
sell  them  at  a  higher  price  than  would  prevail  under  abso- 
lutely free  competition.  And,  like  the  operation  of  all  priv- 
ilege-making social  arrangements,  the  tariff  on  watches  cer- 
tainly does  harm  to  a  greater  number  of  people  than  it  ben- 
efits, in  proportion  as  there  are  more  .watch  users  than  watch 
makers. 

It  is  one  of  the  tenets  of  the  jurisprudence  of  America 
that  special  legislation  is  a  bad  thing  and  not  to  be  tolerated. 
So  all  of  our  laws  and  institutions  are,  ostensibly,  general 
laws  and  institutions  which  act  alike  on  every  member  of 
the  community. 

In  fact,  all  our  institutions  and  laws  are  framed  in  general 
terms,  and  none  of  them  specifies,  nor  even  suggests,  that  the 
intention  is  to  enable  any  member  of  the  society  to  enjoy  an 
economic  advantage  over  his  fellow  citizens.  And  because 
the  institutions  and  laws  are  general  in  form  and  purport,  it 
is  asserted  that  the  institutions  and  laws  at  least  create  no 
privileges  and  result  in  no  discrimination  between  the  several 
members  of  the  community. 

From  this  assertion  it  is  further  inferred  that  any  injustice 
which  exists  in  the  economic  relations  between  men  may  not 


I'KIXILEGES  43 

be  ascribed  to  tbe  institutions  and  laws.  Therefore,  it  is  finally 
concluded  that,  so  far  as  the  institutions  and  laws  are  con- 
cerned, all  citizens  are  put  on  a  parity — they  all  enjoy  equal 
rights  before  the  law,  which  is  all  that  in  reason  may  be  de- 
manded from  government. 

Our  system  of  land  tenure  denies  to  no  man  the  right  to 
own  land  if  he  can,  under  the  law.  get  a  title  to  it.  Never- 
theless, the  operation  of  our  system  of  land  tenure  has  resulted 
in  the  ownership  of  all  of  the  land  by  less  than  half  of  the 
people,  the  ownership  of  the  greater  proportion  of  the  land  by 
a  comparatively  few  people,  and  the  ownership  of  no  land 
by  a  majority  of  the  people.  And  it  has  resulted  in  the  pay- 
ment by  some  people  to  other  people  of  several  thousands 
of  millions  of  dollars  per  annum,  in  the  form  of  land  rent, 
for  which  they  received  nothing  in  return. 

These  several  circumstances  show  that  the  present  institu- 
tion of  land  tenure  confers  upon  those  members  of  the  com- 
munity who  have  been  iible.  under  the  so-called  impartial  land 
laws,  to  acquire  ownershij)  of  tlie  land,  a  privilege  wliich 
enables  them  to  appropriate  a  very  considerable  proportion 
of  the  fruits  of  the  labor  of  all  non-landowners,  who  con- 
stitute a  majority  of  the  peoi)le,  without  giving  them  a  ])cnny 
or  rendering  them  the  slightest  service  in  return. 

It  is  impossible  to  arrive,  by  the  empirical  process  of  rea- 
soning, at  correct  conclusions  as  to  whether  social  arrange- 
ments work  economic  justice  or  injustice. 

Of  course,  all  the  facts  would  show  precisely  to  what  ex- 
tent a  protective  tariff  were  either  helpful  or  harmful.  But 
if  it  were  possible  to  gather  all  the  facts,  it  would  not  be  worth 
the  great  trouble ;  for  all  economic  questions  are  moral  ques- 
tions, questions  of  right  and  wrong,  and  not  questions  of  per- 
centages or  averages,  or  great  or  small  quantities.  It  is  abun- 
dantly sufficient  for  us  to  ascertain  whether  the  protective 
tarift,  or  any  other  social  arrangement,  is  right  or  wrong,  by 


44  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

putting  it  to  the  test  of  recognized  principles  of  morality  and 
justice. 

If  the  protective  tariff,  or  any  other  social  arrangement, 
makes  it  possible  for  anyone  to  acquire  an  economic  advantage, 
that  advantage,  in  the  nature  of  things,  can  only  be  enjoyed 
by  a  small  minority  and  must  be  enjoyed  at  the  expense  of 
a  great  majority. 

The  protective  tariff  law  is  in  form  a  general  law;  it  is 
no  respecter  of  persons.  One  man,  when  he  imports  a  certain 
commodity,  must,  according  to  law,  pay  the  same  tariff  as 
any  other  man.  But  the  actual  net  result  of  the  operation  of 
this  law  has  been  to  enable  a  comparatively  few  members  of 
the  community  to  compel  the  remainder  to  pay  them  tribute 
to  the  extent  of  several  thousand  million  dollars  a  year.  In 
other  words,  the  protective  tariff  has  conferred  upon  a  few 
of  the  people  the  privilege  of  appropriating  a  considerable 
proportion  of  the  fruits  of  the  labor  of  the  great  majoity  of 
the  people,  without  giving  them  anything  or  any  service  in 
return. 

Many  simple  minded  people  have  a  notion  that,  if  a  law  is 
general  in  its  form,  or  if  an  institution  does  not  specifically 
discriminate  between  individuals,  privileges  are  not  created 
by  such  laws  and  institutions,  but  that  the  rights  of 
all  individuals  will  be  and  will  remain  equal  under  such  laws 
and  institutions.  For  they  have  been  taught  that  such  laws 
and  institutions  put  every  member  of  the  community  on  an 
equal  footing.  And,  therefore,  if  some  individuals  acquire 
an  economic  advantage  over  others,  it  never  enters  their  minds 
to  look  to  those  laws  and  institutions  as  the  only  cause  of  the 
privileges.  And,  of  course,  so  long  as  they  labor  under  the 
delusion  that  there  is  no  connection  between  such  laws  and 
the  economic  advantages  referred  to,  it  is  impossible  for  them 
to  find  out  what  is  the  cause  of  those  economic  advantages. 


I'RIVILICGKS  45 

There  is  no  such  thing  as  a  natural  economic  advantage  or 
privilege. 

All  privileges  or  economic  advantages  are  created  by  law. 

If  one  man  be  more  intelligent,  more  ingenious,  or  m(jre 
dexterous,  or  if  he  be  physically  stronger  than  another,  he 
may  be  able  to  produce  more  wealth  and  conse(iucntly  enjoy 
the  blessings  of  more  wealth  llum  another,  even  under  a  just 
system;  but.  under  a  just  system  he  will  not  bo  able  to  accjuire 
wealth  at  the  expense  of  another. 

To  make  a  just  system  of  social  arrangements  is  simply 
to  make  it  impossible  for  anyone  to  profit  at  the  exj^ense  of 
another  without  committing  plain  fraud  or  theft  by  the  terms 
of  the  written  law;  and  to  make  it  impossible  for  anyone  to 
take  economic  advantage  of  another  without  suffering  the 
consequences,  is  to  make  a  just  social  system;  which  is  equiv- 
alent to  saying  that  a  social  system  so  contrived  that  it  would 
render  the  subsistence  of  any  privilege  impossible,  would  be  a 
just  system. 

It  is  impossible  to  draft  any  law  which  is  general  in  its 
application  which  will  result  in  giving  any  individual  an  econ- 
omic advantage — that  is  to  say,  which  will  make  it  possible  for 
any  individual  to  get  from  another,  against  the  other's  will, 
something  for  nothing,  without  giving  the  power  to  a  fcic  to 
appropriate  the  belongings  of  the  nia)i\\  unless  it  be  a  law 
establishing  chattel  slavery,  and  that,  under  that  law,  one  man 
should  own  a  single  man  only. 

It  is  impossible  to  create  by  law  an  economic  advantage 
which  would  benefit  equally  all  members  of  the  community; 
just  as  impossible  as  it  is  by  law  to  create  wealth. 

The  claim  that  any  such  laws  enrich  the  community  col- 
lectively is  a  self-evitlent  absurdity.  It  is  equivalent  to  saying 
that  by  law  the  total  production  may  be  enhanced,  which 
means,  if  it  means  anything,  that  wealth  may  be  produced 
by  law. 


46  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

Even  the  political  economists,  who  hold  that  land  and  cap- 
ital are  economic  factors  of  production — that  is  to  say,  they 
are  such  independent  agencies  in  the  production  of  wealth 
that  they  may  justly  lay  claim  to  a  part  of  the  produce,  have 
never  maintained  that  the  law  is  a  factor  of  production. 

However,  it  would  be  no  more  absurd  to  assert  that  the  law 
is  a  factor  of  production  and  increases  production,  than  it  is 
to  assert  that  land  and  capital  contribute  such  a  share  toward 
production  as  to  justly  entitle  their  owners  to  a  share  of  the 
produce. 

It  would  be  quite  as  impossible  to  devise  a  privilege  which 
would  benefit  equally  each  of  a  majority  of  the  community, 
as  it  would  be  to  contrive  one  which  would  equally  benefit 
every  member  of  the  community. 

For  that  reason  the  granting  of  any  particular  privilege  can 
never  be  to  the  self-interest  of  a  sufficient  number  of  the  in- 
dividual members  of  the  society  to  constitute  a  majority. 

Hence,  under  a  social  system  where  the  will  of  the  majority 
would  actually  be  the  law  of  the  land — where  every  member 
of  the  community  would  exercise  the  right  to  vote  that  each 
and  every  social  arrangement,  every  institution  and  every  law 
shall  conform  to  his  own  self-interest,  and  where  his  vote, 
like  that  of  every  member  of  the  society,  would  count  for 
one — it  is  as  certain  as  that  human  nature  is  human  nature, 
that  not  a  single  privilege  would  ever  be  granted,  unless  a 
considerable  number  of  persons  failed  to  understand  what 
their  self-interest  in  the  matter  was. 

But  it  may  be  supposed  that  the  granting  of  privileges  gen- 
erally may  become  the  self-interest  of  a  majority  of  the  com- 
munity, for  this  reason : 

That  while  no  single  privilege  may  benefit  more  than  a 
small  minority  of  the  people,  a  few  may  be  benefitted  by  one 
privilege,  another  few  by  another  privilege,  and  still  others  by 
other  privileges,  until  the  benefits  of  one  privilege  or  another 


PRIVILEGES  47 

would  be  enjoyed  by  enough  individuals  to  make  a  majority, 
an!  that,  therefore,  it  might  be  to  the  self-interest  of  a  ma- 
jority to  have  privileges,  and  that  consequently  under  a  system 
of  majority  rule  there  would  be  privileges. 

But  the  fallacy  of  this  supposition  becomes  apparent  the 
moment  we  consider  that  the  gains  of  the  bencliciaries  of  each 
privilege  are  had  at  the  cost  of  more  than  an  equivalent  loss 
by  the  remainder  of  the  community,  including  the  bencliciaries 
of  all  other  privileges,  and  that  the  total  net  gains  of  all  the 
beneficiaries  of  all  privileges  must  be  drawn  from  the  so- 
called  surplus  produce  of  the  minority  of  the  people. 

For  all  privilege  owners  cannot  possibly  gain  anything  by 
merely  appropriating  the  produce  of  each  other's  labor. 

If  the  total  net  gains  of  all  the  beneficiaries  of  all  privileges, 
in  case  they  constituted  a  majority  of  the  people,  must  neces- 
sarily be  drawn  from  the  produce  of  the  labor  of  the  minority, 
non-owners  of  privileges,  the  gain  of  each  privilege  owner,  if 
they  all  gained  alike,  would  be  even  less  than  the  profits  on 
the  labor  of  a  single  man.  If  some  of  them  gaine<l  more,  their 
excess  gains  would  have  to  be  made  at  the  expense  of  other 
privilege  owners,  and  if  many  of  them  gained  more,  and  if  a 
considerable  number  of  them  g;iine  1  much  more,  the  gains 
of  the  bulk  of  privilege  owners  would  be  reduced  to  worth- 
less proportions,  or  be  overbalanced  by  their  losses,  in  which 
latter  case  they  would  be  put  in  the  same  class  as  the  non- 
privilege  owners — losers  on  account  of  privileges. 

So  finally,  we  find  that  this  supposition  does  not  in  the  least 
alter  the  conclusion  that,  in  the  nature  of  things,  it  can  never 
be  to  the  self-interest  of  a  majority  to  sanction  privileges,  and 
that  the  enormous  and  almost  universal  gains  of  the  owners 
of  privileges  could  never  be  drawn  from  the  surplus  produce 
of  a  minority  of  the  people  (the  productive  power  of  labor, 
great  as  it  is,  is  not  great  enough  for  that),  but  must  be  drawn 
from  the  produce  of  the  labor  of  an  overwhelming  majority 


48  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

of  the  people,  whose  self-interest  it  would  be,  of  course,  to 
be  rid  of  privileges. 

Fairly  assuming  that  the  privilege  owners  now  appropriate 
fully  one-half  of  what  the  productive  workers  produce,  and 
that  they  appropriate  as  much  as  they  can,  and  assuming  the 
existence  of  a  single  privilege  as  powerful  as  all  existing  priv- 
ileges combined,  and  that  its  benefits  were  equally  distributed 
among  half  the  people  plus  one,  each  one  of  that  majority 
could  live  no  better  from  his  income  from  the  privilege  than 
the  ordinary  worker  now  lives. 

The  income  from  privileges  must  necessarily  be  great  or 
small  as  the  number  of  privilege  owners  compared  with  the 
number  of  non-privilege  owners  is  small  or  great.  And  the 
fabulous  total  of  incomes  from  privilege  is  conclusive  evi- 
dence that  a  vast  majority  of  the  people  are  being  despoiled  by 
a  small  minority  through  the  agency  of  privileges. 

To  say,  therefore,  that  the  producers  would  be  twice  as  well 
off  as  they  are  now  if  there  were  na  privileges  is  presenting 
the  case  well  within  the  actual  facts,  and  there  is  no  telling 
how  much  better  off  than  once  again  they  would  be. 

Instead  of  there  being  a  single  privilege,  there  actually  are 
a  number  of  privileges,  the  benefits  of  each  of  which  are 
enjoyed  by  different  sets  of  people,  and  in  different  degrees 
by  the  several  individuals  constituting  each  set. 

The  proprietors  of  each  privilege  get  something  for  nothing 
from  the  owners  of  the  other  privileges,  and  from  those  who 
share  in  the  benefits  of  no  privilege. 

Therefore,  if  a  single  privilege  owned  equally  by  a  ma- 
jority, which  privilege  was  capable  of  absorbing  the  entire 
surplus  produce  of  the  minority,  would  profit  each  member  of 
the  majority  but  slightly,  and  would  certainly  not  enable  him 
to  live  in  the  style  of  the  common  workman  without  doing 
some  productive  labor  himself,  how  then  is  it  possible  for 
thousands  of  owners  of  a  number  of  privileges  to  grow  enor- 


J'klVlLKGES  49 

niously   rich,   unless   they   do   so  at   the  expense  of  a   much 
greater  number  of  people? 

Then,  how  in  the  name  of  common  sense  can  it  he  claimed 
that  any  law  or  institution,  which  in  any  manner  interferes 
with  the  natural  order  respecting  the  production  and  distrib- 
ution of  wealth,  or  which  results  in  any  privilege,  i.  c.,  any 
economic  advantaj^e  of  some  members  of  the  community  over 
other  members,  will  at  the  same  time  result  in  the  greatest 
good  to  the  greatest  number? 

There  is  but  one  privilege  which  is  capable  of  abstjrbing 
the  entire  so-called  surplus  produce  of  the  non-privilegibts, 
and  that  is  the  privilege  of  land  engrossment. 

In  any  country,  where  all  the  land  available  for  sustaining 
life  has  been  appropriated,  the  landlord  class  can  and  does 
appropriate  practically  all  the  surplus  produce  of  those  who 
own  no  land,  after  other  forms  of  privilege  have  absorbed  as 
much  of  the  produce  of  the  non-landowners  as  it  was  in  their 
power  to   absorb. 

But,  if  in  such  a  country  all  forms  of  privileges  except 
the  land  monopoly  were  abolished,  the  landlord  class  would 
be  able  to  absorb  practically  all  the  surplus  produce  of  the 
non-landowners,  including  that  portion  which  the  other  forms 
of  privilege  formerly  got,  for  the  concentration  of  the  owner- 
ship of  land  would  proceed  with  renewed  vigor  and  celerity. 

The  large  land  owners  who  now  invest  the  proceeds  of  rent 
in  other  forms  of  privilege,  would  then  devote  such  proceeils 
to  the  purchase  of  more  land,  as  it  would  be  to  the  interest 
of  everyone  to  invest  his  surplus  income  in  land,  because  there 
would  be  no  other  form  of  investment  which  would  yield  an 
increase  gratis. 

Land  would  become  the  most  desirable  form  of  property. 
The  ownership  of  land  would  become  tlie  most  certain  and 
quickest  means  of  acquirinj::^  wealth  and  power.  Land  values 
would  soon  rise  to  the  extent  to  which  the  incomes  from  other 


50  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

forms  of  privilege  had  been  lopped  off,  and  they  would  con- 
tinue to  rise  with  every  improvement  in  the  arts  and  with 
every  increase  in  the  productive  power  of  labor  from  any 
cause  whatsoever. 

As  the  concentration  of  land  ownership  progressed,  the 
power  of  the  landlord  class  would  increase,  and  it  would  not 
be  long  until  the  landlord  class  would  be  able  not  only  to 
appropriate  the  entire  surplus  produce  of  the  non-landowners 
above  their  present  standard  of  living,  but  they  would  be 
able  to  force  the  standard  of  living  downward  to  a  con- 
siderably lower  level. 

Social  injustice  consequent  to  privileges  granted  by  gov- 
ernment is  the  ultimate  source  of  political  corruption.  Why? 
Because  the  acquirement,  maintenance,  or  extension  of  priv- 
ileges, which  give  to  some  men  an  economic  advantage  over 
the  mass  of  the  people,  afford  the  motive  to,  in  some  manner, 
bribe  the  so-called  representatives  of  the  people,  who  have  the 
power  to  grant,  withhold,  or  abolish  privileges,  to  act  in  the 
interest  of  the  privilegist  and  against  the  interest  of  the 
body  of  the  people ;  and  because  the  so-called  representatives 
of  the  people,  having  the  power  to  grant,  withhold  or  abolish 
privileges,  will  not  grant  privileges  to  which  there  is  opposi- 
tion by  the  people,  unless  they  themselves  are  to  profit  in 
some  manner  by  the  transaction. 

The  privilegist,  therefore,  goes  into  the  legislative  market 
and  buys  what  he  wants  at  the  lowest  price  that  he  can  bar- 
gain for. 

The  legislators,  conscious  of  their  power  to  grant,  with- 
hold, or  abolish  privileges,  who  are  also  conscious  of  their 
duty  to  deny  many  privileges  or  to  abolish  privileges  that 
have  li^en  previously  granted,  v/ould  frequently  withhold  or 
abolish  privileges  but  for  the  threats  of  the  ]:)rivilegists  of 
punishment,  by  the  use  of  money  in  politics,  or  the  hope  of  a 
benefit  to  be  gained  in  the  form  of  a  bribe. 


PRIVILEGES  51 

Keeping  always  in  mind  that  man  seeks  to  satisfy  his  de- 
sires by  the  least  effort,  if  any  particidar  system  of  social 
arrangements  affonls  the  oi)i)()rtunity  for  some  individuals  to 
save  themselves  toil  and  tnnihle  at  the  exjiense  of  their 
fellows,  to  satisfy  their  desires  hy  means  of  the  toil  and 
trouble  of  others,  we  may  couLdude  with  moral  certainty  that 
they  will  avail  themselves  of  that  opportunity. 

Thus,  under  a  system  which  permits  the  ownership  of  an 
unlimited  extent  of  land  by  an  indivicUial.  we  fmd  that  men 
strive  to  ac(|uire  the  owncrshi])  of  as  nuich  land  as  possible, 
and  that  land  will  be  monopolized. 

Under  a  system  of  social  arrangements  wdiich  establishes 
privileges  in  any  form,  there  will  be  a  contest  for  the  pos- 
session of  those  privileges. 

If  the  privileges  be  such  as  to  enable  their  possessors  to 
wax  rich  at  tiic  expense  of  the  remainder  of  the  community 
and  thus  keep  the  remainder  poor,  then  we  may  unerringly 
conclude  that  that  will  be  the  result  of  the  operation  of  that 
system,  and  that  the  things  called  Capital,  which  are  said 
to  be  such  an  important  factor  in  the  production  and  dis- 
tribution of  wealth,  will  be  monopolized. 

Under  a  system  wdiich  imposes  a  high  protective  tariff,  we 
know  that  men  in  the  same  line  of  business  will  endeavor  to 
make  as  nearly  as  possible  a  monopoly  of  that  business  for  the 
purpose  of  raising  the  price  of  their  wares  in  the  home  market- 
to  a  higher  level  than  unrestricted  competition  would  permit. 

Under  a  system  wdiich  permits  that  vastly  important  depart- 
ment of  production,  the  transportation  of  commodities  and 
transmission  of  intelligence,  to  be  owned  by  private  individuals 
and  operated  for  private  gain,  we  know  that  the  inlividuals 
who  are  so  fortunate  as  to  acquire  possession  of  those  priv- 
ileges, will  make  their  charges  as  great  as  the  traffic  will  bear. 

When  patent  rights  arc  granted  by  government,  we  may  be 
sure  that  there  will  oftentimes  be  a  struggle  to  obtain  pos- 


52  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

session  of  the  exclusive  right  to  use  a  valuable  discovery  or 
invention.  And  if  it  should  be  to  the  interest  of  those  who 
acquire  a  title  to  a  patent  right,  not  to  use  it  themselves,  nor 
to  permit  others  to  use  it,  however  advantageous  the  use  of 
that  discovery  or  invention  would  be  to  the  people  at  large, 
they  will  relegate  it  to  disuse. 

When  the  financial  system  of  a  country  makes  it  possible 
to  monopolize  the  medium  of  exchange,  we  may  be  certain 
that  it  will  be  monopolized.  If  it  makes  it  possible  for  bank- 
ing facilities  to  be  monopolized,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the 
banking  facilities  will  be  monopolized  and  that  the  people  will 
find  it  impossible  to  transact  business  without  paying  tribute 
to  that  monopoly. 

The  above  portrayal  of  the  operation  of  several  of  the  most 
important  institutions  and  laws,  illustrates  how  social  ar- 
rangements, which  were  established  ostensibly  for  a  very  dif- 
ferent purpose,  engender  and  foster  privileges,  and  how  social 
rules  which  are  general  in  form,  in  efifect  confer  special  ad- 
vantages. 

Let  us  now  consider  some  of  the  more  indirect  effects  of 
certain  laws  which  purport  to  accomplish  some  good  end,  but 
which,  through  the  accomplishment  of  that  end,  necessarily 
accomplish  the  bad  end — the  making  of  privileges. 

The  petty  privileges  v/hich  are  conferred  by  means  of  taxes 
and  licenses,  invariably  result  in  evasion  of  the  law  and  cor- 
ruption of  the  officials  whose  duty  it  is  to  administer  the  law, 
in  the  form  of  bribery  or  blackmail.  Some  of  these  evils  ac- 
company the  very  smallest  of  privileges. 

In  most  of  the  large  cities  one  must  obtain  a  license  to 
engage  in  the  not  very  extensive  nor  over  lucrative  business 
of  selling  fruit  from  a  push  cart,  and  must  observe  certain 
rules  in  the  conduct  of  his  business.  He  may  not,  for  exam- 
ple, remain  in  one  place  longer  than  ten  minutes.  This  ar- 
rangement practically  clothes  the  policeman  with  discretionary 


I'KIXII.I'-.GKS  53 

power  (Ivor  the  !icciise<l  rij^lits  of  tlic  fruit  vcinler.  The  i)olicc- 
man  may  make  ilie  vender  move  every  two  mimites  or  he  may 
m-t  (lisliiih  liiin  thouj^h  he  may  remain  in  a  desirane  location 
for  half  an  lunir.  or,  if  the  i)oliceman  he  not  hur<lene<l  with 
scruples,  he  may  arrest  the  vender  on  the  charge  of  having 
violated  the  city  ordinance,  even  though  the  ordinance  had 
been  strictly  complied  with.  It  is  not  unusual,  therefore,  to 
see  a  policeman  take  an  api)le  or  orange  from  one  of  these 
j)ush  carts  without  asking  leave,  and  to  find  that  the  poor 
vender  makes  not  the  slightest  protest. 

If  so  trifling  a  privilege  as  a  license  to  peddle  fruit  results 
in  such  des{)icably  small  violation  of  rights,  it  may  he  readily 
imagined  to  what  enormous  proportions  this  character  of  evils 
u  hich  always  follow  in  the  wake  of  privilege  grow,  where 
the  interests  at  stake  are  tremendously  great. 

Having  the  knowdcdge  that  no  form  of  privilege  has  ever 
been  nor  can  be  invented  that  has  not  resulted  and  will  not 
result  in  additional  forms  of  injustice  besides  those  which  are 
the  immediate  and  apparent  consequence  of  the  privilege,  if 
we  would  rid  society  of  economic  evil.-.,  from  the  largest,  the 
ai)j)ropriation  of  the  produce  of  the  labourof  others  in  the  form 
of  rent,  interest  antl  profits,  down  to  the  smallest,  the  appro- 
priation of  a  vender's  apple  by  a  policeman,  we  find  that  we 
must  arrange  matters  so  that  all  forms  of  privilege,  regardless 
of  their  pretended  beneficent  objects,  will  be  made  impossible. 

In  order  to  impress  upon  the  minds  of  the  people  the  idea 
that  privileges  are  sacred,  the  rulers,  their  aids  and  abettors, 
their  hireling  spokesmen  and  professional  bunco  steerers  al- 
ways carefully  apply  to  privileges  the  appellation  of  rights; 
and  such  privileges  as  have  been  acquired  by  means  of  a  so- 
called  contract,  such  as  a  charter,  arc  held  by  the  ])rivilegists 
to  be  even  more  sacred  than  ordinary  privileges,  and,  in  order 
to  impress  that  notion  on  the  minds  of  the  people,  this  class 
of  privileges  are  pretentiously  called  vested  rights.    The  word 


54  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

for  privilege  in  German  is  Vorrecht,  which  literally  means  a 
right  which  goes  before,  that  is,  which  takes  precedence  of 
other  rights. 

Now,  when  the  people  get  ready  to  claim  their  rights,  which 
they  can  only  do  l)y  abolishing  all  privileges,  they  will  not 
permit  the  false  labels,  with  which  privileges  are  marked,  to 
stand  in  their  way.  They  will  wipe  out  the  patrician  privi- 
leges called  vested  rights,  such  as  charters,  franchises,  and 
the  present  system  of  land  tenure,  along  with  the  plebean 
privileges  created  by  the  protective  tariff  and  licenses. 

A  privilege  is  always  a  privilege,  regardless  of  its  age,  its 
parentage,  the  ceremony  attending  its  birth,  the  name  it  was 
christened,  or  its  pretended  virtues.  It  is  in  its  very  nature 
a  vicious  beast,  of  which  it  will  greatly  advantage  mankind 
to  rid  themselves. 

The  claim  that  when  a  public  official,  acting  under  the  laws, 
grants  a  privilege,  some  charter  or  franchise,  say,  if  the 
grant  takes  the  form  of  a  contract,  the  grantee  thereby  ac- 
quires a  valid  property  right  in  the  privilege,  of  which  he 
cannot  be  thereafter  deprived  without  his  consent,  is  the  veri- 
est claptrap. 

There  is  no  such  thing  in  morals  as  a  property  right  in  a 
privilege.  When  the  people  make  up  their  minds  to  go  after 
their  rights,  they  will  treat  that  bit  of  sophistry  as  they  will 
treat  every  other  obstacle  in  their  path ;  they  will  simply  tread 
it  under  foot. 

There  is  another  barefaced  fraud  which  will  disappear  when 
privileges  disappear.  I  refer  to  that  legal  fiction  called  a  cor- 
poration. 

A  corporation  is  an  artificial  person,  created  by  law,  which 
may  be  owned  by  three  or  any  larger  number  of  persons. 

It  has  rights,  duties  and  responsibilities  which  do  not  at- 
tach to  its  individual  owners. 
It  never  dies  so  long  as  it  has  any  owners. 


PRIVILEGES  55 

It  is  impersonal  and  inhuman. 

Its  owners  make  rules  for  the  government  of  its  conih.ct 
which  binti  it  but  not  them. 

The  responsibility  for  its  acts  devolves  upon  its  empIo}es 
or  agents  and  not  upon  its  owners. 

It  is  like  the  King's  mythical  other  self,  invisible,  yet  it  can 
buy,  sell  and  make  contracts,  sue  and  be  sued,  and  do  all 
sorts  of  rascally  things  with  impunity,  without  throwing  any 
discredit  on  its  ow^ners. 

When  an  agent  of  a  corporation  lies,  cheats,  slanders  or 
persecutes  a  real  living  human  being,  he  does  so  in  the  name 
of  the  corporation,  and  not  in  his  own  right.  The  corporation 
has  no  conscience,  no  code  of  morals  but  the  art  of  grabbing 
what  belongs  to  others,  and  it  only  observes  the  law  of  ti'.e 
land  when  its  lawyer  vassals  are  unable  to  find  a  safe  means 
of  circumventing  it. 

The  corporation  is  a  monster  moral  outlaw,  armed  with  let- 
ters of  marque  and  reprisal  to  pirate  the  economic  seas. 

What  else,  then,  can  be  said  of  the  corporation,  than  that 
the  sooner  it  is  abolished  the  better?  In  so  far  as  co-opera- 
tion is  necessary  or  advantageous,  there  will  be  better  co-ope- 
ration without  the  corporation  than  with  it. 

It  is  claimed  in  behalf  of  the  corporation  that  that  device 
accomplishes  two  desirable  objects  wdiich  cannot  be,  at  least 
as  conveniently,  attained  by  any  other  means. 

The  one  is  that  large  capitals  necessary  to  the  carrying  on 
of  extensive  enterprises  cannot  as  well  be  gathered  together 
in  any  other  way  as  by  incorporating  the  enterprise  and  sell- 
ing its  bonds  and  stock  to  many  individuals. 

The  corporation  is  no  doubt  a  very  useful  instrument  to 
the  exploiter  of  wage  slaves,  and  it,  of  course,  harmonizes 
beautifully  with  the  whole  scheme  of  exploitation;  yet,  there 
is  no  enterprise  which,  under  a  just  system  of  social  arrange- 
ments, could  not  be  more  efficiently  and  economically  carricl 
on,  either  by  the  government  or  under  the  joint  ownership 


56  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

and  control  of  the  persons  who  are  actually  engaged  in  per- 
forming the  labor  incident  to  the  carrying  on  of  the  business. 

Under  a  system  which  made  it  impossible  for  anyone  to 
get  something  for  nothing,  when  the  entire  produce  would  go 
to  the  producers  as  wages,  and  when,  therefore,  the  things 
called  capital  would  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  producers 
and  be  equitably  distributed,  self-interest  would  make  co- 
operation the  natural  order  of  the  times. 

There  would  be  precisely  as  much  co-operation  as  would 
be  found  to  be  necessary  or  advantageous,  and  since  the 
workers  would  be  the  only  "capitalists,"  the  workers  them- 
selves could  readily  provide  all  the  capital  necessary  to  carry 
on  any  enterprise. 

And  when  the  interests  of  the  "capitalist"  and  the  worker 
have  thus  become  identical,  the  amount  of  wealth  produced, 
and  consequently  the  amount  of  "capital"  which  could  be  ac- 
cumulated, would  be  enormously  increased.  And  there  being  no 
artificial  obstructions  to  hinder  enterprise  at  every  turn,  as  is 
now  the  case,  and  the  uncertainty  of  success,  now  occasioned 
by  unequal  competition,  being  eliminated,  the  capital  required 
to  carry  on  any  business  for  which  there  was  a  demand,  would 
be  incomparably  more  easily  obtainable  than  it  is  now  to  finance 
a  corporation. 

The  other  virtue  which  is  claimed  for  the  corporation  is 
that  it  is  invested  with  perennial  life. 

If  one  of  the  owners  of  a  corporation  dies,  another  takes 
his  place.  If  all  of  the  one-time  owners  of  a  corporation  die, 
other  owners  step  into  their  places,  and  thus  the  same  corpora- 
tion may  live  for  centuries,  provided  only  that  there  con- 
tinue to  be  living  persons  to  claim  the  ownership. 

In  fact,  there  are  corporations,  such  as  colleges  whose  man- 
agement is  entrusted  to  boards  of  trustees,  invested  with  self- 
perpetuating  power,  which  live  on  from  century  to  century 
without  the  ghost  of  an  owner. 


PRIVILEGES  57 

Now,  under  a  just  system,  where  co-operative  production 
would  be  the  rule,  the  life  of  cnterjjrises  would  be  prolonged 
in  practically  the  same  manner  as  the  life  of  corporations  is 
now  extended  beyond  the  lives  of  their  original  owners,  under 
the  present  system. 

The  personnel  of  the  ownership  of  a  co-operative  concern 
would  change  from  time  to  time,  and,  so  long  as  it  were  eco- 
nomically advantageous  to  carry  on  that  business,  there  would 
be  others  to  fdl  up  the  ranks  in  the  place  of  those  who  dropped 
out. 

But  the  object  of  the  corporation  is  not  to  prolong  the  life 
of  a  legitimate,  economically  useful  business,  but  to  perpetuate 
some  form  of  privilege,  and,  consequently,  when  all  privileges 
have  been  abolished,  and  rent,  interest  and  profits  have  dis- 
appeared, the  corporation  would  die  from  the  lack  of  any 
function  to  perform.  There  is  no  place  for  the  corporation 
in  a  social  system  which  does  not  admit  of  the  getting  of  some- 
thing for  nothing. 

It  is  not  worth  while  to  consider  the  virtues  or  advantages 
of  the  corporation  as  a  holder  of  endowments  of  colleges  and 
eleemosynary  institutions. 

Such  institutions  serve  a  very  good  purpose  imder  the  pres- 
ent unjust  system.  l)ut  under  a  just  system,  where  rent,  in- 
terests and  profits  were  absent,  the  endowments  would  not 
last  long  in  the  first  place,  and  besides,  such  charities  wouM 
be  ciuite  unnecessary,  and  they  also  would  disappear  from  the 
lack  of  patronage. 

All  laws  which  result  in  privilege  bring  about  such  results 
by  interference  with  the  natural  course  of  production  and  dis- 
tribution of  wealth,  and  whenever  the  natural  course  of  pro- 
duction and  distribution  is  interfered  with  by  law,  the  effect 
must  be  both  to  curtail  production  and  to  cause  an  inequitable 
distribution. 

The  valid  inference  is  that  every  law  or  institution  which 


58  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

purports  to  enhance  production  in  general  or  in  particular, 
or  which  essays  arbitrarily  to  adjust  the  distribution  of  wealth 
beneficially,  will  always  considerably  diminish  the  amount  of 
wealth  produced,  and  inevitably  result  in  an  unjust  distribu- 
tion of  wealth. 

What  utterly  condemns  all  privileges,  whatever  their  form 
or  ostensible  purpose  may  be,  are  these  simple  facts :  That  it 
is  absolutely  impossible  for  government  to  bestow  economic 
benefits  on  any  number  of  the  members  of  the  community, 
without  coincidently  inflicting  corresponding,  and  generally 
greater,  injuries  on  the  remaining  members;  that  it  is  impos- 
sible for  government,  through  any  form  of  privilege,  to  eco- 
nomically benefit  all  members  of  the  community,  or  even  a 
small  fraction  of  the  members  in  an  equal  degree;  and  that 
a  privilege  always  results  in  economically  benefiting  a  small 
minority  of  the  people  in  different  degrees,  and  economically 
injuring  the  vast  majority  of  the  people. 

It  is  fortunate  that  this  is  true  in  the  constitution  of  things. 
From  this  truth  springs  the  hope,  aye,  the  certain  knowledge, 
that,  once  the  masses  of  the  people  become  conversant  with 
the  true  nature  and  eft'ects  of  privileges,  they  wall  not  rest 
until  they  eradicate  the  last  vestige  of  privilege  from  our  social 
system. 

Since  all  privileges  always  harm  the  vast  majority  of  the 
people,  and  the  power  to  regulate  social  arrangements  lies 
ultimately  with  the  majority,  self-interest  wnll  impel  the  ma- 
jority to  overthrow  all  privileges  as  soon  as  they  learn  that 
they  are  being  hurt,  and  how  badly  they  are  being  hurt  by 
privileges. 

Any  law  which  grants  any  sort  of  a  privilege  is  essentially 
class  legislation. 

For  the  reason  that  only  a  few  can  take  advantage  of  and 
profit  by  a  privilege,  all  such  laws  actually  create  classes,  a 
class  of  masters  and  a  class  of  slaves. 


PRIVILEGES  59 

Therefore,  it  will  require  tio  coaxing  to  induce  any  man  who 
becomes  aware  tliat  he  l>elungs  to  the  class  that  are  being 
exploited  and  that  consequently  all  privileges  are  opposed  to 
his  self-interest,  to  adopt  as  his  motto: 

"Tolerate  no  social  arrangement  which  enables  some  to  get 
something  ior  nothing  and  compels  others  to  give  something 
for  nothing." 

If  every  man  in  this  country  who  is  being  worked  like  an 
ox  for  the  benefit  of  others;  if  every  man  who  is  being  in- 
sulted, intimidated,  arbitrarily  bossed,  starved,  or  whose  life 
is  being  made  worthless  in  a  thousand  ways  which  I  cannot 
here  describe,  could  be  brought  to  understand  his  self-interest 
respecting  social  arrangements,  there  wouUl  not  be  a  single 
privilege  of  any  description  left  in  this  country  in  four  years. 

The  Single  Taxers  want  land  monopoly  destroyed,  not  be- 
cause they  recognize  the  truth  that  land  rent  is  the  natural 
consequence  of  man-made  land  monopoly,  but  because  they 
understand  and  know  that  the  extortion  froin  one  person  by 
another  of  tribute  for  the  use  of  land  is  sheer  robbery. 

Tiie  Socialists  want  to  get  rid  of  rent,  interest  and  profits 
because  they  understand  and  know  that  all  of  those  things 
are,  according  to  the  moral  law,  common  tiieft.  They  pro- 
pose to  abolish  rent,  interest  and  profits  by  making  land  and 
capital,  so-called,  common  property,  while  the  single  taxers 
would  eliminate  the  injustice  involved  in  the  payment  of  land 
rent  only,  by  one  person  to  another,  by  means  of  government 
appropriation  of  the  rental  value  of  land. 

All  that  I  desire  to  say  here  on  this  subject  is  that  in  a  sub- 
sequent volume  I  will  demonstrate  that  rent,  interest,  and 
profits  are  nothing  more  than  the  creatures  of  law-matle  privi- 
leges, and  that,  therefore,  when  all  privileges  have  been  abol- 
ished, rent,  interest  and  profits  will,  as  a  natural  consequence, 
disappear. 

It  will  there  be  demonstrated  that  the  avowed  objects  of 


60  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

the  single  taxers  cannot  be  attained  by  means  of  the  single 
tax ;  that  the  proclaimed  purposes  of  the  socialists  cannot  pos- 
sibly be  accomplished  by  any  of  the  devices  nor  by  any  com- 
bination of  the  devices  claimed  to  be  socialism ;  and  that  the  de- 
clared ends  of  anarchists  would  be  defeated  by  anarchism  or 
by  communist-anarchism. 

Concerning  the  single  tax,  it  will  be  shown  that  while  the 
appropriation  by  government  of  the  precise  rental  value  of 
every  parcel  of  land,  irrespective  of  improvements  (if  that 
were  possible)  would  abolish  the  privilege  of  land  engross- 
ment and  would  put  the  people  in  their  relation  to  land  on  an 
equal  footing,  it  would  at  the  same  time  initiate  a  decline  in 
land  values  which  would  not  stop  until  they  completely  dis- 
appeared. This  monopoly-begotten  fund  having  disappeared, 
it  would  be  found  that  in  order  to  support  what  government 
they  desired,  the  single  taxers  would  be  compelled  to  raise 
their  revenue  in  a  manner  which  would  be  quite  clearly  a 
tax  on  labor,  but  not  more  truly  so  than  the  would-be  appro- 
priation of  the  assumed  unearned  increment  of  land. 

Concerning  socialism,  it  will  be  shown  that  while  private 
monopoly  of  the  means  of  production  may  be  abolished  by  the 
substitution  therefor  of  state  monopoly  of  all  production,  and 
that  thereby  rent,  interest  and  profits  may  be  abolished,  any 
system  of  state  socialism  possible  to  contrive  would  be  so 
complicated  and  cumbersome  that  it  is  impossible  to  draught 
even  an  outline  of  its  mechanism.  It  will  further  be  shown 
that  any  variety  of  socialism  will  fail  to  accomplish  the  lauda- 
ble and  righteous  purposes  common  to  socialists  of  all  creeds, 
for  the  reason  that  none  of  the  systems  of  social  arrange- 
ments proposed  by  any  school  of  socialism  has  for  its  basis 
fundamental  principles  of  justice,  but  only  dogmatic  assertion 
prompted  by  considerations  of  expediency  incident  to  the 
peculiarities  of  each  of  these  arbitrary  systems. 

Concerning  anarchism,  whose  ultimate  objects,   like  those 


PRIVILEGES  61 

of  socialism  and  the  single  tax,  arc  conimcii'lahlc  and  just 
(in  truth,  there  is  no  important  diflfcrcncc  between  the  ob- 
jects of  the  three,  but  what  distinguishes  them  one  from  the 
other  are  only  di(Terences  of  methods)  it  will  be  demonstrated 
that  although  the  inauguration  of  anarchism  would  preclude 
law-made  privileges,  it  would  not  secure  to  each  and  every 
indivi<iual  the  free  exercise  of  all  his  natural  rights,  which 
is  the  desideratum. 

But  it  will  not  only  be  proven  that  none  of  the  above 
named  reform  systems  will  accomplish  their  declared  objects; 
it  will  also  be  demonstrated  that  those  objects  can  be  attained 
only  by  a  system  of  social  arrangements  funrlamentally  flif- 
ferent  from  any  and  all  of  them,  a  system  deduced  from  the 
natural  laws  of  morality  having  for  tiieir  basis  the  law  of 
human  nature. 

The  reason  why  neither  the  single  taxer,  the  socialist  nor 
the  anarchist  can  convince  the  other  two  that  they  are  wrong 
and  that  he  is  right,  is  simply  because  all  three  of  them  are 
wrong. 

But  when  Truth  once  enters  the  arena,  there  cannot 
be  the  slightest  doubt  that  it  will  command  recognition,  and 
that  before  long  a  large  majority  of  the  people,  including 
most  single  taxers,  socialists  and  anarchists  will  be  marching 
in  step  under  its  banner  with  the  unitc<l  purpose  not  only  of 
abolishing  all  cc(^nomic  privileges,  but  also  of  establishing 
a  social  system  under  which  privileges  will  nevermore  sprout, 
and  justice,  freedom  from  wMiit  and  the  fear  of  want,  will 
overspread  the  land,  and  a  vantage  ground  be  reached,  from 
which  will  spring  a  new  era  of  civilization  and  human  progress. 


CHAPTER  II. 
INSTINCT. 

In  order  to  arriv^e  at  a  correct  understanding  of  the  nature 
of  human  beings  and  the  part  which  human  nature  plays  in 
human  afifairs,  and  in  order  that  the  superstructure  of  our 
philosophy  of  human  interests  may  rest  upon  indisputable 
grounds,  we  must  first  ascertain  the  truth  respecting  the  very 
fundamental  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  all  animal  life, 
instinct. 

It  will  also  be  an  important  aid  to  a  clear  understanding 
of  human  nature  to  discover  the  characteristics  which  dis- 
tinguish the  instinct  of  man  from  that  of  the  lower  animals, 
and  the  different  office  which  instinct  performs  for  each. 

The  organism  of  every  animal  is  precisely  suited  to  its 
environment  or  its  environment  is  exactly  suited  to  its  organ- 
ism. Whether  the  environment  was  adapted  to  the  organism 
or  the  organism  adapted  to  the  environment,  the  fact  remains 
that  they  are  exact  complements  of  each  other. 

Certain  kinds  of  food  are  suited  to  the  structure  and  needs 
of  particular  animals  and  each  animal  knows  the  particular 
objects  which  will  best  serve  it  as  food.  Other  objects  con- 
taining the  elements  which  would  nourish  the  animal,  but 
which,  on  account  of  the  structure  of  the  animal  and  the  form 
of  the  object,  cannot  be  used  as  food,  will  neither  attract  the 
animal  nor  repel  it.  Other  objects  are  of  such  a  character 
that  the  eating  of  them  would  be  harmful.  That  is  to  say, 
the  animal  is  made  for  its  food  and  the  food  is  made  for  the 
animal. 

Now,  in  order  that  the  animal  may  secure  the  nourishment 
necessary  to  its  life  and  otherwise  employ  its  appropriate  en- 
vironment to   fulfill  the  ends  necessary  to  its   well-being,  it 


INSTINCT  63 

must,  in  the  nature  of  these  circumstances,  be  endowcfl  with  a 
knowledge,  or  a  feeling  which  is  equivalent  to  a  knowledge, 
of  whether  the  seizure  or  avoidance  of  anything  which  it  sees, 
hears,  smells  or  tastes,  is  beneficial. 

If  it  were  true,  as  Spencer  says,  that  the  character  of  im- 
pressions made  on  the  organism  of  an  animal,  whether  those 
impressions  will  be  agreeable  or  rejndsive,  is  determincfl  by 
the  character  of  the  external  object,  by  primarily  affecting 
the  organism  through  its  taste,  smell  or  opacity,  the  unavoid- 
able implication  is  that  the  sense  of  taste,  smell  or  sight  of 
each  species  of  animals  must  necessarily  be  so  adjusted  that 
the  inherent  qualities  of  external  objects  would  cause  attrac- 
tive or  repulsive  impressions  accordingly  as  the  qualities  of 
the  external  object  would  minister  to  the  benefit  of,  or  do 
harm  to  the  different  species  of  animals  respectively,  and 
such  an  hypothesis  is  contradictory  to  common  knowledge. 
While  it  is  an  undisputed  fact  that  the  impressions  made  on 
different  species  of  animals  by  the  same  external  objects  are 
extremely  different  and  frequently  directly  opposite,  that 
does  not  prove  Spencer's  contention. 

If  the  senses  of  different  animals  arc  not  adjusted  so  that 
the  impressions  on  their  organism  will  correspond  to  the  in- 
herent qualities  of  external  objects,  and  thus  apjirisc  the 
animal,  without  the  intervention  of  thought,  through  the  feel- 
ings aroused  by  those  impressions,  whether  the  seizure  or  the 
avoidance  of  the  object  will  be  beneficial,  then,  the  implica- 
tion is.  that  in  order  that  the  animal  may  be  apprised  of  the 
beneficial  or  harmful  character  of  the  object,  it  must  neces- 
sarily be  aided  by  reason  and  experience.  It  must  be  able  to 
distinguish  the  qualities  of  the  o].<ject  and  determine  by  rea- 
son, whether  any  object  having  particular  qualities  should  be 
seizefl  or  shunned. 

But  reason  in  the  animals  under  view  is  assumed  by  Spen- 
cer to  be  non-existent. 


64  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

The  only  other  alternative  is,  that  the  animal  is  possessed 
of  an  inborn  or  instinctive  knowledge  of  what  objects  or 
character  of  objects  it  will  be  beneficial  for  it  to  seize  or 
to  shun. 

The  instinct,  which  resides  in  the  brain,  is  so  adjusted  to 
the  purpose  of  preserving  the  life  and  furthering  the  welfare 
of  each  particular  species  of  animals  that  the  instinct  of  the 
animal  determines  that  the  impression  made  by  the  sight,  taste, 
or  smell  of  an  external  object  shall  correspond  to  the  fact 
whether  the  character  of  the  object  is  such  that  the  seizure 
of  or  escape  from  it  would  be  beneficial  or  harmful.  It  is 
not  the  character  of  the  external  object,  which  determines 
the  character  of  the  impression  made  on  the  animal  that  the 
seizure  of  or  escape  from  the  object  would  be  beneficial,  for 
that  hypothesis  implies  the  exercise  of  reasoning  on  the  part 
of  the  animal  respecting  the  character  of  the  object,  and  the 
only  alternative  is  that,  in  the  absence  of  reason,  there  must 
be  instinctive  knowledge  as  to  whether  the  object  is  bene- 
ficial or  harmful. 

If  we  define  instinct  as  the  principle  in  living  things,  which 
impels  them  to  preserve  their  lives  and  pursue  their  interests ; 
if  we  limit  the  meaning  of  the  term  instinct  so  as  to  denote 
only  the  force  which  prompts  action,  and  consider  instinct  as 
merely  the  actuating  principle  of  animal  nature,  as  distin- 
guished from  the  principle  which  directs  it  to  pursue  the  par- 
ticular course  of  action  which  will  be  beneficial,  the  necessary 
inference  is,  that  the  thing  must  in  somehow  know  or  in  some 
manner  be  apprised  of  what  course  of  action  will  preserve  its 
life  or  conduce  to  its  welfare;  for  it  is  an  unquestioned  fact 
that  all  animals  do  act  in  a  manner  to  preserve  their  lives  and 
subserve  their  welfare. 

But  I  must  admit  that  I  am  unable  to  discover  any  line  of 
demarcation  between  these  hypothetically  diflferent  principles, 
and  I  know  of  no  philosopher  who  has  succeeded  in  demon- 


INSTINCT  65 

strating  the  existence  of  any  such  perceptible  line,  however 
faint. 

All  the  writers  seem  to  agree  that  in  animals  instinct  de- 
termines them  to  act  in  accordance  with  their  welfare  and 
in  furtherance  of  the  highest  tlestiny  of  the  lives  of  their 
species. 

It  is  held  by  some  writers  that  instinct  acts  blindly  and  inde- 
pendently of  reason  and  that  reason  acts  independently  of 
instinct. 

Some  writers  contentl  that  there  is  no  way  to  account  for 
certain  actions  of  some  animals  except  on  the  assumption 
that  those  animals  are  possessed  of  at  least  a  modicum  of 
the  power  to  reason. 

They  then  argue  that  when  reason  becomes  operative,  in- 
stinct becomes  dormant,  and  that  then  reason  alone  determines 
conduct.  Or  in  other  wortls,  instinct  wholly  determines  ac- 
tions wiien  reason  is  altogether  absent,  but  it  exerts  no  in- 
fluence when  reason  is  present. 

Some  philosophers  have  concluded  that  instinct  and  reason 
act  in  such  perfect  unison  that  the  relative  influence  of  eacli 
is  indeterminable,  but  that  each  contributes  to  the  result  inde- 
pendently of  the  other. 

If  it  be  assumed,  for  we  cannot  know,  that  some  animals 
which  display  a  disposition  to  seek  what  is  good  for  them 
and  to  avoid  vi^hat  will  do  them  harm  are  devoid  of  the  power 
of  reason  and  must  depend  altogether  upon  their  instinct,  the 
inference  is  that  their  instinct  comprises  both  the  impulse  to 
promote  their  welfare  and  a  recognition  of  the  means  of 
accomplishing  that  end. 

Where  reason  is  present,  all  animals — brute  and  human — are 
irresistibly  impelled  to  act  in  accortlance  with  the  mental  con- 
clusions respecting  self-interest. 

I  conclude,  therefore,  that  to  all  intents  and  jiurposes,  anrl 
in  so  far  as  our  present  state  of  intelligence  and  knowledge 


66  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

makes  it  possible  for  us  to  learn,  there  is  but  a  single  force, 
which  at  once  impels  all  creatures,  not  only  to  act,  but  to  act 
in  accordance  with  their  knowledge  or  understanding  of  what 
acts  will  preserve  their  lives  or  further  their  welfare,  whether 
that  knowledge  be  inborn,  acquired  by  experience  or  by  the 
process  of  reasoning;  and  that  in  human  beings,  where  the 
judgments  of  reasoning  constitute  the  understanding  of  what 
is  the  self-interest,  it  matters  not  whether  the  understanding 
be  true  or  erroneous,  that  same  force  impels  the  human  being 
to  pursue  the  attainment  of  the  object  which  his  understanding 
represents  to  him  to  be  his  self-interest. 

Perhaps  a  clearer  idea  of  the  relation  between  the  element 
knowledge,  innate  or  acquired,  and  the  actuating  element  may 
be  gained  when  we  say  that  instinct  which  is  a  natural  attri- 
bute of  the  brain  or  nervous  center,  imperatively  commands 
the  animal  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  impressions  as  to  self- 
interest  received  by  the  brain  through  either  inborn  knowl- 
edge or  reason,  instinctive  conclusions  or  mental  judgments. 

If  we  undertake  to  show  that  instinct — the  first  law  of  crea- 
ture nature  —  the  principle  which  universally  causes  living 
things  to  conform  their  actions  to  their  needs  or  welfare — is 
composed  of  two  elements,  to  wit:  An  element  which  impera- 
tively prompts  action,  and  impressions  received  by  the  brain, 
which  constitute  the  understanding  or  feeling  as  to  what  mode 
of  action  will  best  serve  needs  or  welfare,  which  element  in- 
variably and  imperatively  molds  action,  we  are  confronted  by 
the  fact  that  these  tvv-o  elements  are  so  completely  merged, 
and  their  influences  so  perfectly  co-ordinated,  that  their  com- 
bined influences  uniformly  compass  the  same  end — the  satis- 
faction of  needs  or  desires — and  in  their  operation,  we  are  un- 
able to  distinguish  one  element  from  the  other  or  perceive, 
separately,  their  respective  influences.  It  certainly  cannot  be 
held  that  the  one  element  ever  exerts  a  greater  influence  than 
the  other,  or  that  either  element  ever  acts  alone. 


INSTIxNCT  67 

Certain  actions  of  some  animals,  such  as  the  migration  of 
birds  and  the  returning  home  of  kine,  dogs,  cats,  etc.,  witliout 
the  opportunity  to  observe  the  route  by  wliich  they  were  taken 
from  liome,  must  be  exphiincd  by  causes  of  which  experience 
and  reason  constitute  no  element.  Such  actions  can  be  ac- 
counted for  only  by  the  assumption  that  there  is  inborn  in 
those  animals  a  knowledge  or  instinct  that  to  return  home  or 
to  migrate  to  a  different  climate  at  certain  times,  will  sub- 
serve their  well-being,  and  a  knowledge  of  the  direction  the 
animal  must  take  to  reach  home  or  the  locality  to  which  mi- 
gration is  desirable. 

The  newborn  baby  takes  the  nip[)le  and  extracts  milk  from 
its  mother's  breast  by  employing  the  principle  of  physics 
called  suction.  The  child  does  not  know  that  there  is  milk 
in  its  mother's  breast,  neither  does  it  know  that  by  manipu- 
lating its  mouth  in  a  particular  manner  there  will  be  pro- 
duced in  its  mouth  a  partial  vacuum,  which  will  overcome 
the  resistance  of  the  nipple  and  cause  the  milk  to  flow  into 
its  mouth.  How  it  comes  that  the  newborn  infant  takes  the 
nipple  and  with  expert  deftness  goes  through  the  process  re- 
quired to  extract  milk  from  the  breast,  without  having  ac- 
quired, or  even  having  the  opportunity  of  acquiring,  knowl- 
edge that  there  was  milk  in  the  breast,  that  the  milk  would 
nourish  it,  or  that  a  principle  of  physics  called  suction,  about 
which  it  had  no  means  of  gaining  a  knowledge,  must  be  em- 
ployed to  extract  the  milk,  is  commonly  expressed  by  the 
inelegant,  unscholastic.  though  simple  and  practically  accurate 
statement :  the  baby  knows  enough  to  suck. 

This  inborn  knowledge  of  what  is  desirable  and  how  to  at- 
tain it  is  denoted  with  sufficient  accuracy  by  the  term  in- 
stinctive knowledge,  which,  together  with  the  instinctive,  im- 
perative impulse  to  act.  is  for  all  practical  purposes  accu- 
rately denoted  by  the  single  term,  instinct. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  actions  of  some  animals  cannot  be 


68  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

explained,  except  by  the  theory  that  they  have  the  capacity 
to  profit  by  experience — to  acquire  knowledge  within  certain 
limits,  and  are  possessed  of  the  faculty  of  associating  cause 
and  effect,  adapting  means  to  ends — possessed  of  the  power  of 
reasoning  to  such  extent  that  the  employment  of  reason,  in 
addition  to  their  inborn  knowledge,  will  conduce  to  the  full- 
ness of  their  intended,  prescribed  and  circumscribed  lives — 
dog  life,  horse  life,  monkey  life,  etc.  Is  it  not  the  most 
rational  thing  imaginable  to  infer  that  the  various  species 
of  animals  are  endowed  with  a  power  of  reasoning,  adapted  to 
the  fulfillment  of  the  highest  destiny  of  the  lives  of  the  spe- 
cies respectively,  as  men  are  endowed  with  a  much  greater 
power  of  reasoning,  suited  to  the  fulfillment  of  human  life? 
And  is  it  not  true  of  animals  capable  of  forming  mental  judg- 
ments, that  their  nature  imperatively  directs  them  to  act  in 
accordance  with  the  judgments — in  accordance  with  their 
knowledge  of  what  their  welfare  is  and  of  the  mode  of  action 
which  will  effect  the  desired  result?  And  furthermore,  is  it 
not  true,  that  there  can  be  perceived  no  difference  in  the 
manner  in  which  the  nature  of  an  animal  causes  it  to  act, 
where  reason  or  experience  does  not  enter  into  the  determi- 
nation of  the  act,  and  where  reason  or  experience  does  consti- 
tute the  natural  motive  in  accordance  with  which  the  actuat- 
ing element  of  instinct  acts?  Whether  the  operation  which 
takes  place  in  the  minds  of  animals  and  which  appears  to  be 
the  exercise  of  reasoning  is  subject  to  the  same  principles 
as  is  the  reasoning  faculty  of  human  beings,  or  but  an  in- 
stinctive and  therefore  an  involuntary  operation,  we  know 
not.  But  there  is  to  be  observed  this  important  difference 
between  the  manifestations  of  what  we  conceive  to  be  the 
faculty  of  reasoning  in  the  animals  and  what  we  clearly  per- 
ceive to  be  the  factulty  of  reasoning  in  mankind.  With  ani- 
mals the  mental  judgments  respecting  their  v^^elfare  are  as  un- 
erring as  is  their  instinctive  knoudedge  of  self-interest,  while 


INSTINCT  6V 

with  human  beings  their  intellectual  ju<lgnients  respecting  their 
self-interest  arc  frequently,  and  too  frequently,  erroneous. 

Anil,  as  is  always  the  case  with  nature,  this  ditTerence  in 
the  character  and  manifestations  of  the  reasoning  powers  of 
animals  and  human  beings  is  due  to  a  wise  purpose.  The 
reasoning  capacity  of  the  animal  is  adapted  to  its  intended 
life,  and  no  amount  of  cultivation  can  enlarge  that  capacity 
beyond  certain  narrow  bounds.  Likewise,  the  intellectual 
powers  of  man  were  adapted  to  the  intended  possibilities  of 
his  life,  the  bounds  of  which  wc,  at  this  time,  cannot  im- 
agine. Man  is  essentially  a  reasoning  animal.  He  is  dis- 
tinguished from  other  animals  only  by  the  scope  of  his  reason- 
ing powers.  Young  animals  quickly  attain  all  knowledge 
which  they  are  cajiable  of  acquiring  during  their  whole  life, 
or  that  the  same  species  of  animal  is  capable  of  acquiring 
during  any  numl)er  of  succeeding  generations.  There  is  no  in- 
dication that  any  animal  is  possessed  of  a  desire  to  rise  above 
its  original  stale.  The  dog  has  no  ambition  to  walk  on  his 
hind  legs,  wear  a  hat,  or  cook  food,  and  much  less  has  he 
an  inclination  to  speculate  about  his  origin  or  future  <lcstiny; 
in  short,  a  dog  is  a  dog;  always  was  a  dog  and  always  will  be 
a  dog,  with  due  respect  to  my  friends  the  evolutionists.  Why? 
Because  all  evidence  goes  to  show  that  it  was  not  inteivled 
that  he  should  ever  be  anything  but  a  doq-.  Unless  we  deny  the 
wisdom  of  all  creation,  we  must  conclude  that  dogs  were  made 
for  a  wise  purpose,  to  fulfdl  which  nothing  but  a  dog  would 
suffice.  For  that  reason  there  are  dogs,  an<l  for  the  same 
reason  there  are  horses,  sheep  and  mosquitoes. 

But  man  is  endowed  with  the  faculty  of  reasoning,  which 
is  susceptible  of  wonderful  cultivation  and  development,  and 
capable  of  fathoming  all  the  secrets  of  nature  which  wouM 
possibly  be  of  use  to  him  as  a  means  to  his  progress  toward 
a  higher  life.  An  evident  and  exceedingly  important  part 
of  the  scheme  of  humanity  as  we  observe  it  is  that  the  prin- 


70  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

ciples  and  properties  of  natural  things,  which  may  be  used 
by  man  to  promote  his  well-being,  are  so  hidden  that  their 
discovery  by  man  requires  great  effort  and  toil.  His  prob- 
lem is  to  discover  facts  of  nature  which  will  be  serviceable 
to  him,  and,  accordingly,  he  is  endowed  with  all  the  capaci- 
ties which  are  necessary  to  the  discovery  of  all  such  facts ; 
and  we  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  there  are  such  facts 
without  end,  and  that,  therefore,  there  are  no  knowable  lim- 
its to  the  development  of  man.  Besides  the  capacity  to  ac- 
quire knowledge  which  will  subserve  his  well-being,  he  is 
imbued  with  a  restless  dissatisfaction  with  his  present  con- 
dition. 

There  is  in  nature  everything  which  could  contribute  to  the 
highest  development  which  the  constitution  of  man  will  per- 
mit. There  is  in  man  an  unremitting,  irresistible  desire  to 
serve  his  own  welfare  as  best  he  knows  how.  He  is  fully 
equipped  with  the  faculties  having  the  latent  power  required 
for  the  discovery  of  all  facts  of  nature  which  can  be  of  use 
to  him.  But  the  very  important  fact  must  not  be  overlooked, 
that  the  cultivation  of  the  faculties  and  the  development  of 
their  powers  depend  upon  the  initiative  of  the  individual 
through  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  his  reason.  And  when  he 
exercises  his  reasoning  powers  to  discover  a  new  fact,  he  is 
prompted  to  do  so  by  his  instinct,  acting  in  accordance  with 
his  already  acquired  knowledge  that  the  discovery  and  knowl- 
edge of  that  fact  will  be  of  use  to  him. 

Altogether  unlike  animals,  there  has  been  imposed  upon 
man  the  task  of  solving  problems  the  solution  of  which  alone 
can  promote  his  welfare. 

From  the  above  conclusion  there  follows  the  further  con- 
clusion that  human  beings  progress  in  exact  proportion  to 
their  acquirement  of  knowledge  of  their  self-interest,  and 
therefore  the  single  prerequisite  to  any  progress  of  individ- 


INSTINCT  71 

uals,  or  societies  of  individuals,  beyond  their  present  slate, 
is  the  acquirement  of  new  or  more  accurate  knowlc  Ige  of 
what  is  truly  good  for  them,  which  brings  us  to  the  fmal  con- 
clusion that  the  first  knowledge  they  must  possess  is  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  simple  but  prodigiously  important  fact  that  more 
knowledge  of  self-interest  is  the  only  thing  of  which  man- 
kind is  in  need. 


CHAPTER  III. 
HUMAN  NATURE. 

The  principles  and  forces  of  physical  nature,  the  properties 
of  matter,  and  their  application  to  useful  purposes,  have  been 
discovered  chiefly  by  induction,  by  experiment,  by  the  ob- 
servation of  phenomena.  The  conditions  under  which  the 
principles  and  forces  of  nature  and  properties  of  matter  man- 
ifest themselves  are  not  so  divers  and  complex  but  that  defi- 
nite and  reliable  data  of  both  the  phenomena  and  the  condi- 
tions under  which  the  phenomena  occur  may  be  obtained, 
and  the  principles  and  forces  of  nature  and  properties  of  mat- 
ter induced  therefrom.  For  this  reason  it  is  possible  to  pro- 
vide the  required  conditions  for  making  such  practical  experi- 
ments as  will  lead  to  a  discovery  of  the  facts  of  physical  na- 
ture and  the  means  of  adapting  them  to  useful  purposes. 

But  this  is  far  from  being  true  of  the  principles  and  attri- 
butes of  human  nature  and  their  phenomena,  human  conduct. 
Knowledge  or  belief  of  what  will  subserve  self-interest  being 
the  guiding  principle  of  conduct,  the  conduct  of  no  two  indi- 
viduals is  alike,  because  the  state  of  knowledge  of  no  two 
individuals  respecting  self-interest  is  ever  alike,  even  though 
other  conditions  were  the  same. 

Knowledge  or  beliefs  being  the  directing  factor  of  conduct, 
the  particular  combinations  of  knowledge  and  beliefs  of  each 
member  of  an  entire  society  of  people  would  constitute  an 
indispensable  part  of  the  data  from  which  we  would  have  to 
induce  the  principles  of  human  nature,  if  we  undertook  to  get 
at  them  by  the  inductive  method.  The  variations  of  conduct 
are  infinitely  greater  than  the  physical  variations  which  cause 
the  countenances  of  people  to  be  distinguishable  one  from  an- 
other.    If  anyone  is  possessed  of  the  notion  that  the  know!- 


HUMAN    NATURE  72, 

edge  and  beliefs  of  a  single  individual  respecting  his  self- 
interest,  which  have  determined  the  manner  of  every  act  of 
his  life,  can  be  ascertained,  let  him  endeavor  to  enumerate 
these  data  respecting  himself. 

There  is  no  avoiding  the  conclusion  that  the  principles  which 
determine  human  conduct  must  be  deduced  from  the  nature 
and  fitness  of  things,  and  that  these  principles  can  have  and 
need  have  no  other  sanction.  They  cannot  be  discovered 
through  the  observation  of  their  phenomena,  because  the  phe- 
nomena are  of  infmite  variety,  and,  judging  from  the  phe- 
nomena alone,  it  would  appear  that  human  conduct  is  gov- 
erned by  no  principles  whatever. 

There  is  nothing  else  in  nature  like  liuman  nature.  While 
the  discovery  of  useful  knowledge  of  physical  nature  is  ac- 
complished through  the  operation  of  the  principles  and  facul- 
ties of  human  nature  by  observation  of  phenomena,  the  prin- 
ciples of  human  nature  and  their  operation  must  be  discov- 
ered through  their  own  operation,  not  by  introspection,  but 
by  a  priori  reasoning — by  deduction  from  the  necessities  in 
the  nature  of  things. 

While  the  discovery  of  the  principles  which  govern  human 
conduct  must  necessarily  be  made  by  reasoning  out  what,  in 
the  nature  of  things,  they  must  be,  we,  of  course,  cannot  be 
quite  sure  of  the  correctness  of  our  reasoning  until  we  have 
put  our  conclusions  to  the  test  of  common  experience,  and  have 
found  that  they  furnish  a  rational,  unerring  explanation  of  all 
observable  human  conduct. 

Hence,  there  is  no  wonder  that  the  discovery  of  the  truths 
regarding  human  nature  is  beset  with  much  greater  difficulties 
than  is  the  discovery  of  truths  respecting  outward  nature,  and 
quite  as  little  wonder  that  the  adoption  of  the  methods  suited 
to  the  discovery  of  physical  truths,  in  endeavoring  to  dis- 
cover the  truths  of  human  nature,  to  which  such  methods  are 
altogether  unsuited,  has  resulted  in  failure. 


74  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

Human  nature,  like  everything  else  in  nature,  was  con- 
trived with  infinite  wisdom.  As  a  means  to  the  end,  the 
steady  progress  of  mankind  toward  a  higher  and  higher  state, 
— material,  physical,  mental,  moral,  and  social — human  nature 
was  made  complete  and  perfect.  To  make  any  imaginable 
change  in  human  nature  as  we  find  it,  would  not  only  render 
human  nature  incapable  of  serving  the  best  interests  of  man- 
kind, but  it  would  absolutely  defeat  and  destroy  the  scheme 
of  humanity. 

It  is  absolutely  impossible  to  imagine  how  human  nature 
could  be  different  from  what  it  is,  and  mankind  survive;  and 
it  is  preposterous  to  suppose  that  human  nature  may  be  so 
changed  that  greater  progress  toward  a  higher  state  of  civi- 
lization would  thereby  be  facilitated.  Human  nature  has 
never  changed  any  more  than  the  law  of  gravitation  has 
changed. 

No  step  toward  more  just  social  conditions  has  ever  been 
made,  except  through  the  operation  of  that  inexorable  law  of 
human  nature,  which  impels  every  man  to  act  under  all  cir- 
cumstances in  accordance  with  what  he  conceives  to  be  his 
own  best  interest.  One  might  as  well  argue  that  the  attrac- 
tive force  of  gravitation  could  be  changed  into  a  repellant 
force  without  destroying  the  scheme  of  the  universe,  as  to 
argue  that  the  fundamental  principle  of  human  nature,  self- 
preservation,  which  implies  self-interest  in  lesser  matters  than 
the  preservation  of  life  itself,  could  be  changed,  without  de- 
stroying the  scheme  of  humanity. 

Centuries  of  human  conduct  leave  not  a  shadow  of  a  doubt 
that  men  never  have  conducted  themselves  righteously  for 
righteousness'  sake.  No  human  being  that  ever  lived — savage, 
barbarous  or  civilized — nor  any  society  of  individuals  that  ever 
existed,  whatever  their  state  of  civilization  may  have  been, 
ever  did  a  righteous  act  which  was  not  prompted  by  the  self- 
interest  of  the  doer.     For  some  hundreds  of  years  the  en- 


HUMAN    NATURE  75 

(leavor  has  been  made  to  induce  people  to  act  righteously  for 
righteousness'  sake,  but  human  nature,  unperturbed,  has  pur- 
sued the  even  tenor  of  its  course  and  has  impelled  all  men 
to  act  in  accordance  with  their  conception  of  what  was  their 
self-interest,  whether  such  action  were  righteous  or  unright- 
eous. And  it  is  a  most  remarkable  thing,  that  in  the  face  of 
all  this  experience,  it  has  not  long  ago  dawned  upon  the  intel- 
ligence of  generally  intelligent  people,  that  if  they  desired  the 
general  conduct  of  people  to  be  as  righteous  as  the  prevail- 
ing ideals  of  righteousness,  they  must  so  arrange  matters  that 
it  will  be  obviously  to  the  self-interest  of  at  least  a  majority 
of  the  people  to  conduct  themselves  in  accordance  with  that 
standard. 

To  those  of  my  readers  who  may  allow  their  preconceived 
notion  that  they  are  better  than  they  were  made  to  be,  to  cause 
them  to  disjiute  the  foregoing  truth,  let  me  earnestly  recom- 
mend that  they  cultivate  the  practice  of  introspection,  and 
thereby  learn  to  know  themselves. 

Thus  we  see  that  not  only  is  there  nothing  the  matter  with 
human  nature,  and  that  human  nature  does  not  need  to  be 
changed  in  order  that  there  may  be  just  economic  relations 
between  men,  but  that  human  nature  is  just  what  it  ought  to 
be  and  what  it  must  be  in  order  that  just  relations  between 
men  may  ever  be  brought  about. 

It  cannot  be  imagined  how  the  fundamental  law  of  human 
nature,  self-preservation,  self-interest,  instinct,  could  be  so 
modified  or  changed,  that  the  effects  of  its  operation  would 
be  more  beneficent  under  any  system  of  social  arrangements, 
whether  good  or  bad,  than  would  result  from  the  operation  of 
human  nature  as  we  know  it. 

If  the  operation  of  human  nature,  as  it  is,  under  the  bad 
system  of  social  arrangements  now  existing,  produces  bad  re- 
sults, any  change  in  the  law  of  human  nature,  if  such  a  change 
were  conceivable  or  possible,  would  surely  produce  worse  re- 


76  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

suits.  There  is  no  avoiding  the  conclusion,  that  notwithstand' 
ing  the  fact  that  under  a  system  of  bad  social  arrangements 
the  operation  of  human  nature  as  it  is  brings  about  bad  re- 
sults, it  brings  about  the  best  results  possible  under  that  sys- 
tem of  social  arrangements. 

For,  since  each  member  of  the  society  always  acts  in  ac- 
cordance with  what  he  conceives  to  be  his  best  interests,  the 
resulting  effects  in  the  aggregate  must  necessarily  be  the  best 
possible  under  the  circumstances.  For  no  individual  can  act 
more  wisely  under  any  given  circumstances  than  his  knowl- 
edge or  perception  of  what  his  interests  are  will  enable  him 
to  do.  And  each  individual  must  necessarily,  as  a  rule,  act  on 
his  own  knowledge  as  to  what  is  best  for  himself,  because  every 
one  knows  that  no  one  else  can  know  all  the  circumstances 
which  surround  him,  and  the  relative  influence  of  each  of 
those  circumstances,  as  he  himself  does.  It  is  for  this  reason 
that  we  see  the  almost  universal  indisposition  of  people  to  act 
on  the  advice  of  others. 

That  it  would  be  possible  to  bring  about  more  desirable 
results,  in  the  aggregate,  if  any  considerable  proportion  of 
the  individuals  of  the  society  were  to  act  contrary  to  what  they 
conceived  to  be  their  best  interests,  is  an  unthinkable  propo- 
sition. 

Thus  we  are  brought  to  the  momentous  and  far-reaching 
truth  that  the  principle  of  human  nature,  which  impels  each 
individual  to  act  in  obedience  to  his  conception  of  what  con- 
stitutes his  own  self-interest,  will,  in  the  absence  of  better 
knowledge  of  self-interest,  bring  about  the  best  results  for 
each  individual  member  of  the  society,  and  consequently  the 
best  results  in  the  aggregate  that  are  possible  under  any  sys- 
tem of  social  arrangements  and  under  the  particular  environ- 
ment of  each  individual  resulting  from  the  system  of  social 
arrangements. 

If  there  be  any  purpose  at  all  in  nature  or  in  human  nature, 


HUMAN    NATURi:  77 

evcrytliing  natural  must  be  guvcrncd  by  universal,  ininiutablc, 
inexorable  laws.  ( )lber\visc  \vc  coubl  know  nothing  of  the 
properties  and  forces  of  physical  nature,  nor  how  to  employ 
them  to  the  satisfaction  of  our  wants.  And  unless  human  na- 
ture were  governed  by  a  universal  principle,  we  could  not 
know  what  human  nature  is,  we  could  not  know  the  nature 
of  other  persons,  nor  even  our  own  nature. 

If  the  fundamental  principle  of  human  nature,  self-interest, 
ceaseil  to  be  the  actuating  motive  of  human  conduct,  society 
would  be  plunged  into  chaos.  The  contluct  of  all  individuals 
woulil  be  mere  chance.  No  individual  would  be  able  to  take 
care  of  himself.  He  would  not  have  even  the  desire  to  take 
care  of  himself.  There  would  be  no  rule  by  wdiich  one  per- 
son would  be  able  to  know  what  the  probable  course  of  action 
of  another  person  w'ould  be  under  any  given  conditions. 

For  conditions  would  count  for  nothing  if  the  actuating 
principle  of  human  nature,  self-interest,  were  eliminated.  In 
fact,  there  would  be  no  common  basis  upon  which  intercourse 
between  persons  could  be  carried  on.  It  would  make  no  dif- 
ference to  any  one  what  he  did  or  what  he  did  not  do,  nor 
would  he  have  any  concern  about  what  others  did  or  did  not 
do.  If  one  did  not  consider  his  own  interests  or  rights,  he 
certainly  would  not  consider  the  interests  or  rights  of  others. 

The  entire  social  fabric  would  fall  to  pieces,  the  human  race 
would  disappear  from  the  face  of  the  eartli.  and  the  animals, 
possessed  of  the  instinct  of  self-j^reservation,  would  overrun 
the  world. 

The  assumption  that  human  nature  is  bad  and  ought  to  be 
made  good,  and  that  therefore  the  egoism  of  human  nature,  as 
we  know  it.  must  l)c  changed  into  altruism,  proceeds  from  the 
erroneous  notion  that  the  unjust  acts  of  men  are  the  result  of 
a  human  nature  so  faulty  made  that,  in  order  to  produce 
good  results,  it  must  be  not  only  made  over,  but  must  be  made 
just  the  opposite  from  what  it  is.     And  the  notion  that  the 


78  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

unjust  acts  of  men  are  the  result  of  a  botched  human  nature, 
proceeds  from  a  confusion  of  human  character  and  human 
nature,  two  fundamentally  distinct  things. 

The  confounding  of  human  nature  and  human  character 
makes  it  utterly  impossible  to  arrive  at  correct  conclusions 
with  reference  to  social  questions.  No  one  who  fails  to  ap- 
prehend the  sharp  distinction  between  these  two  attributes 
of  human  beings  can  possibly  perceive  what  is  the  matter  with 
bad  social  conditions,  nor  determine  what  social  arrangements 
would  work  justice.  For,  since  all  social  arrangements,  good 
or  bad ;  all  social  conditions,  good  or  bad ;  all  economic  rela- 
tions between  man  and  man,  good  or  bad ;  all  individual  con- 
ditions, including  individual  character,  are  but  the  product 
of  the  operation  of  the  same  universal  principle  of  human 
nature,  self-interest,  a  clear  understanding  of  what  human 
nature  is,  and  of  the  part  which  it  plays  in  the  affairs  of  men 
furnishes  the  key  to  the  solution  of  all  social  questions. 

The  nature  of  all  men  is  precisely  the  same;  the  character 
of  each  individual  is  different  from  that  of  every  other  indi- 
vidual. The  baby  is  born  possessed  of  human  nature  as  the 
various  animals  come  into  the  world  possessed  of  their  va- 
rious animal  natures.  The  baby  is  born  devoid  of  thought, 
knowledge  or  character.  The  infant  brain  is  equipped  with 
the  latent  power  of  reasoning  and  is  prepared  to  receive  im- 
pressions yet  to  be  made  upon  it.  Its  power  of  reasoning  must 
be  cultivated  and  developed.  The  character  of  the  impressions 
it  is  to  receive  will  depend  upon  the  character  of  its  environ- 
ment, and  the  character  of  the  child  throughout  its  life  will 
depend  upon  the  character  of  the  impressions  made  upon  its 
brain  through  the  course  of  its  life;  which  means  that  the 
character  of  a  person  is  the  product  of  the  actuating  principle 
of  human  nature,  self-preservation,  acting  according  to  his 
understanding  of  what  constitutes  his  self-interest,  which  un- 


HUMAN    NATURE  79 

derstanding  is  largely  determined  by  the  influences  of  hh 
environment. 

That  most  people,  more  or  less  consciously,  draw  a  distinc- 
tion between  human  nature  and  human  character,  when  think- 
ing of  a  single  indiviilual,  is  evident  from  such  common  ex- 
pressions as,  Bad  associations  have  an  ill  cflfect  on  character, 
and,  The  character  is  peculiarly  susceptible  to  the  influence 
of  environment  during  the  early  i)eriod  of  its  formation,  and 
from  the  fact  tiiat  reference  is  never  made  to  the  influence  of 
environment  on  tiie  individual's  human  nature. 

But  even  the  most  able  thinkers,  when  having  social  ques- 
tions under  consideration,  have  fallen  into  the  error  of  ascrib- 
ing evil  conduct,  which  is  properly  associated  with 
character,  to  the  imperfection  of  human  nature  itself. 
Whereas,  a  correct  understanding  of  the  matter  unavoidably 
leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  evil  conduct  complained  of. 
as  well  as  the  immoral  character,  of  which  the  evil  conduct 
is  the  expression,  can  be  reformed  alone  by  the  operation  of 
the  fundamental  principle  of  human  nature,  self-interest,  by 
the  play  of  human  nature  as  it  is. 

When  we  speak  of  the  character  of  an  individual,  we  mean 
the  quality  of  his  general  conduct.  When  we  say  that  a  man 
has  a  spotless  character,  we  mean  that  no  fault  can  be  founrl 
with  any  part  of  his  conduct.  When  we  refer  to  a  man  as 
having  a  fair  character  we  mean  to  imply  that  in  some  re- 
spects his  conduct  is  not  as  good  as  it  might  be.  One's  char- 
acter in  many  respects  may  be  good  and  in  other  respects  bad. 
A  thief  may  be  generous  and  kind  to  his  acquaintances,  and 
an  habitual  liar  may  mean  no  harm  to  any  one.  But,  what- 
ever the  combination  of  traits,  tendencies  or  dispositions,  which 
form  the  character  of  an  individual,  they  are  the  product  of 
the  play  of  human  nature  un<ier  the  influence  of  his  environ- 


80  SOCIAL  JUSTICE 

ment  and  enlightenment,  that  is  to  say,  the  degree  of  his 
knowledge  of  what  is  his  self-interest. 

There  need  be  no  fear  that  the  recognition  of  the  truth 
that  the  subservance  of  self-interest  is  the  motive  of  every 
act  will  tend  to  make  us  more  "selfish,"  cause  us  to  be  less 
generous,  sympathetic,  charitable,  loving,  less  lovable  or  ad- 
mirable in  any  respect.  Whether  we  recognize  the  truth  or 
not,  the  truth  that  we  always  have  been,  are,  and  always  will 
be  absolutely  "selfish,"  regardless  of  what  our  beliefs  respect- 
ing human  nature  may  be,  still  remains.  Love,  sympathy, 
generosity,  charitableness,  are  traits  of  character  which  de- 
pend upon  acquired  knowledge  and  environment  and  not  at 
all  upon  the  inborn  propensity  which  we  call  human  nature. 
Instead  of  destroying  or  debilitating  the  higher  sentiments 
or  traits  of  character,  a  right  understanding  of  our  nature, 
and  of  the  factors  of  conduct  (which  are  likewise  the  factors 
of  character),  will  cause  us  to  direct  our  energies  toward  the 
getting  of  knowledge  of  how  to  establish  social  justice,  and 
thereby  provide  the  conditions  indispensable  to  the  highest 
development  of  the  sentiments  and  traits  of  character  which 
are  most  to  be  admired. 

Nothing  merely  happens.  Every  occurrence  is  the  result 
of  the  operation  of  inexorable,  natural  laws.  Every  phe- 
nomenon is  the  effect  of  a  perfectly  natural  cause  or  causes. 
Everything  which  takes  place,  does  so  take  place,  because  in 
the  nature  of  things,  the  forces  and  conditions  which  were 
immediately  or  remotely  brought  to  bear,  nothing  but  what 
actually  did  take  place  could  possibly  have  taken  place.  That 
is  to  say,  for  every  phenomenon,  whether  within  the  sphere 
of  human  conduct,  or  belonging  to  the  class  of  purely  physical 
events,  with  which  human  conduct  has  nothing  to  do,  there 
is  a  natural  cause.  All  phenomena  are  simply  the  manifesta- 
tions of  natural  laws.  In  the  discovery  of  the  natural  law  or 
laws  which  have  contributed  to  the  production  of  events,  we 


Ill:  MAX    XATliRl':  81 

discover  the  reason  for  tilings,  an. I  there  is  a  reason  for  every- 
thing that  takes  i»lacc,  which  is  hnt  ancjthcr  way  of  stating 
that  every  phenomenon  has  a  natnral  canse ;  that  it  is  the 
effect  of  the  orderly  operation  of  inexorahle  natural  laws. 

Did  not  all  the  forces  of  nature  and  the  princi|>les  of 
human  nature  operate  presistently  and  uniformly  to  the  same 
purpose,  there  wouM  be  no  reason  for  anything.  We  would  he 
unable  to  connect  any  phenomenon  with  its  cause.  We  would 
be  unable  to  learn  anything  by  experience,  becraise  our  e-;- 
pericnce  in  one  case  would  not  be  ai)i)licablc  to  another.  WV- 
would  not  be  able  to  adapt  means  to  ends,  because  we  would 
not  know  what  means  would  result  in  particular  en<ls.  All  of 
our  speculations  respecting  economics  as  v.ell  as  our  specula- 
tions for  the  purpose  of  adapting  i)hysical  forces  to  our  pur- 
poses, would  be  of  no  value.  All  that  w-e  could  do  would 
be  simply  to  wait  until  things  hapiUMicd.  and  when  they  did 
happen  we  woul  1  mtt  kiKJW  how  nor  why  they  happened. 

Recognizing  the  truth  that  human  nature  was  so  wisely 
contrived  that  thrcaigh  its  operation  alone  the  best  interests 
of  humam'ty  may  be  furthered  and  its  highest  destiny  attaine  i, 
we  must  look  for  the  cause  of  social  injr.sticc,  not  to  any 
defects  in  human  nature,  but  elsev.here. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
HUMAN    NATURE— Continued. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  it  was  developed  that  every  human 
being  is  irresistibly  impelled  to  act  under  all  circumstances 
in  accordance  with  his  understanding  as  to  what  mode  of 
action  will  best  subserve  his  self-interest. 

We  have  also  seen  that  any  betterment  of  his  condition 
depends  on  getting  more  knowledge  of  what  will  advance  his 
self-interest. 

It  will  now  be  in  order  to  consider  all  the  factors  which 
determine  the  manner  of  all  human  conduct;  to  elucidate  the 
nature  of  the  influence  each  factor  directly  exerts  in  the  for- 
mation of  immediate  conduct  and  the  influence  the  several 
factors  have  on  each  other,  and  how  they  thus  affect  future 
conduct. 

In  order  to  establish  social  justice,  it  v/ill  be  necessary  to 
find  the  means  by  which  social  conduct  may  be  rendered  just. 
We  cannot  know  how  to  begin  that  undertaking  until  we  have 
learned  what  are  the  principles  or  laws  which  determine  all 
conduct.  And.  therefore  I  would  here  impress  upon  my  read- 
ers the  inestimable  importance  of  the  truths  brought  to  light 
in  the  present  chapter. 

Since  the  science  of  social  justice  really  consists  in  an 
accurate  knowledge  of  human  nature,  and  of  the  manner  in 
which  human  nature  will  cause  men  to  act  under  any  actual 
or  imaginary  combination  of  social  arrangements,  and  of  the 
application  of  this  knowdedge  in  the  construction  of  a  social 
system  which  will  produce  economic  justice,  it  is  of  primor- 
dial importance,  in  dealing  with  that  subject,  that  a  clear 
understanding  be  had  of  human  nature  itself,  and  the  part 
that  human  nature  plays  in  determining  the  economic  rela- 


HUMAN    NATURH  83 

tions  between  individuals.  For  all  social  (lucstions,  in  their 
final  analysis,  resolve  themselves  into  ciiicstions  of  human 
con<luct,  and  human  conduct  is  controlled  f)rimarily  by  the 
fundamental  principle  of  human  nature,  self-interest. 

All  social  questions  arise  by  reason  of  our  knowledge  that 
the  operation  of  human  nature,  under  the  conditi(jns,  does 
not  produce  desirable  results;  that  there  is  somewhere  a  cause 
or  agency  which  protluces  injustice — wrong  economic  conduct. 
The  knowledge  that  something  is  wrong  leads  us  to  incjuirc 
into  the  nature  of  the  wrong  and  its  cause.  Knowing  that 
the  fault  does  not  lie  in  human  nature,  which  is  a  perfectly 
ada[)ted  means  to  the  desired  end,  it  must  be  found  in  the 
social  system.  We  may  learn  wherein  the  system  is  faulty 
only  by  ascertaining  why  the  social  system  so  determines  the 
interests  of  the  incHvidual  members  of  the  community  as  to 
impel  them  to  act  unjustly.  When  we  have  ascertained  those 
facts  we  will  have  found  precisely  what  is  the  matter  with 
the  social   system. 

If  we  would  learn  what  system  of  social  arrangements 
would  bring  desirable  results,  we  may  do  so  only  l)y  ascertain- 
ing what  the  several  social  arrangements,  constituting  the 
entire  social  system,  must  be,  in  order  that  each  and  every 
individual  may  freely  pursue  his  own  self-interest,  and  the 
result  l)e  just  relations  between  them.  And  when  we  have 
found  a  combination  of  social  arrangements  which  will  make 
it  to  the  true  interest  of  each  in<lividual  member  of  the  com- 
munity to  be  just  in  all  his  dealings  with  his  fellows,  which 
will  actual)}-  make  honesty  the  best  policy,  we  may  be  certain 
that  we  have   found  the  solution  of  all  social  questions. 

Therefore,  it  may  be  truly  said  that  the  science  of  social 
justice  or  the  science  of  sociology  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than 
the  science  of  human   nature. 

In  contemplating  the  operation  of  human  nature  under 
present  social  arrangements,  and  in  endeavoring  to  determine 


84  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

why  human  nature,  self-interest,  acting  under  those  social 
arrangements,  produces  innumerable,  indescribable  evil  results, 
we  must  always  keep  in  view  the  vitally  important  truth  that 
there  are  three  factors  which  conjointly  mold  economic  con- 
duct— instinct,  environment  and  knowledge. 

Instinct  is  an  invariable  force,  which  always  impels  us 
to  act  in  accordance  with  what  we  conceive  to  be  our  self- 
interest,  whether  our  conception  of  what  our  interests  are, 
be  true  or  false. 

In  man,  nature  implanted  the  principle  of  self-preservation, 
and  gave  that  principle  dominion  over  every  human  act.  Man 
was  endowed  with  the  dominating  and  never  changing  desire 
not  only  to  preserve  his  life,  but  to  conserve  his  interests  in 
less  vital   affairs. 

Human  instinct  is  the  actuating  principle  or  factor  of  con- 
duct. It  invariably  prompts  us  to  pursue  the  satisfaction 
of  our  desires.  It  has  been  through  the  pursuit  of  self- 
interest  that  mankind,  by  experience,  originally  has  acquired 
knowledge,  and  that  every  individual  now  acquires  knowl- 
edge. It  has  been  self-interest  which  has  always  prompted 
man  to  seek  knowledge,  and  the  same  self-interest  has  urged 
men  to  carry  on  tedious  and  arduous  experimentations,  that 
they  might  discover  the  secrets  of  nature  and  gain  more 
knowledge  for  the  purpose  of  better  satisfying  their  desires ; 
and  it  has  been  self-interest  alone  which  impelled  men  to 
acquire  what  knowledge  they  have  thus  far  acquired  of  the 
social  arrangements  by  which  their  economic  condition  has 
been  im.proved. 

Instinct  being  innate  and  invariable,  it  has  been  feasible 
to  deal  with  that  factor  of  conduct — to  show  what  it  is  and 
how  it  operates — without  reference  to  the  other  two  factors, 
except  in  a  very  general  way. 

Rut  when  we  come  to  deal  with  the  other  two  factors, 
environment  and  knowledge,  which  are  man-made,  and  there- 


HUMAN    NATURE  85 

fore  constantly  changing,  an^l  further.  I)ecause  eacli  of  those 
factors  is  partly  tlie  cause  and  partly  the  elTect  of  the  other,  we 
find  it  inipracticahle  to  cnniprchcnsively  treat  of  them  sep- 
arately. 

I'or  the  purpose  of  (Ictorniining  h<nv  environment  influ- 
ences conduct,  it  will  be  necessary  for  us  to  divide  what  is 
usually  included  in  the  term  environment  into  two  distinct 
classes,  natural  environment,  that  part  of  our  i)hysical  en- 
vironment which  is  fixed  by  nature  and  over  which  man  has 
no  control,  an<l  artificial  or  economic  environment,  that  part 
of  our  environment  which  is  made  by  man  and  over  which  man 
has  complete  control. 

Now,  our  natural  environment  does  not  enter  into  any 
of  our  social  problems.  It  exerts  no  influence  in  determining 
the  economic  relations  of  men,  for  nature  is  no  respecter 
of  persons.  But  our  artificial  or  economic  environment  ab- 
solutely fixes  the  economic  relations  of  men,  and  may  make 
those  relations  perfectly  just,  or  unjust  to  the  last  degree,  even 
to  the  taking  of  life   itself. 

When,  therefore,  the  term  environment  is  used  in  the 
course  of  this  treatise,  it  is  intended  to  mean  our  artificial 
or  economic  environment  only. 

Our  economic  environment  is  immediately  determined  by 
the  institutions  and  laws  under  which  we  live.  The  institu- 
tions and  laws  determine  the  general  conduct  of  all  members 
of  the  society.  They  determine  the  economic  status  of  every 
infjividual.  They  determine  the  avocations  of  men.  They 
ordain  whether  a  man  shall  be  master  or  slave.  They  consti- 
tute the  rules  umler  which  iiKhviduals  are  permitted  to  pro- 
duce wealth  and  by  which  the  wealth  is  distributed.  They 
are  immediately  responsible  for  every  bit  of  economic  in- 
justice that  exists,  and  therefore,  whenever  there  is  economic 
injustice,  we  must  look  to  the  social  arrangements  for  its 
cause. 


86  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

If  anyone  will  consider  how  he  came  to  be  doing  what  he 
is  now  doing  for  a  living,  he  will  find  that  it  came  about 
through  a  catenation  of  circumstances  which  were  the  result 
of  and  peculiar  to  the  institutions  and  laws.  He  will  find 
that,  in  so  far  as  he  had  any  choice  in  the  matter,  his  choice 
was  limited  to  the  opportunities  which  had  been  determined 
by  the  institutions  and  laws,  and  that,  but  for  the  artificial 
determination  of  opportunities  by  the  social  arrangements, 
he  might  have  done  or  would  have  been  under  the  neces- 
sity of  doing  something  very  different. 

The  will  to  satisfy  desire  is  always  present  and  is  the 
prompter  of  every  action ;  the  scope  of  the  antivities  of  the 
individual  is  practically  bounded  by  his  environment.  If  the 
prospect  of  satisfying  one's  desires  in  one  direction  is  made 
impossible  by  circumstances,  his  desires  themselves  will  be 
fixed  upon  obtainable  objects  in  other  directions,  and  thus 
the  makings  of  a  good  physician  or  a  brilliant  scientist  are 
sometimes  turned  into  an  average  shoemaker  or  blacksmith. 

Our  social  arrangements  constitute  the  general  environ- 
ment which  exerts  an  influence  on  the  economic  conduct  of  all 
individuals.  They  are  the  rules  by  which  wealth  is  distrib- 
uted. The  self-interest  of  each  individual,  acting  under  those 
rules,  and  under  the  simultaneous  influence  of  the  conduct 
of  all  other  individuals,  determines  his  economic  conduct. 
Therefore,  the  social  arrangements,  combined  with  the 
economic  conduct  of  all  other  individuals,  compose  the  econ- 
omic environment  of  each  individual. 

If  the  social  arrangements  be  just,  the  people  will  find  it 
to  their  self-interest  to  act  justly  toward  one  another,  be- 
cause under  just  social  arrangements  no  one  could  act  un- 
justly toward  his  fellows  without  obviously  violating  both  the 
written  and  the  moral  law,  and  thereby  incurring  the  reproba- 
tion of  public  opinion. 

If  the  social  arrangements  be  unjust,  the  people  will  violate 


HUMAN    NATURR  87 

the  moral  law  without  compunction,  so  long  as  they  keep 
within  the  written  law,  and  they  will  lind  it  to  their  self- 
interest  to  circiunvent  tiie  unjust  concHtions  imposed  by  those 
arrangements;  they  will  find  it  to  their  self-interest  to  obviate 
the  naturally  unjust  elTects  of  unjust  institutions  and  laws, 
even  though  they  be  compelled  thereby  to  violate  both  the 
written   and   the   moral   law. 

And  since  all  imjust  social  arrangements  invariably  impose 
the  condition  that  some  members  of  the  community  must 
profit  at  the  expense  of  other  members,  it  is  perfectly  natural 
for  every  one  to  endeavor  to  get  out  of  and  keep  out  of  the 
class  who  must  suft'er  injustice,  even  though,  in  order  to  do 
so,  they  must  do  injustice  to  others.  If  they  must  either 
cheat  or  be  cheated,  they  will  cheat  rather  than  be  cheated. 

Thus  we  see  that  our  economic  environment,  which  exerts 
a  tremendous  influence  on  conduct,  is  subject  to  the  absolute 
control  of  the  people  through  the  social  arrangements,  and 
can  be  made  to  work  either  practically  absolute  economic 
justice,  or  economic  injustice  to  any  degree. 

Now,  when  we  find  in  any  community  that  most  of  the 
people  get  less  than  they  produce,  and  that  some  get  more  than 
they  produce,  and  that  some  get  a  great  deal  without  produc- 
ing anything,  and  that  a  great  many  are  prevented  from  pro- 
ducing or  getting  anything  by  their  own  labor,  we  may  be 
sure  that  such  a  state  of  affairs  has  not  been  wrought  by 
any  defects  in  human  nature  or  through  any  fault  in  its 
operation,  but  that  it  has  resulted  from  the  operation  of  the 
law  of  human  nature  under  the  man-made  institutions  and  laws 
which  made  it  possible  for  some  members  of  the  community  to 
acquire  an  economic  advantage  over  the  remainder,  in  spite 
of  the  innate  disposition  of  the  remainder  to  look  out  for 
their  own  interests. 

Again  wc  are  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  the  cause  of 
the    imjust    economic    relations    of    the    divers    members    of 


88  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

the  community  to  each  other  must  be  found  in  the  man-made 
institutions  and  laws  and  not  in  the  natural  law  of  human 
nature.  And  if  we  would  find  a  remedy  for  that  state  of 
affairs,  we  must  find  it  by  abolishing  these  institutions  and 
laws  and  putting  in  their  place  a  system  of  social  arrange- 
ments under  which  each  member  of  the  community  may  act 
in  his  own  self-interest,  and  yet  could  not,  if  he  would,  acquire 
an  economic  advantage  at  the  expense  of  others. 

In  endeavoring  to  contrive  such  a  system  of  social  arrange- 
ments, we  must  never  for  one  moment  lose  sight  of  the  truth 
that  under  any  social  system  men  will  always  direct  their 
activities  in  their  economic  intercourse  so  as  to  best  promote 
their  own  interests ;  and  that,  if  a  social  system  even  passively 
permits  or  renders  possible  the  inauguration  of  privileges, 
privileges  there  will  be. 

The  people  may  through  unwise  institutions  and  laws  mis- 
direct human  conduct  by  making  their  interests  such  that 
their  pursuit  must  result  in  injustice,  and  thus  make  human 
nature  itself  appear  sordid  and  in  many  of  its  aspects  ugly. 
But  they  cannot  make  any  improvement  in  the  principle  of 
human  nature,  nor  can  they  so  reform  human  nature  by 
education,  or  by  any  other  method,  that  under  an  absolutely 
just  system  of  social  arrangements  human  nature  will  pro- 
duce more  equitable  economic  conditions  than  will  result  from 
the  operation  of  human  nature  as  it  is,  under  such  a  system. 
Nor  can  they  so  reform  human  nature  by  education  or  any 
other  means  that  under  an  unjust  system  of  social  arrange- 
ments the  operation  of  human  nature  will  bring  about  just 
economic  conditions  or  produce  better  results  than  will  be 
produced  by  the  operation  of  human  nature  as  it  is,  under 
that    system. 

The  only  power  that  men  have  over  human  conduct  is 
either  to  misdirect  it  through  mischievous  social  arrangements, 
and  cause  the  manifestations  of  human  nature  in  the  pursuit 


HUMAX    NATURE  89 

of  self-interest  to  take  objectionable  or  vicious  forms,  or  to 
direct  it  so  that  the  pursuit  of  self-interest  will  produce  just 
results. 

The  doctrine  of  natural  depravity  is  a  vicious  doctrine. 
Men  naturally  prefer  to  do  right  rather  than  to  do  wrong. 
To  argue  that  men  naturally  prefer  to  do  wrong  rather  than 
to  do  right  is  to  argue  that  they  prefer  to  do  themselves 
injury  rather  than  to  do  themselves  good.  The  reason  why 
men  commit  wrong  acts  is,  either  that  they  are  impelled  to 
do  so  perforce  of  an  unwholesome  environment  which  makes 
it  to  their  self-interest  to  do  wrong,  or  that  they  lack  the 
knowledge  of  what  course  of  conduct  will  best  promote  their 
interests.  Every  good  act  is  necessarily  a  wise  act,  and  every 
wise  act  is  wise  because  it  will  result  in  good  to  the  doer. 

Men  commit  economic  wrongs  simply  because  unjust  social 
arrangements  make  it  to  their  interest  to  do  wrong  rather 
than  right. 

It  matters  not  what  the  various  manifestations  of  human 
nature  may  be;  whether  they  be  what  we  call  just  or  unjust, 
egoistic  or  altruistic,  they  are  all  alike  invariably  prompted 
by  the  same  motive,  self-interest,  the  satisfaction  of  desire. 
The  most  dastardly  deed  is  committed,  or  the  most  beautiful 
benevolence  is  conferred,  from  precisely  the  same  motive,  self- 
satisfaction. 

The  great  diversity  in  the  manifestations  of  human  nature 
in  the  same  individual,  or  in  different  individuals,  is  due  not 
to  changes  in  the  inherent  attributes  of  the  nature  of  the 
individual  from  time  to  time,  nor  to  any  dilTerences  in  the 
character  of  the  nature  of  the  several  individuals,  but  is  due 
to  the  ever-changing  environment  of  each  individual,  to  the 
infinite  diversification  of  the  environment  of  the  several  in- 
divi(hials  and  to  each  individual's  state  of  knowledge  of  self- 
interest,  which,  like  his  environment,  is  forever  changing. 

Not  only  is  the  environment  of  each  individual  constantly 


90  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

changing,  but  the  environment  of  no  two  individuals  is  alike 
at  any  period  of  their  lives,  while  the  varieties  of  environ- 
ment under  which  any  two  individuals  live  throughout  their 
lives,  are  still  more  different,  and  the  knowledge  and  beliefs 
of  different  persons,  which  constitute  their  understanding  of 
their  self-interest,  and  therefore  determine,  under  the  environ- 
ment, the  direction  and  character  of  their  activities,  are  as 
divers  as  are  their  environments. 

Like  begets  like;  injustice  begets  injustice;  kindness  begets 
kindness ;  hatred  begets  hatred ;  the  observance  of  the  small 
amenities  of  life  begets  the  observance  of  those  amenities; 
and  justice  begets  justice. 

Unjust  social  arrangements  not  only  induce  perforce  of 
example,  but  compel  unjust  dealings  between  the  divers  mem- 
bers of  the  society.  Import  duties  prompt  smuggling  and 
the  bribery  of  custom  officials.  Prohibition  laws  create  blind 
pigs.  Internal  revenue  taxes  produce  the  moonshiner,  the 
adulterer  of  beverages  and  the  tricks  of  the  tobacco  trade. 
Patent  rights  are  a  source  of  a  variety  of  outrageous  frauds. 
The  taxation  of  personal  property  incites  perjury.  The  tax- 
ation of  buildings  and  land  values  results  in  gross  discrimin- 
ations in  assessments  often  induced  by  bribery  on  the  part  of 
the  property  owner,  or  tempts  the  assessor  to  blackmail  the 
property  owner,  and  so  on  through  the  whole  catalogue  of 
unjust  social  arrangements. 

But  just  as  unjust  institutions,  unwise  laws  and  the  gen- 
erally unwholesome  economic  conditions  proceeding  there- 
from incite  conduct  which  is  regarded  as  wrong  conduct, 
so  will  just  institutions  and  laws  and  the  resulting  whole- 
some economic  environment  not  only  permit  individuals  to  act 
in  accordance  with  the  obtaining  ideals  of  ethics,  but  will  make 
it  to  their  interest  to  do  so. 

Precedent  to  the  possibility  of  "Justice  on  Earth,  Good 
Will  to  Men,"  the  individual  must  live  and  exercise  his  facul- 


HUMAN    NATURE  91 

ties  in  a  just  economic  environment.  Man  is  no  more  immune 
against  the  blighting  influences  of  unwholesome  conditions 
than  is  the  horse  or  the  chrj'santhemum. 

The  social  arrangements  of  the  society  not  only  immediately 
determine  whether  the  economic  tlealings  of  its  members  with 
eacii  other  will  be  just  or  unjust,  but  for  that  very  reason 
they  preordain  the  interests  ami  therefore  the  entire  char- 
acter, and  hence,  the  conduct  of  the  several  individuals  in 
all  their  relations  of  life. 

Unjust  institutions  and  laws  propagate  injustice  through- 
out all  the  ramifications  of  human  life,  even  unto  the  small- 
est detail.  When  the  institutions  and  laws  of  a  country  set 
up  a  system  of  cheating  as  the  national  game  at  which  the 
people,  willy-nilly,  must  play  in  the  economic  field,  the  taint 
of  injustice  and  deception  must  perforce  of  example  and  habit 
permeate  all  the  walks  of  life,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
a  just  system  of  social  arrangements  will  produce  the  oppo- 
site effect. 

When  the  institutions  and  laws  of  a  countrj'  actually  compel 
men  to  act  unjustly  toward  each  other  in  the  pursuit  of  the 
very  necessities  of  life,  it  is  a  matter  of  course  that  they  will 
have  the  same  disregard  for  the  rights  of  others  in  tlie  pur- 
suit of  their  less  important  interests.  For  the  reason  then, 
that  the  actuating  principle  of  human  nature,  self-interest, 
is  immutable,  when  we  undertake  to  devise  a  system  of  social 
arrangements,  which  will  insure  economic  justice,  if  we  would 
succeed,  we  must  be  able  to  determine  whether,  under  any  set 
of  contemplated  social  arrangements,  the  free  play  of  human 
nature,  as  it  is,  will  or  will  not  of  itself  make  for  economic 
justice. 

We  see  that  under  a  system  of  land  tenure  which  permits 
the  unlimited  individual  ownership  of  land,  the  operation  of 
the  immutable,  fundamental  principle  of  human  nature  has 
resulted  in  land  monopoly  or  land  engrossment,  which  notori- 


92  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

ously  results  in  turn  in  the  most  flagrant  economic  injustice. 
Therefore  it  is  childish  and  absurd  to  assume,  as  many  well 
meaning  people  do,  that  where  we  have  bad  results  produced 
b>  the  coincident  operation  of  the  natural  law  (human  nature), 
and  the  man-made  institution  (our  system  of  land  tenure), 
the  evil  may  not  be  remedied  by  changing  or  abolishing  the 
man-made  institution  forthwith,  but  that  we  must  wait,  and 
wait,  and  wait  until  somehow,  at  sometime,  we  know  not  how 
nor  when,  a  change  in  the  natural  law  shall  take  place. 


CHAPTER  V. 

KNOWLEDGE— ITS     RELATION'     TO    HUMAN 
NATURE     AND     CONDUCT. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  office  which  knowledge  performs 
as  a  factor  of  conduct,  and  its  relations  to  the  other  two 
factors,  human   instinct  and   environment. 

We  have  found  that  it  is  the  nature  of  human  Ix'ings  to 
pursue  what  their  understanding  points  out  to  them  as  their 
self-interest.  We  have  learned  that  our  economic  conduct  is 
determined  by  our  environment  so  far  as  the  justice  of  our 
conduct  is  concerned,  and  that  the  making  of  our  environ- 
ment, so  as  to  produce  either  good  or  evil  results,  flepends 
upon  our  knowdedge  as  to  what  sort  of  social  arrangements 
will  best  subserve  our  interests. 

Here,  then,  we  are  brought  to  the  conclusion  that,  since  our 
conduct  will  be  just  or  unjust  accordingly  as  our  environment 
be  just  or  unjust,  and  that,  since  our  environment  will  be 
just  or  unjust  accordingly  as  our  knowledge  of  wdiat  social 
arrangements  will  l)est  promote  our  interests  be  accurate  or 
faulty,  the  justice  or  injustice  of  all  social  conduct  depends 
ultimately  upon  the  state  of  our  knowledge  respecting  self- 
interest. 

Whether  our  understanding  as  to  wdiat  our  true  self-interest 
is  be  right  or  wrong,  we  must  act  in  accordance  with  that 
understanding.  \Mien  our  understanding  of  our  self-interest 
is  erroneous,  our  instinct  will  as  certainly  cause  us  to  act  in 
conformity  with  that  understanding,  as  it  will  when  we  have 
a  perfectly  accurate  knowledge  of  our  true  self-interest. 

Resides  the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  man  was  also  en- 
dowed with  tlic  power  of  reason,  by  the  use  of  which  he  would 


94  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

be  enabled  to  ascertain  what  course  of  conduct  would  best 
preserve  his  life  and  subserve  his  other  interests. 

He  was  endowed  with  the  faculty  of  memory  and  with  the 
faculty  of  speech,  and  in  the  faculties  of  memory  and  speech 
he  was  provided  with  means  to  store  up  and  to  transmit  any 
knowledge  which  he  might  acquire. 

Man  was  thus  equipped  for  the  acquirement  of  knowledge 
of  the  nature  of  things  and  their  uses,  of  his  true  relations 
to  external  matter  and  of  the  proper  relations  of  man  to  man. 

But  nature  did  not  bestow  on  man  a  particle  of  such  knowl- 
edge. The  discovery  of  the  facts,  principles  and  forces  of 
material  nature  and  of  the  principles  of  human  nature  and 
their  adaptation  to  the  satisfaction  of  man's  desires  and  to 
the  advancement  of  his  welfare,  was  the  problem  which  nature 
set   for  him  to  solve. 

Accordingly,  we  find  that  mankind  has  progressed,  phys- 
ically, mentally,  morally,  socially  and  materially  to  a  degree 
exactly  commensurate  with  the  extent  to  which  man  has 
learned  to  use  the  properties  of  matter  and  the  principles  and 
forces  of  nature  to  the  promotion  of  his  well-being,  and  has 
learned  what  are  the  equitable  relations  of  man  to  external 
things  and  the  just  relations  of  man  to  man. 

During  the  past  century  tremendous  progress  has  been  made 
in  the  physical  sciences  and  in  the  arts,  but  little  or  no 
progress  has  been  achieved  in  social  science.  The  reason  for 
the  foregoing  facts  is,  that  the  principle  of  self-interest  has 
been  directed  almost  exclusively  toward  the  acquirement  of 
knowledge  in  the  physical  sciences  and  the  arts,  while  scarcely 
any  serious  effort  has  been  put  forth  to  improve  social  con- 
ditions. The  efforts  of  men  have  been  thus  directed  by  the 
knowledge  that  improvement  in  the  physical  sciences  and 
arts  would  bountifully  minister  to  their  material  wants. 

But  no  such  intensity  of  purpose  and  lavish  expenditure  of 
mental  and  physical  labor  has  been  directed  toward  the  prac- 


KNOWLEDGE  95 

tical  solution  of  what  arc  called  social  questions,  because  the 
peo[)lc  lacked  the  knowledge  that  the  correct  solution  of  social 
questions  would  result  not  only  in  much  more  rapid  progress 
in  the  improvement  of  the  sciences  and  the  arts,  but  that  it 
would  also  result  in  an  improvement  in  the  mental,  moral, 
social  and  material  conditions  of  all  men,  which  would  be  of 
infmitely  greater  value  to  them. 

That  the  principle  of  self-interest  has  not  succeeded  in 
bringing  about  as  great  an  advancement  in  social  conditions  as 
it  did  in  the  physical  sciences  and  arts,  has  been  due  solely  to 
a  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  intimate  relations  between  social 
arrangements  and  the  economic  condition  of  each  in<lividual — 
a  failure  to  connect  economic  injustice  with  its  real  causes, 
auvl  ignorance  of  what  social  arrangements  would  establish 
just  economic  relations  between  men.  For  there  has  been 
no  consequential  addition  to  the  fund  of  knowledge  wdiich 
would  enable  the  people  to  better  apprehend  the  faults  in  pres- 
ent social  arrangements,  or  to  understand  how  to  make  any 
material  improvement  in  them,  since  the  appearance  of  Adam 
Smith's  book,  "The  Wealth  of  Nations." 

Human  instinct  causes  us  to  act  in  conformity  with  what 
we  conclude  is  our  self-interest  under  the  circumstances.  Our 
experiences  and  reason,  the  power  to  put  this  and  that  to. 
gether,  to  connect  cause  and  effect,  and  to  adapt  means  to 
ends,  teach  us  whether  our  conclusion  was  correct  or  incorrect. 

If  our  conclusion  is  found  to  be  correct  by  the  desired 
results  having  been  produced,  we  will  certainly  repeat  the 
same  action  under  similar  circumstances  in  the  future,  know- 
ing that  the  desired  results  will  again  be  produced.  Rut  if 
the  experience  of  the  results  of  our  action  proves  that  our 
conclusion  was  incorrect,  we  will  not  repeat  the  same  action, 
but  our  instinct,  guided  by  that  knowledge,  will  profi  us  to  seek 
a  better  knowdedge  of  both  what  our  true  self-interest  is 
and  the  means  of  realizing  it. 


96  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

Thus  it  is  that  human  nature,  which  causes  us  to  pursue 
our  self-interest  under  the  guidance  of  our  present  knowledge, 
prompts  us  to  acquire  a  better  knowledge  of  what  our  self- 
interest  is. 

In  view  of  this  rational  explanation  of  the  relations  of 
human  instinct  and  knowledge  to  one  another  and  their  cor- 
relative influence  on  conduct,  the  seemingly  incompatible  gen- 
eralizations heretofore  made,  viz. :  that  human  instinct  has 
primary  dominion  over  every  human  act,  even  over  every 
effort  to  gain  knowledge,  and  that  the  state  of  knowledge 
regarding  self-interest  is  immediately  the  dominating  factor  of 
conduct,  are  plainly  to  be  seen  to  be  consistent  and  true. 

A  given  knowledge,  or  belief  which  is  mistaken  for  knowl- 
edge, causes  human  instinct  to  manifest  itself  in  a  particular 
manner.  A  different  state  of  knowledge  or  belief  concerning 
our  self-interest  would  direct  human  instinct  to  manifest  itself 
in  a  different  manner.  In  other  words,  human  instinct  in- 
variably manifests  itself  in  accordance  with  our  state  of 
knowledge  or  beliefs  respecting  our  self  interest,  whatever 
our  knowledge  or  beliefs  may  be. 

The  fact  that  the  state  of  knowledge  respecting  self-interest 
determines  the  mode  of  action,  while  instinct  compels  action 
of  some  sort,  accounts  for  the  notion  that  the  principle  of 
human  nature,  instinct,  is  not  invariable  and  universal,  but  that 
human  instinct  itself  may  be  reformed  and  must  be  radically 
changed  in  order  that  its  play  will  produce  desirable  conduct. 

This  notion  is  deduced,  first,  from  the  assumption  that 
human  instinct,  as  it  is,  is  inherently  bad,  and  consequently 
produces  bad  results ;  and  second,  that  human  instinct  is  the 
creature  of  the  obtaining  state  of  knowledge,  opinions  and 
feelings,  and  that  therefore  an  improvement  in  knowledge  and 
refinement  of  opinions  and  feelings  are  capable  of  reforming 
human  instinct  or  human  nature. 

This  misconception  of  the  true  relations  of  human  instinct 


KNOWLEDGE  97 

or  human  nature  and  knowledge,  opinions  and  feelings  to  each 
other  and  of  all  of  these  to  comluct,  has  been  prolific  of  so- 
called  systems  of  social  and  moral  philosophy  which  fail  to 
yield  a  rational  explanation  of  social  and  moral  phenomena. 

If  the  assumption  that  human  nature,  or  human  instinct, 
which  are  synonymous  terms,  is  the  product  of  knowledge, 
opinions  and  feelings,  be  true,  the  logical  deduction  would  be 
that  an  improvement  in  knowledge  and  a  higher  cultivation  of 
opinions  and  feelings  would  improve  human  nature.  But  the 
very  reverse  of  that  assumption  is  the  truth. 

Knowledge,  opinions  and  feelings,  which  may  properly  be 
included  in  the  term,  "the  state  of  knowledge,"  are  a  factor 
of  conduct  as  human  nature  is,  but  instead  of  the  state  of 
knowledge  being  a  factor  of  human  nature,  human  nature 
is  a  factor  of  knowledge.  We  could  never  have  attained  our 
present  state  of  knowledge  unless  human  nature  had  always 
been  precisely  the  same  as  it  is  now,  and  what  is  more,  it 
would  be  impossible  for  us  to  further  elevate  our  state  of 
knowledge,  if  human  nature  did  not  remain  exactly  as  it 
now  is. 

It  may  be  argued  that  since  the  principle  of  human  nature, 
self-interest,  is  the  primary,  initiative  factor  of  knowledge, 
and  that  even  though  the  state  of  knowle<lge  respecting  self- 
interest  determines  the  mode  of  action,  while  instinct  merely 
prompts  action  in  accordance  with  that  state  of  knowledge, 
the  actuatincr  principle  of  human  nature,  instinct,  is  responsible 
for  all  conduct,  good  or  bad,  and  that  bad  conduct  implies 
that  human  nature  is  defective. 

This  reasoning  may.  upon  superficial  examination,  appear 
to  be  logical  and  conclusive.  But  the  conclusion  is  an  utterly 
false  deduction  from  the  first  statement — that  the  principle 
of  human  nature,  self-interest,  is  the  primary  initiative  factor 
of   knowledge. 

Self-interest    is    the    primary,    initiative    factor    in    the    ac- 


98  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

quirement  of  knowledge  as  it  is  of  all  action.  Since  man 
is  born  without  knowledge,  knowledge  is  an  acquisition  or 
an  accomplishment.  Instinct  invariably  impels  action  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  understanding  of  self-interest.  It  is  difficult 
to  imagine  human  beings  without  any  knowledge  whatever 
of  what  their  self-interest  in  any  respect  was.  Being  born 
with  the  faculty  of  reason,  man  could  not  long  exist  with- 
out the  acquirement  of  knov/ledge  of  what  course  of  action,  in 
some  respects,  was  good  for  him.  In  the  absence  of  any  such 
knowledge  we  can  only  conceive  that  he  would  act  in  some 
manner,  and  that,  except  perchance,  he  would  act  in  a  manner 
not  conducive  to  his  welfare.  By  his  haphazard  actions  he 
would  now  and  then  gain  some  knowledge  of  his  self-interest 
and  his  instinct  would  then  prompt  him  to  act  in  accordance 
with  that  knowledge.  Every  particle  of  knowledge  he  gained 
would  assist  him  to,  sooner  or  later,  gain  more  knowledge. 
His  reasoning  faculties  would  be  stimulated  and  strength- 
ened and  he  would  in  time  learn  by  his  experiences  that 
knowledge  of  some  things,  if  not  that  knowledge  in  general, 
would  minister  to  his  welfare,  which  knowledge  v»'Ould  sooner 
or  later  cause  his  instinct  to  incite  his  activities  toward  the 
pursuit  of  further  knowledge. 

But  some  will  ask,  how  will  this  explanation  of  the  process 
of  human  progress  explain  the  fact  that  one  society  of  people 
will  make  no  perceptible  progress  during  the  course  of  sev- 
eral centuries,  while  another  society  will  make  tremendous 
progress,  in  some  respects  at  least,  within  a  period  of  a 
quarter  of  a  century? 

To  recount  all  the  circumstances  and  occurrences  which 
have  provided  the  conditions  requisite  to  the  acquirement  of 
the  particular  state  of  knowle  Ige  obtaining  in  any  society  of 
people  at  any  particular  time,  is  of  course  an  impossibility. 
But  to  know  the  general  character  of  the  circumstances  and 
occurrences    which    either   make    for    progress   or    retard    it, 


KNOWLEDGE  99 

is  entirely  feasible.  We  know  that  the  opinions,  beliefs  and 
feelings  of  a  people — their  state  of  knowledge — promote  or 
retard  progress  and  occasionally  result  in  retrogression. 

The  more  firmly  fi.xed  the  opinions,  feelings,  beliefs  and 
customs  of  a  people  are,  the  less  progress  they  will  be  able  to 
make.  This  is  so  for  the  very  simple  reason  that  they  are 
satisfied  with  their  present  state  of  knowledge,  and  therefore 
they  not  only  do  not  desire  to  change  their  opinions,  beliefs, 
feelings  and  customs,  but  determinedly  repel  any  suggested 
innovation  ;  and  they  assume  this  attitude  for  no  other  reason 
than  that  they  regard  it  as  in  their  self-interest  to  hold  fast 
to  the  opinions,  feelings,  beliefs  and  customs  they  already 
have. 

When  there  is  satisfaction  with  the  material  state,  it  is 
because  there  is  a  lack  of  knowledge  that  better  conditions 
are  possible,  which  circumstance  iu'lnces  satisfaction  with 
the  state  of  knowledge.  So  long  as  this  state  of  affairs  per- 
sists, there  will  be  no  progress,  instinct  will  act  toward  the 
conservation  of  things  as  they  are.  Tiie  moment  the  reason 
arouses  dissatisfaction  with  present  conditions,  self-interest 
will  impel  the  pursuit  of  more  knowledge,  provided  the  dis- 
satisfaction is  troublesome  enough  to  overcome  the  irksomc- 
ness  attendant  upon  the  getting  of  the  knowledge  sought. 

Dissatisfaction  with  the  present  conditions  arises  from  the 
acquirement  of  knowledge  that  self-interest  is  not  being  well 
subserverj.  That  knowledge  naturally  begets  a  desire  to  gain 
a  knowledge  of  how  better  to  subserve  self-interest,  an! 
then  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  prompts  the  pursuit  of 
that  knowledge. 

The  gaining  of  knowledge,  like  the  production  of  wealth, 
is  to  be  had  only  at  the  cost  of  toil.  Toil  is  naturally  irk- 
some, and  it  will  be  undertaken  only  when  there  is  promise 
that  the  benefits  which  its  fruits  will  bring  will  outweigh 
the  repugnance  to  the  toil.    Now.  since  all  progre:;s  depends  en- 


100  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

tirely  upon  the  acquirement  of  further  knowledge  of 
what  will  promote  self-interest,  and  since  the  only  incentive 
to  gain  more  knowledge  of  what  will  serve  our  interests  is 
a  knowledge  that  the  present  state  of  things  ill  serves  our 
interests,  and  serves  our  welfare  so  poorly  as  to  arouse  so 
much  dissatisfaction  with  present  conditions  that  the  ac- 
companying desire  to  improve  them  will  overcome  the  dis- 
tastefulness  of  the  toil  required  to  accomplish  that  object,  the 
interplay  of  human  nature  and  knowledge,  as  above  described, 
constitutes  the  essence  of  the  theory  of  human  progress. 

The  instinct  of  self-preservation  is  not  a  teacher  of  knowl- 
edge and,  therefore,  it  in  no  manner  determines  the  state  of 
knowledge.  It  is  not  a  factor  of  the  character  or  extent  of 
knowledge.  It  simply  renders  it  impossible  for  human  beings 
to  act  otherwise  than  in  conformity  with  their  understanding 
as  to  what  action  will  best  subserve  their  self-interest,  how- 
ever wise  or  unwise  that  understanding  may  be. 

The  knowledge  or  understanding  of  self-interest  is  a  thing 
to  be  had  only  by  mental  effort.  It  is  the  infinitely  m.ulti- 
farious,  never  ending  problem,  which  nature  has  propounded 
for  man  to  solve  through  the  toilsome  exercise  of  his  mental 
faculties.  The  instinct  called  self-preservation  invariably 
works  in  the  same  manner  and  toward  the  same  end.  It  does 
not  discriminate  as  to  the  accuracy  or  inaccuracy  of  the  un- 
derstanding as  to  self-interest,  in  conjunction  with  which  it 
must  necessarily  act.  It  will  act  in  accordance  with  a  mis- 
understanding of  self-interest  as  certainly  and  imperatively 
as  it  will  act  in  accordance  with  an  accurate  knowledge  of 
self-interest.  That  is  to  say,  self-interest  always  acts  in  con- 
junction with  the  understanding  and  cannot  act  otherwise 
than  in  accordance  with  that  understanding. 

Perhaps  there  can  be  found  no  more  striking  illustration  of 
the  great  truth  that  the  state  of  knowledge  (mental  conclu- 
sions)  respecting  self-interest  is  the  sole  determinator  of  the 


KNOWLEDGE  101 

mode  of  conduct,  tlian  the  generally  recognized  fact  that  the 
hindsight  is  hotter  tiian  the  foresight. 

When,  tliiiiking  of  the  unsatisfactory  results  of  some  past 
act,  one  remarks  that  liis  hindsight  is  better  than  was  his 
foresight,  lie  means  that  his  present  knowledge  of  what  course 
of  action  would  have  brought  results  more  in  accordance  with 
his  self-interest,  is  better  than  it  was  when  he  did  the  act, 
and  that,  had  he  then  understood  his  self-interest  as  well  as 
he  does  now,  he  would  have  acted  more  wisely — more  suit- 
ably to  his  self-interest. 

Hence,  the  task  of  deliberately  promoting  human  progress 
consists  in  the  task  of  getting  more  knowledge  of  what,  in 
the  nature  of  things,  will  further  human  welfare. 

Knowledge  is  the  si)ring  whence  the  waters  of  progress 
flow — beliefs  are  the  debris  which  choke  it  up. 

Original  knowledge  of  all  individuals  who  ever  lived  was 
the  product  of  human   nature. 

Present  knowledge,  general  and  individual,  is  the  product 
of  human  nature  and  past  natural  and  artificial  environment. 

Future  economic  environment  must  be  the  product  of  human 
nature  and  present  or  future  knowledge. 

Future  general  and  individual  knowledge  must  be  the  pro- 
duct of  human  nature  and  present  environirient.  natural  and 
artificial,  and  present  knowledge. 

Thus  we  see  that  human  instinct  is  the  natural,  primor- 
dial, persistent,  universal  motive-principle  which  is  the  primary 
cause  of  all  human  progress.  It  is  antecedent  to  and  the 
original  cause  of  knowledge,  for  the  fundamental  principle 
of  human  instinct,  self-preservation,  self-interest,  furnishes 
the  only  motive  for  the  acquisition  or  the  use  of  knowledge. 

With  the  advent  of  knowledge,  a  new  factor  of  comluct. 
an  artificial  factor,  comes  into  being,  and  henceforth  knowl- 
e(!ge  joins  human  instinct  in  molding  conduct  and   furthering 


102  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

human  progress,  human  instinct  being  the  actuating  principle 
and  knowledge  the  guiding  principle. 

Human  instinct,  being  a  natural  law,  is  beyond  the  con- 
trol of  men.  It  will  continue  to  act  as  it  now  acts,  and  as 
it  has  always  acted,  regardless  of  anything  that  men  may  do, 
and  therefore,  when  we  have  once  a  correct  conception  of 
what  human  instinct  is,  and  how  it  operates,  we  need  not 
further  deal  with  it  in  the  discussion  of  economic  questions 
except  to  bear  the  truth  concerning  human  instinct  constantly 
in  mind. 

Now,  since  the  solution  of  economic  questions  is  a  prob- 
lem for  men  to  solve,  a  problem  which  must  be  solved  by 
men,  in  the  discussion  of  the  solution  of  economic  questions, 
we  must  deal  only  with  those  factors  of  conduct  over  which 
men  have  control,  artificial  environment  and  knowledge. 

While  artificial  environment  may  properly  be  held  to  be  a 
factor  of  conduct,  it  is  a  secondary  factor,  derived  from  human 
instinct  and  the  state  of  knowledge.  It  is  a  static  force,  a 
mere  condition  of  things,  which  simply  hedges  and  swerves 
the  currents  of  the  activities  of  men. 

Knowledge  is  a  dynamic  force,  the  force  of  intelligence, 
which  directs  our  conduct  in  general  and  gives  the  people 
control  over  their  artificial  environment.  And  since  artificial 
environment  is  the  product  of  the  natural  factor,  human 
instinct,  and  the  artificial  factor,  acquired  knowledge,  and 
since  we  have  no  control  over  instinct,  the  natural  factor, 
knowledge,  the  guiding  factor  of  human  conduct  and  of  human 
progress,  the  primary  factor,  over  which  we  do  have  control, 
becomes  the  key  to  the  solution  of  economic  questions.  The  two 
forces  which  must  bring  about  future  progress  toward  economic 
justice,  are  human  instinct  and  knowledge.  These  two  co- 
operating forces  may  be  comprehensively  defined  by  the  term 
enlightened  self-interest. 

Having  the  knowledge  of  what  human  instinct  is  and  how 


KNOWLEDGE  103 

it  bcli.'ivcs,  knowitig  that  it  is  a  iialiiral  law  and  therefore  an 
invariable  force,  tiiat  it  always  impels  men  to  seek  the  satis- 
faction of  their  desires,  our  prohleni  consists  in  the  acquisi- 
tion of  an  exact  knowledge  of  how  to  contrive  a  system  of 
social  arrangements  luidcr  which  the  play  of  human  instinct, 
the  untrammelc"!  pursuit  of  self-interest,  will  pr<jtluce  econ- 
omic justice  between  men. 

'J'he  satisfaction  of  desires  is  the  inspiration  of  everything 
we  do.  Our  environment,  which  moans  all  the  circumstances 
in  which  we  arc  placed,  including  the  institutions  and  laws 
and  the  cft'ects  that  they  have  had  in  determining  the  tastes, 
inclinations,  ideas,  ideals  (jr  interests  of  all  people  with  whom 
we  come  in  cantact,  and  even  of  those  people  we  have  never 
seen,  exerts  a  powerful  inlhicnce  on  our  tastes,  inclinations, 
ideas,  ideals  and  interests,  and  therefore  very  largely  de- 
termines the  direction  of  our  economic  activities  and  our 
conduct  in  general.  As  environment  changes,  so  also,  will 
its  efTects  on  us  change. 

As  has  been  pointed  out,  the  element  which  plays  a  most 
important  i)art  in  determining  what  course  of  action  we  will 
take  under  the  circumstances  in  which  we  find  ourselves,  is 
the  more  or  less  accurate  knowledge  of  what  course  of  action, 
in  view  of  our  environment,  will  best  subserve  our  self- 
interest.  If  our  knowledge  of  what  we  should  do  un<ler  any 
particular  combination  of  circimistances,  in  order  to  best  sub- 
serve our  own  self-interest,  to  bring  us  the  greatest  possible 
benefits,  or  best  avoid  imi)ending  harm,  be  correct,  our  actions 
will  be  wise,  the  best  possible  under  the  circumstances.  If 
our  ideas  as  to  the  course  of  conduct  which  will  bring  u  '  the 
best  results  under  the  circumstances  be  erroneous,  we  will 
act  unwisely  and  get  corresponding  results. 

Many  persons  believe  and  teach  that  every  individual  is 
the  architect  of  his  own  career.  hiU  I  am  f|uite  sure  that  such 
persons  have   failed  to  apj)rchend  tlic  circumstances  and  in- 


104  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

fluences  which  have  given  direction  to  their  own  careers.  If 
there  were  no  momentous  social  questions  pressing  for  solu- 
tion, I  would  not  be  expending  tivnQ  and  labor  in  writing 
this  book,  and  there  is  not  the  slightest  doubt  that,  had  our 
social  questions  been  correctly  solved  a  generation  ago,  the 
career  of  every  individual  in  this  country  would  have  been 
far  different  from  what  it  has  been. 

There  is  just  this  much  truth  in  the  notion  that  the  indi- 
vidual is  the  maker  of  his  own  career :  The  more  accurate  the 
knowledge  of  what  course  of  action  will  in  the  long  run  yield 
him  the  greatest  benefits,  taking  into  account  his  environment, 
tastes,  talents  and  aptitudes,  the  better  will  be  his  career, 
that  is  to  say,  enlightened  self-interest  produces  the  best  re- 
sults under  the  circumstances,  and  conversely,  unenlightened 
self-interest,  the  actuating  principle  of  human  nature  directed 
by  a  misunderstanding  of  what  one's  true  self-interest  is, 
produces  undesirable  results  under  all  circumstances. 

Enlightened  self-interest  also  prompts  us  to  seek  to  change 
the  features  of  our  environment  which  we  find  to  have 
deleterious  effects  both  upon  our  own  conduct  and  the  conduct 
of  all  other  members  of  the  society,  and  therefore  upon  our 
own  self-interest  and  upon  the  self-interest  of  every  other 
member  of  the  community,  which  in  turn  have  their  effect  on 
our  own  interest. 

Each  individual  may  alter  his  own  condition  for  better  or 
for  worse  by  acting  wisely  or  unwisely  under  tlie  circum- 
stances, and  he  can  acquire  a  better  knowledge  of  Vvhat  his 
interests  are  and  of  the  means  by  which  his  interests  may 
be  cared  for,  or  he  may  grossly  neglect  to  gain  such  infonna- 
tion.  But  he  can  thus  modify  his  environment,  or  the  in- 
fluences of  his  environment,  though  he  may  greatly  change 
his  pecuniary  condition,  only  to  a  very  limited  extent,  for 
over  the  most  potent  features  of  his  environment,  tlie  pro- 
ducts of  the  institutions  and  laws,  the  customs,  moral  ideals 


KNOWLEDGE  1U5 

and  general  knowledge  of  the  people  of  the  country,  he,  as  an 
individual,  can  have  ahsolutely  no  control. 

He  must  play  the  game  according  to  the  rules  which  the 
circumstances  above  mentioned  have  imposed  upon  every 
member  of  the  community.  To  attempt  to  set  up  different 
rules  of  his  own  for  his  guidance  will  only  work  him  injury. 
This  overpowering  environment,  wdiich  is  now  blighting  and 
distorting  the  lives  of  every  human  being,  rich  or  poor,  can 
only  be  changed  by  the  operation  of  the  enlightened  self- 
interest  of  a  majority  of  the  people. 

Since  even  the  economic  or  pecuniary  interests  of  a  great 
majority  of  the  people  necessarily  coincide  with  just  social 
arrangements,  all  that  is  needed  to  bring  about  just  social 
conditions  is  for  that  great  majority  to  learn  what  social 
arrangements  will  work  justice  for  each  of  them ;  for,  if  a 
particular  set  of  social  arrangements  results  in  justice  for 
each  of  a  majority  of  the  members  of  society,  in  the  nature  of 
things  it  must  result  in  justice  for  every  individual  member 
of  the  society,  aye,  furthermore,  a  social  system,  which  would 
work  even  justice  in  all  his  economic  relations  and  dealings 
to  a  sinq^le  member  of  the  society,  w^ould  in  the  nature  of 
things  work  even  justice  to  every  member;  and  conversely, 
any  social  system  which  inflicts  economic  injustice  on  a  single 
unit  of  the  society  will,  in  the  nature  of  things,  mete  out 
injustice  to  every  other  unit.  For,  a  system  of  social  arrange- 
ments does  not  confine  its  infiuence  to  this  or  that  individual 
but  it  affects  every  individual  who  lives  under  it. 

It  is  because  all  activities  of  human  beings  are  determined 
by  inexorable  natural  laws,  by  the  interplay  of  instinct,  knowl- 
e('ge  and  environment,  and  because,  while  the  instinct  of  all 
men  is  the  same,  the  combinations  of  knowledge — the  states 
of  knowledge — or  the  environments  of  no  two  individuals  art 
alike,  that  discoveries  of  new  truths  which  make  for  human 


106  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

progress  are  made  only  now  and  then  by  single  individuals 
here  and  there. 

These  new  truths  are  only  discovered  when  all  the  requisite 
conditions  are  at  once  present.  The  discoverer  must  have 
already  acquired  such  knowledge  as  would  form  a  basis  from 
which  logical  reasoning  would  lead  to  the  discovery  of  the 
truth,  and  he  must  be  so  circumstanced  as  to  become  sufficiently 
dissatisfied  with  his  present  state  of  knowledge  as  to  begin  to 
enquire  wherein  his  knowledge  was  lacking. 

It  is  by  first  learning  that  our  knowledge  is  deficient  that  we 
realize  that  there  is  a  truth  of  which  we  are  ignorant,  and 
then,  by  finding  out  in  what  particular  and  why  our  knowl- 
edge is  deficient,  we  get  the  first  glimpse  of  the  truth  itself, 
but  generally  in  a  very  indistinct  and  nebulous  form. 

Also  the  circumstances  of  the  discoverer  must  be  such  as 
to  make  it  appear  to  him  to  be  to  his  self-interest  to  put  forth 
the  effort  and  to  keep  at  his  task  until  he  has  brought  the 
truth  into  full  and  distinct  view,  and  he  is  able  to  describe 
its  metes  and  bounds. 

Thus  we  see  the  tremendous  importance  of  subjecting  all 
of  our  beliefs  and  every  idea  which  others  attempt  to  induce 
us  to  adopt,  particularly  those  beliefs  and  ideas  which  relate 
to  social  affairs,  and  therefore  seriously  affect  for  weal  or 
woe  our  lives  and  the  lives  of  those  dear  to  us,  to  the  most 
searching  scrutiny  and  put  them  to  every  possible  test  in  order 
to  discover  whether  they  are  true  or  false. 

Loyalty  to  a  wrong  opinion,  however  we  came  by  it,  re- 
specting social  arrangements  is  the  same  thing  in  another 
form  as  that  blind,  irrational,  purely  sentimental  patriotism 
which  leads  men  to  uphold  a  government  which  oppresses 
them,  because  they  have  been  brought  to  regard  it  as  their 
government.  Such  pride  in  their  possession  of  self-destruc- 
tive beliefs  or  imaginary  belongings,  as  in  the  case  of  "their 


KNOWLEDGE  107 

government,"  is  so  far  from  being  commendable  that  it  is 
embarrassingly  pitiful  to  behold.  To  embrace  and  defend  false 
beliefs  is  to  take  to  your  bosom  and  coddle  a  viper  whicii  will 
thrust  its  poisonous  fangs  into  your  flesh  at  tiic  first  oppor- 
tunity. 


CHAPTER  VI. 
ALTRUISM. 

As  the  acquirement  of  knowledge  is  the  only  means  by 
which  the  state  of  mankind,  in  any  particular,  may  be  elevated, 
the  mere  absence  of  knowledge  delays  progress.  But  the  hold- 
ing of  beliefs  which  are  not  true  not  only  delays  progress,  as 
does  the  mere  absence  of  knowledge,  but  it  stubbornly  stands 
in  the  way  of  the  acquirement  of  knowledge,  which  is  indis- 
pensable to  progress. 

For  the  reason  that  a  knowledge  of  human  nature  and  its 
relations  to  progress  is  prerequisite  to  an  intelligent  initiation 
and  direction  of  progress,  there  can  be  no  greater  hindrance  to 
deliberate  furtherance  of  progress,  than  false  beliefs  respecting 
human  nature. 

Of  such  false  beliefs  the  doctrine  of  altruism  and  the  teach- 
ings which  have  altruism  for  their  basis  are  the  most  harmful. 

The  term  altruism  was  coined  by  Comte,  to  be  used  to  rep- 
resent a  figment  of  the  imagination  in  a  fantastic,  compli- 
cated, unintelligible  and  arbitrary  system  of  philosophy,  which 
was  also  purely  an  invention  of  his.  I  refer  to  his  philosophy 
as  an  invention,  because  it  does  not  square  with  the  facts 
of  human  nature.  Untruths  are  invented,  but  truths  can  only 
be  discovered. 

Now,  what  was  the  gist  of  that  branch  of  the  philosophy 
of  Comte  for  the  elucid.ation  of  which  it  was  necessary  to 
coin  the  term  altruism?  Comte,  in  his  Positive  Polity,  ac- 
cording to  John  iVIorley,  teaches: 

"That  the  improvement  in  the  social  organism  can  only  be 
effectefl  by  a  moral  development,  and  never  by  any  changes  in 
mere  political  mechanism  or  any  violences  in  the  way  of  an 
artificial  redistribution  of  wealth.  A  moral  transformation 
must  precede  any  real  advance.    The  aim,  both  in  public  and 


ALTRUISM  IW 

ii!  private  life,  is  to  secure  to  the  utmost  possible  extent  the 
victory  of  the  social  feeling  over  self-love,  or  Altruism  over 
Iigoisni.  This  is  the  key  to  the  regeneration  of  social  exist- 
ence, as  it  is  the  key  to  that  unity  of  individual  life  which 
makes  all  our  energies  converge  freely  and  without  wasteful 
friction  toward  a  common  en<l.  What  are  the  instruments  for 
securing  the  prep(jnderance  of  Altruism?  Clearly  they  must 
work  from  the  strongest  clement  in  human  nature,  and  this 
element  is  Feeling  or  the  Heart." 

Comte  here  teaches  that  the  intellectual  perceptions  of  how 
men  should  act,  either  individually  or  collectively,  in  order  to 
bring  about  the  most  desirable  results,  that  is  to  say,  the  most 
moral  conditions — conditions  which  will  best  subserve  even 
their  individual  welfare  or  self-interest — are  not  to  be  de- 
pended upon,  but  that  the  only  reliable  dependence  is  to  be 
put  on  the  feelings  oi  the  heart.  I  am  inclined  to  think  that 
while  constructing  his  system  of  philosophy,  Comte's  intellect 
was  entirely  subordinated  to  his  "feelings"  or  "heart,"  and 
that  he  wrote  what  he  "felt,"  rather  than  what  rational  con- 
sideration would  dictate. 

Comte  practiced  what  he  preached.  He  evolved  his  system 
out  of  his  "feelings"  instead  of  out  of  his  reason,  and  the  nat- 
ural result  was  an  entirely  unreasonable  philosophy.  And  be- 
cause of  its  unreasonableness,  that  is  to  say,  its  untruthfulness, 
it  has  resulted  in  great  harm  to  both  individuals  and  societies 
in  which  his  doctrine  has  found  lodgment. 

All  of  the  economic  ills  that  the  masses  of  mankind  have 
suffered  at  the  hands  of  an  insignificant  few,  they  have  suf- 
fered simply  and  only  from  a  lack  of  knowledge  of  what  was 
their  just  relation  to  material  nature  and  to  each  other — a 
lack  of  knowledge  of  what  their  self-interest  was  respecting 
social  arrangements.  In  the  place  of  such  knowledge,  their 
minds  were  filled  with  beliefs  and  their  "hearts"  filled  with 
corresponding  "feelings,"  which  made  it  absolutely  impossible 


110  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

for  them  to  extricate  themselves  even  from  such  forms  of  in- 
justice of  which  they  had  a  sort  of  mental  perception. 

No  progress  has  ever  been  made  through  the  feelings  and 
the  heart  as  agencies  independent  of  reason.  When  the  feel- 
ings, sentiments  or  impulses  are  the  result  of  mere  beliefs,  and 
do  not  represent  mental  conclusions  which  conform  to  funda- 
mental principles  of  morality,  they  may  be  relied  upon  as 
instigators  of  wrong  conduct  only.  When  they  represent  ac- 
curate deductions  from  principles  of  morality  they  may  be 
depended  upon  to  incite  good  conduct,  but  only  because  such 
feelings,  sentiments  or  impulses  are  themselves  nothing  but 
the  result  of  correct  mental  conclusions — mere  manifestations 
cf  the  presence  of  knowledge  of  self-interest. 

Without  exception,  every  transition  from  worse  to  better 
economic  or  moral  conditions,  has  been  effected  by  the  advent 
of  an  understanding  of  the  reasons  why  the  conditions  were 
bad,  and  the  manner  in  which  those  conditions  could  be  de- 
signedly improved.  That  is  to  say,  all  improvements  have  been 
brought  about  through  the  desire  of  those  who  had  the  power 
to  change  conditions,  to  subserve  their  self-interest,  accom- 
panic'l  by  a  more  or  less  accurate  knowledge  of  what  their 
self-interest  was. 

Enlightened  self  -  interest,  therefore,  has  been  the  lever 
which  has  removed  every  obstacle  to  progress  toward  economic 
justice  which  has  thus  far  been  made,  and  it  is  the  only  power 
v/hich  will  or  can  remove  obstacles  to  further  progress. 

To  appeal  to  men  to  cultivate  feelings  and  beliefs  which 
are  incompatible  with  their  self-interest,  in  order  that  through 
such  feelings  and  beliefs  there  will  take  place  a  regeneration 
of  morals,  v.diich  will,  in  turn,  bring  about  justice,  is  not  only 
a  waste  of  time  and  energy  (for  no  progress  will  ever  be  made 
by  such  means),  but  instead  of  furthering  progress,  it  will 
retard  progress  in  proportion  as  such  means  are  depended 
upon.     And   if   such  means   be   wholly   depended   upon,   pro- 


ALTRUISM  111 

gross  will  iitJt  only  altogether  cease,  but  retrogression  will 
set  in.  I'or.  if  the  gui'ie  to  goo  1  coiiiluct,  enliglitencl  self- 
interest,  be  neglected  or  (liscanle.l,  there  is  no  other  princi- 
ple which,  as  a  giii  le,  can  take  its  i)lace. 

To  say  that  we  shouM  aim,  through  our  con  luct,  to  secure 
victory  of  t!ic  social  feeling  over  self-love,  or  altruism  over 
egoism,  implies  that  the  social  interests  are  dilTerent  from 
and  incompatible  with  the  interests  of  the  individuals  who 
make  up  the  society,  and  that  social  interests  are  paramount 
to  imlividual  interests,  and  that,  therefore,  to  secure  that  unity 
i-f  indivilual  life,  which  makes  all  our  energies  converge 
freely  and  without  wasteful  friction  to  a  common  en  ',  we 
i:iust  neglect  our  own  interests  and  consider  only  interests 
not  our  own,  ami  diflferent  from  our  own.  The  sum  and  sub- 
stance of  this  reasoning  is  that  the  way  to  subserve  our  own 
interests  is  to  act  in  opposition  to  them. 

Even  if  it  were  possible  that  our  own  in  lividual  interests 
could  be  best  cared  for  by  ignoring  them  au'l  paying  exclusive 
rttenti(jn  to  the  "interests  of  society,"  if  there  were  such  a 
thing,  the  only  conceivable  motive  there  could  be  for  adopting 
that  course,  would  be  that  it  would  be  the  means  of  furthering 
Jt'//-interest.  And  how  can  it  be  imagined  that  we  could  be 
in  luced  to  adopt  any  means  for  the  purpose  of  advancing  our 
self-interest  witliout  taking  our  self-interest  into  account?  So 
if  the  victory  of  the  social  feeling  over  self-love  consists  in 
furthering  .self-interest  by  furthering  the  interests  of  society, 
it  is  the  sort  of  victory  which  in  fact  is  defeat.  For  self- 
interest  still  remains  the  victor. 

Comte  teaches  that  there  can  be  no  real  a  Ivatice  towar  1 
just  social  arrangements  or  conditions  until  there  has  been  a 
moral  transformation,  such  as  will  cause  to  be  the  aim,  both 
in  public  and  private  life,  to  secure  to  the  utmost  possible 
extent  the  victory  of  the  social  feeling  over  self-love,  or  altru- 
ism over  egoism. 


112  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

By  moral  regeneration  Comte  meant,  of  course,  a  reforma- 
tion of  the  feelings  or  heart  of  men;  or,  in  words  which  will 
more  clearly  describe  his  meaning,  a  regeneration  of  the  na- 
ture of  men,  or  of  human  nature;  in  short,  he  teaches  that 
there  can  be  no  progress  towards  social  or  economic  justice 
until  human  nature  has  been  radically  changed  in  its  funda- 
mental characteristic. 

Whoever  gives  credence  to  this  false  doctrine,  knowing 
from  past  experience  that  there  will  be  no  change  in  human 
nature  during  his  own  lifetime  or  that  of  his  grandchildren, 
can  have  no  hope  of  any  improvement  in  social  conditions 
during  the  lives  of  those  in  whom  he  may  be  directly  inter- 
ested. If,  therefore,  there  can  be  no  hope  of  improvement 
even  for  three  generations,  what  incentive  can  any  man  have 
to  put  forth  any  effort  in  behalf  of  future  improvement? 

Therefore,  there  could  scarcely  be  promulgated  a  more 
harmful  doctrine.  For,  without  the  hope  of  accomplishing 
our  ends,  we  will  undertake  nothing.  Comte  prided  himself 
on  his  "altruism"  in  teaching  a  theory,  the  very  attempt  to  put 
which  into  practice  would  immensely  lessen  the  ability  of  men 
to  do  good  unto  others,  by  hampering  and  misdirecting  their 
efforts  to  strengthen  themselves.  He  felt  that  he  was  doing 
an  altruistic  deed  in  giving  to  the  world  his  Positive  Polity ; 
he  felt  that  he  was  bestowing  on  humanity  a  great  boon, 
v/hereas,  in  fact,  he  was  inoculating  their  minds  with  the 
blight  of  despair. 

If  we  must  wait  until  the  fundamental  principle  of  human 
nature  has  been  changed  so  that  an  opposite  principle  has 
become  the  dominating  one ;  if  we  must  wait  until  men  cease 
to  seek  to  satisfy  their  desires  along  the  lines  of  least  resist- 
ance, and  no  longer  intelligently  adapt  means  to  ends,  then, 
ot  course,  it  would  be  a  waste  of  time  to  speculate  as  to 
how  the  sort  of  conditions  which  we  know  ought  to  exist, 
may  be  brought  about. 


ALTRUISM  11.^ 

l.ct  it  be  obscrveil,  however,  that,  while  iin[)ractical  |)hiloso- 
phers  like  Comte,  an<l  while  the  ruling  classes  have,  under 
the  guise  of  the  teachings  of  so-called  moral  i)hilnso()hy. 
jreached  this  doctrine  of  hopeless  despair,  the  ruling  classes, 
the  great  interests,  the  practical  men  of  affairs,  have  in  prac- 
tice, given  this  theory  a  wi<le  berth. 

Their  nature,  as  they  found  it,  was  good  enough  for  their 
purposes.  They  at  least  have  understood  that  the  most  effec- 
tive means  of  accumulating  wealth  is  not  by  giving  their 
wealth  away.  Moreover,  they  have  understood  that  if  they 
woidd  accumulate  riches,  they  must  not,  in  their  dealings  with 
others,  give  more  than  they  receive.  And  they  have  also 
known  that  in  order  to  accumulate  any  great  amount  of 
wealth,  in  their  dealings  with  others,  they  must,  by  hook  or  by 
crook,  get  a  great  deal  for  which  they  give  nothing,  and  what 
has  been  more  important  still,  they  have  known — an<l  have 
systematically  acted  on  that  knowledge — that  the  only  way 
in  which  they  could  persistently  get  something  for  nothing, 
was  by  invoking  and  using  the  i)ower  of  government. 

Now.  let  me  ask  the  reader  to  consider  how  long  it  will  be 
before  the  ruling  class  becomes  so  altruistic  as  to  voluntarily 
desist  from  using  the  power  of  government  for  the  purpose 
of  appropriating  what  other  men  have  produced.  an<l,  instead 
of  imposing  upon  the  masses  of  the  people  shameful  poverty 
and  all  the  evils  that  poverty  entails,  will  bestow  upon  their 
fellowmen  pecuniary  benefits  out  of  the  produce  of  their  own 
labor?  An<l  then,  let  me  ask  him  to  ponrler  whether  the  altru- 
ism which  he  is  called  ujion  to  practice  in  yielding  up  to  others, 
who  already  have  more  than  lie,  a  large  part  of  the  produce 
of  his  own  labor,  is  destined  to  improve,  pecuniarily  or  morally, 
either  himself  or  the  society? 

It  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  that  anything  could  have 
prompted  Comte  to  build  his  system  of  philosophy  but  the 
belief  that  a  calamitous  error  was  made  in  implanting  in  hu- 


114  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

man  nature  the  principle  of  self-preservation;  that  human 
nature,  as  we  find  it,  is  wrong  and  of  itself  works  harmful 
results,  and  that  consequently,  precedent  to  any  real  advance 
toward  justice,  there  must  be  discovered  a  means  by  which 
human  nature  could  be  transformed,  which  he  undertook  to  do. 

The  doctrine  of  altruism,  taught  by  Comte,  has  exerted  a 
vicious,  directing  influence  on  the  speculations  of  practically 
all  writers  on  political  economy,  ethics,  or  jurisprudence  since 
his  time.  The  effect  that  the  altruism  idea  has  had  on  the 
writings  of  others  may  be  fairly  judged  by  the  effect  it  had 
on  the  writings  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

It  may  be  contended  that  actions  which  are  not  sanctioned 
by  reason,  are  frequently  prompted  by  the  feelings  only.  It  is 
apparently  assumed  that  if  one  does  not  act  in  accordance  with 
reason,  but  contrary  to  reason,  his  act  is  prompted  by  some- 
thing else  than  reason,  and  this  something  else,  a  certain 
school  of  philosophers  of  which  Comte  is  a  fair  exponent, 
call  the  feelings. 

But  this  assumption  really  proceeds  from  a  mental  delu- 
sion. For,  acts  which  are  apparently  prompted  by  the  feelings 
and  not  by  the  reason,  are  actually  prompted  by  the  reason 
nevertheless.  Every  act  of  every  person  is  done  for  a  reason. 
If  an  act  proves  by  its  ultimate  results  to  be  unwise,  that  is 
to  say,  unreasonable,  that  fact  does  not  argue  that  the  act 
was  prompted  by  the  feelings  instead  of  the  reason.  If  we 
ask  the  actor  why  he  committed  the  act,  he  will  give  us  his 
reasons,  and  if  the  act  resulted  in  evil  effects,  we  will  find 
that  the  reasons  which  prompted  the  act  were  not  sound. 

If  acts  may  be  prompted  by  feelings  independently  of  rea- 
son, then  it  would  as  frequently  happen  that  right  conduct 
would  be  prompted  by  feelings,  while  being  condemned  by  the 
reason  of  the  actor,  as  that  wrong  conduct  would  be  prompte  1 
by  the  feelings,  while  being  condemned  by  the  reason  of  the 
actor.    Because  bad  conduct  is  incompatible  with  right  reason, 


ALTRUISM  113 

it  is  erroneously  assumed  that  sucli  conduct  is  not  prompted 
by  the  reason,  but  by  the  fccHngs ;  and  tlien,  by  analogy,  it  is 
reasoned  that  good  conchict,  which  is  necessarily  and  always 
perfectly  compatible  with  right  reason,  may  also  be  prompted 
by  the  feelings,  indejicndcntly  of  the  reason. 

In  the  latter  case,  it  cannot  be  said  that  feelings  are  a  better 
guide  for  conduct  than  the  reason.  In  the  former  case,  the 
very  statement  that  bad  conduct  is  incompatible  with  right 
reason,  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  reason  is  the  true  guide 
for  conduct,  and  the  obvious  and  valid  inference  is,  that  bad 
conduct  is  promi)ted,  not  by  the  feedings,  but  by  erroneous 
reason. 

The  feelings  themselves  are  but  conclusions  arrived  at  by 
more  or  less  dcfmite  or  correct  reasoning.  For,  if  we  ask 
one  to  account  for  any  feeling  he  may  have,  he  will  proceed 
to  put  in  as  definite  a  form  as  he  can  the  reasons  which 
caused  him  to  have  that  feeling,  although  his  reasons  may  be 
cither  valid  or  invalid,  and  consequently  his  feeling  justi- 
fiable or  unjustifiable. 

If  the  reasons  be  valid,  his  feeling  will  have  been  moral. 
If  he  has  acted  in  accordance  with  such  feeling,  the  result 
of  his  act  will  have  been  good.  Therefore,  it  cannot  be 
claimed  that  the  feeling  prompted  the  act  in  any  other  sense 
than  that  it  was  the  immediate  prompter.  The  feeling  being 
the  prorliict  of  the  reason,  there  is  no  avoiding  the  conclusion 
that  the  primary  prompter  of  the  act  was  the  reason. 

If  the  reason  for  the  feeling  be  not  valid,  his  feeling  will 
have  been  immoral,  anrl  any  act  committed  at  the  instance  of 
such  feeling,  will  have  been  wrong.  Here  also,  the  act  was 
actually  prompted  by  the  reason,  though  faulty  reason,  which 
produced  the  inappropriate  feeling.  A  man  who  claims  that 
he  acted  on  the  prompting  of  a  feeling  for  which  he  had  no 
reason  at  all,  is  considered  irresponsible  or  insane.     For,  if 


116  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

one  acts  on  his  feeling,  he,  of  course,  can  give  no  reason  for 
his  act,  and  one  who  acts  without  reason  is  insane. 

If  feelings  themselves  prompted  conduct  independently  of 
reason,  then  it  would  be  necessary  to  cultivate  appropriate 
feelings,  in  order  that  proper  conduct  might  ensue.  But  the 
absurdity  of  the  idea  that  feelings  do  independently  prompt 
conduct,  becomes  palpable  the  moment  we  undertake  to  con- 
sider how  we  could  go  about  cultivating  proper  feelings,  while 
ignoring  reason. 

The  only  process  by  which  we  could  undertake  to  educate 
the  feelings  without  resort  to  reason,  would  be  to  describe 
the  feeling  that  we  may  deem  appropriate  (without  recourse 
to  reason,  of  course)  to  every  different  occasion,  and  when 
it  is  desired  to  know  what  feeling  we  should  have  under  any 
given  circumstances,  all  we  would  have  to  do  would  be  to  con- 
sult our  catalogue  of  feelings.  If  the  set  of  circumstances  in 
question  and  their  appropriate  feeling  were  to  be  found  in  the 
catalogue,  then  simply  feel  that  way. 

Every  normal  person  has  a  reason  for  every  feeling,  and 
he  invariably  feels  as  his  reason  dictates.  Upon  being  told 
that  under  certain  circumstances  he  should  have  a  certain 
feeling,  he  would  immediately  want  to  know  why  the  feeling 
was  appropriate  to  the  circumstances.  When  we  speak  of 
appropriate  feelings,  feelings  of  fear,  generosity,  revenge, 
hatred  or  love,  all  of  these  qualifications  of  feelings  imply  that 
there  are  reasons  for  the  feelings. 

This  fact  will  be  more  clearly  seen,  perhaps,  if  we  divide 
all  feelings  into  two  classes,  good  and  bad ;  for,  when  we 
characterize  a  feeling  as  good  or  bad,  we  must  have  reasons 
for  so  characterizing  it.  Otherwise  our  characterization  would 
be  meaningless. 

I  have  taken  the  pains  to  demonstrate  that  reason,  and  not 
the  feelings,  is  the  only  guide  of  conduct,  because  the  idea 
that   feelings  are  the  most  imperative  guide  of  conduct  has 


ALTRUISM  117 

led  to  the  conclusion  that  just  social  arrangements  can  never 
prevail  until  the  fcchngs  and  the  heart  (which  the  feelings- 
school  of  philosophers  treat  as  the  organ  of  the  feelings)  of 
humanity  have  hccn  transformed — until  Innnan  nature  has 
been  cliangcd.  WluMcas,  an  understan<ling  that  reason, 
whether  it  be  vaHd  or  iinalid,  i^  the  guide  of  all  conduct, 
leads  to  the  correct  conclu.^ion,  namel}',  that  in  order  that 
economic  justice  sliall  prevail,  it  is  only  necessary  for  the 
reason  to  discover  such  a  system  of  social  arrangements  as 
will  result  in  economic  justice,  through  the  free  play  of  old 
egoistic  human  nature,  as  we  know  it— such  a  system  of  ar- 
rangements as  will  nird<c  it  to  the  interest  of  each  individual 
to  deal  justly  with  his  fellows  and  enable  each  individual  to 
protect  himself  against  any  encroachment  uj)on  his  rights  by 
another,  even  though  the  other  were  misled  to  believe  it  to  be 
his  interest  to  commit  such  encroachment. 

Many  erroneous  ideas  have  become  prevalent  by  the  substi- 
tution of  one  word  for  another  of  a  different  meaning.  WTien 
one  says  he  feels  happy,  he  does  not  mean  that  he  feels 
happy,  as  he  would  feel  hot  or  cold,  but  he  means  that  he  is 
in  a  happy  state  of  mind,  that  he  is  experiencing  agreeable 
thoughts.  When  one  remarks  that  he  feels  an  aversion  to- 
ward a  certain  person,  he  really  means  to  convey  the  idea  that 
that  person  has  made  an  unfavorable  impression  on  his  mind. 
The  fact  is  that  what  are  commonly  called  feelings  are  not 
feelings  at  all,  but  mental  conclusions. 

Thus,  by  habitual  use  of  the  term  feelings  to  signify 
'houghts.  the  idea  that  one  has  feelings  takes  the  place  of  the 
id.ea  that  one  has  thought'^,  and  there  follows  the  idea  that 
these  so-called  feelings  are  something  entirely  different  from 
thoughts  or  mental  conclusions. 

When  we  have  rid  ourselves  of  the  absurd  notion  that  good 
conduct  is  actuated  by  consideration  of  the  welfare  of  others. 
in    disregard   of   self-interest,   and    when    we   have    come    to 


118  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

realize  that  all  conduct  is  prompted  by  self-interest,  whether 
the  conduct  be  good  or  bad,  whether  it  actually  benefits  or 
harms  the  actor,  or  anyone  else;  and  when,  therefore,  we 
shall  habitually  ascribe  all  conduct  to  its  true  motive — the  de- 
sire of  the  actor  to  subserve  what  he  understands  to  be  his 
self-interest,  intercourse  between  individuals  will  rest  on  an 
honest  basis,  and  hypocrisy  and  cant,  conscious  or  uncon- 
scious, will  no  longer  be  tolerated. 

When  it  has  become  the  common  conviction  that  whenever 
an  individual  does  a  wrong  act,  he  does  it,  not  because  of  any 
shortcoming  in  his  nature,  but  simply  because  he  considers  it 
to  be  his  self-interest  to  do  the  wrong;  the  remedy  will  be 
obvious,  readily  applied  and  efficacious.  He  must  be  brought 
to  realize  that  he  was  ill  informed — that  to  do  the  wrong 
was  not  promotive  of  his  true  self-interest.  Social  and  busi- 
ness ostracism  of  persistent  wrong-doers,  and  of  those  who 
give  them  countenance,  is  a  far  more  efficient  deterrent  than 
punitive  laws.  But  we  must  first  give  every  man  the  opportu- 
nity to  do  right  by  removing  all  conditions  which  afford  an 
excuse  for  doing  wrong  before  the  spirit  of  intolerance  to- 
ward wrong-doing  can  be  expected  to  flourish.  And  when  ex- 
cuses for  wrong-doing  are  removed,  the  incentive  for  doing 
wrong  vanishes,  and  the  incentive  to  do  right  takes  its  place. 

What  Comte  meant  by  the  feelings  or  the  heart  is  precisely 
denoted  by  the  more  commonly-used  expression,  the  con- 
science. The  conscience  (in  ethics)  is  defined  by  the  Standard 
Dictionary  as  being  "the  power  or  faculty  in  man  by  which 
he  distinguishes  between  right  and  wrong  in  conduct  and 
character,  and  which  imperatively  commands  and  obliges  him 
to  do  the  right  and  abstain  from  doing  the  wrong;  the  moral 
nature ;  moral  faculty ;  moral  sense ;  the  feeling  or  sense  of 
right  and  wrong;  an  intuitive  moral  impulse,  or  moral  impera- 
tive commanding  that  the  right  be  done." 

Here  we  have  a  word  much  used  which  is  the  appellation  of 


ALTRUISM  119 

a  supposetl  independent  power  or  faculty  inherent  in  man, 
which,  in  fact,  lias  no  existence.  The  so-called  conscience 
has  often  been  likened  unto  the  magnetic  needle;  always  direct- 
ing conduct  in  its  right  course,  as  the  needle  always  points 
to  the  North  I'ole.  But  there  is  not  the  slightest  analogy  be- 
tween the  principles  and  attributes  of  human  nature,  which 
actually  govern  ct)nduct,  and  the  magnetic  needle.  iJesides, 
the  defuiition  of  the  term  conscience,  if  that  word  is  to  be 
used  as  a  name  for  the  real  guide  of  conduct,  is  altogether 
wrong,  because  it  conveys  an  entirely  erroneous  idea  of  the 
real  prompter  and  director  of  conduct. 

Since  the  only  guide  to  conduct  is  the  state  of  the  under- 
standing of  what  is  self-interest,  which  is  an  accomplishment, 
and  not  a  gift  of  nature,  the  only  legitimate  use  of  the  term 
conscience  is  to  denote  the  state  of  knowledge  of  self-interest 
— knowle<lge  of  the  truths  of  nature  and  the  human  uses  to 
which  they  may  be  put;  which,  of  course,  includes  knowledge 
of  the  principles  of  morality.  This  knowdedge  is  different 
at  different  times  and  places,  and  is  different  with  different 
peoples.  And  conscience  varies  precisely  as  this  knowletlge 
varies. 

Spencer's  Data  of  Ethics  contains  one  chapter  entitled 
"Egoism  versus  Altruism,"  and  another  entitled  "Altruism 
versus  Egoism."  In  the  first-mentioned  chapter  Spencer  un- 
dertakes to  show  that  while  "egoism  precedes  altruism  in  order 
of  imperativeness,"  pure  egoism  is  not  the  best  gui<le  of  con- 
duct—will not  produce  the  most  desirable  results.  For  one  to 
be  too  egoistic,  Spencer  holds,  will  not  only  result  in  harm 
to  the  one,  but  to  the  society.  Spencer  says :  "The  adequately 
egoistic  individual  retains  those  powers  which  make  altruistic 
activities  possible.  The  individual  who  is  inadequately  egoistic 
loses  more  or  less  of  his  ability  to  be  altruistic." 

The  purport  and  endeavor  of  the  whole  chapter  is  to  estab- 
lish the  proposition  that   while  egoism   precedes   altruism   in 


120  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

imperativeness,  too  much  egoism  is  almost,  if  not  quite,  as 
detrimental  as  too  little  egoism — that  in  so  much  as  egoism 
must  be  narrowed,  a  quantity  of  altruism  must  be  supplied — 
that  to  produce  the  best  results,  the  compound  must  consist  of 
neither  too  much  nor  too  little  of  egoism,  but  just  enough, 
and  just  enough  of  altruism,  neither  too  much  nor  too  little. 
But  nowhere  does  Spencer  undertake  to  definitely  show  in 
what  proportions  these  two  opposite  principles  should  be 
blended  in  order  to  produce  the  perfect  compound. 

Spencer  even  asserts  that  all  human  progress  which  has 
thus  far  been  made  has  resulted  from  the  operation  of  the 
egoistic  principle  of  human  nature,  when  he  says :  "throughout 
past  eras,  the  life,  vast  in  amount  and  varied  in  kind,  which 
has  overspread  the  earth,  has  progressed  in  subordination  to 
the  law  that  every  individual  shall  gain  by  whatever  aptitude 
it  has  for  fulfilling  the  conditions  to  its  existence." 

Yet,  he  does  not  believe  that  this  same  principle  may  be 
wholly  depended  upon  as  a  means  to  further  progress. 

In  the  chapter  "Altruism  versus  Egoism"  Spencer  under- 
takes to  show  that  pure  altruism  is  as  little  desirable  as  pure 
egoism — that  neither  altruism  nor  egoism  come  first  in  order 
of  time,  but  that  they  are  both  primordial  principles  which 
have  evolved  simultaneously — that  altruism  is  as  imperative 
as  egoism,  but  that  egoism  is  the  more  imperative — that  "from 
the  dawn  of  life  egoism  has  been  dependent  upon  altruism,  as 
altruism  has  been  dependent  upon  egoism,  and  in  the  course 
of  evolution  the  reciprocal  services  of  the  two  have  been  in- 
creasing," and  that  all  the  while  each  has  been  endeavoring  to 
exterminate  the  other — that  there  are  many  kinds  of  altruism, 
the  principal  varieties  of  which  are  as  follows :  pure,  physical, 
compulsory,  conscious,  unconscious,  automatic,  egoistic,  ra- 
tional, automatically  psychical  and  negative. 

In  his  volume  entitled  "Justice,"  Chapter  R^,  Spencer  says : 

"While  we  may  thus  understand  how  the  egoistic  sentiment 


ALTRUISM  121 

of  justice  is  developed,  it  is  much  less  easy  to  understand  how 
there  is  developed  the  altruistic  sentiment  of  justice.  On  the 
one  hand,  the  implication  is  that  the  altruistic  sentiment  of 
justice  can  come  into  existence  only  in  the  course  of  adapta- 
tion to  social  life.  On  the  other  hand,  the  implication  is  that 
social  life  is  made  possible  only  by  maintenance  of  those 
e(iuitable  relations  which  imply  the  altruistic  sentiment  of  jus- 
tice.    How  can  these  reciprocal  requirements  be  fulfdled? 

"The  answer  is  that  the  altruistic  sentiment  of  justice  can 
come  into  existence  only  by  the  aid  of  a  sentiment  which 
temporarily  supplies  its  place,  and  restrains  the  actions 
prompteil  by  pure  egoism — a  pro-altruistic  sentiment  of  jus- 
tice, as  we  may  call  it.  ♦  *  *  The  associated  state  having 
been  maintained  among  men  by  tlie  aid  of  the  pro-altruistic 
sentiment  of  justice,  there  have  been  maintained  the  condi- 
tions under  which  the  altruistic  sentiment  of  justice  itself  can 
develop." 

Here  we  find  still  another  variety  of  altruism,  which  Spen- 
cer says  we  may  call  pro-altruism ;  and  we  find  also  that 
the  most  important  variety  of  altruism,  the  kind  which  is  sup- 
posed to  intluence  human  conduct  and  to  rectify  human  ego- 
ism is  not  j)rimordial  like  egoism,  but  that  at  some  stage  of 
human  development,  what  we  may  call  pro-altruism  made  its 
appearance,  and  that  out  of  pro-altruism  must  be  evolveil  the 
genuine  article,  true  altruism. 

I  have  not  put  .Spencer's  several  statements  concerning  the 
fundamental  principle  of  human  nature  in  juxtaposition  for 
the  mere  purpose  of  calling  attention  to  his  inccmsistency,  but 
rather  to  show  that  he  has  written  a  lot  of  nonsense  about  a 
mere  name  of  nothing. 

Spencer  was  unquestionably  a  very  learned  man.  The  ref- 
erences to  hundreds  of  authorities  on  all  imaginable  subjects 
show  that.  There  have  been  few  men,  if  any.  who  have  learned 
more  that  was  not  so,  than  he.    He  learned  so  much  of  specu- 


122  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

lative  lore  that  he  necessarily  gathered  more  chaff  than  wheat. 

Reverting  to  the  subject  of  altruism,  as  I  have  already  inti- 
mated, the  chief  fault  to  be  found  with  his  meditations  is 
that  he  literally  did  not  know  what  he  was  talking  about,  any 
more  than  one  who  talks  about  ghosts,  their  habits,  character- 
istics, development,  sentiments,  etc.,  knows  what  he  is  talking 
about.  For  there  is  no  such  thing  as  altruism,  any  more  than 
there  are  things  called  ghosts. 

Now,  the  whole  theory  of  evolution  has  no  better  founda- 
tion than  has  the  mere  belief  in  the  name  altruism,  which  has 
no  owner. 

If  Spencer  had  learned  the  truth  respecting  human  nature, 
he  would  have  repudiated  Comte's  invention,  altruism,  and  he 
would  have  seen  that  human  progress  depends  entirely  upon 
the  acquirement  of  knowledge  of  what  course  of  conduct,  indi- 
vidual or  collective,  will  subserve  the  self-interest  of  the  indi- 
vidual or  the  society,  respectively,  and  that  pure,  unadulter- 
ated egoism  will  do  the  rest. 


CHAPTER  VII. 
FREE  WILL. 

There  is  a  great  deal  said  in  i)lHlosophic  writings  to  the 
effect  that  man  is  endowed  with  free  will,  and  that  the  course 
of  conduct  of  every  individual  depenils  upon  what  he  wills  to 
make  it,  and  that,  consequently,  under  a  given  set  of  circum- 
stances, an  iniji vidua!  could  do  one  thing  as  well  as  another, 
provided  he  luerely  willed  to  do  it. 

Let  us  see  if  this  is  so.  The  free-will  doctrine,  like  many 
other  notions  respecting  human  nature,  sprang  out  of  ignor- 
ance of  the  natural  principle  which  governs  human  conduct. 

This  ignorance  has  resulted  from  a  failure  to  perceive  the 
interdependent  relation  existing  between  knowledge  of  what 
will  subserve  self-interest,  which  appears  to  be  acquired  by 
wholly  voluntary  action,  and  the  innate,  inexorable  law  which 
prompts  everyone  to  pursue  what  he  understands  to  be  his 
self-interest. 

If  one  has  committed  a  wrong  act,  the  believers  in  the  free- 
will theory  would  argue  that,  even  though  he  did  not  know 
any  better,  he  might,  had  he  willed  to  do  so,  have  learned  bet- 
ter prior  to  the  commission  of  the  act,  and  hence,  to  all  in- 
tents and  purposes,  he  willed  to  do  wrong  instead  of  right. 

But  does  the  acquirement  of  knowledge  of  what  is  good 
for  us — knowledge  of  right  conduct — depend  upon  free  will? 

It  has  already  been  observed  that  the  acquirement  of  all 
knowledge  has  invariably  been  prompted  by  the  inborn,  un- 
controllable desire  to  subserve  our  self-interest,  and  that  since, 
to  us,  our  self-interest  is  always  what  we  imderstand  it  to  be, 
the  law  of  human  conduct  is  to  do  that  which  we  imderstand 
it  to  be  to  our  self-interest  to  do. 

Hence  the  course  of  our  conduct  is  never  optional.     We 


124  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

are  never  free  to  do  either  one  of  several  things  under  the 
circumstances.  The  only  thing  which  we  can  zvill  to  do  is  that 
which  our  understanding  apprises  us  is  to  our  self-interest 
to  do. 

If  ever  we  fail  to  act  right  under  any  circumstances,  it  is 
because  we  have  arrived  at  a  wrong  conclusion  as  to  what 
course  of  action  will  best  serve  our  welfare,  and  that  wrong 
conclusion  is  the  result  either  of  faulty  reasoning  or  a  lack 
of  knowledge  of  the  truth,  which  must  form  the  basis  of 
correct  reasoning  under  the  circumstances. 

Thus  we  see  that  free  will  is  in  no  manner  a  factor  of 
human  conduct. 

If  it  be  asked  why  does  not  self-interest  always  impel  us 
to  industriously  endeavor  to  acquire  knowledge  of  what  is 
good  for  us,  since  the  acquirement  of  such  knowledge  is  the 
most  profitable  enterprise  in  which  one  can  embark,  the  an- 
swer is,  that  we  will  never  undergo  the  necessary  toil  to  ac- 
quire that  knowledge,  unless  first,  by  experience  or  otherwise, 
we  have  learned  in  general  the  value  of  such  knowledge ;  and, 
second,  unless  our  present  understanding  advises  us  that  the 
advantages  to  be  gained  by  the  acquirement  of  further  knowl- 
edge of  what  is  our  self-interest  outweigh  the  disagreeable- 
ness  of  the  toil  required  to  gain  the  knowledge. 

Here  again  we  come  to  the  same  conclusion — that  free  will 
has  nothing  to  do  with  the  determination  of  conduct,  but  that 
conduct  is  universally  determined  by  the  state  of  knowledge 
respecting  self-interest,  which  itself  is  the  product  of  the  inex- 
orable law  of  self-preservation,  and  environment  (from  the 
influence  of  which  there  is  likewise  no  escape),  including  the 
store  of  knowledge  to  which  there  is  access. 

If  by  free  will,  we  mean  the  power  to  act  independently 
of  the  law  of  human  nature  playing  under  our  environment, 
and  of  our  knowledge  of  our  self-interest,  then  there  is  no 
such  thing  as  free  will. 


I'klClC    WILL  125 

When  one  says  that  lie  wills  to  <\o  a  certain  thing,  he  is 
simply  giving  expression  to  his  c()nclusif)n  as  to  what  he  must 
do  in  order  to  best  serve  his  self-interest. 

The  formation  of  a  conclusion  as  to  what  course  of  action 
would  best  serve  his  self-interest  was  imperatively  commanded 
by  the  law  of  human  nature,  and  the  character  of  his  conclu- 
sion was  determined  by  the  state  of  his  knowledge,  the  nature 
of  his  environment,  and  the  state  of  culture  of  iiis  reasoning 
I)Owers. 

Even  when  one  has  acted  wrong  when  he  knew  that  he  was 
about  to  do  a  thing  which  was  in  itself  wrong,  at  the  time  he 
acted,  and  under  the  existing  circumstances,  he  could  not 
have  willed  to  act  in  any  other  manner  than  he  did,  because, 
at  the  behest  of  human  nature,  he  acted  in  accordance  with 
his  understanding  as  to  what  action  would  best  subserve  his 
self-interest.  Notwithstanding  his  knowledge  of  what  action 
would  have  been  right,  in  the  abstract,  his  understanding  that 
a  (HfTerent  course  would  better  serve  his  self-interest  made  it 
inevitable  that  nature  would  imperatively  command  him  to 
act  in  accordance  with  that  understanding  and  contrary  to 
his  knowledge  of  what  was  right  per  se.  Xo  doubt  he  would 
have  preferred  to  do  right  instead  of  wrong.  The  cause  of 
his  wrong-doing  was.  in  its  fmal  analysis,  not  of  his  makin,2^. 
Me  had  been  placed  in  unjust  circumstances,  which  made  it 
seem  to  be  to  his  self-interest  to  act  wrong. 

The  lesson  to  be  drawn  from  the  above  observations  is, 
that  since  every  human  being  invariably  acts  in  accordance 
with  his  un<lerstanding  as  to  his  self-interest  in  the  matter, 
before  there  can  be  general  just  conduct,  there  must  be  just 
social  arrangements  from  which  will  result  just  environment. 
For  by  no  other  means  is  it  possible  to  induce  right  conduct 
than  by  providing  an  cnviromiicnt  in  which  it  will  be  to  the 
.self-interest  of  people  generally  to  act  right,  and  that  most 
desirable  end  can  only  be  attained  by  the  acquirement  by  a 


126  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

majority  of  the  people  of  accurate  knowledge  respecting  self- 
interest  concerning  social  arrangements. 

It  is  not  to  be  inferred  from  the  above  arguments  that 
wrongdoers  are  not  to  be  held  accountable  for  their  evil  con- 
duct. I  have  shown  in  Chapter  VIII  that  one  should  be  held 
to  strict  accountability  not  only  for  wrong  actions,  but  for 
wrong  opinions  which  incite  wrong  actions,  provided  he  had 
the  means  of  learning  what  was  right  in  the  matter  under 
the  circumstances. 

That  Blackstone's  views  of  natural  rights,  of  the  province 
and  functions  of  government,  were  warped  by  his  misunder- 
standing of  the  laws  of  human  conduct,  is  shown  by  the 
following  excerpts  from  his  writings : 

"  *  *  *  when  He  (God)  endowed  him  (man)  with 
the  faculty  of  free  will.  *  *  *  man,  considered  as  a  free 
agent,  endowed  with  discernment  to  know  good  from  evil 
and  with  the  power  of  choosing  those  measures  which  ap- 
pear to  him  most  desirable." 

Now,  man  is  not  a  free  agent;  he  was  not  endowed  with 
discernment  to  know  good  from  evil,  and  much  less  was  he 
endowed  with  a  knowledge  of  what  is  good  and  what  is  evil. 

He  was  endowed  with  the  faculty  of  reasoning  by  the  ex- 
ercise of  which  he  might,  in  time,  when  circumstances  per- 
mitted, learn  to  know  good  from  evil,  always  being  prompted 
to  learn  what  he  does  learn  by  his'  previous  understanding  as 
to  his  self-interest  in  that  respect. 

This  being  true,  man  was  not  endowed  with  the  power 
of  choosing  those  measures  which  appear  to  him  most  de- 
sirable, but  he  was  endowed  with  a  nature  which  makes  it 
impossible  for  him  to  do  anything  else  than  to  enact  the 
measures  which  appear  to  him  most  desirable.  When  he 
concludes  by  his  reason  what  measures  are  most  desirable, 
those  are  the  measures  which  "appear"  to  him  most  desirable, 
and  when  that  mental  conclusion  is  presented  to  his  conscious- 
ness or  to  the  ego,  he  has  then  no  choice  of  action.    He  must 


FREE    WILL  Ml 

act  in  accordance  with  what  the  reason  presents  to  the  ego 
as  (lesirahle. 

One  time  I  was  walking  in  a  park  witli  a  frien<l,  aii'l  it 
occurred  to  nie  to  ask  him  if  he  thought  tliat  man  was  en- 
dowed with  the  power  of  free  will. 

He  answered,  "yes." 

When  I  suggested  that  the  I,  or  the  ego  never  exercised 
any  option  as  to  the  course  of  action  to  be  taken ;  that  the 
principle  of  human  nature  which  incites  and  excites  all  action, 
which  is  therefore  the  only  thing  which  can  properly  he  de- 
nominated the  li-'ill,  is  devoid  of  the  attribute  of  discretion, 
and  that,  consequently,  one  can  never  do  anything  but  that 
which  the  understanding  represents  to  the  ego  as  the  best 
thing  to  be  done,  he  undertook  to  illustrate  the  truth  of  his 
contention. 

Said  he,  "There  is  a  tree  which  I  can  climb  (jr  not  climb, 
as  I  will." 

"Well,"  said  L  "which  do  you  will  to  do?" 

"I  will  not  climb  the  tree." 

"Why?" 

"Because,  if  I  should  climb  the  tree.  I  wouM  make  a  spec- 
tacle of  myself,  which  I  do  not  desire  to  do." 

"Rut  that  is  the  very  reason  why  you  cannot,  in  your  present 
state  of  mind,  will  to  climb  the  tree." 

"True  enough;  but  if  I  wanted  to  climb  the  tree,  notwith- 
standing the  disagreeable  attention  I  would  attract  in  doing 
.so,  I  could  will  to  climb  the  tree." 

"Yes,  but  when  you  make  the  proviso,  'if  I  wanted  to  climl) 
the  treee.'  you  admit  that  you  could  not  will  to  climb  the  tree 
unless  for  some  reason,  wise  or  unwise,  you  thought  it  to 
your  self-interest  to  do  so,  because  you  could  not  want  to  do 
anything  else." 

"Why  certainly,"  he  exclaimed,  with  a  shake  of  my  hand, 
"you  are  right.     Because,  if  I  did  conclude  to  climb  the  tree 


128  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

in  order  to  prove  to  you  that  I  could  will  to  climb  the  tree  or 
not  as  I  pleased,  I  would  climb  the  tree  only  because  I  had 
concluded  that  it  was  to  my  self-interest  to  demonstrate  to 
you  that  I  could  will  to  climb  the  tree  now,  whereas  a  moment 
ago  I  had  willed  not  to  climb  it.  It  would  be  the  reversal 
of  my  understanding  as  to  my  self-interest  concerning  the 
climbing  of  the  tree  which  would  have  reversed  my  will  and 
therefore  would  have  reversed  my  action." 

After  what  has  been  said,  it  will  also  be  clearly  seen  that 
the  term  "good  intentions,"  with  which,  it  has  been  aptly 
said,  the  road  to  hell  is  paved,  is  a  misnomer.  It  does  not 
properly  characterize  the  fact  for  which  it  is  used  as  an 
appellation. 

When  we  say,  that  while  one  has  acted  badly,  his  inten-i 
tions  were  good,  we  mean  that  he  thought  that  he  was 
doing  right  when  he  was  doing  wrong,  which  implies  that 
he  had  a  misunderstanding  of  his  self-interest. 

There  is  no  such  thing  as  intention  any  more  than  there 
is  free  will  apart  from  one's  understanding  of  what  his  self- 
interest  is.  For  one  can  never  intend  to  do  anything  but 
that  which  his  understanding  represents  to  him  to  be  his  self- 
interest,  since  his  nature  invariably  compels  him  to  do  that 
thing  regardless  of  the  consequences. 

And  since  the  instinct  or  nature  of  man  is  no  respecter 
of  the  consequences  of  his  acts,  the  characterization  of  one's 
intentions  as  good  or  bad  conveys  an  entirely  erroneous  con- 
ception as  to  his  responsibility  and  culpability  when  he  com- 
mits a  wrong  act  with  so-called  good  intentions. 

Let  the  act  of  the  King  be  ever  so  atrociously  vicious,  and 
he  will  claim  that  he  did  it  with  the  best  intentions,  for  the 
best  interests  of  his  beloved  subjects. 

Let  the  congress  enact  a  thieving  tariff  law,  and  the  con- 
gressmen who  vote  for  it  will  proclaim  that  they  made  that 
law  with  the  purest  of  motives,  the  noblest  intentions,  for  the 


FREE   WILL  129 

benefit  of  the  tlear  people,  and  particularly  in  the  interest  of 
the  iK)or  downtrodden  workinginan. 

When  a  judge  renders  a  pettifogging,  dishonest,  rascally 
opinion,  and  is  called  to  accoiuit  for  it,  he  swells  up  with 
dignity,  and  protests  that  in  formulating  his  opinion,  he  was 
insjiired  by  the  loftiest  of  intentions,  the  observance  of  his 
oath  of  office,  the  meting  out  of  even  justice  according  to  the 
laws  of  the  land. 

Let  us  have  done,  therefore,  with  the  miserable,  hypo- 
critical pretense  called  good  intentions.  If  we  would  put  a 
proper  estimate  on  the  quality  of  an  act,  whether  it  be  com- 
mitted by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  a  member  of  the 
Supreme  Court,  a  merchant  or  a  hod  carrier,  we  must  ignore 
all  claims  as  to  intentions  and  consider  only  the  act  itself  and 
its  consequences. 

For  when  we  consider  the  claimed  intentions,  we  lose  sight 
of  the  nature  and  consequences  of  the  act,  and  therefore 
we  are  deprived  of  the  only  means  by  which  we  may  hold 
men  to  account  for  their  deeds ;  the  only  means  to  compel 
good  conduct;  the  only  means  by  which  it  may  be  made  the 
self-interest  of  men  to  act  right. 

When  we  have  come  to  know  that  every  man  always  acts  in 
accordance  with  his  understanding  of  his  self-interest,  we  will 
no  longer  permit  any  man  to  commit  evil  deeds  under  the  pre- 
tense of  good  intentions,  but  we  will  only  consider  the  nature 
of  the  naked  acts,  and  then,  when  he  does  a  wrong  deed,  we 
will  tell  him  that  he  was  misinformed  as  to  his  self-interest, 
that  he  has  violated  the  moral  law  which  he  had  the  means 
of  knowing,  that  he  must  be  held  accountable  for  his  wrong 
act  and  must  acquaint  himself  with  his  true  self-interest  by 
learning  the  moral  law. 

The  dawn  of  the  bright  day  when  men  will  know  their  own 
nature  will  be  the  doom  of  the  pharisee  and  the  bunco- 
steerer. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 
THE    LAW    OF    JUSTICE. 

It  having  been  demonstrated  that,  by  reason  of  their  very 
nature,  all  human  beings,  always,  under  all  circumstances, 
act  in  conformity  with  their  understanding  as  to  what  course 
of  action  it  is  to  their  self-interest  to  take  and  that  all  human 
progress — including  progress  toward  moral  or  just  conduct 
and  just  relations  between  men — depends  upon  the  gaining 
of  further  knowledge  of  self-interest,  we  are  led  up  to  the 
formula  of  right  conduct — the  law  of  justice. 

Let  every  man  do  that  which  will  subserve  his  self-interest, 
for  he  who  serves  his  true  self-interest  doeth  unto  himself 
naught  but  good,  and  doeth  no  harm  unto  any  other  man. 

In  view  of  what  has  been  said  in  previous  chapters,  it  will 
be  seen  at  once  that  this  formula  is  a  universal  rule  of  right 
conduct ;  that  there  is  no  doubt  that  it  is  a  definite,  positive 
statement  of  what  just  conduct  is,  and  that  it  is  equally  ap- 
plicable to  what  may  be  termed  purely  personal  conduct,  con- 
duct which  in  common  phrase  is  said  to  be  no  one  else's  business 
but  that  of  the  actor,  and  to  conduct  which  may  be  described 
as  relative,  as  that  involved  in  intercourse  between  men. 

Now,  for  the  reason  that  the  formula  is  a  universal  rule  of 
right  conduct,  it  formulates  the  mode  by  which  all  human 
progress  must  be  made,  since  universal  right  conduct  would 
be  the  perfection  of  the  social  state,  and  human  progress  is 
nothing  more  than  progress  toward  universal  right  conduct. 

We  are  enjoined  to  conduct  ourselves  justly  toward  our- 
selves. We  are,  by  implication,  enjoined  to  do  no  injustice 
to  our  fellow  men,  anrl,  for  the  reason  that  we  cannot  do  that 
which  it  is  our  true  self-interest  to  do,  unless  we  know  what 


TIIF    I  AW    OF    JUSTICE  1.^1 

<nir  true  sclf-iiitercst  is,  \vc  arc  infcrentially  cnjoineM  to  gain 
a  knovvleilge  of  what  our  self-interest  is. 

In  truth,  since  we  invariahly  act  in  accor<lance  with  our 
un<Ierstan(ling  as  to  what  mode  of  action  will  best  subserve 
our  self-interest,  wc  will  always  serve  our  self-interest  when- 
ever we  know  what  our  self-interest  is,  and,  therefore,  the 
single  prcreciuisite  to  the  subservance  of  self-interest  is  the 
accjuirement  of  knowledge  of  our  self-interest.  Hence,  the 
formula  of  right  conihict  may  also  be  accurately  stated  thus: 

Let  every  man  learn  what  his  self-interest  is. 

For  the  reason  that  the  subservance  of  self-interest  is  the 
first  law  of  nature,  and  for  the  further  reason  that  self- 
interest  can  only  be  subserved  by  first  gaining  a  knowledge 
of  what  self-interest  is,  the  greatest  satisfaction  to  be  gotten 
out  of  life  is  the  acquirement  of  new  knowledge  respecting 
self-interest. 

Nature  has  propounded  to  man  riddles  without  end.  The 
solving  of  those  riddles  is  the  zest  of  life.  The  line  which 
distinguishes  man  from  other  animals  cannot  be  more  sharply 
drawn  than  by  the  statement  that  man  is  the  only  problem- 
solving  animal. 

The  problems  yet  to  be  solved  by  man,  respecting  the  prin- 
ciples and  properties  of  physical  nature,  the  solution  of  which 
will  minister  to  material  well-being,  are  infinite.  There  are 
multitudinous  truths  of  nature,  the  knowledge  of  which  would 
greatly  promote  our  material  welfare,  but  of  the  existence  of 
which  we  now  have  not  even  a  su.spicion.  It  is  obvious, 
therefore,  that  no  specific  rule  can  be  laid  down  which  would 
be  of  any  use  to  us  toward  the  acquirement  of  such  knowl- 
edge. The  one  thing  that  we  may  do,  however,  which  will 
accelerate  the  acquirement  of  that  sort  of  knowledge,  is  to 
provide  an  atmosphere  most  congenial  to  the  getting  of 
knowledge  in  general,  which   is  social  justice. 

Dut  it  cannot  be  too  clearly  imderstood  that  social  justice. 


132  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

which  in  importance  is  paramount  to  every  other  consider- 
ation, is  not  in  the  least  dependent  upon  the  state  of  the 
arts  and  physical  sciences.  The  science  of  social  justice  is 
a  department  of  knowledge  entirely  distinct  from  all  other 
departments.  It  has  for  its  basis  a  knowledge  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  human  nature,  and  it  is  brought  to  completion  simply 
by  the  consistent  appHcation  of  those  principles  to  social  af- 
fairs. And  when  we  consider  that  there  is  nothing  else  in 
nature  analogous  to  human  nature,  we  shall  perceive  how 
entirely  independent  is  the  science  of  social  justice  of  all  other 
branches  of  knowledge. 

With  the  acquirement  of  knowledge  of  the  arts  and  physical 
sciences  it  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  book  to  deal.  Its  pur- 
pose is  to  point  out  the  way  to  the  attainment  of  social 
justice. 

It  is  high  time  that  we  should  arrive  at  a  definite  knowl- 
e'lge  of  human  nature  and  of  the  principles  of  morality  de- 
ducible  thereform  and  of  how  to  adjust  our  social  arrange- 
ments to  the  requirements  of  those  principles.  The  principles 
themselves  are  few  and  simple.  I  suspect  that  my  readers 
will  find  little  cause  to  quarrel  over  the  principles  set  forth, 
but  that  what  opposition  will  be  met  with,  will  arise  either 
from  inability  to  follow  the  application  of  those  principles 
throughout  the  ramifications  of  complex  social  interests,  due 
to  wrong  ideas  induced  by  living  under  the  present  unjust 
system,  or  to  aversion  to  give  the  matter  any  consideration, 
growing  out  of  the  belief  that  social  justice  does  not  com- 
port  with   self-interest. 

It  does  not  stand  to  the  credit  of  mankind,  that  in  the 
face  of  the  present  power  of  labor  to  produce,  besides  the 
necessities,  even  more  than  the  ordinary  comforts  of  life,  a 
way  has  not  been  found  to  rid  all  humanity  of  that  greatest 
scourge  which  is  also  the  mother  of  most  other   scourges — 


THE   LAW    OF   JUSTICE  133 

the   all  -  absorbing  struggle    for   subsistence   and    for   security 
against  want. 

A  knowledge  of  the  rudiments  of  arithmetic,  addition  an<l 
subtraction,  is  easily  acquired,  but  the  application  of  these 
simple  rudiments  in  the  solution  of  intricate  mathematical 
problems  is  not  so  easily  understood.  Yet,  when  the  prin- 
ci|)les  have  been  logically  api)lied.  and  tlie  application  has  been 
explained,  no  one  who  is  able  to  follow  the  reasoning  will 
dispute  the  conclusion. 

Now,  the  reason  that  the  way  to  social  justice  has  not  yet 
been  found,  is  not  that  many  men.  wdio  have  dealt  with  the 
subject,  lacked  the  mental  capacity  to  solve  the  problem,  dif- 
ficult though  it  has  been,  but  that  they  have  failed  to  dis- 
cover the  fundamental  principles  ui)on  which  the  solution 
devolves. 

I  adjure  my  readers,  therefore,  to  consider  the  applica- 
tion of  the  principles  of  human  nature  to  social  arrange; 
ments  with  the  same  analytical  care  which  they  would  give 
to  an  explanation  of  the  solution  of  a  mathematical  problem, 
and  thus  determine  whether  the  conclusions  arrived  at  be  valid 
or  invalid.  For  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  if  our  principles 
be  true,  their  correct  application  to  social  problems  will  result 
in  their  correct  solution,  as  surely  as  the  correct  application 
of  the  principles  of  mathematics  to  any  mathematical  prob- 
lem will  yield  the  true  answer. 

Principles  of  morality  are  but  truths  of  human  nature 
which,  like  the  truths  of  physical  nature,  of  mathematics, 
geometry,  electricity,  pneumatics,  etc.,  have  always  existed  for 
the  use  and  profit  of  mankind  wiienever  they  have  earned  the 
benefits  to  be  derived  from  their  use  by  discovering  them. 

Now,  when  a  principle  of  human  nature  or  of  morality  has 
been  once  discovered  and  thoroughly  comprehended,  there  can 
be  no  more  room  for  disputation  over  what  human  nature  or 
morality  is,  than  there  is  for  contention  over  the  proposition 


134  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

that  two  and  two  make  four.  A  principle  is  a  fact  the 
verity  of  which  cannot  in  the  sHghtest  degree  be  shaken  by- 
all  the  opinions  in  opposition  to  it  which  can  be  conjured  up. 
To  hold  differently,  would  be  to  assume  either  that  we  cannot 
have  a  definite  knowledge  of  a  principle,  or  that  we  have  no 
way  of  knowing  when  we  have  acquired  a  knowledge  of  it. 

Some  accepted  authorities  on  moral  philosophy  specifically 
aver  that  to  claim  to  have  a  knowledge  of  a  principle  of  moral- 
ity and  to  insist  that  conduct,  in  order  to  be  moral,  must  be 
consistent  with  that  principle  of  morality,  is  to  assert  one's 
personal  infallibility. 

These  waiters  do  not  specifically  deny  the  existence  of 
principles  of  morality;  on  the  contrary,  they,  by  implication, 
admit  their  existence  in  making  morahty  the  subject  of  their 
discussion.  If  these  philosophers  assume  to  teach  morality 
and  at  the  same  time  hold  that  they  are  not  nor  can  be  sure 
that  they  themselves  have  any  true  principles  of  morality  to 
guide  them,  what  assurance,  pray,  have  we  that  they  know 
what  they  are  talking  about? 

As  a  rule,  our  writers  on  moral  philosophy,  which  includes 
jurisprudence  and  political  economy,  have  been  mere  contro- 
versialists or  doctrinaires  rather  than  seekers  of  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  morality  by  a  knowledge  of  which  alone 
we  may  know  the  difference  between  right  and  wrong.  They 
have  been  setting  up  mere  opinions,  having  no  principle  as  a 
basis,  against  other  opinions,  likewise  based  upon  beliefs  rather 
than  a  knowledge  of  fundamental  principles.  They  have  been 
opposing  error  with  error,  and,  quite  naturally,  the  state  of 
our  morals,  estimated  by  principles,  has  scarcely  improved 
during  the  last  two  or  three  centuries,  and  still  remains 
abominable.  It  is  puerile  to  hope  that  there  ever  can  be  a 
decent  state  of  society  until  we  have  discovered  and  definitely 
formulated  the  natural  laws  of  morality,  and  until  we  habit- 
ually settle  all  questions  of  morality  with  reference  to  those 


THE    LAW    OF    JUSTICE  135 

principles  alone.  All  questions  of  right  and  wrong  must  be 
made  to  turn  upon  the  principles.  Until  the  principles  them- 
selves have  been  shown  to  be  erroneous,  there  will  be  no 
excuse  for  <!ifferences  of  oi)inion  respecting  right  conduct. 

My  single  purpose  in  writing  this  book  is  to  bring  to  view 
the  principles  of  human  nature  and  of  morality,  and  to  eluci- 
date their  application  to  social  conduct  ami  affairs,  and  I  con- 
fi'lently  expect  that  the  teachings  contained  in  these  pages 
v.ill  stand  or  fall  with  the  principles  herein  set  forth. 

And  mark,  that  if  the  fun  lamental  principles  herein  enun- 
ciated are  found  by  tlie  judgment  of  mankind  to  be  true, 
there  will  result  not  an  ages  long  evolution  of  ideas,  ideals, 
sentiments,  feelings,  heart  and  human  nature,  but  a  swift 
revolution  of  all  present  and  past  philosophy,  as  complete  as 
the  discoveries  of  Copernicus  and  Newton  made  in  the  field 
of  astronomy. 

Now  we  may  give  our  formula  of  justice  further  consi- 
deration. 

Let  every  man  do  that  which  will  subserve  his  self-interest. 

Let  every  man  learn  what  his  self-interest  is. 

As  I  have  already  said,  this  formula  of  right  conduct  ap- 
plies with  equal  force  to  purely  personal  activities,  activities 
which  do  not  affect  the  rights  of  others,  and  to  conduct  toward 
others. 

While  no  other  person  nor  association  of  persons  has  the 
light  to  force  one  either  to  do  or  to  desist  from  doing  any- 
thing, even  the  doing  himself  harm,  provided  the  action  bears 
no  relation  to  the  rights  of  others,  it  can  hardly  be  .said  that 
one  has  the  riylit  to  <'o  himself  harm.  However,  unless  one 
lives  the  life  of  a  recluse,  there  are  very  few  things  which  it 
is  possible  for  him  to  do  that  will  do  himself  harm,  which  will 
not  at  the  same  time,  more  or  less,  directly  or  indirectly,  mili- 
tate against  the  rightful  claims  of  others.  I'.ut.  that  one  has 
the  right  to  do  that  which  will  subserve  his  self-interest,  when 


136  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

his  action  bears  no  relation  to  the  rights  of  others,  not  even 
the  writers  on  moral  philosophy  deny. 

Nothing  more  is  required  to  be  said  here  of  the  application 
of  the  formula  to  purely  personal  conduct.  It  is  the  knowl- 
edge and  inauguration  of  right  social  conduct  that  is  our  chief 
concern.  Let  us  have  moral  social  conduct,  and  we  shall  have 
the  conditions  under  which  the  morality  of  purely  personal 
conduct  will  best  thrive.  In  truth  nothing  more  can  be  done 
by  society  to  jjromote  the  development  of  personal  morals. 
We  will  therefore  now  proceed  to  consider  the  application  of 
the  formula  to  social  conduct  and  affairs. 

By  implication,  the  formula  asserts  that  all  men  have  the 
equal  right  to  do  that  which  will  subserve  their  true  self-in- 
terest. Therefore,  if  one  person  deprives  another  of  the  pro- 
duce of  his  labor,  he  deprives  him  of  the  right  to  pursue  his 
true  self-interest  in  accordance  with  the  requirement  of  the 
formula,  to  produce  wealth  and  enjoy  its  benefits,  the  desire 
to  do  which  was  his  motive  for  producing  the  wealth.  If  one 
defames  the  character  of  another,  he  filches  from  him  that 
which  by  the  terms  of  the  formula  he  is  entitled  to  enjoy,  and 
in  each  of  these  cases  the  transgressor  does  himself  injury, 
because  he  himself  cannot  be  secure  in  the  possession  of  his 
own  property  or  character  unless  he  respects  the  right  of 
others  to  their  property  and  character. 

In  the  present  demoralized  state  of  society  it  is  the  general 
conviction  of  wealthy  men  that  it  is  more  difficult  to  hold  on 
to  their  wealth  than  to  get  it.  The  reason  is,  that  the  present 
system  of  social  arrangements  makes  of  business,  or  what 
is  called  "making  money,"  a  cheating  game,  the  objective  point 
of  the  game  being  to  get  possession,  by  hook  or  by  crook,  of 
wealth  which  has  already  been  produced  by  others,  or  titles 
to  privileges  which  are  but  mortgages  on  the  future  labor  of 
others.  And  since  most  wealth  and  evidences  of  privilege  are 
in  the  hands  of  the  wealthy,  it  is  but  natural  for  shrewd  busi- 


THE    T  AW    OF   JUSTICE  137 

ness  men  to  sit  up  nights  to  devise  schemes  to  relieve  some 
wealthy  man  of  a  part  of  his  wealth ;  and  besides,  it  is  rightly 
considered  no  greater  wrong  to  appropriate  the  wealth  of  the 
wealthy  man  than  it  was  for  the  wealthy  man  to  appropriate 
the  wealth  he  has. 

The  injunction  to  gain  a  knowledge  of  what  our  self-in- 
terest is,  in  order  that  right  conduct  may  ensue,  leads  us  to  the 
profoundly  important  conclusion  that  every  man  is  responsi- 
ble for  every  wrong  act,  which  is  invariably  the  result  of  igno- 
rance of  true  self-interest,  provided  the  attainment  of  a 
knowledge  of  his  true  self-interest  was  to  him  possible. 

Every  improvement  in  the  sciences  and  the  arts  will,  in  the 
natural  order  of  things,  promote  in  some  degree  the  well- 
being  of  all  members  of  the  society,  and  therefore,  to  make  use- 
ful discoveries  and  inventions  is  to  advance  our  true  self- 
interest,  lint  our  failure  to  discover  a  secret  of  nature  does 
not  hoUl  us  morally  responsible  for  not  serving  our  true  self- 
interest  in  that  respect,  for,  in  the  nature  of  things,  it  is  im- 
possible for  this  generation,  or  for  any  future  generation,  so 
far  as  we  are  able  to  conceive,  to  know  everything  that  is  in 
nature.  It  is  obviously  a  part  of  the  scheme  of  humanity  to 
make  life  worth  the  living  by  giving  to  mankind  eternally 
something  to  strive  for.  which,  if  gained,  would  give  satis- 
faction to  their  natural  desires. 

Because,  in  the  nature  of  things,  knowledge  of  the  uses  to 
which  matter  and  the  principles  and  forces  of  nature  may  be 
put  to  further  human  welfare,  must  be  gradually  acquired 
(for  our  ability  to  di.scover  a  new  truth  generally,  if  not  al- 
ways, depends  upon  the  knowledge  we  have  already  acquired 
of  other  truths  which  are  related  to  the  new  truth,  and  guide 
us  to  its  discovery),  the  failure  to  make  discoveries  of  that 
nature,  and  therefore,  the  failure  to  subserve  true  self-in- 
terest by  that  means  does  not  imply  moral  culpability.  The 
failure  to  make  a  beneficial  discovery  or  invention  bears  no 


138  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

relation  to  the  relations  between  men,  and  it  could  only  be 
construed  as  a  negative  violation  of  the  formula  by  an  active 
omission,  on  the  assumption  that  the  discovery  or  invention 
could  have  been  made  under  the  circumstances.  But  that 
would  be  a  false  assumption,  since  there  are  no  prejudices 
in  civilized  countries  against  new  adaptations  of  nature  to  the 
uses  of  men ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  there  is  every  incentive, 
both  natural  and  artificial,  to  make  useful  discoveries  and 
inventions,  and  therefore,  we  must  conclude  that  the  failure 
to  make  them  is  ascribable  to  the  impossibility  of  making 
them  under  the  circumstances — most  likely  the  lack  of  some 
indispensible  intermediate  knowledge. 

But,  no  matter  what  the  state  of  the  sciences  and  arts  may 
be  at  any  particular  time,  no  matter  whether  the  productive 
power  of  labor  be  great  or  small,  there  can  be,  and  therefore, 
there  ought  to  be,  just  relations  between  men.  The  fact  that 
the  uses  of  electricity  were  not  known  a  hundred  years  ago 
in  no  wise  stood  in  the  way  of  there  being  just  relations  be- 
tween the  people  who  lived  at  that  time,  nor  does  the  fact 
that  there  are  still  many  important  discoveries  yet  to  be  made 
militate  in  the  least  degree  against  the  establishment  of  just 
relations  now.  But  what  is  to  be  said  respecting  responsi- 
bility for  unjust  social  relations? 

Those  who  abhor  the  evil  conditions  which  now  prevail,  and 
strive  with  single-mindedness  to  learn  what  just  relations  be- 
tween men  are,  and  the  means  by  which  they  may  be  brought 
about,  are  certainly  not  responsible. 

Neither  are  those  responsible  who  by  education  and  cir- 
cumstances are  rendered  incapable  of  distinguishing  right 
from  wrong  relations,  and  whose  minds  are  so  steeped  in 
false  beliefs  that  they  can  have  no  conception  of  how  matters 
could  be  different  from  what  they  are.  Nor  are  those  re- 
sponsible who  suffer  from  unjust  conditions,  and  yet  uphold 
the  social  arrangements  which  are  their  primary  cause,  be- 


THE   LAW   OF   JUSTICE  139 

cause  they  have  heeii  taught  t<j  helievc,  and  <lo  believe,  tliat 
there  is  no  rehition  between  their  sutTering  and  the  social  ar- 
rangnients  which  are  tlie  actual  cause  of  it. 

But  the  person  who  permits  his  prejudices  or  preconceived 
notions  or  beliefs  to  close  his  mind  against  careful  considera- 
tion of  any  serious  and  morally  justifiable  means  of  reme<ly- 
ing  any  social  evil,  and  who  refuses  to  assist  in  api)lying  any 
means  which  will  even  ameliorate  the  evil  so  long  as  there  is 
no  better  remedy  offered,  is  himself  guilty  of  an  overt  act  of 
injustice,  not  merely  to  one  individual,  but  to  thousands  of  hib 
fellow  men. 

There  is  no  human  frailty  more  pitiful  to  behold  than  the 
obstinate  clinging  to  an  erroneous  opinion  because  of  the  lack 
of  the  moral  courage  to  admit  having  held  a  wrong  opinion. 
So  tenacious  are  most  people  of  their  fancied  right  to  main- 
tain any  opinion  which  by  chance  may  have  found  lodgment 
ni  their  mintls,  and  thereby  has  become  their  opinion,  tliat 
they  will  stubbornly  hold  fast  to  opinions  which  a'-e  dea;lly 
to  their  own  natural  rights,  rather  than  admit  that  they  have 
been  so  humiliatingly  duped. 

The  assertion,  which  we  so  frequently  hear  made,  that  one 
man  has  as  much  right  to  his  oj)inion  as  any  other  man  has  to 
his  opinion,  is  no  defense  for  holding  a  wrong  opinion  as 
against  a  right  ojiinion,  unless  the  opinion  be  one  respecting 
a  matter  wliicii  concerns  no  one  but  himself.  Even  then  one 
cannot  claim  the  right  to  hold  a  wrong  opinion,  the  acting  on 
which  woubl  produce  evil  results  to  himself,  unless  it  can  be 
claimed  that  he  has  a  riglit  to  do  himself  a  wrong. 

The  idea  that  any  person  has  the  same  right  to  his  opinion 
as  any  other  person,  is  a  false  deduction  from  the  principle 
of  equality  of  rights.  The  claim  of  the  right  to  hold  wrung 
opinions  as  a  corollary  of  the  principle  of  equality  of  rights, 
when  observed  in  practice,  is  seen  to  be  a  denial  of  the  prin- 
ciple fnjm  which  it  is  contended  the  claim  is  deduceil. 


140  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

While  right  thinking  people  will  have  pity  for  a  person  who 
persists  in  injuring  himself,  and  may  with  propriety  advise 
him  against  such  conduct,  they  would  have  no  ground  for  a 
quarrel  with  him.  For,  if  he  chose  to  do  so,  he  could  truly 
tell  them  that  it  was  none  of  their  business. 

But,  when  a  man  holds  a  wrong  opinion,  the  acting  on 
which  transgresses  the  rights  of  others,  it  is  altogether  unjus- 
tifiable and  immoral  for  him  to  promulgate  such  opinion.  If 
one  has  the  right,  so  far  as  others  are  concerned,  to  do  him- 
self injury,  he  surely  has  no  right  to  trespass  upon  the  rights 
of  others.  Therefore,  he  has  no  right  to  hold  opinions  which, 
when  acted  upon,  will  result  in  harm  to  others,  and  much  less 
has  he  the  right  to  propagate  wrong  opinions  which  will  incite 
wrong  conduct  by  others. 

And  here  it  is  worth  while  to  observe  that  the  prevailing 
idea  that  one  man  is  as  much  entitled  to  his  opinion  as  any- 
one else,  right  or  wrong,  is  the  source  of  the  strength  of  the 
rulers  and  the  weakness  of  the  people. 

The  rulers  hold  the  same  opinions  and  act  in  concert,  while 
the  people  quarrel  with  each  other  over  the  right  to  hold  dif- 
ferent opinions  and  vote  against  each  other.  Tenacity  of 
opinion,  or  belief,  right  or  wrong,  has  always  been  encouraged 
by  the  rulers,  as  long  as  the  opinion  or  belief  did  not  menace 
the  supposed  interests  of  the  rulers.  The  greater  the  variety, 
and  the  more  incongruous  are  the  opinions  and  beliefs  of  the 
different  individuals  among  the  masses,  the  more  helpless  they 
are  as  a  whole,  and  the  easier  it  is  to  rule  them.  But,  let  a 
mere  citizen  who  does  not  belong  to  the  favored  class,  give 
voice  to  an  idea,  however  sound  and  just,  which  threatens 
privileges,  and  the  privilegists  will  throw  him  into  prison,  if 
they  can. 

Wrong  conditions  can  exist  only  in  an  atmosphere  of  wrong 
opinions.    If  ignorance  is  no  excuse  for  violation  of  the  written 


THE    LAW    OF    JUSTICE  141 

l;i\v.  wii\-  slioiild  ij^MioraiKi.'  hi-  ;in  excuse  for  infraction  of  the 
nioral  law?  There  is  less  excuse,  because  a  knowledge  of  the 
mural  law  is  inlinitely  more  easy  to  accjuirc  than  is  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  written  law.  To  opinions  and  beliefs  in  conflict 
with  the  moral  law  there  should  be  relentless  intolerance,  for 
actions  are  the  creatures  of  opinions.  Just  conduct  is  never 
begotten  of  wrong  beliefs.  There  will  be  injustice  so  long  as 
there  is  a  wrong  opinion  to  imjiel  wrong  con<luct.  Therefore, 
if  we  would  be  rid  of  injustice,  we  must  first  rid  ourselves  of 
false  ideas,  and  not  tolerate  those  who  voice  opinions  at  va- 
riance with  the  moral  law. 

So  simple  and  easy  of  comprehension  is  the  moral  law,  that 
ignorance  of  it  is  morally  reprehensible.  The  ease  with  which 
acquaintance  with  the  moral  law  may  be  had,  renders  the  asser- 
tion of  opinions  and  beliefs  at  variance  with  it  an  aggressively 
immoral  act. 

Now,  particular  attention  is  directed  to  the  important  fact 
that  every  wrong  opmion  respecting  governmental  arrange- 
ments, or  relations  between  men,  is  of  the  character  which  has 
just  been  described.  The  abstract  principle  that  all  men  are 
entitled  to  ec|ual  rie^hts  is  sufficiently  understood  and  gener- 
ally recognized.  That  principle  so  completely  covers  the  sphere 
of  relative  conduct  that,  if  it  were  consistently  applied  to  all 
social  matters,  there  would  result  just  relations  between  men. 

But  many  peo])le,  when  they  come  to  consider  social  ar- 
rangements in  detail,  doggedly  refuse  to  apply  the  funda- 
mental principle  in  which  they  claim  to  believe.  They  assume 
this  positively  immoral  attitude  for  various  reasons,  none  of 
which  are  vali<l.  The  majority  of  these  culprits  are  either  too 
indolent  or  too  obsefjuious  to  authority  to  think  for  them- 
selves, and.  finding  it  necessary  to  hold  some  ojiinion  of  af- 
fairs which  concern  them,  they  adojH.  as  their  own.  ready- 
made  opinions  which  have  been  designedly  so  formulated  as 
to  afford  them  some  sort  of  more  or  less  plausible  excuse  for 


142  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

their  adoption.  As,  when  interested  persons  desire  to  im- 
press on  the  mind  of  the  workingman  the  notion  that  he  wants 
a  certain  system  of  taxation  (a  system  which  will  not  only 
cause  him  to  support  an  extravagant  government,  but  which 
will  also  make  many  millionaires  at  his  expense),  they  name 
that  system  of  taxation  "Protective  Tariff,"  and  tell  the  work- 
ers that  the  system  was  made  for  their  special  protection, 
offer,  by  way  of  demonstration,  masses  of  facts  and  figures, 
and  tens  of  thousands  and  even  millions  of  workingmen  begin 
to  shout  and  vote  for  the  protective  tariff. 

When  the  capitalist  desires  to  cultivate  in  the  wealth  pro- 
ducer the  quality  of  docility,  in  order  that  the  latter  will 
stand  quietly  while  his  pockets  are  being  picked,  they  form  or- 
ganizations composed  of  wealth  producers  and  wealth  absorb- 
ers for  no  better  purpose  than  the  spider  weaves  its  web — to 
catch  the  fly — to  paralize  the  power  of  the  workers  to  per- 
ceive their  rights,  by  inoculating  their  minds  with  the  devilish 
belief  that  the  interests  of  capital  and  labor  are  identical. 
And  then  we  find  labor  leaders  serving  the  purposes  of  the 
capitalists  by  telling  their  followers  that  what  is  good  for  the 
capitalist  is  also  good  for  the  worker,  and  what  will  deprive 
the  capitalist  of  any  of  his  power  or  perquisites  will  only 
deprive  him  of  the  power  to  give  work  to  the  worker,  and 
therefore,  the  only  just  claim  the  worker  may  insist  upon,  is 
a  "fair  share"  of  the  wealth  which  he  has  produced. 

There  is  another  class  of  malefactors,  not  so  large  in  num- 
ber, but  much  more  culpable,  and  on  whose  shoulders  rests  a 
far  greater  responsibility.  I  refer  to  those  who  systematically 
and  persistently  spread  abroad  false  ideas ;  those  who  teach 
that  wholesale  robbery  is  a  necessary  concomitant  of  civiliza- 
tion and  progress,  who  conjure  up  arguments  to  induce  those 
who  produce  all  wealth  to  believe  that  it  is  quite  just  that  they 
should  give  the  greater  part  of  it  to  those  who  produce  no 
wealth;  those  who  teach  that  universal  injustice  terminates  in 


TIIF.    LAW    (^I'    J r STICK  143 

in-livi'lual  justice,  and  that  all  the  crime,  poverty,  sickness 
aii'l  death,  and  the  evils  which  all  these  evils  entail.  an<l 
which  are  the  direct  result  of  wickedly  ininioral  social  arrange- 
ments, are  but  by-products  of  civilization,  which  have  their 
beneficent   purposes. 

This  class  includes  those  who  maintain  pul)lic  ojnnion  bu- 
reaus for  the  purpose  of  polluting  and  vitiating  public  thought. 
It  includes  those  who  bribe  legislatures  and  corrupt  the  courts; 
those  who  intimidate  others  to  vote  against  their  own  will  or 
their  own  interest,  and  who  punish  others  for  holding  opin- 
ions different  from  theirs;  those  who  buy  the  control  of  party 
machinery  which  they  have  had  made  to  order  by  the  law- 
makers for  so  much  money. 

This  is  the  class  who  are  primarily  responsible  for  the  stu- 
pendous mass  of  injustice  which  distorts  and  sears  the  life  of 
every  living  being,  the  i-ich  and  poor,  deceiver  and  deceived, 
briber  and  bribe  1.  intimidator  and  intimidated.  This  class 
is  composed  of  e'iucated  men  wdio  have  large  financial  interests 
and  whose  shrewdness  has  been  highly  cultivated  by  assidu- 
ously playing  the  game  of  getting  possession  of  wealth  which 
has  been  produced  by  others,  and  then  keeping  other  shrewd 
men  from  getting  it  away  from  them. 

They  have  every  facility  for  manufacturing  public  opinion, 
for  hiring  respectable  bunco  stecrcrs  to  demand,  in  the  name 
of  the  people,  measures  which  will  benefit  their  employers 
at  the  people's  expense,  an  1  for  doing  anything  which  their 
pecuniary  interests  dictate,  the  only  consideration  being  the 
cost.  These  are  the  men  who  think,  and  do  things.  They 
sit  in  the  front  iicv.s  in  the  churches;  many  of  them  sit  on 
the  bench  and  in  the  legislative  halls ;  they  manage  to  keep 
in  the  limelight  and  to  get  themselves  interviewed  by  the 
newspapers ;  they  answer  to  most  of  the  toasts  at  banquets, 
and  when  there  are  more  banr]ucts  than  the  great  leaders  of 
this  class  can  possibly  attend,  they  transmit  their  views  by 


144  SOCIAL  JUSTICE 

letters  which  are  read  to  the  banquetters  and  printed  in  the 
papers.  In  short,  this  class  have  the  ability,  and  maintain 
the  facilities,  to  exercise,  and  do  exercise,  an  influence  on  pubHc 
thought  and  public  affairs  out  of  all  proportion  to  their  num- 
bers. They  set  themselves  up  as  authorities,  and,  pitifully, 
their  dupes  recognize  them  as  such.  Therefore  they  have 
been  the  ruling  class,  and  therefore  also  they  are  pre-eminently 
the  responsible  class. 

That,  if  every  man  should  do  that  which  will  subserve  his 
self-interest,  social  justice  would  be  the  result,  will  become 
obvious  even  to  those  privilegists  who,  after  reading  this  book 
may  still  hold  that  the  existence  of  privilege  is  good  for  those 
who  exercise  the  privileges,  and  who  may  contend  that  con- 
sequently, pursuant  to  the  law  of  nature,  all  persons  who  en- 
joyed or  hoped  to  enjoy  privileges,  would  naturally  and,  in 
view  of  the  formula,  justifiably  uphold  privileges,  when  it  is 
pointed  out  that  even  though  it  were  to  the  true  self-interest 
of  the  actual  and  prospective  beneficiaries  of  privilege,  and 
in  pursuance  of  their  self-interest  they  were  to  put  forth 
every  effort  to  uphold  privileges,  they  would  be  powerless  to 
do  so,  because,  in  the  nature  of  things,  the  self-interest  of 
an  overwhelming  majority  of  the  people  is  absolutely  opposed 
to  any  and  all  privileges. 

Now,  it  is  as  certain  as  day  follows  night,  that  Avhen  the 
masses  of  the  people  once  realize  how  shamefully  they  have 
been  betrayed,  deceived,  cajoled,  and  cheated  by  the  social 
paupers  who  live  either  by  public  alms  in  the  form  of  privi- 
leges, or  by  downright  theft;  when  they  once  discover  the 
means  by  which  they  have  been  deprived  of  their  lives,  their 
liberties,  and  the  happiness  which,  under  just  conditions  they 
could  have  achieved ;  when  they  learn  what  belongs  to  them 
and  how  to  keep  it;  when  they  have  gained  a  knowledge  of 
what  their  true  self-interest  is;  then,  the  public-opinion  bu- 
reaus, the  insidious  newspaper  interviews,  the  speechmaking, 


THE    LAW    OF   JUSTICE  145 

the  bunco  steerers  and  the  pompous,  owlish  posing  as  author- 
ity, will  be  shorn  of  their  influence  and  be  regarded  by  tiie 
people  with  utter  contempt. 

For,  as  the  people  are  now  misled  into  depriving  themselves 
of  tiieir  own  most  precious  belonging,  their  natural  rights,  be- 
cause tliey  neither  understand  what  their  rights  are,  nor  the 
incalculable,  prodigious  advantages  which  the  free  exercise  of 
their  rights  would  bring  to  them ;  when  they  do  understand 
these  things,  no  one  will  be  able  to  deceive  them,  and  they 
will,  with  the  consciousness  that  they  are  right,  press  their 
claim  to  their  own  with  a  persistence  and  insistence  which 
will  be  irresistible. 

Having  a  knowledge  of  what  rights  belong  to  them,  the 
natural  law  of  self-preservation,  which  ever  acts  in  strict 
accordance  with  the  understanding  of  what  self-interest  is, 
will  brush  aside  every  obstacle  which  may  stand  in  the  way 
of  the  attainment  of  those  rights.  They  need  but  to  gain  a 
kiiovv  ledge  of  what  their  true  self-interest  is.  The  instiiu't 
which  will  impel  them  to  act  in  accordance  with  such  knowl- 
edge they  have  had  since  their  birth,  and  it  will  abide  with 
them  until  their  death. 

If  a  man  will  resist  the  taking  from  him  of  a  five-cent 
piece  with  all  the  power  he  possesses,  what  will  he  do  to 
retain  rights  the  value  of  which  cannot  be  even  measured  in 
dollars  and  cents ! 

There  can  be  but  one  true  rule  of  right  conduct  for  human 
beings,  and  that  must  have  for  its  basis  the  principles  of 
human  nature.  It  would  be  fatuous  to  suppose  that  right 
conduct  could  ever  issue  from  the  observance  of  a  wrong  rule 
of  cou'luct.  A  rule  of  conduct  which  in  its  meaning  is  indefi- 
nite, or  in  its  essence  incompatible  with  the  principles  of  hu- 
man nature,  will  either  have  no  influence  at  all  on  conduct, 
or  it  will  incite  wrong  conduct  as  all  wrong  opinions  or  the 
lack  of  a  knowle  Ige  of  the  truth  always  does.     One  formula 


146  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

of  right  conduct  or  of  justice  is  not  as  good  as  another  any 
more  than  ignorance  is  as  good  as  knowledge. 

To  many  persons  it  may  appear,  when  first  presented  to 
them,  that  it  is  a  matter  of  no  moment  what  the  precise  forms 
or  meanings  of  the  various  formulae  of  justice,  freedom  or 
right  are,  and  that  the  pointing  out  of  flaws  in  them  is  but  a 
display  of  factitious,  carping  criticism.  But  mark,  that  it  is 
of  paramount  importance  that  these  formulae,  which  lay 
down  the  fundamental  principle  by  which  conduct  is  to  be 
juiged,  shall  be  both  precise  and  correct  in  both  form  and 
meaning.  For,  these  formulae  constitute  the  premise  upon 
which  all  argument  of  questions  of  justice  or  right  conduct 
is  based,  and  from  which  all  conclusions  are  deduced.  An 
erroneous  formula  of  justice  must  therefore  inevitably  lead 
to  wrong  conclusions  respecting  right  conduct. 

Of  this  we  may  be  absolutely  certain:  a  formula  of  right 
conduct  to  be  true  must  stand  the  test  of  these  requirements : 
It  must  be  so  definite  as  to  constitute  an  explicit  guide  for  all 
conduct,  and  the  conduct,  when  made  to  implicitly  follow  the 
directions  of  the  formula,  must  result  in  absolute  justice. 

It  will  be  exceedingly  profitable,  therefore,  to  subject  some 
of  the  recognized  formulae  of  justice  (which  by  most  of  the 
ordinary  run  of  men  are  considered  to  mean  the  same  thing) 
to  analysis,  and  thus  determine  whether  they  measure  up  to 
the  requirements. 

The  golden  rule  being  the  most  generally  accepted  rule  of 
conduct,  let  us  give  it  first  consideration. 

"And  as  ye  would  that  men  should  do  to  you,  do  ye  also 
to  them  likewise." 

The  first  thing  to  be  done  is  to  get  at  the  real  meaning  of 
this  rule.  This  we  may  best  do  by  undertaking  to  make  a 
mental  application  of  it.  The  rule  commands  us  to  do  to  oth- 
ers what  it  is  our  desire  that  others  should  do  to  us.  Clearly 
then,  according  to  the  rule,  the  only  means  we  have  of  learn- 


THE    LAW    OF   JUSTICE  147 

ing  what  {o  do  to  others,  is  to  coiisilcr  what  wc  woul  I  that 
others  shoultl  flo  to  us.  That  stipulation  constitutes  our  sole 
guide.  Whether  our  conduct  would  be  right  or  wrong,  would. 
of  course,  depeml  entirely  upon  whether  our  understan<ling 
as  to  what  others  should  do  to  us  were  right  or  wrong.  But, 
so  long  as  we  did  do  to  others  what  we  thought  others  should 
do  to  us,  whether  our  action  were  right  or  wrong,  we  would 
have  strictly  complied  with  the  mandate  of  the  rule.  If  every 
man  implicitly  folowed  the  rule,  general  right  conduct  would 
not  be  the  outcome  unless,  at  the  same  time,  every  one  had 
a  correct  understanding  as  to  what  is  right  conduct,  and  no 
one  would  have  others  do  more  nor  less  than  right  by  him. 
But  these  last  two  stipulations  are  not  included  in  the  rule. 
Hence  we  see  that  wdiile  the  rule  when  construed  literally  is 
definite  enough  to  be  followed,  the  putting  it  into  practice 
will  not  proiluce  right  conduct. 

Just  what  the  gold.en  rule  was  intended  to  mean  we  have 
no  means  of  knowing;  but,  judging  by  its  context,  it  may  be 
Imagined  that  its  intended  purport  might  be  that  wdiich  is  ex- 
pressed thus :  Do  unto  another  as  ye  would  that  he  should 
do  unto  you,  were  you  in  his  place  and  he  in  yours. 

The  rule  presented  in  this  form  requires  of  us  to  do  that 
wdiich  is  quite  impossible,  for,  no  one  can  possible  put  him- 
self in  another's  place  or  circumstances.  Nevertheless,  we 
cannot  know  what  we  would  that  others  should  do  to  us,  un- 
less we  can  exchange  places  with  others.  In  the  presence  of 
that  impossibility  the  nearest  that  wc  can  come  to  following 
this  construction  of  tlic  rule  is  to  do  to  others  wdiat  in  our 
opinion  we  would  wish  others  to  do  to  us  if  wc  were  in  their 
places  and  they  in  ours.  We  would  have  to  be  exceedingly 
goofl  guessers,  and  more — we  would  have  to  be  veritable 
mind  rea  !crs  to  be  able  to  tell  what  we  would  have  others  do 
to  us  if  wc  were  they,  an  1  they  were  we,  and  thus  be  able 
to  know  what  to  do  to  others  according  to  the  rule.     There- 


148  SOCIAL  JUSTICE 

fore  this  construction  of  the  rule  renders  it  as  a  rule  of  con- 
duct altogether  meaningless. 

Thus  we  see  that  while  acting  strictly  in  accordance  with 
the  rule  we  are  as  likely  (so  far  as  the  rule  serves  as  a  guide) 
to  act  wrong  as  to  act  right,  and  since  we  must  do  to  others 
what  we  would  that  others  should  do  to  us,  and  what  we  would 
have  others  do  to  us  depends  solely  upon  what  our  under- 
standing of  our  self-interest  was,  the  rule,  according  to  its 
most  favorable  interpretation,  commands  us  to  do  nothing 
more  than  that  which  we  would  consider  it  to  our  self-interest 
to  have  done  if  we  were  the  object  instead  of  the  subject  of 
the  action — it  would  make  no  difference  whether  what  we 
would  have  others  do  to  us  would  be  just  or  unjust. 

Worthless  as  the  rule  would  be  as  a  guide  to  right  con- 
duct, if  it  were  possible  for  us  to  really  know  what  we  would 
that  others  should  do  to  us  by  ceasing  to  be  ourselves  and 
actually  becoming  the  others  in  thought  and  circumstances,  it 
is  seen  lo  be  still  more  worthless  when  we  realize  that  we  must 
determine  what  we  would  have  others  do  to  us,  from  our  own 
point  of  view  under  the  influence  of  our  own  circumstances 
and  interests.  It  is  to  be  obsers^ed  that  the  rule  does  not  tell 
us  that  in  order  to  determine  how  we  should  act  toward  others, 
we  must  ask  them  to  advise  us  how  they  would  have  us  act 
tov.ard  them,  and  then  act  accordingly.  But  it  instructs  us  to 
go  about  learning  how  we  should  deal  with  others  in  a  very 
different  manner,  which  produces  very  different  results — we 
must  consi'^^'er  only  what  ive  think  we  would  want  others  to  do 
to  us. 

All  of  us  know,  that  to  order  our  dealings  with  others  ac- 
cording to  f/jeiV  will,  would  result  in  general  injustice.  But 
who  knows  of  any  principle  by  which  it  may  be  shown  that  to 
regulate  our  actions  tov.-ard  others  according  to  our  own  hypo- 
thetical opinion  as  to  the  manner  we  would  have  others  act 
toward,  us,  will  result  in  any  less  injustice? 


THE    LAW    f)F    JUSTICE  149 

Let  us  see  how  tlie  golden  rule  stands  the  test  of  practical 
application  to  every-day  occurrences  in  economic  conduct. 

The  golden  rule  enjoins  us  to  pay  rent,  interest  and 
profits,  if  perchance  we  would  want  others  to  pay  to  us  rent, 
interest  and  profits,  if  we  were  in  a  position  to  levy  such  tri- 
bute, notwithstanding  the  fact  that  rent,  interest  and  profits, 
even  though  they  be  paid  with  apparent  willingness  or  in  com- 
pliance with  a  contract  freely  or  even  eagerly  entered  into  by 
both  parties,  are  sheer  robbery. 

In  spite  of  the  golden  rule,  there  are  few  of  us  who  would 
not  be  very  glad  to  be  relieved  of  the  burdens  of  rent,  interest 
and  profits,  and  not  a  few  of  us  struggle  hard  to  get  rid  of 
those  burdens  by  getting  ourselves  in  a  position  where  we  will 
be  able  to  get  rent,  interest  and  profits  from  others.  We  may 
believe  in  the  teachings  of  the  golden  rule,  and  therefore  be- 
lieve that  the  payment  of  rent,  interest  and  profits  is  right, 
but  somehow,  so  long  as  some  must  pay  and  others  receive 
such  bonuses,  every  mother's  son  of  us  wants  to  get  out  of 
the  class  of  ])ayers  and  into  the  class  of  receivers  as  soon  as 
he  can.  If  it  were  as  good  for  us  to  pay  these  bonuses  as  to 
leceive  them  tliere  could  be  no  fault  found  with  the  teachings 
of  the  goUlen  rule  in  this  particular  matter ;  but  it  is  a  fact 
which  cannot  be  dodged  that  when  applied  to  tlie  prevailing 
system  of  legalized  theft,  the  golden  rule  enjoins  the  prac- 
tice of  the  most  far-reaching,  most  demorahzing  species  of 
dishonesty  that  curses  the  lives  of  men.  For,  since  the  golden 
rule  enjoins  the  payment  of  rent,  interest  and  profits,  it.  by 
implication,  sanctions  the  taking  of  rent,  interest  and  profits. 
Were  the  golden  rule  a  true  guide  to  right  conduct,  its  ob- 
servance in  any  of  our  dealings  with  one  another  could  not 
possibly  result  in  such  grossly  immoral  conduct  as  can  only 
be  properly  described  as  common  theft.  Because  we  have  been 
brought  up  under  an  unjust  system,  and  therefore,  have  al- 


150  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

v/ays  believed  the  system  to  be  right,  does  not  alter  one  jot 
Cr  tittle  its  degrading  thievish  character. 

The  golden  rule  enjoins  us  to  work  for  low  wages,  for  less 
even  than  the  current  price  of  labor  in  a  glutted  labor  mar- 
ket under  a  system  of  industrial  slavery,  provided  only  that 
if  we  had  others  to  work  for  us  we  would  want  them  to  ac- 
cept such  low  wages.  It  enjoins  us  to  pay  just  wages,  wages 
equal  to  the  full  value  of  the  product  of  the  labor  performed 
for  us,  provided  that  we  conceived  that  if  we  were  the  work- 
ers and  the  workers  were  our  employers,  we  would  want  as 
wages  the  full  produce  of  our  labor. 

The  rule  commands  us  to  demand  as  compensation  for 
labor  an  equivalent  in  value  to  the  entire  produce  of  our  labor, 
not  because  that  would  be  the  only  just  compensation,  but 
only  in  the  event,  and  then  for  that  reason,  that  we  were  of  a 
mind  that  we  would  want  others  whom  we  might  employ  to  de- 
mand from  us  no  less  compensation  for  their  labor. 

The  rule  commands  us  to  buy  labor  as  cheap  as  it  can  be 
had  in  the  slave  market,  not  because  such  a  bargain  would  be 
just  to  the  worker,  but  merely  in  the  event,  which  in  our  cir- 
cumstances would  seem  to  us  impossible  to  take  place,  and 
then  because  we  held  the  opinion,  no  matter  by  what  course 
of  reasoning  we  reached  it,  that  we  would  only  want  the 
market  price  for  our  labor,  regardless  of  the  relation  which 
that  price  bore  to  the  value  which  the  labor  produced. 

The  point  to  be  made  here  is  that  there  can  scarcely  be 
anything  more  destructive  of  morality,  and  consequently  the 
well-being  of  the  people,  than  a  general  belief  that  a  pleasing 
jingle  of  words  fraught  with  good  intentions,  which  is  so  in- 
definite as  to  be  subject  to  a  great  variety  of  interpretations, 
■s  a  perfect  law  of  right  conduct. 

The  long  continuance  of  immoral  customs  has  always  been 
(hie  to  the  fact  that  they  have  found  support  in  some  ambigu- 
ous precept  which  was  believed  to  be  authentically  moral. 


THE    LAW    OF   JUSTICK  151 

The  gohlcn  rule  as  a  guii'.c  of  coirluct  is  an  utter  failure, 
as  tiie  con.luct  of  all  Christian  peoples  from  the  year  one  up 
to  (late  attests.  It  is  a  failure  because  it  takes  no  account 
either  of  human  nature  or  the  state  of  knowledge  of  what  is 
right  conduct  —  of  what  is  one's  self-interest.  Therefore, 
Christians  have  always  acted  precisely  as  they  would  have 
acted,  no  better  nor  worse,  if  they  had  never  heard  of  the 
golden  rule.  For,  all  men  who  ever  lived,  before  or  after 
Christ,  have  always  acted  toward  others  in  that  manner  which 
they  understood  it  to  be  to  their  self-interest  to  act.  entirely 
regardless  of  how  they  would  that  others  should  act  toward 
them. 

Even  the  best  intcntioned  Christians,  those  who  have  sin- 
cerely believed  the  rule  to  be  golden,  and  who  have  endeavored 
to  make  their  actions  conform  to  the  rule,  could  never  make 
a  truer  application  of  it  than  to  conclude  that  what  they  wouM 
that  others  should  <lo  to  them  was  identical  with  whatever 
they  might  desire  to  do  to  others.  That  is  to  say.  what  they 
rcgar  led  as  to  their  self-interest  to  do  to  others,  they  would 
deem  to  be  their  wish  that  other  should  do  to  them. 

Thus,  in  endeavoring  to  follow  the  golden  rule,  the  upshot 
has  been  the  doing  what  it  was  considered  the  self-interest 
to  do,  which,  according  to  the  state  of  knowledge  respecting 
self-interest,  would  have  been  done  just  the  same  if  the  golden 
nde  had  never  been  spoken. 

Whenever  the  understanding  of  self-interest  is  faulty,  there 
always  results  wrong  conduct  toward  others,  and  only  when 
the  un>'erstrn.'ing  of  self-interest  is  correct,  does  there  ever 
take  i)lace  rig'.it  conduct  toward  others. 

Kant,  the  Cicrman  philosopher,  or  rather  metaphysician,  has 
given  us  a  rule  which  he  deemed  to  be  the  law  of  riii^hl  con- 
duct. His  rule  is,  "Act  only  on  that  maxim  whereby  thou 
canst  at  the  same  tin^.e  will  that  it  should  become  a  universal 
law." 


152  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

The  golden  rule  implies  practically  the  same  meaning — 
that  we  should  do  that  which  we  would  wish  to  be  universally 
done. 

The  idea  that  Kant  intended  to  embody  in  his  rule  was  that 
every  one  ought  to  do  right,  and  that  if,  when  one  is  about 
to  act,  he  will  consider  how  he  would  like  everyone  to  act  in 
like  circumstances,  which  would  include,  of  course,  the  actions 
of  others  toward  himself,  he  will  act  right,  and  he  will  act 
right  simply  for  right's  sake. 

Kant  makes  the  fatal  error  of  assuming  that  human  conduct 
can  ever  be  governed  by  pointing  out  to  men  in  general  terms 
Vvhat  they  ought  to  do,  and  then  commanding  them  to  do  that 
which  they  ought  to  do,  for  no  other  reason  than  that  it  is 
right  that  they  should  do  so.  For,  as  has  already  been 
abundantly  shown,  all  actions  of  all  men  are  prompted  and 
determined  not  by  a  prescribed  rule  of  what  they  ought  to 
do,  merely  because  they  are  told  that  it  is  their  duty  to  act 
in  a  certain  manner,  but  invariably  by  their  understanding 
as  to  what  manner  of  action  will  best  subserve  their  self- 
interest. 

The  comments  here  made  on  Kant's  rule  apply  with  equal 
force  to  the  golden  rule,  and  the  comments  I  have  made  on  the 
golden  rule  apply  likewise  to  Kant's  rule. 

Spencer's  formula,  "Every  man  is  free  to  do  that  which 
he  wills,  provided  he  infringes  not  on  the  equal  freedom  of 
any  other  man,"  is  so  far  from  being  a  formula  of  justice, 
that  it  is  devoid  of  any  meaning  which  can  serve  as  a  guide 
of  right  conduct. 

If  this  formula  means  anything,  it  must  be  as  applicable 
to  two  persons  as  to  a  society  composed  of  several  million 
persons,  and  if  we  undertake  to  apply  it  to  a  community  com- 
posed of  A  and  B,  we  get  the  following  result : 

A  is  free  to  do  that  which  he  wills,  provided  he  infringes 
not  on  the  equal  freedom  of  B  to  do  that  which  he  wills,  pro- 


THE    LAW    OF   JUSTICE  153 

viiled  lie  does  not  infringe  on  the  equal  free'lom  of  A  to  do 
that  which  he  wills,  pruvide<l — and  so  on  ad  inlinituni. 

If  we  undertake  to  translate  this  formula  into  terms  which 
will  convey  a  definite  meaning,  the  formula  oi  justice  would 
read :  Every  man  is  free  to  do  that  which  he  wills,  right  or 
wrong,  provided  he  does  not  do  wrong.  If  it  he  held  that  the 
second  clause  of  Spencer's  formula:  "provided  he  infringes 
not  on  the  equal  freedom  of  any  other  man,"  the  negative 
element,  so  limits  the  positive  statement  in  the  first  clause  that 
the  two  clauses,  taken  together,  convey  hut  a  single  idea,  then, 
let  me  ask,  what  single  idea  can  he  gathered  from  the  entire 
formula,  unless  it  be  that  no  man,  in  the  exercise  of  liis  own 
freedom,  shall  infringe  on  the  equal  freedom  of  any  other 
man,  and  therefore,  the  positive  assertion,  "every  man  is  free 
to  do  that  which  he  wills,"  ceases  to  be  a  positive  statement. 
The  positive  statement  is  only  made  in  order  to  assert  a  nega- 
tive, and  therefore,  the  formula,  taken  as  a  wdiole,  is  tanta- 
mount to  a  negative  statement,  an  inhibition  of  the  infringe- 
ment of  undefined  freedom,  but  by  no  possible  construction 
is  it  a  definition  of  legitimate  freedom  nor  an  intelligible  guide 
of  conduct. 

The  fault  to  be  found  with  all  formulae  of  right  or  justice 
which  have  come  to  my  notice  is : 

1.  They  are  all  indefinite  and  inconclusive  in  thai  they  de- 
fine the  freedom  of  one  individual  by  the  equal  freedom  of  all 
other  individuals,  or  the  rights  of  one  person  by  the  equal 
rights  of  all  other  persons  without  defining  what  the  freedom 
or  the  rights  of  any  person  are,  and 

2.  They  convey  the  idea  that  while  all  persons  should  enjoy 
equal  freedom  or  equal  rights,  in  order  that  all  may  enjoy 
equal  freedom  or  rights,  their  freedom  or  rights  must  be 
limited. 

An    egregious    error    is    insinuated    into    these    formulae 
of    right   conduct   by   confounding   in    them    the    idea    of    the 


154  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

necessity  of  inhibiting  wrong  actions  with  the  idea  of  the 
necessity  of  limiting,  in  a  sense  of  curtailing,  natural  rights 
or  true  freedom. 

From  this  postulate  there  necessarily  follows  the  conclu- 
sion that  there  can  be  no  such  things  as  absolute  rights  or 
absolute  justice  in  the  actualities  of  civilized  society,  but  that 
there  can  be  only  "relative  rights"  or  "relative  justice,"  and 
that  the  only  alternative  of  choice  is  between  bad  and  worse. 
And  accordingly,  Spencer  finds  no  incongruity  in  our  barbar- 
ously unjust  system  of  land  tenure  and  his  formula  of  jus- 
tice, because  he  considered  our  land  system  "relatively  just," 
the  system  which,  of  all  possible  systems  of  land  tenure,  is 
the  least  wrong. 

He  arrived  at  this  conclusion  by  assuming  that  we  must  have 
either  a  system  of  unlimited  individual  ownership  of  land, 
such  as  obtains  in  the  United  States  and  most  European  coun- 
tries, or  a  communistic  system  under  which  all  the  land  is 
directly  owned  and  controlled  by  the  people  in  common,  and 
then  arguing  that  the  badness  of  the  required  system  of  ad- 
ministration of  common  ownership  renders  the  better  system 
of  unlimited  private  ownership  relatively  just. 

But  if  it  should  transpire  that  there  is  a  better  system  of 
land  tenure  than  either  of  those  which  Spencer  conceives  to 
be  the  only  possible  systems,  what  becomes  of  his  conclusions 
respecting  the  present  system,  and  what  becomes  of  Spencer's 
reputation  as  a  great  philosopher?  It  would  have  been  more 
creditable,  both  to  his  ju^lgment  and  to  his  sense  of  justice, 
had  he  condemned  the  communistic  system  as  impracticable, 
the  system  of  unlimitcl  individual  ownership  as  monstrously 
unjust,  and,  instead  of  referring  to  the  subject  as  "a  vexed 
question,"  had  he  acknowledged  that  he  did.  not  know  hov/  a 
just  system  of  land  tenure  could  be  contrived. 

Spencer,  in  his  formula,  defines  what  freedom  is  by  a  state- 
ment of  what  freedom  is  not,  which  constitutes  purely  a  nega- 


THE    LAW    OI-    JUSTICE  155 

tive  Icfinition  of  frectlom.  Spencer  makes  the  positive  state- 
ment that  every  man  is  free  to  do  that  which  he  zcills,  and 
then  denies  the  freedom  to  do  what  one  zn'ills  by  asserting  in 
an  indefinite  and  incomprehensible  manner  what  he  may  )tot 
do,  though  he  may  will  to  do  it.  which  leaves  us  to  deduce 
what  one  may  do,  from  an  unintelligible  definition  of  what  one 
may  not  do. 

But  Spencer  does  not  suffer  such  a  trifling  difficulty  to 
stand  in  liis  way.  He  sets  up  this  would-be  formula  of  justice 
as  the  fundamental  principle  from  which  he  derives  all  rights 
as  corollaries.  an<l  since  the  formula  of  justice  imi)lies  that 
some  activities  must  be  restricted,  he  concludes  that  what  he 
calls  freedom  must  be  restricted;  and  since  all  rights  are  de- 
rivatives from  the  law  of  equal  freedom,  rights  must  be 
restricted. 

When  the  necessity  of  limiting  freedom  is  asserted  instead 
of  positively  defining  and  asserting  natural  rights,  the  infer- 
ence is  that  it  is  necessary  to  limit  some  forms  of  rightful 
freedom  which  arc  held  by  the  constructors  of  formulae  of 
freedom  or  justice  to  be  not  rightful.  Spencer  himself  evi- 
dently did  not  consider  the  mere  injunction  not  to  do  wrong 
a  complete  and  sufficient  formula  of  justice,  because  he  pro- 
ceeds to  argue  the  necessity  of  limiting  that  freedom  to  which 
every  individual  has  a  right — the  limitation  of  individual, 
natural  rights.  The  injunction  to  do  no  wrong,  besides  being 
no  specific  rule  of  right  conduct,  would  not  open  the  way  for 
the  limitation  of  natural  rights,  which  Spencer  recognized  in 
pure  abstract  ethics  as  a  wrong.  He  was  bent  upon  the  justi- 
fication of  the  curtailment  of  natural  rights,  and  therefore, 
his  formula  of  justice  and  his  elucidation  of  the  formula  were 
made  to  conform  to  that  end.  The  statement  that  no  one  has 
the  right  to  do  wrong  is  an  indubitable  and  undisputed  truth, 
but  it  is  not  a  formula  of  right  conduct. 

Had  Spencer  prescribed  what  all  men  are  not  free  to  do, 


156  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

which  his  formula  assumes  to  do  (the  restriction  of  freedom 
is  the  only  definite  idea  contained  in  his  formula)  by  saying: 
"Every  man  in  the  exercise  of  his  own  freedom  shall  not  in- 
fringe on  the  equal  freedom  of  any  other  man,"  he  would  have 
clearly  conveyed  the  idea  of  the  necessity  of  limiting  activities, 
by  excluding  unjust  activities,  without  entangling  it  with  the 
idea  of  the  necessity  of  limiting  needful  or  desirable  freedom. 

Now,  if  we  substitute  the  words,  natural  rights,  for  free- 
dom, in  the  above  formula  of  restricted  activities,  we  have: 
"Every  man  in  the  exercise  of  his  own  natural  rights  shall  not 
infringe  on  the  equal  natural  rights  of  any  other  man;"  which 
is  an  entirely  superfluous  statement,  since  the  exercise  of  nat- 
ural rights  axiomxatically  preckv.Ies  the  infringement  of  the 
natural  rights  of  others. 

But  Spencer  had  a  preconceived  theory  to  the  conservation 
of  which  everything  which  stood  in  its  way,  including  human 
nature  and  common  sense,  must  be  sacrified.  For  the  pre- 
servation of  his  theory  of  evolution  he  was  compelled  to  main- 
tain that  the  existing  social  arrangements  are  right,  that  is  to 
say  "relatively  right,"  the  least  wrong  possible  in  the  present 
state  of  development  of  human  nature  and  the  social  organism, 
the  present  order  of  things  being  the  product  of  evolution  dur- 
ing a  time  reaching  backward  beyond  the  knowledge  of  man. 
For  he  must  necessarily  argue  that,  since  it  has  required  so 
many  thousands  of  years  to  have  evolved  the  present  state  of 
relative  justice,  a  state  which  he  admits  bears  a  very  remote 
relation  to  absolute  justice,  it  must  require  a  very  long  period 
of  future  evolution  to  bring  about  even  an  appreciable  improve- 
ment in  human  nature  and  other  matters  which  influence  social 
conditions.  Were  he  to  admit  that  any  or  all  unjust  social 
conditions  which  are  ethically  wrong,  could  be  made  ethically 
right  forthwith,  by  merely  substituting  right  governmental 
arrangements    for    wrong   governmental    arrangements,    there 


THE   LAW    OF   JUSTICE  157 

woiiM  be  til)  place  for  his  so-calleil  universal  law  of  evolution 
in  the  treatment  of  social  affairs. 

lUit  Spencer  cviilenily  thought  it  to  be  a  duty,  to  himself 
at  any  rate,  to  give  us  the  theory  of  evolution,  even  though  a 
universal  belief  in  it  wouUI  make  all  human  progress  abso- 
lutely inipossii)le  as  long  as  that  belief  prevailed. 

The  parrots  who  rei)eat  the  misleading  jargon  which  con- 
stitutes the  frame  and  tissue  of  the  evolutiim  theory,  are  to-day 
all  over  the  world  using  that  abominable  theory  to  obstruct 
progress  toward  justice  by  making  men  incapable  of  straight 
thinking  respecting  just  relations  between  themselves. 

Spencer  himself  is  guilty  of  the  ignominy  of  concocting  a 
preposterous  system  of  philosophy,  and  then  using  it  as 
grounds  for  the  justification  of  even  the  most  monstrous,  single, 
social  injustice  extant,  the  present  system  of  land  tenure. 

Spencer's  formula  does  not,  either  by  the  literal  meaning 
of  its  terms,  or  by  any  reasonable  interpretation  of  them,  ex- 
ckule  aggression  nor  counter  aggression.  For  that  reason 
alone  the  formula  is  fatally  defective.  In  the  negative  stipu- 
lation— "provided  he  infringes  not  on  the  equal  freedom  of 
any  other  man" — the  words  "the  equal  freedom"  are  subject 
to  no  other  construction  than  that  "the  freedom  of  any  other 
man"  is  equal  to  the  freedom  of  "every  man."  referred  to  in 
the  lirst  clause,  containing  tlie  ])ositive  assertion  of  the  formula 
— "Every  man  is  free  to  do  that  which  he  wills."  The  neces- 
sary inference  being  that  any  other  man  has  the  ec|ual  free- 
dom to  do  that  which  //<•  wills. 

But  Spencer  disclaims  the  intention  to  embody  in  his  formula 
any  such  meaning.  On  the  contrary,  he  asserts  that  sucb  an 
interpretation  is  a  perversion  of  its  meaning.  "For."  says  he, 
"the  truth  to  be  expressed  is  that  each  in  carrying  on  the  ac- 
tions which  constitute  his  life  for  the  time  being,  and  conduce 
to  the  subsequent  maintenance  of  his  life,  shall  not  be  impeded 
further  than  by  the  carrying  on  of  those  kindred  actions  which 
maintain  the  lives  of  others.    It  does  not  countenance  a  super- 


158  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

fiuous  interference  with  another's  life,  committed;  on  the 
ground  that  an  equal  interference  may  balance  it.  Such  a  ren- 
dering of  the  formula  is  one  which  implies  greater  deductions 
from  the  lives  of  each  and  all  than  the  associated  state  neces- 
sarily entails." 

It  will  be  seen  that  Spencer  elucidates  the  meaning  of  his 
indefinite  formula  with  an  explanation  quite  as  indefinite. 
To  understand  his  explanation  we  must  know  what  he  means 
by  maintenance  of  life,  and  how  great  are  the  deductions  from 
life  which  the  associated  state  necessarily  entails,  and,  above 
all  things,  we  should  know  why  the  social  state  entails  any 
deductions  from  the  highest  possible  life  of  any  one. 

In  view  of  Spencer's  extraordinary  ability  to  formulate 
his  ideas  with  precision  and  perspicuity,  one  is  constrained  to 
conclude,  after  reading  his  chapter  on  the  formula  of  justice 
and  following  his  arguments  to  their  ultimate  conclusions, 
that  he  wanted  not  a  definite,  rigid,  but  an  indefinite,  elastic 
formula,  a  formula  wdiich  in  itself  means  nothing  in  particular, 
but  which  could  be  adapted  to  the  exigencies  of  his  theory  of 
evolution. 

Spencer's  strained,  forced  and  disingenuous  arguments  and 
his  habit  of  jumping  or  circumventing  obstacles  w^hich  he  was 
unable  to  squarely  and  reasonably  dispose  of,  and  the  utterly 
untenable  and  vicious  conclusions  he  arrives  at,  prove  con- 
clusively that  he  was  not  seeking  the  truth,  but  rather  en- 
deavoring to  invent  arguments,  as  plausible  as  might  be,  in 
support  of  the  doctrine  of  evolution. 

In  Chapter  VIII  of  "Data  of  Ethics."  entitled  "The  Socio- 
logical View,"  by  way  of  establishing  the  premises  which  will 
enable  him  to  deal  with  the  morals  of  human  conduct  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  general  theory  of  evolution,  and  thus  permit 
him  to  reach  a  formula  of  right  conduct  in  consonance  with 
that  theory,  Herbert  vSpenccr  says : 

*     *     *     "our  own  species  is,  on  the  whole,  to  be  distin- 


THE    LAW    OF    J  U STICK  159 

guislic<l  (from  animals)  as  having  a  formula  for  complete 
life  which  sjjeciaily  recog^iizes  the  relations  of  each  indiviiUial 
to  otiiers,  in  the  |)rescnce  of  whom,  and  in  co-operation  with 
whom,  he  has  to  live.  This  additional  factor  in  the  problem 
of  complete  living,  is.  indeed,  so  imj)ortant  that  the  neces- 
sitated mo(hlications  of  conduct  have  come  to  form  a  chief 
part  of  the  code  of  conikict.  Ilecause  the  inherite<l  desires 
which  (hroctly  refer  to  the  maintenance  of  individual  life  arc 
fairly  adjusted  to  the  re(|uirements.  there  has  been  no  need 
to  insist  on  that  conformity  to  them  which  furthers  self-con- 
servation. Conversely,  because  these  desires  prompt  activities 
that  often  conflict  with  the  activities  of  others;  and  because 
the  sentiments  corresponding  to  others'  claims  are  relatively 
weak,  moral  codes  emphasize  those  restraints  on  conduct  which 
the  presence  of  tiieir  fellowmen  entails." 

Here  Spencer  starts  out  with  the  statement  of  the  truth 
that  a  formula  for  complete  life  recognizes  the  relations  of 
each  individual  with  others,  in  the  presence  of  whom,  and  in 
co-operation  with  whom,  he  has  to  live.  It  would  indeed  be 
a  queer  formula  for  complete  life  (which  implies  the  existence 
of  absolutely  just  relations  between  iu'lividuals)  if  it  did  not 
recognize  the  relations  of  each  individual  with  others.  For  the 
life  of  no  incHvidual  can  be  complete,  or  whole,  if  he  suffers 
from  unjust  relations  with  his  fellows.  Just  relations  between 
individuals  is  a  prerequisite  to  a  complete  life. 

Now,  particular  attention  is  directed  to  Spencer's  next 
statement  which  consists  of  one  of  those  subtle  mixtures  of 
truth  and  error,  the  dexterity  in  compoundin^ij  which  appears 
to  constitute  the  basis  of  the  fame  of  most  philosophers.  Says 
Spencer:  "This  additional  factor  (the  recognition  of  the  rela- 
tions of  each  individual  to  others)  in  the  problem  of  complete 
living  is.  indeed,  so  important  that  the  necessitated  modifi- 
cations of  conduct  have  come  to  form  a  chief  part  of  the  code 
of  conduct.".  Interpreted  by  what  he  says  el'^cwhere  and  par- 
ticularly in  Chapter  YI  of  "Justice."  entitled  "The  Formula  of 
Justice,"  Spencer  meant  by  the  "necessitated  modifications  of 


160  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

conduct"  the  limitation  or  abridgement  of  individual  natural 
rights. 

From  Spencer's  use  of  the  term  activities  in  the  above 
quotation  it  will  be  seen  that  when  he  used  the  term  freedom 
in  his  elucidation  of  his  formula  of  freedom,  he  meant  by  free- 
dom, activities,  and  that  his  use  of  the  word  freedom  to  mean 
activities  vitiates  all  his  arguments  on  the  subject  of  freedom. 
For  the  term  "activities"  includes  all  actions,  right  and  wrong, 
while  the  term  freedom  excludes  all  wrong  actions — its  essen- 
tial meaning  being  security  against  interference  by  others  with 
one's  rightful  activities — it  means  the  state  of  being  able  to 
do  everything  which  it  is  to  our  self-interest  to  do,  and  by 
implication,  it  puts  restrictions  on  others,  denying  them  any 
interference  with  our  doing  such  things. 

His  reasoning  amounts  to  simply  this,  that,  because  wrong- 
ful activities  of  others  shoul  i  be  restricted,  the  freedom  of 
each  and  every  one  should  be  restricted.  And  hence,  he  puts  in 
the  foreground  and  emphasizes  the  inferred  necessity  of  the 
limitation  of  freedom,  instead  of  the  necessity  of  the  limitation 
of  unjust  activities,  which  would  be  equivalent  to  the  assertion 
of  the  necessity  of  the  conservation  of  absolute  freedom,  as 
a  right. 

Once  accept  the  conclusion  that  an  individual  must  sur- 
render some  or  a  part  of  his  natural  rights  in  order  that  he, 
as  a  member  of  society,  ma}'  secure  and  maintain  his  civil 
or  social  rights — once  concede  the  proposition  that  the  interests 
of  society  are  paramount  to  and  incompatible  with  some  or  a 
part  of  the  natural  rights  of  the  individual,  there  is  no  limit 
to  the  invasion  of  individual  natural  rights  under  the  pre- 
text of  conserving  the  rights  of  society  or  promoting  the  gen- 
eral welfare.  Whoever  admits  that  each  man  must  have  cer- 
tain restricted  rights,  asserts  that  it  is  right  that  each  man 
should  have  his  rights  restricted,  and  that  therefore  a  part  of 
his  rights  must  be  lopped  off. 


THE   LAW    OF   JUSTICE  161 

Many  of  the  things  which  the  savage  is  free  to  do,  and  which 
the  civilized  man  is  not  free  to  do,  may  be  essential  to  the 
well-being  of  the  savage,  yet,  I  do  not  think  that  a  single 
one  of  such  "freedoms,"  peculiar  to  the  savage,  can  be  speci- 
fied which  wouM  not  be,  if  not  positively  detrimental,  at  least 
non-essential  to  the  well-being  of  civilized  man. 

The  point  which  writers  on  this  subject  have  overlooked, 
is  that  liberties  of  action,  by  the  very  process  of  conformation" 
to  the  principles  which  determine  natural  rights,  must  be  fhf- 
ferent  in  different  states  of  society  and  under  ever  varying 
circumstances  in  the  same  society,  civilized  or  uncivilized.  The 
state  of  man  is  just  as  natural  where  tiiere  is  civilization  as 
where  there  is  savagery,  and  the  princi])les  whicli  underlie 
and  determine  natural  rights  are  universal. 

One  in  a  civilized  society  is  at  perfect  liberty  to  flo  in  the 
privacy  of  his  chamber  that  which  he  would  not  be  permitted 
to  do  in  the  public  street,  but  which  the  savage  might  freely 
tlo  in  the  wigwam  or  in  the  presence  of  the  whole  tribe.  But 
it  is  not  essential  for  the  civilized  man  to  do  anything  in 
public  wliich  is  offensive  to  the  moral  sensibilities  or  the  sense 
of  propriety  of  his  fellow  men.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  so  far 
as  our  mere  physical  actions  or  movements  are  now  restricted, 
the  restrictions  go  no  furtlier  than  to  inhibit  such  actions  as 
transgress  the  natural  rights  of  others;  and  if  the  savage  knew 
what  were  good  for  him,  he  would  impose  upon  himself  like 
restrictions  of  his  so-called  natural,  savage  liberties.  If  he 
did  so,  he  would  have  no  greater  natural  liberties  nor  liberties 
different  in  character  than  has  the  civilized  man.  Two  Indians 
would  find  it  quite  as  impossible  to  occupy  the  same  spot  at  the 
same  time  as  would  two  citizens  of  New  York  Citv.  An 
Inrlian  would  be  free  to  run  across  a  plane  at  top  speed  with- 
out getting  into  trouble,  provided  no  other  Indian  were  in 
his  path,  but  if,  instead  of  deflecting  his  course  to  avoid  collid- 
ing with  another  Inchan.  he  run  him  down,  there  would  be  a 


162  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

fight.  The  same  principle  would  cover  the  movements  of  a 
civilized  man  in  the  crowded  streets  of  an  American  city. 

The  truth  is  that  right  thinking  men  will  voluntarily  impose 
upon  themselves  such  restrictions  of  their  mere  physical  ac- 
tivities as  may  he  necessary  to  avoid  the  infringement  of  the 
natural  rights  of  others.  Why?  Because  it  is  their  self- 
interest  to  do  so,  and  because,  to  do  otherwise  is  not  needful 
to  their  well-being,  but  on  the  contrary,  will  imperil  the  safety 
of  their  own  natural  rights ;  and  how,  let  me  ask,  can  any- 
one possess  greater  or  more  desirable  liberties  or  rights  than 
the  fullest  exercise  of  such  liberties  and  rights  as  will  best 
subserve  his  true  self-interest? 

The  assumption  that  individuals  in  a  savage  state,  in  a 
society  slightly  developed,  may  exercise  natural  rights  which 
an  individual  in  a  society  somewhat  further  advanced,  such 
as  the  United  States,  may  not  exercise  without  trespassing 
upon  the  interests  of  society  or  diminishing  the  general  welfare, 
is  nothing  short  of  preposterous.  It  may  be  freely  admitted 
that  man  in  a  savage  state  may  do  without  let  or  hindrance 
many  things  which  he  would  not  be  permitted  either  by  law 
or  by  public  opinion  to  do  in  the  present  state  of  society,  but 
this  admission  by  no  means  implies  that  living  in  a  civilized 
social  state  makes  it  either  desirable  or  necessary  to  abridge 
in  any  degree  the  fullest  exercise  of  all  natural  rights,  which 
exercise  is  the  true  meaning  of  the  term  freedom. 

Spencer  quotes  Sir  James  MacKintosh's  definition  of  a  law 
of  nature,  not  in  support  of  the  essence  of  his  own  formula  of 
justice,  but  merely  in  corroboration  of  his  championship  of 
the  a  priori  method  of  reasoning.  MacKintosh's  definition 
(with  the  requirements  of  which  Spencer's  formula  will  hardly 
pass  muster)  is,  in  substance,  all  th.at  can  be  desired.  His  de- 
finition of  a  law  of  nature  is : 

"A  supreme,  invariable  and  uncontrolable  rule  of  conduct 
to  all  men.      .      .      .      It  is     the  law  of  nature,     because  its 


THE    LAW    OF   JUSTICE  163 

general  precepts  are  essentially  adapted  to  promote  the  liaj)- 
piness  of  man  .  .  .  because  it  is  discoverable  by  natural 
reason,  and  suitable  to  our  natural  constitution,  an<l  because 
its  fitness  antl  wisdom  are  founded  (jn  the  general  nature  of 
human  beings,  and  not  on  any  of  those  tempcrary  and  acci- 
dental situations  in  which  they  may  be  placed." 

Barring  his  use  of  the  word  happiness,  where  he  should 
have  employed  the  word  welfare  (since  happiness  refers  only 
to  the  state  of  mind,  wdiile  welfare  includes  not  only  happiness 
but  also  everything  else  which  the  completest  life  requires), 
MacKintosh's  definition  of  a  natural  law  is  a  singularly  accur- 
ate tlescription  of  my  formula  of  justice. 

A  formula,  to  be  a  formula  of  right  conduct,  must  be  the 
embodiment  of  a  natural  law,  and,  of  course,  it  must  be  of 
universal  application. 

Heretofore  we  have  only  considered  the  application  of  the 
formula  to  the  relative  conduct  of  members  of  the  same  society 
or  nation,  that  is,  of  people  who  live  together.  Let  us  now 
contemplate  its  application  to  the  relative  conduct  of  differ- 
ent peoples  or  nations,  who  are  widely  separated  from  each 
other  by  distance  or  who  are  marked  off  from  each  other  by 
political  lines. 

Just  as  the  natural  rights  or  rightful  interests  of  all  indi- 
viduals of  the  same  society  or  country  are  perfectly  compati- 
ble with  each  other,  so  the  natural  rights  or  true  self-interest 
of  each  member  of  one  society  are  perfectly  compatible  with 
the  natural  rights  or  true  self-interest  of  each  citizen  of  any 
other  country,  and  so,  also,  arc  the  natural  rights  or  true  self- 
interest  of  all  citizens  of  any  country  in  complete  harmony 
with  those  rij^hts  or  interests  of  all  citizens  of  all  other  coun- 
tries;  and,  therefore,  if  the  dealings  of  the  people  of  any 
country  in  their  corporate  capacity,  with  j^eoples  of  other 
countries  in  tlicir  corporate  capacity,  were  made  to  conform  to 
the  rc(|uircmcnts  f)f  my  formula  of  justice,  there  would  result 
just  relations  between  nations.      I'or,  nations  have  no  rights, 


164  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

no  interests  apart  from  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  indi- 
viduals composing  the  nation,  and  it  follows  that  in  their  last 
analysis  all  international  questions  are  questions  of  individual 
rights. 

So  we  find  that  the  principles  of  morality  or  justice  which 
determine  what  is  moral  conduct  of  individuals,  and  there- 
fore, what  are  moral  or  just  relations  between  individuals,  are 
precisely  the  same  principles  which  must  determine  the  mo- 
rality or  immorality  of  national  conduct  and  the  moral  or  just 
relations  between  nations.  So  that  if  we  substitute  the  word 
nation  for  the  word  man  in  our  formula,  it  will  read  thus : 

Let  every  nation  do  that  which  will  subserve  its  self-in- 
terest, for  the  nation  which  serves  itS'  self-interest  does  unto 
itself  naught  but  good,  and  does  no  harm  unto  any  other 
nation. 

And  this  formula  reduced  to  its  simplest  terms  is : 

Let  every  nation  learn  what  is  its  self-interest. 

There  is  no  other  way  by  which  not  only  peace — the  cessa- 
tion of  warfare — and  amity,  but  just  relations  between  nations 
in  all  respects  (which  is  the  desideratum)  can  ever  be  at- 
tained. It  is  only  needful  to  further  say  that  just  relations 
between  nations  will  not  come  before,  but  will  naturally  follow 
the  establishment  of  just  domestic  relations. 

And  hence,  the  only  thing  which  individuals  of  any  nation, 
or  any  nation  itself,  can  do,  which  will  terminate  in  amicable 
and  just  relations  between  nations,  is  to  establish  just  rela- 
tions between  the  citizens  of  the  nation.  And  then  they  will 
realize  that  the  principles  which  have  worked  such  beneficence 
when  applied  to  domestic  affairs,  will  work  as  well  when  ap- 
plied to  foreign  afifairs.  For,  the  establishment  of  absolute 
social  justice  within  the  borders  of  any  country  will  result 
in  such  tremendous  benefits  to  its  inhabitants  that  the  obvious 
Ltlf-interest  of  the  people  of  other  countries  will  impel  them 
to  do  likewise. 


CHAPTER  IX. 
RIGHTS. 

All  social  questions,  properly  so  called,  arise  from  unjust 
relations  between  men.  They  consist  in  an  inquiry  as  to  how 
those  unjust  conditions  may  be  remedied.  Unjust  relations 
between  men,  while  immediately  giving  rise  to  social  questions, 
are  themselves  invariably  the  result  of  unwise  social  arrange- 
ments, and,  therefore,  all  social  questions  are  primarily  caused 
by  ill-contrived  social  arrangements.  If  all  social  arrange- 
ments were  just,  there  would  be  no  social  question.  Society 
as  a  whole  would  not  be  responsible  for  any  ill  with  which 
any  member  of  the  society  might  be  afflicted.  Society,  through 
organized,  concerted  action,  can  do  no  more  than  to  establish 
and  maintain  just  relations  between  the  individual  members  of 
the  community.  So  that  when  we  say  that  certain  social  con- 
viitions  constitute  a  social  question,  we  mean  that  those  condi- 
tions are  wrong;  that  they  are  the  result  of  wrong  social 
arrangements,  and  that  the  wrong  can  be  righted  by  righting 
the  social  arrangements. 

The  first  great  truth  wliicli  must  be  thoroughly  understood 
before  any  intelligent,  systematic  and  concerted  effort  to  abol- 
ish injustice  can  be  made,  is  that  every  social  question  is  an 
inrlividual  question.  It  must  be  understood  that  every  social 
injustice  is  an  injustice  perpetrated  against  individuals.  No 
inflividual  can.  on  the  grounds  of  justice,  demand  or  expect 
from  society  more  than  the  unrestricted  cnjiiyment  of  his 
natural  rights  or  the  freedom  to  do  everything  which  it  is  to 
his  self-interest  to  do. 

For  the  society  to  add  one  iota  to  the  absolute  natural  rights 
of  each  ami  every  one  of  its  members,  is  as  much  a  natural 
impossibility  as  it  would  be  to  put  more  water  into  a  vessel 


166  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

already  quite  full.  It  is  equally  impossible  for  the  society  to 
give  to  some  of  its  members  more  than  their  full  natural  rights 
without  taking  from  other  members  a  part  of  their  natural 
rights.  Justice  is  an  exact  quantity.  Anything  more  or  less 
than  justice,  is  injustice. 

The  vital  element  of  all  forms  of  social  injustice  is  the 
same,  viz :  the  violation  by  government  of  individual  rights. 
Social  injustice  can  be  inflicted  in  no  other  way  than  by  de- 
priving the  individual  of  his  inherent  rights.  When  thus 
viewed  in  the  light  of  universal  truth,  all  social  questions  take 
on  a  new  aspect.  Every  political  and  economic  question  is 
reduced  to  a  question  of  individual  rights. 

To  be  able  to  judge  whether  any  particular  social  arrange- 
ment transgresses  individual  rights,  it  is  of  course  necessary 
that  we  have  a  definite  knowledge  of  what  the  rights  of  the 
individual  are.  Until  we  have  accurately  formulated  the  nat- 
ural rights  of  the  individual,  we  cannot  know  what  justice  is. 
and  much  less  can  we  hope  to  detect  every  injustice  in  our 
social  institutions  and  understand  how  to  apply  the  true  rem- 
edy. If  we  do  not  know  what  our  rights  are,  we  cannot  know 
when  our  rights  are  trespassed  upon.  The  recognition  of 
what  is  right  involves  a  knowledge  of  what  is  wrong.  If  our 
knowledge  of  what  is  right  be  correct,  our  conception  of  what 
is  wrong  will  be  correct.  And  it  is  equally  true  that  if  our 
understanding  of  what  is  right  is  erroneous,  our  conception 
of  what  is  wrong  must  necessarily  be  erroneous. 

A  clear  perception  of  what  a  natural  right  is  will  unfail- 
ingly enable  us  to  discern  the  slightest  infringement  of  that 
right.  But  we  may  keenly  feel  and  truly  know  that  we  have 
been  done  a  serious  injustice  without  having  formulated,  or 
being  able  to  formulate,  the  right,  the  violation  of  which  con- 
stituted the  injustice.  And  much  less  then  are  we  able  to 
connect  the  injustice  with  its  cause  and  put  our  finger  upon 
the  agency  which  primarily  brought  the  injustice  about. 


RIGHTS  167 

A  mother  wlio  has  a  young  baby  Hves  in  a  tenement  house 
in  a  congested  tHstrict  of  a  large  city.  Having  no  other  means 
of  giving  the  child  fresh  air  and  a  little  sunshine,  she  takes 
it  to  the  crowded,  filthy  street  and  trundles  it  among  the  mass 
of  unclean,  disease-laden  and  poverty-stricken  creatures,  who, 
like  herself,  are  compelled  to  live  unwholcsomely  huddled  to- 
gether in  damp,  dark,  disease-brccdinp^  quarters.  The  child 
catches  a  filth  disease  antl  dies. 

That  mother  did  not  wish  to  live  in  a  tenement  house  in  a 
squalid  district  of  a  great  city.  She  knew  that  if  she  had  lived 
in  a  clean,  wholesome,  sunlit  home,  apart  from  other  families, 
and  away  from  the  diseases  spread  by  squalid  poverty,  her 
child  would  not  have  caught  that  disease,  and  in  all  proba- 
bility she  would  iiave  raised  it  to  maturity.  That  mother  knew 
that  she  had  suffered  a  most  poignant  injustice;  but,  if  we 
were  to  ask  the  woman  what  was  the  occasion  of  her  great 
sorrow,  she  would  most  likely  give  us  some  such  reason  as 
this:  that  her  husband  formerly  had  a  good  position  with  a 
manufacturing  concern  in  a  village  nearljy.  but  the  factory 
closed  down,  and  he  was  compelled  to  come  to  the  city  to 
seek  work.  lie  failed  to  find  work  in  the  city,  and  after  being 
idle  for  several  months,  his  savings  were  gone,  and  they  were 
compelled  to  take  rooms  in  a  cheaj)  tenement. 

That  poor,  outraged  mother  had  not  the  remotest  conception 
of  what  her  and  her  husband's  natural  rights  were.  To  her 
the  primary  cau.se  of  her  troubles  was  the  shutting  down  of 
that  factory.  She  did  not  know  the  cause  of  the  factory's 
closing;  how  could  she  know  the  cause  of  that  cause  and  all 
of  the  causes  in  the  order  of  sequence  back  to  the  final  cause? 
She  did  not  even  dream  that  her  husband's  right  to  produce 
a  livino:  by  his  labor  should  never  have  depended  upon  the 
closing  down  of  any  factory,  nor  upon  the  convenience,  interest 
or  leave  of  any  other  man. 

And   then   consider  how   utterly   and    lamentably   incapable 


168  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

that  unfortunate  mother  was  of  connecting  all  such  troubles 
as  she  herself  had  experienced,  and  had  observed  all  about  her, 
with  their  true  causes,  and  of  thus  perceiving  that,  in  so  far 
as  they  were  the  result  of  the  economic  conditions,  the  bad 
economic  conditions  being  the  result  of  the  violation  of  her 
natural  rights  by  government,  her  misfortunes  Vvcre  brought 
about  by  the  use  of  the  government  by  a  few  to  create  privi- 
leges for  the  benefit  of  a  few  and  at  the  expense  of  the  many, 
including  herself. 

By  natural  rights  we  mean  those  rights  the  possession  of 
which,  in  the  nature  of  things,  is  necessary  to  the  living  of 
the  completest  life.  Such  rights  are  natural  because  they  are 
compatible  with  the  nature  of  things,  and  because  their  non- 
existence or  the  existence  of  any  other  so-called  rights  would 
be  incongruous  with  the  nature  of  things.  While  the  term 
natural  rights  includes  all  rights  which  conform  to  natural 
laws,  the  term,  by  its  unmistakable  meaning,  clearly  excludes 
all  artificial  rights;  and  since  all  artificial  rights  can  have  no 
other  sanction,  nor  any  other  source,  than  the  power  of  gov- 
ernment, the  term  excludes  the  investment  of  government  with 
the  power  to  create  any  right  whatsoever. 

These  natural  rights  are  natural  rights  because,  in  the  na- 
ture of  things,  they  subserve  individual  welfare,  and  each 
individual  may  exercise  them  to  the  fullest  extent  without  in- 
fringing on  such  rights  of  any  other  individual ;  for,  an  essen- 
tially distinguishing  characteristic  of  any  right  is,  that  the 
freest  exercise  of  it  by  any  individual  will  in  no  manner  in- 
fringe upon  any  right  of  another. 

This  characteristic  of  natural  rights  sharply  distinguishes 
them  from  any  so-called  rights  created  by  government.  For, 
while  all  individuals  may  concurrently  exercise  all  their  nat- 
ural rights  to  the  fullest  extent  without  occasioning  any  con- 
flict between  the  rights  of  each  other,  and  while,  in  truth,  so 
long  as  all  individuals  confine  their  activities  to  the  exercise 


RIGHTS  169 

of  their  natural  riglits,  there  cannot  possibly  be  any  conflict 
between  the  rights  of  each  other,  it  is  absolutely  impossible  that 
all  individuals  may  concurrently  exercise,  to  any  extent,  any 
artificial  right,  any  right  coined  by  men.  This  fact  alone  puts 
all  so-called  rights,  all  rights  other  than  natural  rights,  out- 
side the  category  of  rights,  and  condemns  them  as  wrongs. 
They  are,  in  the  nature  of  things,  zvrongs. 

Every  so-called  right,  coined  by  government,  is  nothing 
more  nor  less  than  a  privilege  by  which  government  bestows 
on  some  members  of  the  community  rights  which  are  not 
natural  rights,  but  spurious  rights,  to  which  they  are  not  enti- 
tled, and  thereby  deprives  other  members  of  the  community  of 
a  part,  at  least,  of  their  natural  rights. 

Our  abstract  ideals  of  justice  respecting  social  conduct 
might  be  absolutely  correct,  yet  they  would  count  for  naught 
toward  the  establishment  of  just  social  institutions,  until  they 
were  crystalized  into  definite,  universal  principles  of  justice, 
the  adaptation  of  social  arrangements  to  which  would  make 
the  agreement  of  our  social  conduct  with  our  ideals  of  justice 
not  only  possible,  but  imperative. 

If  our  ideas  of  justice  in  the  concrete  were  suddenly  elevated 
to  the  present  level  of  our  abstract  ideals  of  justice,  there 
would  quickly  follow  a  transformation  in  our  social  system 
compared  with  which  the  throwing  off  of  the  English  yoke 
and  the  establishment  of  a  republican  form  of  government 
would  be  insignificant. 

But  unfortunately,  our  practical  ideas  of  justice  are  habitu- 
ally at  cross  purposes  with  our  abstract  ideals  of  justice. 

If  we  were  to  propound  to  a  thousand  persons,  as  we  hap- 
pen to  run  across  them,  the  question.  Do  you  think  that  it  is 
right  that  the  government  of  the  United  States  should  estab- 
lish such  institutions  and  make  such  laws  as  confer  upon 
some  citizens  the  power  to  confiscate  and  appropriate  the  pro- 
duce of  the  labor  of  other  citizens?  everyone  of  that  thousand 


170  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

persons  would  in  all  probability  answer  in  the  negative.  But 
after  they  had  answered  the  above  question  in  the  negative,  if 
we  put  to  them  the  further  question,  Do  you  believe  that  the 
present  system  of  land  tenure,  which  compels  most  of  the  peo- 
ple to  pay  tribute  to  others  for  the  mere  opportunity  to  apply 
their  labor  to  land,  which  is  the  only  means  by  which  the  neces- 
saries and  comforts  of  life  can  be  had  and  the  only  means  by 
which  life  itself  can  be  sustained,  is  just?  the  chances  are 
that  nearly  all  of  them  would  answer  in  the  affirmative. 

If  we  were  to  press  them  to  state  the  reasons  for  their  be- 
lief, no  matter  how  many  forms  of  reasons  would  be  given,  we 
would  discover  that  they  were  all  based  upon  the  single  notion 
that  the  present  system  of  land  tenure,  whether  abstractly 
right  or  wrong,  is  the  most  expedient  system,  and  therefore, 
it  is  practically  right,  or  as  might  be  correctly  stated  in  Spen- 
cerian  language — while  absolute  ethics  may  dictate  that  every 
human  being  has  a  right  to  the  use  of  land,  and  while  no 
breach  of  that  right  is  implied  by  the  schemes  of  socialists, 
single  taxers  or  other  land  reformers,  the  obtaining  system  of 
land  tenure  is  warranted  by  that  relative  ethics  which  takes 
account  of  evolving  transitional  needs,  and  dictates  such  limi- 
tations of  it  as  is  necessitated  by  the  adaptation  of  the  present 
structure  of  the  social  organism  to  the  now  existing  land 
system. 

Neither  the  Declaration  of  Independence  nor  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States,  as  it  was  adopted,  deals  with  jus- 
tice further  than  to  give  expression  to  sundry,  indefinite  sen- 
timents about  freedom  or  to  make  general  indefinite  reference 
to  the  preservation  of  unspecified  privileges  or  immunities  of 
citizens. 

Those  instrum.ents  were  framed  by  men  whose  ideas  of 
practical  social  justice,  justice  between  man  and  man,  were 
yet  in  a  nebulous  state.  The  constitution,  the  basic  law  of 
the  land,  concerns  itself  almost  exclusively  with  governmental 


RIGHTS  171 

powers,  and  scarcely  at  all  with  individual  rights.  It  nut  only 
fails  to  secure  to  the  individual  his  natural  rights,  but  it  con- 
fers upon  the  legislative,  executive  and  judicial  branches  of 
government  powers  which  in  themselves  are  the  very  essence 
of  injustice. 

The  constitution  confers  upon  the  President  and  the  Fed- 
eral Supreme  Court  and  upon  the  state  governments  discre- 
tionary powers  which,  so  far  as  the  economic  rights  of  the  in- 
dividual are  concerned,  are  unlimited.  While  the  preamble  of 
the  constitution  proclaims  that  it  was  ordained  and  established 
in  order  to  establish  justice,  our  very  form  of  government 
makes  the  subsistence  of  individual  rights  an  impossibility, 
for  all  discretionary  powers  arc  actually  a  grant  of  leave  to 
do  injustice. 

The  lack  of  a  true  and  definite  conception  of  what  consti- 
tutes the  natural  rights  of  the  individual,  which  is  manifested 
by  the  marked  diversity  of  opinions  as  to  their  practical  appli- 
cation to  social  arrangements  among  those  who  profess  to 
believe  in  the  same  abstract  principles,  is  attributal)le  to  a 
misleading  implication,  which  is  obviously  suggested  by  a 
feature  which  forms  a  conspicuous  part  of  all  the  formulae 
of  justice  and  liberty  that  have  been  drafted  by  recognized 
"authorities."  Without  exception,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  the 
writers  on  law,  morals,  philosophy  and  sociology  do  not  define 
justice  or  liberty  as  definite,  positive  integers,  but  as  indefi- 
nite quantities,  circumscribed  by  <juaiUities.  similarly  indefinite. 

The  dominating  stii)ulation  in  all  the  authoritative  "defi- 
nitions" of  liberty  or  rights  is  that  the  li!)erty  or  rights  of 
each  individual  are  limited  by  the  equal  liberty  or  rights  of  all 
other  individuals,  which,  upon  slight  examination,  it  will  be 
seen,  makes  the  intended  definition  no  definition  at  all.  Let 
us  suppose  for  example  a  community  composed  of  A,  B  and  C. 
The  authorities  say  that  the  liberty  or  rights  of  A  consist  of 


172  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

the  liberty  or  right  to  do  whatever  he  may  please  to  do,  pro- 
vided he  does  not  infringe  on  the  equal  freedom  of  action  or 
the  equal  rights  of  B  and  C.  If  they  were  asked  to  define 
the  equal  liberty  or  rights  of  B  and  C,  they  could  only  answer 
that  the  liberties  or  rights  of  B  consist  in  the  freedom  to  act 
as  he  pleases  provided  he  does  not  infringe  on  the  equal  lib- 
erty or  rights  of  A  and  C,  and  the  liberty  or  rights  of  C  are 
limited  by  the  equal  liberty  or  rights  of  A  and  B. 

The  sum  and  substance  of  this  definition  and  the  only  con- 
ception of  his  rights  and  liberties  the  individual  can  gather 
from  it,  is : 

First,  that  his  rights  and  liberties  (the  nature  and  extent  of 
which  he  does  not  understand)  are  bounded  by  the  rights  and 
liberties  of  every  other  individual,  the  nature  and  extent  of 
which  he  also  does  not  comprehend,  and . 

Second,  that  if  each  individual  is  accorded  the  same  rights 
and  liberties  before  the  law,  each  individual  is  blessed  with 
all  the  rights  and  liberty  to  which  he  is  entitled,  or  which 
it  is  within  the  power  of  society  to  bestow  upon  its  individ- 
ual members,  without  doing  violence  to  one  of  the  chief  stipu- 
lations of  this  same  theory  of  rights,  to  wit,  that  there  shall 
be  no  special  privileges. 

This  definition  of  rights  seems  to  have  been  contrived  for 
the  purpose  of  leading  the  individual  to  believe  that  he  is  in 
the  possession  of  rights  of  which  he  is  being  despoiled,  and 
to  divert  his  mind,  so  far  as  possible,  from  a  correct  under- 
standing of  what  his  rights  are.  The  wise  men  tell  the  indi- 
vidual that  he  may  find  out  what  his  own  rights  are  only  by 
finding  out  for  himself  what  every  other  in'iividual's  rights 
are,  for  the  wise  men  do  not  undertake  to  inform  him  as  to 
what  his  own  rights  or  the  rights  of  the  other  fellows  are. 

The  individual,  having  no  definite  idea  of  what  his  rights 
are  in  themselves,  and  believing  that  they,  whatever  they  may 
be,  must  be  somehow  limited  in  their  play,  curtailed  in  extent, 


RIGHTS  173 

or  perhaps  some  of  them  sacrificed  altogether,  in  order  that 
other  in(hvi(hials  may  enjoy  equal  rights  with  himself,  or 
that  by  yielding  some  of  his  natural  rights,  he  gains  other, 
artificial  rights  (of  which  he  has  no  definite  idea),  of  greater 
value  to  him,  is  there  any  wonder  that  we  have  no  criterion 
of  justice;  no  standanl  by  which  we  can  determine  whether 
any  social  arrangement  is  just  or  unjust;  vNdiether  it  accords 
the  individual  all  his  rights  or  what  rights  it  deprives  him 
of? 

Having  such  loose,  intangible  notions  of  rights,  how  can 
it  be  expected  but  that  individuals  will  habitually  cast  their 
influence  in  opposition  to  their  own  rights?  Is  there  any 
wonder  that  blind,  senseless  partisanship  controls  the  indi- 
vi<lual,  if  he  has  no  principles  to  guide  him?  Need  we  be 
perplexed  to  find  the  same  sets  of  indivi(hials  take  opi)osite 
sides  on  a  number  of  i)ublic  measures  or  policies  which  have 
nothing  in  common  between  them,  and  which  are  frequently 
inconsistent  with  each  other? 

What  other  fact  will  exi)lain  the  fact  that  while  the  rights, 
and  consequently  the  interests  of  a  great  majority  of  the  people 
with  respect  to  social  arrangements,  must,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  be  identical,  we  usually  find  the  people  divided  almost 
equally  on  any  question  of  public  polity  which  may  arise,  than 
that  the  individuals  do  not  comprehend  their  rights  nor  their 
interests?  What  other  fact  will  explain  the  fact  that  indi- 
viduals will  vote  and  expend  labor  and  money  in  support  of 
measures  which  are  intended  to  deprive  them  of  certain  of 
their  natural  rights  that  are  essential  to  their  well-being,  but 
that  they  are  ignorant  of  what  their  rights  are  and  do  not 
understand  the  effect  those  measures  will  have  on  their  well- 
being? 

Men  vote  their  feelings  and  beliefs,  because  they  have  no 
principles  to  vote.  They  fuss  and  fume  over  trifling  questions 
of   expediency,   because   they   know   not   what   a   rich    estate 


174  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

Justice  holds  subject  to  their  claim.  They  permit  men  who 
play  the  game  of  politics  to  set  up  word-painted  baubles  for 
them  to  contend  for,  because  they  are  ignorant  of  the  priceless 
rights  belonging  to  them,  yet  not  possessed  by  them,  which 
could  be  quite  as  easily  gained;  for,  if  all  individuals  who 
are  suffering  all  sorts  and  degrees  of  bodily  and  mental  tor- 
tures from  the  mere  non-possession  of  their  rights,  should 
lay  claim  to  them,  who  could  say  them  nay? 

To  tell  the  individual  that  he  has  a  right  to  do  whatsoever 
he  pleases  to  do,  provided  he  does  not  trespass  upon  the  equal 
rights  of  others  to  do  whatsoever  they  please  to  do,  provided 
they  do  not  trespass  upon  the  equal  rights  of  himself  or  of 
each  other,  is  what  is  termed  in  logic  an  identical  proposition. 
It  is  equivalent  to  defining  a  thing  by  itself.  It  gives  us  a 
myriad  of  unknown  quantities  (other  peoples  rights)  by  which 
to  find  another  unknown  quantity  (our  own  rights)  which  is  the 
information  desired. 

Xow,  if  these  writers  cannot  define  the  rights  of  one  in- 
dividual, what  can  they  tell  us  about  the  rights  of  millions 
of  other  individuals?  If  they  cannot  clearly  describe  the 
rights  of  any  one  individual,  of  course  they  can- 
not describe  the  rights  of  numerous  other  individuals,  which, 
they  assert,  fix  the  limits  of  the  rights  of  the  one;  and  further- 
more, if  the  philosophers  do  not  comprehend  what  their  own 
rights  are,  if  they  are  unable  to  distinguish  privileges  from 
rights,  and  do  not  know  when  they  themselves  are  in  pos- 
session of  privileges  or  powers  which  are  not  among  their 
rights,  or  when  they  are  denied  rights  which  do  belong  to 
them,  it  is  inexcusable  presumption,  to  characterize  it  mildly, 
for  them  to  essay  to  instruct  others  in  their  rights. 

If,  instead  of  assuming  to  understand  what  are  the  rights 
of  individuals,  and  then  showing  clearly  by  their  arguments 
that  they  do  not  understand  what  they  are,  they  had  declared 
their  ignorance  of  the  matter,  far  greater  progress  toward  a 


RlGliTS  175 

solution  of  this  most  important  problem  woiiM  have  been 
male.  The  invcstijjators  of  the  subject  would  have  ha<i  the 
advantage  of  having  their  minds  free  from  belief  in  mere 
(lo|,Mnas  and  the  perplexity  occasione<l  by  learning  volumes  of 
logical  reasoninjj^  from  false  jiremises.  Ila<l  our  teachers 
themselves  known  what  they  did  know  and  what  they  did 
not  know,  son'.c  of  them  might  have  stumbled  upon  the  truth. 

The  people  have  been  prevented  from  securing  their  natural 
individual  rights,  or  even  from  understanding  them,  by  the 
very  institutions  which  <lcprive  them  of  their  rights.  The 
methods  employed  have  been  divers,  depending  upon  the  ex- 
igencies of  diverse  circumstances,  but  in  essence  the  means 
used  to  despoil  the  inlivi  kial  of  his  rights  have  always  been 
the  same. 

The  institutions  have  been  constructed  for  the  very  purpose 
of  enabling  one  portion  of  the  community  to  live  off  the  labor 
of  another  portion.  Thus,  it  has  been  necessary  to  persistently 
teach  the  class  who  are  despoileil  that  the  institutions  were 
framed  for  their  special  benefit.  They  must  be  taught  to  love 
the  instruments  by  which  they  arc  oppressed.  They  must  honor 
the  persons  through  whose  machinations  the  institutions  are 
made  to  accomplish  their  nefarious  purpose.  They  must  fight 
for  the  symbol  of  their  own  terrible  discomfiture. 

That  wrong  acts,  designated  relatively  right  acts,  are  the 
best  possible  acts  under  the  circumstances,  implies  that  the 
circumstances  are  wrong,  which  in  turn  implies  that  some 
wrong  has  been  committed  which  brought  about  the  wrong 
circumstances.  Hut  the  fact  that  an  individual  is  placed  by 
other  individuals,  or  by  society,  in  such  circumstances  that  he 
is  compelled  to  choose  between  wrongs,  and  the  nearest  to 
the  right  he  can  come  is  to  choose  the  least  wrong,  or  the 
relatively  right,  no  more  leads  us  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
wrong  act  is  relatively  right,  or  relatively  just,  than  it  leads 


176  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

to  the  conclusion  that  the  wrong  act  is  relatively  wrong,  or 

relatively  unjust. 

Compared  with  what  is  right,  what  is  called  "relatively 
right,"  is  shown  to  be,  not  only  "relatively  wrong,"  but  wrong, 
without  qualification.  There  is  of  course  no  such  thing  as 
"relative  ethics"  or  "relative  justice."  These  terms  are  as 
senseless  as  the  terms,  relative  quart  measure,  relative  yard- 
stick or  relative  pound. 

If  a  doctor  of  relative  ethics  should  purchase  five  pounds  of 
meat  from  the  butcher,  and  when  he  got  home  and  weighed 
the  meat,  found  that  it  weighed  but  four  and  a  half  pounds, 
our  philosopher  would  hardly  be  satisfied  with  the  butcher's 
explanation  that  the  meat  weighed  relatively  five  pounds  and 
that  anyway  he  gave  as  good  weight  as  he  could  in  compe- 
tition with  the  butcher  who  generally  sold  four  pounds  of 
meat  for  the  price  of  five. 

The  doctrine  of  relative  ethics  is  in  itself  a  dishonest  doc- 
trine and  it  is  used  for  no  better  purpose  than  to  justify  out- 
rageously unjust  social  arrangements  by  justifying  unjust 
conduct  which  the  unjust  social  arrangements  engender.  It 
sets  up  what  is  called  relative  ethics,  relative  right,  the  least 
wrong,  wrong  itself  as  the  criterion  of  morality — the  standard 
of  conduct. 

And  here  it  may  be  observed  that  Spencer  himself  demon- 
strates the  utter  worthlessness  of  his  "formula  of  justice"  by 
showing  that  its  application  to  practical  matters  leads  to  a 
no  better  goal  than  relative  justice.  The  title  of  his  formula 
to  be  indicative  of  its  character,  should  be  "A  Formula  of 
Restricted  Liberty  or  Relative  Justice." 

Because  an  individual  acts  as  nearly  right  as  possible  under 
the  circumstances  thrust  upon  him,  circumstances  beyond  his 
control,  for  which  he  is  not  responsible,  and  therefore,  can- 
not be  adjudged  as  having  committed  a  wrong  and  cannot 
justly  be  held  to  accountability  for  any  wrong  resulting  from 


RIGHTS  177 

his  •so-called  relatively  rij^ht  conduct,  it  does  not  follow  that 
his  conduct  was  right  per  st.  Nor  does  it  follow,  that  because 
an  individual  cannot  be  justly  penalized  for  having  acted, 
under  circumstances  which  he  did  not  make,  in  a  manner  tiiat 
caused  the  least  harm,  there  is  no  responsibility  for  the  wrong 
done. 

Xow.  if  governments  are  assumed  to  be  established  in  order 
to  establish  and  maintain  justice,  and  the  governmental  in- 
stitutions cause  such  generally  inequitable  relations  between 
men  that  it  is  impossible  for  them  to  act  in  their  self-interest 
and  also  act  right:  that  it  is  possible  for  them  to  do  only 
relatively  right;  to  do  at  best  only  the  least  wrong,  is  not  the 
system  of  government  directly  responsible  for  all  the  rela- 
tively right  or  least  wrong  acts  to  which  I  here  refer?  la 
not  such  a  government  a  veritable  mockery  of  justice — a 
miserable  pretense — a  contemptible  sham  and  fraud? 

And  what  are  we  to  think  of  moral  philosophers,  who  teach 
that  relative  right  or  the  least  wrong  is  the  only  practical 
standard  of  conduct,  because  the  "governmental  organism" 
is  the  product  of  several  thousands  of  years  of  evolution 
from  a  single  governmental  cell,  and  will  have  to  "evolute" 
several  thousand  years  longer  before  the  organism  can  attain 
even  relative  perfection,  so  that  it  will  cease  to  impose  unjust 
conditions  on  its  constituent  units,  and  that  therefore  the  ill 
conditions  consequent  to  the  still  imperfect  state  of  the  "gov- 
ernmental organism"  must  be  accepted  as  facts  behind  which 
we  cannot  go,  and  for  that  reason,  relative  ethics  must  neces- 
sarily be  our  only  practical  standard  of  conduct  for  an  in- 
definite period? 

To  name  some  indefinite,  unknown  degree  of  injustice, 
provided  only  that  it  is  the  least  possible  injustice  under  the 
circumstances,  "relative  justice."  does  not  in  the  slightest 
degree  change  the  character  of  the  injustice — cannot  make 
anything  but  injustice  out  of  it.  nor  can  the  nan'iing  of  in- 


178  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

justice  "relative  justice,"  absolve  the  moral  philosopher  from 
the  obligation  to  trace  injustice  to  its  source  and  to  discover 
the  remedy. 

The  doctrine  of  relative  ethics  or  relative  justice  does  not 
solve  the  problem,  the  solution  of  which  is  the  desideratum, 
viz.:  what  is  justice  and  how  may  justice  be  established?  It 
not  only  ignores  the  solution  of  the  real  problem,  but  hinders 
it  by  attracting  attention  to  sophistical  arguments  which  are 
altogether  foreign  to  its  solution.  The  accepted  authorities, 
in  defining  justice  respecting  the  right  of  the  individual  to 
exercise  his  faculties  in  pursuit  of  the  satisfaction  of  his 
desires,  pay  little  or  no  attention  to  a  definition  of  what  con- 
stitutes the  positive  rights  of  the  individual  in  that  respect, 
but  put  great  stress  upon  the  limitations  assumed  to  be  neces- 
sary to  what  are  presumed  to  be  his  desired  activities. 

The  failure  to  formulate  a  definite  statement  in  what  the 
right  of  the  individual  to  exercise  his  faculties  actually  con- 
sists, is,  prima  facie,  an  acknowledgment  of  either  a  lack  of 
knowledge  of  what  such  right  does  consist  in,  or  an  avoidance, 
conscious  or  unconscious,  of  the  truth,  for  fear  that  the  truth 
will  either  upset  some  preconceived  notions  of  justice,  or  that 
it  will  be  unpopular  or  inexpedient.  If  the  failure  is  due  to 
ignorance  as  to  what  that  right  consists  in,  then  how  can  one 
knowingly  talk  of  its  limitations?  A  definite  idea  of  the  limita- 
tions which  should  circumscribe  that  right,  implies  a  definite 
idea  of  the  right  itself,  in  fact,  a  definite  conception  of  the 
right  itself  must  precede  a  definite  conception  of  its  bounds. 

Since  any  right,  which  may  be  properly  so  called,  is  based 
upon  a  natural  law,  and  since  all  natural  laws  are  absolute 
and  unconditional,  to  talk  about  the  limitations  of  rights,  while 
at  the  same  time  neglecting  or  avoiding  specific  definitions  of 
rights,  serves  only  to  convey  confused  impressions  instead 
of  a  definite  knowledge  of  what  rights  are. 

This  method  of  dealing  with  rights  does  even  greater  mis- 


RIGHTS  179 

chief  tlian  that.  It  spreads  abroaM  the  notion  that  while 
rights  themselves  are  altogether  inflefinitc  and  undcfinahle,  yet 
there  must  always  he  limitations  to  whatever  rights  there  may 
be.  Rights  being  indefinite  an<l  iindcfinable,  yet  indefinite  and 
undefinable  limitations  must  be  put  on  them.  Tlie  rcsultinj^ 
most  harmful  conclusion  is  that  there  is  no  definite  limitation 
to  the  limitations  which  may  lie  put  on  rights. 


CHAPTER    X. 
RIGHTS— CONTINUED. 

When  we  turn  from  the  moral  philosophers,  who,  one  and 
all,  have  made  their  arguments  to  conform  as  nearly  as  pos- 
sible to  a  preconceived  theory  of  morality,  to  the  legists,  we 
naturally  find  more  astounding  nonsense,  because  their  chief 
aim  has  been  to  justify  existing  forms  of  government,  insti- 
tutions and  laws,  and  they  were  therefore  under  the  necessity 
of  making  their  code  of  morals  conform  to  existing  forms  of 
government,  institutions  and  laws.  For  the  only  justification 
that  any  form  of  government,  institution  or  law  can  have  is, 
tiiat  it  is  base.!  upon  and  is  the  expression  of  morality  or 
justice. 

Hence,  we  find  that  an  American  writer  on  jurisprudence  will 
discover  in  our  form  of  government,  institutions  and  laws  a 
well-nigh  perfect  compliance  with  his  code  of  morals,  and  the 
English  writer  will  see  in  the  English  form  of  government,  in- 
stitutions and  laws  practically  all  that  his  code  of  morals  de- 
Tiian  is.  Consequently,  the  morals  of  the  American  writer  are 
about  as  different  from  the  morals  of  the  English  writer  as  the 
American  form  of  government,  institutions  or  laws  are  differ- 
ent from  the  English. 

Here  is  a  fair  sample  of  the  erudite  nonsense  emitted  by 
one  Blackstone  described  as  William,  and  further  distinguished 
from  other  Blackstones  by  the  title  "Sir,"  which  he  received 
from  his  master,  the  King,  for  services  ably  and  obsequiously 
rendered.  Lest  some  may  think  that  I  am  quoting  from  writ- 
ings which  are  obsolete,  I  will  reproduce  the  first  sentence 
in  the  preface  to  Chase's  Blackstone,  third  edition,  1890,  by 
George  Chase,  L.L.B.,  Professor  of  Law  in  the  New  York 
Law  School: 


RIGHTS  181 

"The  unrivalled  merits  of  lUackstonc's  Commentaries  as 
an  elementary  treatise  upon  the  principles  of  the  common  law 
are  as  fully  recognized  to-(hiy  as  at  any  time  in  the  past,  as  is 
atteste<l  by  the  fact  that  no  wcjrk  is  so  commonly  used  as 
this  for  the  purposes  of  preliminary  legal  instruction  either  by 
lawyers  in  their  oftices  or  by  professional  instructors  in  schools 
and  colleges  of  law." 

The  passages  which  I  will  quote  from  Blackstonc  are  taken 
from  the  Intro  hiction  to  his  C(»mmentaries  in  which  he  treats 
"of  the  nature  of  laws  in  general"  and  lays  down  and  elucidates 
the  principles  of  morality  which,  as  he  conceived,  should  con- 
stitute tiie  basis  of  the  form  of  government  and  the  institutions 
and  laws  created  by  it.  Particular  attention  is  directed  to  the 
fact  that  the  0]iinions  of  IJlackstone  quoted  below  bear  upon 
the  very  fundamentals  of  both  morals  in  general  and  juris- 
prudence in  particular,  and  that  hence  all  of  his  subsequent 
commentaries  cannot  be  at  any  rate  any  wiser  or  truer  than  his 
fundamental  principles  from  which  they  issue. 

Says  Blackstone,  Sir  William,  of  absolute  rights  and  ab- 
solute duties : 

"By  the  absolute  rights  of  individuals,  we  mean  those  which 
are  so  in  their  primary  and  strictest  sense ;  such  as  would 
belong  to  their  persons  merely  in  a  state  of  nature,  and  whicli 
every  man  is  entitled  to  enjoy,  whether  out  of  society  or 
in  it. 

"The  absolute  rights  of  men  consist  properly  in  a  power 
of  acting  as  one  thinks  fit.  without  any  restraint  or  contrt^l, 
unless  by  the  law  of  nature;  being  a  right  inherent  in  us  by 
birth,  and  one  of  the  gifts  of  God  to  man  at  his  creation,  when 
He  endowed  him  with  the  faculty  of  free  will.  But  every 
man  when  he  enters  into  society,  gives  up  a  pan  of  hi.>  natur.d 
liberty,  as  the  i)rice  of  so  valuable  a  purchase;  and,  in  con- 
sideration of  receiving  the  advantages  r.f  mutual  commerce, 
obli<;'cs  himself  to  conform  to  those  laws,  which  the  C(^m- 
munity  has  thought  proper  to  establish.  And  this  species  of 
legal  obedience  and  conformity  is  infinitely  more  desirable  than 
that  wild  and  savage  liberty  which  is  sacrificed  to  obtain  it." 

In  this  collection  of  high  sounding  phrases  Blackstone  has 


182  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

given  us  what,  on  casual  observation  appears  to  be  a  tolerably 
satisfactory  verbal  representation  of  the  natural  rights  of  the 
individual. 

But  his  reasoning  is  entirely  extraneous  to  his  fundamental 
proposition,  that  men  are  born  possessed  of  absolute  rights, 
and  of  course  the  conclusions  he  reaches  are  altogether 
fallacious. 

Men  are  born  with  absolute  rights  which  are  inalienable, 
but  they  were  not  endowed  with  free  will.  No  man  ever 
"enters  into  society."  We  were  all  born  into  society.  We  had 
no  option  in  the  matter.  Besides,  to  be  in  society  is  our 
natural  state,  with  which  the  free  exercise  of  our  absolute 
rights,  which  are  the  same  as  natural  rights,  is  perfectly 
compatible.  Since  no  man  enters  into  society,  every  man  does 
not  give  up  a  part  of  his  natural  liberty,  as  the  price  of  so 
valuable  a  purchase.  It  is  not  in  the  power  of  any  man  to 
give  up  any  part  of  his  natural  liberty,  natural  rights  or 
absolute  rights,  when  we  attach  to  these  terms  their  only 
legitimate  meaning.  One's  natural  liberty,  natural  rights  or 
absolute  rights,  belong  to  him  by  reason  of  the  nature  of 
things,  and  therefore  they  can  no  more  be  obliterated  by 
voluntarily  giving  them  up  or  by  external  force,  than  the 
nature  of  things,  which  determines  natural  liberty  or  rights, 
can  be  changed  by  the  acts  of  men. 

The  right  of  a  member  of  society  to  do  as  he  pleases  should 
be  so  far  restrained  by  human  laws,  and  no  farther,  as  is 
necessary  to  preserve  the  natural  rights  of  each  member  of  the 
society.  Laws,  even  the  most  vicious  of  them,  are  almost 
invariably  made  under  the  pretense  that  they  are  made  for 
the  good  of  the  public.  If  laws  were  made  simply  and  solely 
with  a  view  to  the  preservation  of  the  rights  of  the  individual 
and  for  the  good  of  the  individual,  the  rights  of  the  public, 
if  there  were  such  rights,  would  take  care  of  themselves.  The 
general  welfare  depends  upon  the  welfare  of  each  individual. 


RIGHTS  183 

"The  public  welfare"  is  a  frequent  excuse  for  legislation 
which  is  directly  in  the  interest  of  a  class,  and  often  a  small 
class  of  the  conitnunity,  as  against  the  interest  of  the  re- 
mainder of  the  community.  The  very  admission  that  there  is 
a  distinction  between  the  welfare  of  society  and  the  natural 
rights  of  its  indivi(hial  members,  opens  the  way  for  the 
enactment  of  innumerable  laws  inimical  to  the  welfare  of 
portions  of  the  society  and  most  frequently  of  the  great 
majority  of  the  community,  and  which  operate  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  a  small  fraction  of  the  community,  whose  welfare 
seems  to  be  mistaken  for  that  of  the  whole. 

For  the  welfare  of  the  community,  in  so  far  as  it  can  be 
determined,  can  be  nothing  else  than  the  sum  of  the  welfares 
of  all  its  units.  Hence,  the  welfare  of  the  community  is 
dependent  upon  the  welfare  of  the  individual  members  of  the 
community,  and  therefore,  to  attain  the  welfare  of  the  com- 
munity, the  welfare  of  each  and  every  individual  must  be 
safeguarded.  And  that  can  only  be  accomplished  by  safe- 
guarding the  natural  rights  of  each  and  every  individual. 

Man  is  naturally  a  social  or  gregarious  animal.  There 
never  was  a  time  when  men  did  not  associate  themselves  into 
societies,  and  when  we  speak  of  the  natural  rights  of  men. 
we  mean  such  rights  as  are  consistent  with  such  association. 

No  man  has  naturally  and  absolutely  any  right  to  injure 
another  man,  to  oppress  another  man.  or  to  curtail  the  rights  of 
another  man,  or  to  deprive  him  of  the  full  enjoyment  of  his 
natural,  absolute  rights.  The  idea  that  one  man  has  a  right 
to  trespass  upon  the  rights  of  another,  is  an  absurdity. 

No  less  an  absurdity  is  it  to  assert  that  a  community  or  a 
society  has  the  right  in  its  collective  capacity  to  trespass  upon 
the  rights  of  any  individual,  or  to  curtail  or  regulate  his  natural 
and  absolute  rights,  or  the  method  of  exercising  those  rights. 

It  is  not  necessary  in  order  to  preserve  the  rights  common 
to  all  individuals,  to  deprive  any  individual  of  any  natural 
right.    On  the  contrary,  it  is  first  necessary  to  secure  to  each 


184  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

individual  his  natural  rights  in  order  to  preserve  the  common 
rights  of  all  individuals  as  members  of  the  society.  In  other 
words,  the  natural  rights  of  the  individual  as  an  individual, 
are  identical  with  the  natural  rights  of  all  individuals  as  mem- 
bers of  society. 

Blackstone  and  his  disciples  and  all  writers  on  political 
economy  draw  a  distinction  between  the  rights  of  man  as  an 
individual  and  the  rights  of  man  as  a  member  of  society,  and 
they  place  the  rights  of  man  as  a  member  of  society,  and  the 
so-called  rights  of  the  society  itself,  above  the  rights  of  man 
considered  simply  as  an  individual. 

When  this  distinction  is  once  recognized  as  right,  the  ruling 
class  in  a  community  may  trespass  upon  the  natural  rights 
of  individuals  without  limit,  upon  the  pretence  that  such  tres- 
pass is  necessary  for  the  good  of  the  whole  community,  for 
his  own  good  as  a  member  of  society,  and,  he  being  a  mem- 
ber of  society,  it  is  therefore  unqualifiedly  good  for  him  as 
an  individual.  The  extent  of  such  trespass  becomes  simply 
a  matter  of  discretion  with  the  ruling  class.  There  is  no 
other  thing  to  limit  it,  for  the  line  which  sharply  defines  the 
natural  rights  of  men  has  been  obliterated  and  the  proper 
guide  for  social  regulations  has  been  lost. 

Thus  it  is  that  the  natural  rights  and  liberties  of  man  have 
been  taken  from  him  upon  the  pretense  of  giving  him  other 
rights  and  liberties  which  are  more  desirable,  but  which,  of 
course,  cannot  be  given  alike  to  all  individuals. 

The  true  test  for  any  law  should  be  whether  in  the  slightest 
degree  it  infringes  upon  the  natural  rights  of  any  individual. 
If  it  does  infringe  upon  the  natural  rights  of  a  single  indi- 
vidual, it  is  a  bad  law,  is  wrong,  ought  never  to  have  been 
enacted,  and  should  be  repealed. 

The  proposition  that  man  purchases  the  advantages  of  living 
in   society,   by  giving  up   a   part  of  his   natural   rights   is   so 


KK.IITS  185 

utterly  preposterous  tliat  it  wouM  cause  one  to  feel  foolish  to 
enter  into  a  discussion  of  it. 

Hut  here  is  a  statement  which  ii  will  he  of  advantage  to 
analyze.  A  part  of  the  imaginary  contract  which  Blackstonc 
represents  every  man  as  vohmiarily  making  (with  wIkjmi,  he 
leaves  to  be  imagined),  is  that  "in  consideration  of  receiving 
the  advantages  of  mutual  commerce,  every  man  obliges  him- 
self to  conform  to  those  laws,  which  the  community  has 
thought  proper  to  establish.  And  this  species  of  legal  obedi- 
ence is  infinitely  more  desirable  than  that  wild  and  savag.* 
liberty  which  is  sacrificed  to  obtain  it." 

Here,  Blackstone  implies  that  every  iiKinljcr  of  society,  in 
consideration  of  receiving  the  advantages  of  mutual  com- 
merce, which  the  mere  living  in  society  affords  gratis,  volun- 
tarily obliges  himself  to  conform  to  any  and  all  laws  which 
the  rulers  of  the  .society  have  thought  proper  to  establish.  ( )f 
course,  no  one  ever  does  any  such  thing.  When  one  obeys 
the  laws  which  the  rulers  have  made,  whether  those  laws  be 
just  or  unjust,  he  does  so  simply  because  he  must  obey  them 
or  suffer  penalties. 

Blackstone  speaks  of  the  individual  receiving  these  ad- 
vantages as  he  would  receive  a  coat  from  a  merchant  or  a 
franchise  from  a  legislature,  for  which  he  was  expected  to 
give  a  valuable  consideration.  Xo  one  is  conscious  of  receiving 
the  advantages  of  mutual  commerce  from  anyone,  on  the  con- 
trary, he  knows  that  these  advantages  exist  by  reason  of  the 
existence  of  society  and  that  they  are,  or  rather  ought  to  be, 
free  to  everyone  alike  without  leave  or  license.  Blackstone 
does  not  say  in  so  many  words  that  the  individual  receives  the 
advantages  of  mutual  commerce  from  the  rulers  and  that  in 
consideration  of  the  favor  he  agrees  to  conform  to  any  laws 
which  the  rulers  have  thought  or  may  think  projier  to  es- 
tablish, but  what  he  does  say  is  subject  to  no  other  rational 
interpretation. 


186  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

Since  Blackstone  was  writing  a  brief  in  justification  of 
gross  injustice  then  being  perpetrated  upon  the  people  by  the 
rulers  from  whom  he  expected  to  receive,  and  did  receive, 
as  compensation  divers  advantages,  he  so  juggled  his  words 
as  to  present  the  perpetration  of  a  great  injustice,  the  ruling 
of  the  masses  of  the  people  by  a  small  number  of  self- 
appointed  rulers,  as  a  great  benefit  to  the  people  which  they 
had  gained  by  voluntarily  and  gladly  exchanging  for  it  some- 
thing of  much  less  value.  And  in  order  to  further  show  what 
a  tremendously  good  bargain  the  people,  who  had  lost  every- 
thing but  the  right  to  slave  for  the  benefit  of  the  rulers,  had 
made,  he  points  out  that  "this  species  of  legal  obedience 
(obedience  to  any  laws  the  rulers  have  thought  proper  to  make) 
is  infinitely  more  desirable  than  that  wild  and  savage  liberty 
(natural  rights)  which  is  sacrificed  to  obtain  it." 

Blackstone  does  not  show  that  the  infamously  unjust  insti- 
tutions and  laws  established  by  the  rulers  are  at  all  desirable, 
in  the  sense  of  being  beneficial  to  the  great  body  of  the  people. 
He  does  not  even  assert,  and  much  less  does  he  demonstrate, 
that  those  institutions  and  laws  are  in  themselves  at  all  de- 
sirable. He  says  only  that  obedience  to  them  is  infinitely  more 
desirable  than  that  wild  and  savage  liberty  which  was  sac- 
rificed to  obtain  it. 

In  this  statement  Blackstone  dodges  the  vital  issue,  whether 
the  institutions  and  laws  set  up  by  the  rulers  are  just  or  un- 
just, leads  us  around  the  corner  and  asks  us  to  consider  the 
enormous  advantages  of  obedience  to  outrageously  unjust  law? 
over  that  wild  and  savage  liberty  which  must  be  sacrificed  to 
obtain  such  obedience.  And,  morever,  he  has  attempted  to 
deceive  us  into  the  belief  that  docile  obedience  to  unjust  gov- 
ernment is  the  precious  boon  obtained  so  cheaply  as  by  the 
sacrifice  of  merely  some  sort  of  wild  and  savage  liberty ; 
whereas,  the  truth  of  the  matter  is,  we  have  won  economic 


RIGHTS  187 

serfdom,  endless  misery  ami  degrading  [)overty  by  the  sac- 
rifice of  our  natural  rights. 

In  the  statement  just  referred  to,  Blackstone  has  played 
the  cheap  trick  of  substituting  the  term  wild  and  savage 
liberty  for  the  term  natural  rights,  which  he  use<i  in  the  next 
preceding  sentence.  In  one  sentence  he  speaks  of  natural 
liberty  and  in  the  very  next  sentence,  while  talking  of  the  same 
thing,  he  calls  it  wild  and  savage  liberty,  his  i)urpose  being  to 
cause  the  people  to  be  satisfied  with  the  loss  of  their  natural 
liberty  or  natural  rights,  by  pointing  out  to  them  the  clesirability 
of  getting  rid  of  something,  or  anything  for  that  matter,  which 
is  wild  and  savage. 

And  then  he  proceeds  to  bolster  up  this  piece  of  despicable 
nonsense  with  the  following  argument,  wdiich  contains  the 
statement  of  a  palpable  and  very  important  truth.  "For,"  says 
he,  "no  man  that  considers  a  moment,  would  wish  to  retain 
the  absolute  and  uncontrolled  power  of  doing  whatever  he 
pleases;  the  consequence  of  which  is,  that  every  other  man 
would  also  have  the  same  power;  and  then  there  would  be 
no  security  to  individuals  of  any  of  the  enjoyments  of  life." 

From  the  above  mixture  of  truth  and  falsehood  he  draws 
his  conclusions  thus :  "Political,  therefore,  or  civil  liberty, 
which  is  that  of  a  member  of  society,  is  no  other  than  natural 
liberty,  so  far  restrained  by  human  laws  (and  no  farther)  as 
is  necessary  and  expedient  for  the  general  advantage  of  the 
public." 

His  conclusion  is  absolutely  false,  because,  as  I  conclu- 
sively show  in  various  places  in  this  book,  any  restriction  of 
the  natural  liberty  of  the  individual  is  never  necessary,  never 
expedient  and  never  works  to  the  general  advantage  of  the 
public. 

The  natural  liberty  of  the  individual  is  the  liberty  to  do 
anything  which,  in  the  nature  of  things,  will  produce  good 
results,  and  it  is  impossible  for  one  to  so  act  as  to  be  truly 


188  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

beneficial  to  himself  and  at  the  time  do  injury  to  anyone  else. 
And  if  we  will  always  keep  in  view,  when  we  contemplate 
the  nature  of  things  as  the  source  of  natural  liberty  or  natural 
rights,  that  the  associated  state  of  human  beings,  the  con- 
gregation of  large  numbers  of  people  in  societies,  is  an  ex- 
ceedingly important  part  of  the  things  the  nature  of  which  we 
must  take  into  account  in  determining  natural  libert>',  we  will 
avoid  the  error,  made  by  practically  all  writers  on  the  subject, 
of  concluding  that  natural  rights  or  liberty  must  be  restrained, 
because  harmful  physical  activities  must  be  restrained. 

Because,  in  a  civilized  state  of  society,  one  should  not  be 
permitted  to  exercise  wild  and  savage  liberty,  to  do  wild  and 
savage  things,  to  do  injury  to  others,  is  no  reason  why  one 
should  be  restrained  or  inhibited  from  doing  many  things 
which  are  absolutely  indispensable  to  the  well-being  of  every 
individual.  But  that  is  the  reason,  and  the  only  reason,  which 
Blackstone  gives  in  justification  of  a  theory  of  law  and  gov- 
ernment which  represents  the  destruction  of  such  liberty  of 
action  as  will  promote  and  as  is  absolutely  essential  to  the  wel- 
fare of  every  one,  as  necessary  to  the  public  welfare,  and, 
therefore,  as  right  and  just. 

Blackstone's  argument  is  pure  sophistry,  set  up  as  the  best 
possible  excuse  for  maintaining  the  privileges  of  the  few  and 
keeping  the  masses  of  the  people  poor,  servile,  and  dependent 
on  the  pleasure  of  their  economic  masters  for  the  right  to 
produce,  to  enjoy  the  produce  of  their  labor — the  very  right 
to  live. 

Natural  rights  or  liberty  are  not  questions  of  opinion;  they 
are  natural  facts  which  are  discoverable,  but  which  cannot 
be  made  by  human  laws  nor  regulated  or  modified  by  men. 
These  facts  may  be  discovered  by  ascertaining  what,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  one  must  have  freedom  to  do,  in  order  that 
his  well-being  may  be  perfectly  subserved.  Therefore,  arti- 
ficial  so-called   rights,   which   have   been   determined   by   the 


RIGHTS  189 

criterion  of  what  sonic  person  or  class  of  persons  may  dccin 
cxpc'lient,  or  for  the  best  interests  of  the  community  at  large, 
always  prevent  the  enJDymiiit  of  natural  rights,  are  always 
harmful  to  the  individual  and  conseciuently  contrary  to  the 
best  interests  of  the  people  as  a  whole,  if  there  were  such 
interests,  which  there  arc  not. 

It  was  because  lUackstone  founded  his  rloctrine  of  juris- 
prudence on  his  opinions  as  to  what  was  expedient,  that  his 
teachings  were  about  as  far  from  the  truth  as  they  well 
could  be. 

Postulating  that  in  a  state  of  society  natural  rights  must 
be  restricted,  the  issue  raised  by  the  proposal  of  a  law  be- 
comes therefore,  not  whether  the  law  is  in  keeping  with  the 
rights  of  each  individual  of  the  community,  not  whether  it 
confers  privileges  on  some  at  the  expense  of  others,  but 
whether  the  proposed  law,  even  though  it  does  trespass  upon 
the  natural  rights  of  some  and  confers  upon  others  artificial 
advantages,  will,  through  its  indirect  operation,  inure  to  the 
benefit  of  the  comiuunitj'  as  a  whole;  and  thus  a  false  test  of 
the  righteousness  or  unrighteousness  of  the  law  has  been  deftly 
substituted  for  the  true  criterion,  and  has  in  reality  left  us 
without  any  criterion  at  all. 

The  only  true  test  by  which  we  may  unerringly  judge  any 
institution  or  law  is  the  answer  to  the  question :  Does  that 
institution  or  law  transgress  in  the  slightest  degree  any  natural 
right  of  any  individual  member  of  the  community?  If  the 
answer  be  in  the  negative,  the  institution  or  law  will  be  just ; 
if  the  answer  be  in  the  positive,  the  institution  or  law  is.  in 
that  particular,  unqualifiedly  unjust. 

Instead  of  it  being  necessary  to  restrict  or  curtail  the  nat- 
ural riglits  of  individuals  when  and  because  they  live  in  a 
social  state,  the  only  natural  effect  which  their  living  in  a 
social  state  can  have,  is  to  greatly  enlarge  the  benefits  which 


190  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

would  naturally  result  from  the  full  exercise  of  all  their 
natural   rights. 

The  source  of  the  idea  that  in  order  that  people  might  live 
amicably  in  a  social  state  and  progress  toward  a  higher  civiliza- 
tion some  of  their  natural  rights  must  be  sacrificed,  and  in  lieu 
thereof  some  artificial  rights  must  be  received  as  a  free  gift 
or  be  wrung  from  government,  laid  not  in  the  necessity  of 
restricting  the  wild  and  savage  liberties  so  much  talked  about. 
The  savage  liberties,  which  Blackstone  and  other  writers  re- 
ferred to,  constitute  no  part  of  the  natural  rights  of  the  civil- 
ized man,  and  therefore  it  has  never  been  necessary  (but  always 
a  hindrance)  to  the  welfare  of  mankind  to  abrogate  or  re- 
strict any  man's  natural  rights. 

The  vicious  idea  that  such  a  thing  was  ever  necessary,  grew 
out  of  the  desire  of  some  people  to  live  by  the  labor  of  others. 
That  doctrine  had  its  inception  in  economic  purposes.  A  por- 
tion of  the  members  of  a  society  can  succeed  in  living  by  the 
labor  of  the  other  members  only  by  first  depriving  those  other 
members  of  more  or  less  of  their  natural  rights.  Hence,  the 
doctrine  that  the  people  make  a  most  profitable  bargain  by 
trading  their  natural  rights  for  the  privilege  of  scrambling 
for  a  lot  of  artificial,  law-made  rights,  which,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  only  a  few  can  possibly  gain  possession  of  and  enjoy, 
while  the  great  majority  must  lose  even  more  than  the  few 
gain. 

In  order  that  the  reader  may  get  enough  of  Blackstone's 
arguments  on  the  fundamental  principles  of  government  to 
enable  him  to  judge  for  himself  the  general  character  of  his 
reasoning,  I  will  quote  further  from  him: 

"For  the  principal  aim  of  society  is  to  protect  individuals 
in  the  enjoyment  of  those  absolute  rights  which  were  vested 
in  them  by  the  immutable  laws  of  nature;  but  which  could 
not  be  preserv^ed  in  peace  without  that  mutual  assistance  and 
intercourse,  which  is  gained  by  the  institution  of  friendly  and 
social   communities.     Hence   it    follows,   that   the    first   and 


RIGHTS  191 

primary  end  of  human  laws  is  to  maintain  and  regulate  (sic) 
these  absolute  rights  of  individuals.  Such  rights  as  are  social 
and  relative  result  from,  and  are  posterior  to,  the  formation 
of  states  and  societies ;  so  that  to  maintain  and  regulate  these, 
is  clearly  a  subsequent  consideration.  And  therefore  the  prin- 
cipal view  of  human  laws  is,  or  ought  always  to  be,  to  explain, 
protect,  and  enforce  such  rights  as  are  absolute,  which  in 
themselves  are  few  and  simple ;  and  then  such  rights  as  are 
relative,  which,  arising  from  a  variety  of  connections,  will  be 
far  more  numerous  and  more  complicated." 

After  reviewing  Magna  Charta,  which  Blackstone  refers  to 
as  the  great  charter  of  liberties,  and  the  petition  of  rights, 
sometimes  called  the  bill  of  rights,  Blackstone  says : 

"The  rights  themselves,  thus  defined  by  these  several  stat- 
utes, consist  in  a  number  of  private  immunities ;  which  will 
appear,  from  what  has  been  premised,  to  be  indeed  no  other 
than  either  that  residuum  of  natural  liberty,  which  is  not  re- 
quired by  the  laws  of  society  to  be  sacrificed  to  j^ublic  con- 
venience ;  or  else  those  civil  privileges,  which  society  has  en- 
gaged to  provide,  in  lieu  of  the  natural  liberties  so  given  up 
l)y  individuals.  *  *  *  And  these  may  be  reduced  to  three 
principal  or  primary  articles ;  the  right  of  personal  security, 
the  right  of  personal  liberty,  and  the  right  of  private  property ; 
because,  as  there  is  no  other  known  method  of  compulsion, 
or  of  abrids^ing  man's  natural  free  will,  but  by  an  infringement 
or  diminution  of  one  or  other  of  these  important  rights,  the 
preservation  of  these,  inviolate,  may  justly  be  said  to  include 
the  preservation  of  our  civil  immunities  in  their  largest  and 
most  extensive  sense." 

In  this  last  paragraph  Blackstone  states  that  the  absolute 
rights  of  individuals,  which  he  had  previously  asserted  with 
vigor  were  the  direct  gift  of  the  Maker,  vested  in  man  by 
the  immutable  laws  of  nature  which  are  paramount  to  all  man- 
made  laws,  are  nothing  more  than  that  residuum  of  natural 
liberty  (absolute  rights)  which  is  not  required  by  the  laws  of 
society  to  be  sacrificed  to  public  convenience.  And  from  the 
context  of  his  juggle  of  the  terms  absolute  rights,  free  will, 
natural  liberties,  civil  imnumities,  civil  privileges,  civil  liberty. 


192  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

wild  and  savage  liberty,  which  he  uses  with  punctilious  im- 
partiality, we  can  only  gather  that  the  individual  is  entitled 
to  so  much  of  his  natural  rights  only  as  he  has  not  swapped 
(unbeknownst  to  hmself)  for  a  lot  of  more  precious  civil  rights 
or  liberties  which  society  gave  him  in  lieu  of  such  of  his 
natural  rights  bestowed  by  God  as  it  deemed  fit  to  compel  him 
to  give  up. 

The  final  purport  of  his  reasoning  is,  that  in  prescribing 
the  absolute  rights  of  individuals  the  Creator  made  a  mess  of 
it;  that  He  was  too  lavish  in  His  endowments,  and  that,  had 
the  Lord  been  as  wise  as  the  lords  in  parliament,  He  would 
have  originally  limited  the  absolute  rights  of  individuals  to 
that  residuum  of  them  which  parliament  has  left  in  the  pos- 
session of  Englishmen. 

Blackstone's  fitness  to  lay  down  for  us  the  laws  of  morality 
and  justice  may  be  fairly  judged  from  the  following  luminous 
expression  of  his  feelings  and  heart : 

"The  distinction  of  rank  and  honor  is  necessary  in  every 
well-governed  state.  *  *  *  ^  body  of  nobility  is  also 
more  peculiarly  necessary  to  our  (the  English)  mixed  and 
compound  constitution,  in  order  to  support  the  rights  of  both 
the  crown  and  the  people,  by  forming  a  barrier  to  withstand 
the  encroachments  of  both.  It  creates  and  preserves  that 
gradual  scale  of  dignity,  which  proceeds  from  the  peasant  to 
the  prince,  rising  like  a  pyramid  from  a  broad  foundation,  and 
diminishing  to  a  point  as  it  rises.  It  is  this  ascending  and 
contracting  proportion  that  adds  stability  to  any  government." 

Is  it  not  astounding  that  here,  in  these  United  States,  in 
this  reputedly  enlightened  age.  the  first  book  put  into  the 
hands  of  the  student  of  what  the  law  ought  to  be  as  well  as 
what  the  law  is.  is  a  copy  of  somebody's  Commentaries  on  the 
Commentaries   of   Blackstone? 


CHAPTER    XI. 
RIGHTS— Continued. 

The  law  of  justice,  the  law  of  equal  freedom,  the  law  of 
equal  rights,  the  law  of  moral  contluct  and  the  law  of  human 
progress  are  all  one  and  the  same  law — the  very  simple  law 
defined  in  the  few  words  of  my  formula  of  justice.  If  the 
formula  of  justice  be  true,  the  particular  rights  deducible 
from  the  general  natural  law  will  necessarily  be  true  rights  or 
natural  rights. 

The  subservance  of  self-interest  being  the  criterion  of  right 
conduct,  it  follows  that  every  one  has  the  right  to  do  every- 
thing which  will  subserve  his  self-interest.  To  do  anything 
which  will  subserve  one's  self-interest  is  a  natural  right. 

Hence,  we  arrive  at  a  specific  criterion  of  the  particular 
natural  rights  of  the  individual  as  a  deduction  from  the  form- 
ula of  justice  which  itself  is  deduced  from  human  nature. 

To  do  that  which  will  subserve  self-  interest  is  a  natural 
right  simply  because  the  furthering  of  self-welfare  is  an  es- 
sential part  of  every  individual's  right  to  his  life. 

By  reason  of  his  very  existence  the  life  of  each  individual 
is  his  own.  The  right  to  life  is  born  with  life  itself.  This 
proposition  cannot  be  strengthened  by  argument.  It  is  so  in 
the  ver>'  nature  of  human  beings  and.  therefore,  it  is  a  fun- 
damental truth.  For  we  can  conceive  no  purpose  even  in  the 
existence  of  reasoning  human  beings,  did  not  that  existence 
carry  with  it  the  right  of  each  of  them  to  the  fullest  life  which, 
by  the  exercise  of  his  nature-given  faculties,  he  is  capable  of 
achieving.  In  truth,  life  consists  in  solving  the  never-ending 
problems  of  how  best  to  subserve  self-interest.  The  better 
self-interest  is  subserved,  the  higher  is  the  order  of  life.    And 


194  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

the  character  of  the  lives  of  the  members  of  a  society  is  the 
gage  of  its  civilization. 

I  do  not  propose  to  waste  any  time  in  the  discussion  of  the 
purely  personal  rights  of  the  individual,  such  as  the  right 
to  physical  existence,  freedom  from  corporeal  injury,  the  right 
to  character  and  the  integrity  of  the  person  in  all  respects. 
These  rights  have  been  sufficiently  well  defined  and  justified 
by  many  writers,  and  while  they  are  not  universally  respected, 
they  are  clearly  comprehended  even  by  the  most  illiterate 
people,  and  the  infringement  of  such  rights  has  to  a  tolerable 
degree  been  described  in  our  statutes  as  crimes,  frauds,  or 
misdeaieanors,  and  made  punishable  by  fine  or  imprisonment. 

I  intend  rather  to  devote  my  efforts  to  the  elucidation  of 
another  sort  of  rights  which,  in  so  far  as  they  have  been  at 
all  treated  by  writers  on  subjects  of  which  they  are  the  very 
crux,  have  been  very  badly  treated,  and  which,  instead  of 
receiving  protection  at  the  hands  of  our  institutions  and  laws, 
are  made  the  objects  of  governmental  attack.  I  refer  to  the 
economic  rights  of  the  individual,  such  rights  as  are  involved 
in  the  getting  of  a  living  and  in  the  existence  of  those  con- 
ditions which  are  essential  to  the  refinement  and  embellishment 
of  life. 

We  have  an  abundance  of  criminal  laws,  in  fact  we  have 
too  much  criminal  law,  in  that  some  actions  are,  by  law,  made 
crimes,  which  are  in  themselves  perfectly  moral,  and  I  pro- 
pose to  show  that  the  government  itself  is  the  greatest  criminal 
in  the  land,  and  that,  through  the  wholesale  crime  against 
economic  rights  of  individuals,  which  it  commits,  it  instigates 
nearly  all  of  the  comparatively  petty  retail  crimes  committed 
by  individuals. 

I  do  not  belittle  those  rights  essential  to  bodily  integrity, 
but  I  do  say  with  all  possible  emphasis,  that  while  such  rights 
are  absolutely  essential  to  well-being,  they  may  be  robbed  of 
well  nigh  all  their  value  by  a  denial  of  economic  rights.     We 


RIGHTS  195 

are  perinitteil  to  live,  it  is  true,  yet  by  the  denial  of  our 
economic  rights,  we  are  compelled  to  live  lives  of  misery, 
poverty  and  manhood-crushing  wage-slavery.  Give  us  our 
economic  rights,  and  it  will  become  the  self-interest  of  every 
member  of  the  community  to  see  that  our  other  rights  are 
respected.  Let  the  people  claim  and  exercise  tlic  natural  rights 
which  they  are  now  dei)rived  of,  and  their  civilization  will  be 
revohitionized  within  one  generation.  Universal  i)lenty  will 
take  the  place  of  wide-spread  poverty.  Universal  manhood 
and  independence  will  supersede  supercilious  bossism  and  de- 
grading servitu<le.  Ennobling  justice  will  crow(l  out  hateful, 
humiliating  charity.  The  follies  begotten  of  unearned  riches 
and  the  vices  resulting  from  unearned  poverty  will  disappear, 
and  a  self-poised,  courageous  people  will  devote  their  best 
energies  to  the  acquirement  of  new  knowledge,  the  solution  of 
new  problems,  instead  of  trampling  each  other  under  foot  to 
escape  the  fear  of  want. 

The  inborn  natural  rights  of  men  have  been  treated  purely 
as  idealisms.  They  have  been  regardeil  as  a  product  of  the 
imagination  which  might  subsist  in  an  imaginary  perfect  state 
of  society,  but  to  which  man  in  the  existing  social  state 
or  in  any  state  which  is  likely  to  exist  even  in  the  far  future, 
can  lay  no  valid  claim.  We  have  been  tausj^ht  that  man.  as  a 
member  of  society,  has  no  definite,  absolute  rights — no  rights 
the  metes  and  bounds  of  which  may  be  definitely  ascertained 
and  therefore  maintained  inviolate — no  rights  which  inhere 
in  him  without  regard  to  time,  place  or  circumstance,  and 
which  may  be  claimed  by  him  whenever  he  discovers  what 
they  are,  but  that  his  so-called  abstract  rights,  or  natural  rights 
are  incompatible  with  his  artificial  rights  and  obligations  as  a 
member  of  society,  and.  the  latter  being  paramount  to  the 
former,  his  natural  rights  must  be  so  far  curtailed  as  they 
may  overlap  or  conflict  with  his  acquired  rights  and  duties  as 
a  member  of  society. 


196  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

Man's  natural  individual  rights,  to  the  full  enjoyment  of 
which  he  is  as  much  entitled  as  to  life  itself  (for  every  par- 
ticular natural  right  is  an  inseparable  and  indistinguishable 
part  of  the  right  to  life  itself)  are  thus  made  an  indefinite, 
varying  quantity,  restricted,  more  or  less,  by  another  set  of  so- 
called  rights  to  which  neither  he  nor  anyone  else  can  lay  any 
valid  claim,  and  which  themselves  have  no  other  limits  than 
those  determined  by  the  whims,  beliefs,  and  the  always-in- 
cluded self-interest  of  legislators.  Is  it  any  wonder  then, 
that  the  outlines  of  the  absolute,  natural  rights  of  the  indi- 
vidual have  been  obscured,  when  all  thought  respecting  rights 
has  been  directed  toward  the  contemplation  of  the  outlines  of 
artificial  rights  resulting  from  endless,  ignorant  or  corrupt 
legislation  ? 

Let  any  man  attempt  to  learn  what  his  natural  rights  are 
by  contemplating  the  collection  of  so-called  rights,  themselves 
indefinitely  outlined  by  legislation  and  court  decisions,  and 
he  will  find  that  if  he  has  any  natural  rights,  he  will  be  unable 
to  discern  where  they  begin  or  end.  If  he  should  go  to  the 
shrewdest  lawyer  in  the  land  for  help,  he  would  be  doomed  to 
disappointment.  If  the  lawyer  were  honest,  he  would  say  that 
there  are  no  definitely  ascertainable  natural  rights  established 
by  law ;  that  in  some  cases  the  law  has  drawn  no  line  of  de- 
marcation ;  that  in  other  places  the  line  is  wobbly  and  uncer- 
tain ;  that  in  others  he  finds  two  lines  running  almost  parallel, 
while  very  often  he  runs  across  two  lines  intersecting  at  right 
angles.  In  short,  he  would  admit  that  no  man  knows  all  tlie 
law  or  what  one's  legal  riglits  are  in  every  particular.  And 
concerning  natural  rights,  he  would  declare  that  neither  the 
law  nor  the  lawyers  recognize  any  such  rights,  but  that  the 
only  rights  to  which  any  member  of  the  society  is  entitled 
are  those  prescribed  by  statutory  law  or  dcfirie'l  b}'  ju-iicial 
precedent,  and  that  the  business  of  the  lawyer  is  merely  to 
inform  his  client,  as  best  he  can,  what  his  legal  rights  are 


RIGHTS  1*^7 

where  the  law  is  apparently  clear,  anil,  where  it  is  evidently 
obscure,  to  try  to  induce  the  judge  and  jury  to  believe  that 
the  law  supports  his  claims. 

The  absolute  rights  of  men  are  easily  ascertainable,  and  pre- 
cisely dehnable.  The  writers  on  jurisjirudence.  political  econ- 
omy or  ethics  would  have  had  no  difficulty  in  definitely  de- 
termining in  what  natural  rights  consist,  had  they  not  been 
fettered  and  perplexed  by  their  preformed  belief  that  in  a 
developed  state  of  society  it  is  essential  that  individual  mem- 
bers sacrifice  a  part  of  their  natural  rights,  or  what  they  more 
frequently  term  natural  liberty,  in  order  to  enjoy  the  greater 
advantages  of  the  social  state. 

Because  in  all  societies  of  which  we  have  knowledge  the 
rights  of  the  individual  have  been  prescribed  by  more  or  less 
arbitrary  laws  made  by  government,  in  order  to  justify  these 
laws,  it  was  necessary  to  claim  that  their  precepts  were  in 
accord  with  the  moral  law,  and  all  the  ingenuity  of  the  most 
astute  minds  seems  to  have  been  exercised  in  the  endeavor  to 
impress  upon  the  minds  of  the  people  that  the  claim  was  true. 

Spencer  says  of  true  rights  that  "they  one  and  all  corre- 
spond with  legal  enactments,"  which  is  equivalent  to  saying 
that  all  legal  enactments  correspond  with  true  rights. 

Indeed,  Spencer  undertook  to  show  that  legislative  enact- 
ments, in  important  particulars  at  any  rate,  do  express,  pro- 
tect and  enforce  natural  rights.  The  inference  to  be  drawn 
from  his  entire  treatment  of  the  subject  of  rights  is.  that  we 
now  enjoy  our  tolerably  complete  natural  rights,  and  that,  if 
we,  perchance,  be  short  of  any  of  them,  the  deficiency  may  be 
supplied  by  the  enactment  of  a  few  more  laws  of  the  same 
character  as  those  we  now  have. 

When  individual  rights  are  habitually  prescribed  by  law, 
and  when  it  is  the  universal  habit  to  consult  the  laws  when 
one  wishes  to  learn  what  his  rights  are.  and  when  it  is  the 
custom,  when  one  wants  a  right,  to  petition  the  legislature  to 


198  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

grant  it,  it  is  only  natural  that  the  prevailing  idea  should  be 
that  the  government  is  the  source  of  rights,  and  that  law-made 
rights  are  paramount  to  natural  rights  or  liberty.  This  idea 
has  its  root  in  the  truth  that  some  government  and  laws  are 
necessary  to  the  peaceable  and  orderly  association  of  large 
numbers  of  people. 

The  mistake  was  made,  however,  not  in  providing  so  much 
government  as  was  necessary  to  the  conservation  of  the  peo- 
ple's true  rights,  but  in  permitting  those  who  conducted  the 
government  to  wield  discretionary  power,  which  has  always 
been  used  to  oppress  the  people,  instead  of  protecting  their 
rights.  Irresponsible  government  of  the  people  by  a  small 
class  of  rulers  has  so  long  subsisted  by  reason  of  the  belief 
that,  because  some  government  was  necessary,  the  existing 
form  of  government  was  necessary,  and  that  there  could  not 
be  such  government  as  is  really  necessary,  useful  and  benefi- 
cial, without  having  also  those  evils  which  have  attended  all 
known  forms  of  government — whereas,  the  true  lesson  taught 
by  the  great  evils  which  have  resulted  from  all  known  forms 
of  government  is,  that  they  all  have  been,  in  some  vital  par- 
ticular at  least,  radically  wrong. 

The  right  to  life,  when  we  attach  to  the  word  life  its  full 
meaning,  includes  all  natural  rights.  Possession  of  a  right 
involves  the  complete  enjoyment  of  that  right.  Any  curtail- 
ment of  the  enjoyment  of  a  right  is  an  abridgement  of  the 
right  itself.  Everything  which  is  necessary  to  the  fullest  en- 
joyment of  life  by  each  individual,  is  a  right,  and  anything 
which  in  any  degree  restricts  the  fullest  enjoyment  of  life  by 
each  individual,  is  a  wrong. 

The  line  between  right  and  wrong  being  thus  distinctly 
drawn,  there  need  be  no  difficulty  in  determining  what  are 
natural  rights,  and  what  are  and  what  are  not  just  social  ar- 
rangements. 

To  civilized  men  in  the  present  age  who  can  divest  their 


Kir, I  ITS  Vft 

minds  of  false  teachings  respecting  a  few  fundamental  princi- 
ples, natural  rights  become  self-evident  truths.  As  to  social 
arrangements,  to  be  right  they  must  conform  to  the  require- 
ments of  the  natural  rights  of  each  and  every  individual. 

Among  the  particular  rights  which  are  included  under  the 
general  right  to  life,  that  which  naturally  first  presents  itself 
to  the  mind  is  the  right  of  existence  itself;  and  then,  the  right 
of  freedom  from  injury  to  the  person  by  another  in  any  man- 
ner whatsoever. 

The  right  to  existence  and  tlic  integrity  of  the  person  is 
so  universally  recognized,  that  it  would  be  a  waste  of  time  to 
offer  any  arguments  in  its  support.  That  right  is  now  recog- 
nized as  an  axiom.  The  mere  statement  of  it  is  all-sufficient ; 
it  cannot  be  strengtlicncd  by  argument. 

No  less  axiomatic  than  the  right  to  life,  is  the  right  to  lil)- 
erty.  TTic  latter  right  is  an  integral  j^art  of  the  former.  With- 
out liberty,  and  all  the  liberty  which  may  be  con(Uicive  to  true 
welfare  or  true  self-interest,  the  imimpaircd  right  to  life  can- 
not be  enjoyed. 

Let  every  man  do  that  which  will  subserve  his  true  self- 
interest.  He  who  exercises  his  liberty,  either  of  thought  or 
action,  in  a  manner  which  will  subserve  his  true  self-interest, 
need  have  no  fear  of  evil  consequences  to  himself  or  to  any 
other  man.  That  is  the  natural  law  of  freedom,  individual, 
mutu.'d  an  1  collective;  that  is  the  natural  law  of  justice  and 
the  universal  rule  of  right  conduct,  not  only  for  individuals, 
but  also  for  nations. 

While  the  right  of  existence  and  frcedoiri  from  physical  mo- 
lestation is  recognized  and  upheld  by  all  normal-mimled  men, 
the  equally  essential  right  to  liberty,  without  which  life  is  not 
worth  the  living  (for  existence  has  value  only  in  proportion 
to  the  extent  to  which  true  liberty  has  jilay)  is  neither  recog- 
nized nor  upheld  in  some  most  important  particulars.  On  the 
contrary,  liberties  which  are  absolutely  indispensable  to  the 


200  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

material,  physical,  moral  and  mental  well-being  of  all  indi- 
vidauls,  are  denied  them  on  the  ground  that  the  very  liberties 
which  are  most  necessary  to  their  well-being  would  do  them 
harm. 

The  particular  freedoms  or  rights  which  are  so  indispen- 
sable to  the  full  enjoyment  of  the  right  to  life  and  which  are 
now  denied  to  most  people,  are : 

1.  Freedom  of  production. 

2.  The  free  access  to  and  use  of  land. 

3.  The  free  use  of  all  the  principles  and  forces  of  nature 
and  properties  of  matter. 

4.  The  free  exchange  of  products  of  labor  and  of  services 

5.  The  freedom  of  every  man  and  woman  to  give  direct 
and  equally  effective  expression  to  his  or  her  will  respecting 
all  social  arrangements. 

Besides  the  foregoing  freedoms  or  rights  which  comprehend 
all  activities  in  the  economic  field,  there  are  the  following - 
named  rights  which  pertain  to  condition  or  state,  connoted  by 
the  word  possession : 

1.  The  right  to  the  unimpaired  enjoyment  of  character. 

2.  The  right  of  the  producer  to  the  entire  product  of  his 
labor. 

3.  The  right  of  exclusive  ownership  to  the  products  of 
labor  acquired  by  free  gift,  bequest  or  devise. 

Xow,  let  us  consider  the  nature  of  these  particular  rights 
severally,  with  a  view  of  determining  whether  they  are  essen- 
tial features  of  the  general  right  to  life.  For,  as  has  already 
been  obsers^ed,  all  sorts  of  rights  are  rights  only  because  their 
possession  is  indispensable  to  the  complete  enjoyment  of  the 
right  to  life — to  the  freedom  of  every  man  to  do  that  which 
will  subserve  his  true  self-interest. 

Right  to  Free  Production. 

Human  life  comprises  so  much  more  than  mere  existence, 


RIGHTS  201 

that  mere  existence  would  be  wholly  intolerable.  Without  the 
freedom  to  employ  the  faculties  with  which  we  have  been  so 
richly  endowed  and  which  were  given  us  as  the  only  means 
of  satisfying  our  hunger  for  what  is  good  for  us,  which  is 
itself  an  attribute  of  human  nature,  life  would  not  only  be 
devoid  of  any  positive  value,  but  would  be  an  insupportable 
burden  from  which  death  would  be  a  welcome  relief. 

Must  we  then  write  thousands  or  even  hundreds  of  pages  of 
argument  to  establish  the  simple  truth  that  every  man  has  the 
right  to  freely  use  all  his  faculties  and  to  carry  on  all  the 
activities  which  give  existence  its  only  value,  and  which  are 
necessary  to  the  fulfillment  of  the  requirements  of  that  attri- 
bute of  existence  which  we  call  human  nature?  I  think  that, 
without  ado  and  without  calling  into  council  the  expedientist, 
the  compromiser  or  the  hairsplitter,  we  may  safely  here  draw 
the  conclusion  that  simply  because  every  one  has  the  right  to 
life,  he  has  the  right  to  do  that  which  makes  life  worth  the 
living.  We  may  say,  therefore,  that  every  man  has  the  right 
to  do  that  which  will  subserve  his  true  self-interest.  And  since 
all  our  material  wants  and  needs  can  be  satisfied,  acconling 
to  the  moral  law,  only  by  labor,  which  is  called  production,  we 
may  confidently  hokl  that  every  man  has  the  right  of  free 
production. 

Rights  Respecting  Land. 

Since  land,  which  in  the  economic  sense  includes  everything 
in,  on,  or  about  the  earth,  is  the  product  of  nature  and  not 
of  labor,  there  is  no  moral  sanction  for  absolute  property  in 
land.  In  the  nature  of  things,  all  inhabitants  of  the  earth,  or 
of  any  division  of  the  earth's  surface,  may  not  enjoy  complete 
lives  without  free  access  to  land.  The  indispensability  of  the 
use  of  land  to  well-being  is  so  palpable  a  truth,  that  when 


202  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

one  dwells  upon  the  idea  for  a  moment,  he  must  be  struck 
with  amazement  that  it  was  ever  questioned. 

The  contemplation  of  the  nature  of  things,  the  relation  of 
man  to  the  earth,  of  man  to  man — the  fact  that  all  of  our  ma- 
terial wants  are  obtained  by  the  application  of  labor  to  land, 
and  that  the  satisfaction  of  the  higher  order  of  wants  are  at 
least  dependent  upon  the  previous  satisfaction  of  material 
wants,  discloses  the  profound  truth  that  unrestricted  owner- 
ship of  the  earth,  the  buying  and  selling  of  land  in  the  market 
place,  and  the  consequent  monopolization  of  land  by  a  few 
members  of  the  society,  are  utterly  incompatible  with  the  right 
of  every  individual  to  life  and  to  do  that  which  will  subserve 
his  true  self-interest. 

The  equal  right  of  all  individuals  to  life  implies  the  free- 
dom of  each  to  exercise  all  his  faculties  in  a  manner  condu- 
cive to  his  highest  well-being  and,  therefore,  the  right  to  life 
implies  and  involves  the  right  to  the  use  of  land,  but  only 
to  the  use  of  land,  since  there  is  no  warrant  for  the  absolute 
ownership  of  land. 

If,  then,  we  would  have  a  moral  system  of  land  tenure,  it 
can  be  had  only  by  devising  a  system  which  will  meet  the  re- 
quirements of  the  ethical  principles  above  set  forth.  The  only 
problem  left  to  be  solved,  in  order  to  establish  just  relations 
between  man  and  the  land  and  between  man  and  man,  so  far 
as  those  relations  depend  on  the  disposition  of  land,  is  to  dis- 
cover what  regulations  of  land  tenure  will  eliminate  land  rent, 
give  to  every  individual  free  access  to  land,  and  thus  enable 
everyone  to  have  all  the  land  he  can  use.  A  just  system  of 
land  tenure  is  simply  impossible  on  any  other  terms. 

The  Right  of  the  Producer  to  the  Full  Product  of  His  Labor. 

When  we  come  to  deal  with  particular  rights  separately,  the 
truth,  that  as  the  general  right  to  life  may  not  be  fully  en- 


RICH  ITS  203 

joyed  without  possession  of  nil  particular  rights,  so  also  no 
particular  right  may  he  fully  enjoyed  without  the  posses- 
sion of  every  other  particular  right,  intrudes  itself  upon  our 
notice. 

We  have  seen  that  the  right  to  life  may  not  he  enjoyed 
without  the  right  to  freely  exercise  one's  f.'culties  toward 
the  satisfaction  of  self-henehting  desires,  nor  without  the 
possession  of  the  right  to  free  use  of  land. 

We  have  also  seen  that  the  right  of  free  production  cannot 
he  maintained  without  the  enjoyment  of  the  right  to  free 
access  to  land.  Likewise,  the  right  to  the  free  use  of  land 
may  not  he  fully  enjoyed,  unless  the  user  may  also  claim  as 
his  right  the  entire  produce  of  his  labor.  Now,  is  the  right 
to  the  full  produce  of  one's  labor  indispensable  to  the  right 
to  life? 

All  the  value  which  life  has,  is  derived  from  the  satisfac- 
tion of  desires.  For  no  other  reason  do  men  labor,  mentally 
or  physically,  but  because  the  satisfaction  of  their  desires  can- 
not otherwise  be  attained.  No  sane  man  works  for  the  mere 
sake  of  working.  No  man  will  voluntarily  work  without  the 
prospect  of  satisfying  some  desire.  It  is  the  product  or  re- 
sult of  his  labor  which  he  works  for — which  he  expends  a 
part  of  his  life  to  gain,  the  gaining  of  which  gives  his  life 
what  value  it  has  to  him. 

Therefore,  there  can  be  no  more  indubitable  right,  nor  one 
which  is  more  inextricably  bound  up  with  the  right  to  life,  than 
the  right  of  the  producer  to  the  entire  produce  of  his  labor. 

Here  we  are  brought,  by  the  logical  sequence  of  fundamen- 
tal truths,  to  the  momentous  conclusion,  that  if  we  would  estab- 
lish economic  justice,  accord  to  all  men  their  natural  property 
rights;  aye,  if  we  would  permit  every  individual  to  enjoy  his 
inborn  right  to  life,  the  denial  of  which  is  in  some  degree 
life  slaughter,  we  must  make  our  social  arrangeirients  such  as 


204  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

will  enable  every  man  to  retain  and  enjoy  the  full  produce  of 
his  labor. 

First  as  last,  we  might  as  well  squarely  face  the  obvious 
truth  that  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  economic  justice,  until 
the  precept,  Let  every  man  get  what  he  produces  and  produce 
what  he  gets,  shall  become  a  living  reality. 

All  production  of  material  things,  called  wealth,  consists 
in  the  use  of  the  principles  and  forces  of  nature  and  the 
properties  of  matter  in  changing  the  form  of  matter  or  mov- 
ing it  from  place  to  place,  or  both. 

In  its  economic  aspect,  production  is  labor,  and  nothing  but 
labor. 

By  production  we  mean  the  transformation,  by  human  exer- 
tion, of  matter  in  its  natural  state  to  that  form  for  which 
there  is  a  demand,  and  by  human  toil  bringing  it  to  the  place 
where  it  is  to  be  used. 

Hence,  the  right  to  the  free  use  of  the  principles  and  forces 
of  nature  and  properties  of  matter  is  an  inseparable  part  of 
the  right  to  free  production,  the  right  to  the  free  use  of  land, 
and  of  the  right  of  the  producer  to  the  entire  produce  of  his 
labor. 

The  Patent  Right. 

Invention  is  but  a  mode  of  production.  It  is  the  adaptation 
of  the  principles  and  forces  of  nature  or  properties  of  matter 
in  a  previously  unknown  manner  to  the  production  of  some 
utility.  Therefore,  both  the  right  to  free  production  and  the 
right  to  the  free  use  of  the  principles  and  forces  of  nature 
and  properties  of  matter  imply  the  right  to  freedom  of  in- 
vention. 

The  granting  by  government  of  the  exclusive  right  to  the 
use  or  the  production  of  an  invention,  is  clearly  an  abrogation 
of  the  natural  right  to  the  free  use  of  the  principles  and  forces 


RIGHTS  205 

of  nature  and  properties  of  matter,  and  of  the  right  to  free- 
dom of  pro<kiction  itself. 

The  principles  which  underlie  property  rights  are  in  no  wise 
applicable  to  the  artificial  I'atent  right.  The  Patent  right  is 
a  right  to  the  exclusive  use  of  an  idea  or  ideas  embodied  in  a 
particular  form  of  matter,  conferred  by  government  on  the 
first  person  to  claim  to  be  the  author  of  the  invention.  The 
patent  right  is  not  intended  to  secure  to  the  patentee  his  right 
to  the  concrete  produce  of  his  labor,  which  is  the  only  thing 
to  which  he  has  a  valid  or  natural  right,  but  it  is  intended  to 
do  that  which  it  actually  does — monopolize  particular  indus- 
tries, prevent  free  competition,  enable  capitalists,  who  alone 
can  afford  to  pay  the  exorbitant  prices  put  on  the  use  of  in- 
ventions, to  work  a  greater  number  of  men  for  profit  than 
couM  have  been  done  before  the  invention  was  made,  and 
above  all,  to  give  to  the  patentee  the  right  to  the  exclusive 
use  of  mere  ideas. 

These  ideas  consist  of  the  use  of  the  principles  and  forces 
of  nature  and  the  properties  of  matter  in  a  particular  manner. 
Tlie  exclusive  use  of  ideas  originated  by  him  would  be  of  little 
or  no  i)ractical  value  to  him,  and  is  therefore  really  not  the 
thing  he  wants.  What  he  really  wants  anri  gets  by  means  of 
the  patent  right,  is  the  correlative  right  to  compel  the  use  of 
those  ideas  by  others,  and  by  being  able  to  compel  their  use  by 
others,  to  levy  u])on  those  others  heavy  tribute  for  the  en- 
forced privilege  of  using  them. 

To  the  extent  to  which  nature's  gifts  are  thus  used,  the  use 
of  those  gifts  is  monopolized,  and  when  we  consider  that  al- 
most everything  in  use  is  (either  itself,  or  the  machinery  or 
tools  used  in  its  production)  patented,  it  becomes  obvious  to 
v.hat  a  serious  extent  the  monopolization  of  the  principles  and 
forces  of  nature  and  jiropcrties  of  matter,  which  are  the  free 
gift  of  nature,  and  without  the  employment  of  which  no  pro- 


206  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

duction  is  possible,  has  been  effected  by  the  granting  of  patent 
rights. 

It  follows,  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  with  these  gifts  of 
nature,  which  are  pre-essential  to  production,  monopolized 
by  some  to  the  extent  to  which  their  use  is  denied  to  others, 
there  can  neither  be  production  on  equal  terms,  nor  the  en- 
joyment by  the  worker  of  the  entire  produce  of  his  labor. 
The  Patent  right  is  an  infringement  of  both  the  right  of  free 
production  and  of  the  natural  property  right. 

From  this  invariable  consequence  of  patent  rights  to  in- 
ventions sprang  the  earlier  and  deep-seated  prejudice  of  the 
working  man  against  the  use  of  machinery.  That  prejudice 
still  lingers  in  the  minds  of  many  working  men. 

It  is  only  among  the  younger  generation,  who  have  known 
nothing  else  than  the  wage  system,  and  therefore  thoughtlessly 
take  it  for  granted  that  everyone  who  is  not  born  rich,  must,  in 
the  nature  of  things,  work  for  others  for  wages,  which  at  best 
can  be  only  "a  fair  share"  of  what  their  labor  produces,  that 
the  prejudice  against  machinery  is  weak  or  absent.  But  older 
men.  who  have  suffered  dislodgement  from  their  former  inde- 
pendent self-employment,  and  have  been  forced  to  work  under 
some  boss  at  wages  current  in  a  glutted  labor  market,  cling 
tenaciously  to  that  prejudice,  notwithstanding  all  the  preach- 
ments on  the  blessings  of  machinery  which  have  been  thrust 
upon  their  notice,  and  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  work- 
ing man's  prejudice  was  wrong  per  se,  and  that  the  aforesaid 
preachments  were  right  per  se. 

Improvements  in  the  arts,  ought,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be 
an  unadulterated  blessing,  a  blessing  particularly  to  the  worker, 
and  an  injury  to  no  man.  The  workingmen  have  made  the 
mistake  of  directing  their  opposition  against  machinery  or  im- 
provements in  the  arts,  instead  of  opposing  the  monopolization 
of  the  use  of  machinery  and  improvements  in  the  arts,  which 


RIGHTS  207 

is  occasioned  partly  by  patent  rights,  and  partly  l)y  the  monopo- 
lization in  general  of  tilings  callc«l  capital. 

With  the  abolition  of  patent  rights  and  of  all  other  privi- 
'eges,  the  harmful  effects  of  the  introduction  of  improvements 
in  the  arts  under  the  regime  of  i)rivilege,  will  be  converted 
into  j)urcly  beneficial  efTects  under  a  system  devoid  of  privilege. 

Patent  rights  contravene  the  princii)lcs  of  justice  in  several 
ways.  To  begin  with,  the  patent  right  is  preemptive  in  char- 
acter. It  gives  to  him  who  first  lays  claim  to  an  invention 
exclusive  property  in  it  for  a  long  term  of  years,  while  there 
may  be  others  who  have  well  nigh  completed  practically  the 
same  invention,  and  who  may  have  conceived  the  idea  which 
is  the  basis  of  the  patent  right,  before  the  patentee  did.  In 
fact,  the  patentee  may  have  borrowed  the  primary  idea  of  the 
patent  from  one  of  the  persons  wdio  is  excluded  by  the  patent 
from  its  use. 

Not  only  are  such  circumstances  possible,  but  that  they 
frequently  occur,  is  illustrated  by  the  large  number  of  law 
suits  to  determine  the  priority  of  right  to  inventions.  The 
bitterly  fought  contest  over  the  telephone  patent  is  a  case  in 
point. 

This  gross  violation  of  individual  natural  rights  is  quite 
sufficient  to  utterly  conrlemn  the  jiatent  right. 

Another  sufficient  reason  why  no  patent  right  should  be 
granted  is,  that  it  is  a  powerful  factor  in  the  monopolization 
of  industries. 

The  i)atenting  of  machinery,  tools  or  processes  of  produc- 
tion makes  the  use  of  a  larger  amount  of  accumulated  wealth 
(usually  calle<l  capital)  necessary  to  carry  on  the  industries 
in  which  they  are  employed,  and  thus  restricts  the  use  of  the 
improvements  to  those  who  have  the  necessary  wealth,  and 
at  the  same  time  makes  it  more  difficult  for  those  who  have 
not  inherited  or  already  accumulated  wealth,  to  accumulate  it. 

Hence,  the  tendency  of  patent  rights  is,  through  its  monopo- 


208  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

lizing  effects,  to  reduce  the  body  of  the  people  to  the  miserable 
condition  of  wage  slaves. 

Furthermore,  the  monopolization  of  previous  inventions  is 
a  very  serious  hindrance,  both  to  the  improvement  of  those 
inventions  and  to  making  new  inventions.  It  is  a  notorious 
fact  that  improvements  in  previous  inventions  are  usually 
appropriated  by  mere  capitalists  who  are  not  capable  of  in- 
venting anything.  It  is  also  well  known  that  many  persons 
refrain  from  perfecting  useful  inventions  from  a  realization 
that  the  chances  are  that  their  inventions  would  be  appro- 
priated by  capitalists,  in  which  event  they  would  gain  neither 
fame  nor  public  gratitude  nor  wealth,  but  would  have  expended 
much  toil,  the  result  of  which  would  then  be  used  by  capi- 
talists as  a  means  of  extorting  wealth  from  the  people. 

Under  the  existing  system  of  privileges  the  poor  man  can- 
not afford  to  devote  time  and  labor  on  inventions  for  the 
sake  of  fame  and  without  pecuniary  compensation.  I  have 
been  informed  by  an  employe  of  a  large  electric  manufactory 
that  every  employe  was  required  to  sign  an  agreement  that  any 
invention  he  might  make  would  become  the  property  of  his 
employer.  This  so-called  right  of  the  employer  to  the  inven- 
tions of  employes  can,  of  course,  rest  on  no  other  basis  than 
the  claim  that  but  for  the  capital  of  the  employer,  the  em.ploye 
would  have  had  no  opportunity  to  invent  anything  in  that  line, 
which  is  the  very  condition  of  things  which  needs  to  be 
remedied. 

The  principles  which  are  the  authority  for  the  exclusive 
right  to  things,  afford  no  grounds  for  exclusive  property  rights 
in  ideas.  No  greater  obstruction  to  progress  could  be  imag- 
ined than  the  general  recognition  of  exclusive  property  rights 
in  ideas.  No  man  could  acquire  the  necessary  knowledge  to 
make  an  improvement  in  the  present-day  art,  unless  he  were 
free  to  absorb  and  use  thousands  of  ideas  of  other  persons. 
As  an  inventor  or  discoverer  he  merely  adds  another  idea  or 


RIGHTS  209 

fact  to  the  great  mass  which  were  already  common  property. 
If  he  desires  to  retain  the  exclusive  use  of  his  discovery  or 
invention,  he  is  at  perfect  liberty  to  keep  it  to  himself.  But 
he  has  no  right  to  demand  that  the  government  shall  make 
of  the  itlea,  or  of  the  fact  of  nature  discovered  by  him,  a  com- 
modity and  vest  in  him  a  property  right  to  it,  and  thus  enable 
him  to  exploit  his  fellow  men. 

The  originator  or  producer  of  tangible  things  may  enjoy 
completely  their  use  and  benefits  without  disturbing  the  eco- 
nomic activities  of  others  or  infringing  on  their  natural  rights  ; 
but  when  the  originator  of  an  idea,  or  perhaps  of  the  appli- 
cation only  of  another's  idea,  seeks  a  patent,  what  he  wants  is 
not  the  right  to  the  exclusive  use  of  the  idea  by  himself,  but 
the  right  to  compel  others  to  pay  him  a  royalty  or  bonus  for 
using  the  idea;  because,  if  he  kept  the  idea  secret,  it  would 
most  likely  be  absolutely  worthless  to  him.  For,  in  the  very 
nature  of  things,  ideas,  to  be  of  much  utility  or  value,  must 
be  shared  with  others,  and  be  used  by  them. 

Regarded  from  a  viewpoint  whence  all  about  are  seen  all 
sorts  of  privileges  which  are  recognized  as  rights,  there  is 
little  wonder  that  the  arguments  offered  in  support  of  patent 
rights  are  generally  thought  very  plausible,  if  not  absolutely 
sound. 

The  belief  being  prevalent  that  capital  initiates  all  produc- 
tion, and  that  in  the  nature  of  things  no  industrial  progress 
can  be  made  except  by  way  of  first  establishing  privileges, 
it  is  quite  natural  that  government  should  grant  such  privi- 
leges as  patent  rights,  on  the  ground  that  they  stimulate  inven- 
tion and  make  for  industrial  progress. 

If  capital  is  the  all-important  thing,  the  capitalist  the  most 
useful  and  laudable  member  of  society,  and  if  there  is  no  dis- 
tinction worth  striving  for  but  a  larger  bank  account,  why 
not  create  more  capitalist?  whenever  we  can  find  any  excuse, 
iiowever  flimsy,  for  doing  so?     But  even  so.  the  people  could 


210  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

make  the  same  number  of  capitalists,  at  less  expense  to  them- 
selves, by  first  determining  how  many  new  capitalists  they 
wish  to  turn  out  annually,  and  the  amount  of  capital  each  is 
to  have,  and  then  levy  a  direct  per  capita  tax  on  them- 
selves to  provide  the  necessary  funds.  Such  a  plan  would 
have  the  advantage  of  giving  the  people  some  color  of  right 
to  name  their  capitalists,  to  determine  where  and  how  the  cap- 
ital should  be  invested,  and  to  otherwise  regulate  the  steward- 
ship of  the  capitalist.  To  manufacture  capitalists  through  the 
agency  of  privileges  is  the  most  expensive  method  that  could 
be  contrived. 

Deserved  honor  or  the  merited  esteem  of  one's  fellows  can- 
not be  valued  in  terms  of  money — they  cannot  be  purchased 
with  money.  It  does  not  require  a  very  vivid  imagination  to 
perceive  that  in  a  society  where  economic  justice  was  the  rule, 
and  where,  therefore,  everyone  enjoyed  as  a  matter  of  course 
the  comforts  as  well  as  the  necessities  of  life,  and  no  man 
could  attain  that  power  and  such  distinction  as  money  r.ow 
confers,  men  would  naturally  vie  with  one  another  to  achieve 
the  only  distinction  worth  possessing — the  distinction  of  hav- 
ing bestowed  upon  humanity  some  benefit.  In  such  a  state  of 
society  he  who  would  ask  for  a  patent  right  would  be  treated 
with  as  much  contempt  as  if.  though  he  were  not  in  need,  he 
begged  for  alms. 

The  truth  that  the  patent  right  is  not  founded  on  any  nat- 
ural principle,  as  are  property  rights  in  the  material  things 
produced  by  labor,  is  shown  by  the  very  fact  that,  for  the 
reason  that  it  would  be  detrimental  to  the  public  welfare  by 
clogging  industrial  progress  if  granted  in  perpetuity  the  exclu- 
.sive  right  has  not  been  regarded  as  a  common  law  right,  but 
has  been  treated  by  governments  as  a  privilege,  the  life  of 
which  has  been  limited  to  a  term  of  years  ranging  from  four- 
teen to  twenty-four  in  various  countries. 

For  the  reason  that  by  no  principle  could  the  proper  length 


RIGHTS  211 

of  life  of  a  patent  right  l)c  (Jctcrniincd,  a  purely  arbitrary 
term  of  years,  varying  in  different  countries,  has  been  fixed, 
the  idea  being  that  the  patent  right  should  run  long  en^  u;;') 
but  no  longer  than  is  necessary,  not  only  to  compensate  the 
inventor  for  the  toil  he  has  expended  in  bringing  forth  his 
invention,  but  also  to  yield  him  a  greater  return  in  the  form 
of  a  suitable  reward  for  employing  his  talents  in  behalf  of 
the  public  welfare. 

In  fixing  the  term  of  duration  of  a  patent  right  no  greater 
success  has  been  obtained  in  accomplishing  the  avowed  pur- 
pose than  has  attended  the  attempt  to  arbitrarily  fix  wages  at 
a  point  which  will  secure  to  the  producer  the  much  vaunted 
yet  purely  imaginary  "fair  share"  of  the  wealth  his  own  labor 
has  produced. 

It  has  never  been  argued  by  the  supporters  of  the  patent 
right  that  mere  capitalists  should  be  the  chief  beneficiaries, 
but  such  is  in  most  cases  the  result.  If  the  bestowal  of  great 
fortunes  upon  capitalists,  who  have  had  nothing  whatever  to 
do  v.ith  the  contrivance  of  the  inventions  th.?v  cxjdojt.  is  a 
necessary  concomitant  of  the  patent  right,  there  must  be  some- 
thing very  serious  the  matter  with  the  foundation  upon  which 
the  patent  right  stands ;  for  no  veritable  right,  no  right 
•  rounde'l  on  natural  principles  of  justice,  carries  along  wiili 
it  such  palpably  gross  injustice.  Contrariwise,  the  fullest  ex- 
ercise of  any  natural  right  necessarily  excluvles  the  commission 
of  the  smallest  injustice  of  any  kind. 

Tlic  Copyright. 

Tlie  copyright  a]ipears  on  the  surface  to  be  closely  analo- 
^••'1'^  in  n  tii'T  to  til"  |at;.'nt  ri^'it ;  but  up'^^n  closer  f::r.niitia- 
tion  it  n  ill  be  found  that,  while  these  grants  by  government 
are  similar  in  form,  they  differ  profoundly  in  their  operations 
and  consequences. 


212  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

The  copyright,  Hke  the  patent  right,  is  a  law-made  privi- 
lege. These  two  privileges  are  similar  in  form  and  character. 
They  both  had  a  common  origin  in  the  idea  that  in  order  to 
encourage  men  to  write  books  and  to  produce  novel  utilities, 
government  should  hold  out  a  reward  in  the  form  of  a  monop- 
oly for  a  term  of  years  of  the  use,  sale  or  multiplication  of  the 
original  products  of  their  brains. 

Though  these  privileges  are  alike  in  respect  of  principles 
of  justice,  the  patent  right  is  far  more  harmful  in  its  eco- 
nomic effects,  and  is  therefore  an  injustice  of  much  greater 
magnitude. 

So  universally  are  monopolized  by  patent  rights  the  most 
efficient  tools,  machinery  and  processes  used,  in  part  or  in 
whole,  in  the  production  of  every  commodity  under  the  sun, 
that  practically  no  production  can  be  carried  on  without  pay- 
ing royalty  on  one  or  more  patents.  Consequently,  royalties 
and  profits  on  royalties  enter  into  the  price  of  almost  if  not 
quite  all  consumable  articles.  Every  consumer,  when  he  pur- 
chases any  article  of  commerce,  is  mulcted  in  royalties  on 
patents,  and  also  in  one  or  several  profits  on  the  amounts  of 
the  royalties. 

Both  the  patent  right  and  the  copyright  monopolize  ideas, 
notwithstanding  the  disclaimer  of  their  supporters.  Both  of 
these  law-made  rights  confer  a  monopoly  in  the  use  of  ideas  in 
a  particular  form  or  manner;  but  there  is  this  important  dis- 
tinction which  renders  the  copyright  far  less  injurious  than 
the  patent  right :  The  patent  right  creates  a  monopoly  in  the 
use  of  ideas  in  the  form  or  manner  in  which  alone  they  are 
useful  or  valuable,  but  the  copyright,  while  it  confers  a  monop- 
oly in  ideas  represented  in  a  particular  arrangement  of  words 
in  the  form  of  a  book,  does  not  monopolize  the  use  of  those 
ideas  them.selves,  nor  does  it  compel  any  user  of  such  ideas 
to  pay  tribute  to  the  author  for  their  use. 

No  matter  how  useful  or  valuable,  economically,  ideas  con- 


RIGHTS  213 

tainetl  in  a  copyrighted  book  may  be,  anyone  is  free  to  us« 
them  without  price.  Without  tlie  free  use  of  ideas  and  knowl- 
edge contained  in  books,  there  would  be  few  improvements 
made  either  in  tlie  sciences  or  the  arts.  The  whole  justifica- 
tion of  the  copyright  lies  in  the  claim  that  it  is  a  stimulus  to 
the  introduction  and  dissemination  of  new  ideas  or  new  forms 
of  old  ideas.    Yet,  there  is  no  gnjund  for  tiiis  claim. 

The  man  who  has  an  idea  worth  giving  to  the  world  will, 
if  possible,  find  some  way  of  <iisseminating  it.  If  his  circum- 
stances are  such  that  he  has  not  the  means  to  mform  the  world 
of  his  ideas,  he  is  nc  more  helpless  in  that  respect  without  the 
copyright  than  with  it,  because  witli  the  copyright  law  he  does 
not  get  his  reward  until  after  he  has  accomplished  his  task. 

There  is  in  human  nature  an  innate  pride  in  doing  some- 
thing which  others  have  not  been  able  to  do,  or  doing  a  thing 
better  than  others  are  able  to  do — in  attaining  superiority  in 
some  line  of  endeavor  for  the  enjoyment  which  the  recogni- 
tion of  that  superiority  gives.  This  trait  is  illustrated  by  the 
diligence  with  which  a  school  boy  will  work  over  a  catch  prob- 
lem in  mathematics,  and  the  assiduity  with  which  many  per- 
sons will  apply  what  ingenuity  they  have  to  the  solution  of  a 
puzzle;  also,  by  the  devotion  of  their  whole  lives  by  scientists 
to  the  discovery  of  some  new  fact  or  principle  without  the 
expectation  of  any  other  reward  than  the  reputation  of  having 
made  the  discovery. 

When  it  is  in  a  man  to  evolve  new  ideas  or  to  invent  im- 
provements in  the  arts,  he  can  no  more  help  writing  or  invent- 
ing than  he  can  ignore  any  other  dictum  of  his  self-interest. 
The  copyright  defeats  the  avowed  purpose  of  its  existence. 
Instead  of  facilitating  and  promoting  the  dissemination  of 
ideas,  which  will  be  born  as  certainly  without  the  copyright 
as  with  it,  the  copyright,  by  enabling  the  author  or  the  pub- 
lisher to  put  a  monopoly  price  on  his  work,  discourages  and 


214  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

limits  its  distribution.  Why  then,  it  may  be  asked,  do  I  copy- 
right this  work? 

The  answer  is,  that  while  my  motive  for  writing  this  book 
has  been  to  serve  my  self-interest  in  various  ways — partly  to 
do  what  I  can  to  make  this  a  better  world  to  live  in,  partly  to 
achieve  the  solution  of  questions  of  the  greatest  moment  to 
mankind,  which  have  thus  far  baffled  the  efforts  of  all  who 
have  unvlertaken  to  solve  them,  and  partly  to  gain,  in  propor- 
tion as  I  might  succeed  in  the  foregoing  particulars,  the  good 
will  and  commendation  of  my  fellow  men — I,  like  all  my  coun- 
trymen, must  live  my  life,  work  out  my  own  weal  by  the  best 
methods  open  to  me  under  a  system  which  makes  of  self-in- 
terest and  morality  mortal  enemies,  until  there  is  put  in  its 
stead  a  system  which  will  render  just  conduct  the  height  of 
self-interest.  Therefore,  in  spite  of  my  intense  desire  that 
every  man  and  woman,  and  especially  the  downtrodden  among 
them,  might  read  this  book,  and  greatly  profit  themselves  by 
living  up  to  its  precepts  and  compelling  the  conformation  of 
social  arrangements  to  its  teachings,  I  nevertheless  feel  con- 
strained in  duty  to  my  family  to  copyright  the  book,  and  to 
sell  it  for  a  somewhat  higher  price  than  the  cost  of  mere 
manufacture  would  justify.  I  do  this  in  the  hope  that  not- 
withstanding the  necessity  on  my  part  of  copyrighting  the 
book,  there  will  be  enough  people  who  are  amply  able  to  pay 
the  price,  and  who  will  realize  how  greatly  it  is  to  their  own 
self-interest  for  others  to  learn  what  social  justice  is,  that  no 
person  in  this  country  need  remain  ignorant  of  its  contents. 

While  it  would  be  a  hardship  for  many  persons  to  spare 
from  their  meagre  earnings  the  purchase  price  of  this  book, 
its  perusal  will,  I  think,  convince  most  of  them  that  by  enforc- 
ing, by  means  of  the  ballot,  the  principles  therein  set  forth, 
they  would  be  relieved  of  the  burdens  which  render  them  so 
poor  and  helpless,  be  made  economically  independent,  and  be 


RIGHTS  215 

able  to  buy  a  huntlred  books  with  far  less  sacriJice  or  incon- 
venience than  the  purchase  of  one  would  now  entail. 

The  really  formidable  enemy  of  social  justice  is  not  the 
inherent  power  of  the  privileged  class  nor  of  their  money.  It 
is  only  the  ignorance  of  the  people  of  their  true  self-interest 
which  nee<ls  to  be  vanquished.  When  a  majority  of  the  peo- 
ple set  their  hearts  on  the  abolition  of  privileges,  and  adopt 
a  practical  means  of  accomplishing  their  purpose,  no  amount 
of  money  will  be  able  to  withstand  their  will. 

Riglit  of  Free  Exchange. 

All  property  rights  have  their  foundation  in  the  principle 
that  what  one  proikices  is  his  exclusive  property,  to  do  with 
as  he  pleases,  provided  he  does  not  use  it  in  such  a  way  as  to 
trespass  upon  the  natural  rights  of  others.  In  this  age  of 
infinite  subdivision  of  labor  and  production,  when  one  man 
fre(|ucntly  devotes  all  his  labor  to  the  production  of  one  out 
of  many  ])arts  of  a  sinii^le  commocHty,  in  order  to  secure  for 
his  own  use  and  benclit  scores  of  ditTerciit  complete  commo- 
•lities,  there  can  be  no  property  rights  without  the  absoluir 
freedom  of  exchange.  Just  in  so  far  as  freedom  of  exchange 
is  interferct!  with,  to  that  extent  property  rights  are  denied, 
and  the  denial  of  property  rights  in  any  measure  is,  as  has 
already  l)een  pointed  out,  a  denial  of  so  much  of  the  right 
to  life. 

Nothing  more  can  l)c  said  which  will  demonstrate  more 
clearly  the  absolute  natural  right  of  free  exchange.  It  fol- 
lows as  a  matter  of  course  that  all  taxes,  licenses,  or  regula- 
tions of  any  description,  which  interfere  in  any  manner  with 
the  free  purchase  or  sale  of  the  products  of  labor  or  of  per- 
sonal services,  physical  or  mental,  are  an  infringement  of 
property  rights.  It  follows  also  that  property  rights  cannot 
le   fully  enjoyevi   until  all   such   interferences  with  exchange 


216  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

have  been  removed.  For,  the  complete  recognition  of  property 
rights,  including  the  right  to  freedom  of  trade,  will  result, 
through  the  untrammeled  operation  of  the  law  of  supply  and 
demand,  in  the  equal  exchange  of  service  for  service,  which  in 
turn  may  be  said  to  be  the  only  condition  upon  which  true 
property  rights  depend. 

Until  production  and  exchange  are  put  upon  such  a  basis 
as  will  enable  every  producer  to  receive  for  his  produce  pro- 
ducts of  the  labor  of  others  of  equal  value,  measured  in  labor, 
property  rights  will  remain  a  mere  name  for  something  which 
does  not  exist. 

RigJit  of  Free  Speech. 

As  has  been  previously  observed,  no  man  has  the  right  to 
advocate  by  voice  or  press  opinions  which  transgress  the  fun- 
damental principles  of  morality  or  justice,  for  the  reason 
that  opinions  are  the  prompters  of  conduct,  and  that  immoral 
opinions,  to  the  extent  to  which  they  are  acted  upon,  are  pri- 
marily responsible  for  immoral,  unjust  conduct. 

The  question  of  free  speech  and  free  press  has  always  been 
regarded  as  an  exceedingly  delicate  one.  Like  most  other 
social  questions,  it  has  been  treated  from  the  viewpoint  of  ex- 
pediency. The  evil  effects  of  the  unbridled  expression  of 
wrong  opinions  have  been  duly  recognized.  So  have 
the  evil  effects  of  the  suppression  of  right  opinions  been 
seen.  The  difficulty  has  been  to  find  a  means  to  avoid  both 
of  these  evils,  and  the  source  of  this  difficulty  has  been  pri- 
marily the  lack  of  a  criterion  by  which  the  righteousness  or 
unrighteousness  of  opinions  might  be  judged,  and  secondar- 
ily the  inability  to  conceive  where  the  authority  to  pass  judg- 
ment on  opinions  might  be  lodged  with  good  results. 

There  will  never  be  any  consequential  progress  toward  eco- 
nomic justice  until  there  arises  in  this  country  a  body  of  men 
and  women  who  will  not  tolerate  the  spreading  abroad  of 


RIGHTS  217 

opinions  at  variance  with  tlic  easily  accessible  and  readily  un- 
derstood  fundamental  principles  of  justice. 

To  admit  that  every  man  has  a  right  to  his  opinion  respect- 
ing afTairs  economic  or  governmental,  whether  his  opinion  be 
right  or  wrong,  whether  it  conforms  to  the  natural  law  of  jus- 
tice or  antagonizes'  it,  is  to  assert  practically  that  there  is  no 
criterion  by  which  the  righteousness  or  unriglUe<JUsness  of 
opinions  may  be  judged,  and  it  is  inevitable  that  where  there  is 
no  criterion  by  which  to  judge  opinions,  there  is  no  telling 
right  oi)inions  from  wrong  opinions,  truths  from  falsehoods, 
and  furthermore,  where  principle  is  not  employed  as  a  criterion, 
other,  artificial  criteria  will  be  set  up  by  false  opinions  as 
rules  by  which  those  same  false  opinions  are  to  be  judged. 
That  is  the  sorry  plight  in  which  the  world  is  today  floundering. 

The  manufacturers  of  public  opinion  have  succeeded  in  in- 
sinuating into  the  minds  of  the  people  the  idea  that  expediency 
is  paramount  to  any  consideration  of  mere  principles.  They 
have  taken  great  care,  in  the  discussion  of  iOcial  arrange- 
n'.ents,  to  religiously  eschew  principles,  and  to  set  the  people 
to  fighting  over  the  choice  between  the  two  or  more  expedients, 
none  of  which  are  right. 

That  is  the  one  determining  reason  why  little  or  no  pro- 
gress toward  real  justice  has  been  made  and  why  such  changes 
as  have  been  made  consist  in  the  substitution  of  one  form 
of  injustice  for  another. 

Whenever  a  man  makc.s  his  plea  on  the  grounds  of  expe- 
diency, it  may  be  unerringly  assumed  that  either  he  is  igno- 
rant of  what  justice  is  or  that  he  knowingly  intends  to  do 
injustice.  In  the  first  case  his  error  should  be  considerately 
pointed  out  to  him  by  calling  his  attention  to  the  principles 
of  justice  involved ;  then,  should  he  persist  in  maintaining 
his  wrong  opinion,  he  falls  into  the  same  class  as  one  who  is 
aware  that  the  opinion  he  expresses  is  contrary  to  the  moral 
law.     That  class  of  persons  are  willful  moral  outlaws,  and 


218  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

deserve  such  punishment  as  only  an  outraged  public  opinion 
can  inflict. 

Too  much  stress  cannot  be  laid  on  the  importance  of  always 
bearing  in  mind  that  aside  from  the  dictates  of  the  principles 
of  justice,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  expediency,  and  that, 
where  a  course  of  action  at  odds  with  principles  of  justice  is 
urged  on  the  grounds  of  expediency,  expediency  is  but  an- 
other name  for  injustice. 

Besides  the  preachers  of  expediency,  we  have  another  breed 
of  moral  mongrels  the  ubiquitous  compromiser,  the  fellow  who 
is  always  on  hand,  and  under  all  circumstances  wants  peace 
at  any  price,  and  proposes  a  dicker  between  justice  and  injus-. 
tice,  as  if  the  thing  to  be  determined  were  the  price  to  be  paid 
for  a  second-hand  suit  of  clothes. 

In  the  name  of  fair  play,  the  miserable  compromiser  per- 
forms no  other  office  than  to  help  the  one  who  is  in  the  wrong 
to  hold  on  to  as  much  of  the  wrong  as  his  opponent  may  be 
induced  to  permit.  The  moment  the  people  learn  to  test  every 
social  proposition  by  the  simple  rules  of  right  and  wrong,  the 
vocations  of  the  expedientist  and  of  the  compromiser  will  be 
gone. 

If  individuals  are  to  be  held  to  accountability  for  their 
opinions  which  bear  upon  the  welfare  of  others,  the  implica- 
tion is  that  there  must  be  a  clearly  defined  principle  or  princi- 
ples by  which  the  character  of  the  opinions  may  be  correctly 
determined.  And  if  there  be  such  principles,  it  is  the  bounden 
duty  of  those  who  essay  to  have  opinions  to  know  what  these 
principles  are  and  to  apply  them. 

These  principles  are  very  few,  quite  simple  and  extremely 
easy  of  application.  All  principles  are  easy  to  learn  and 
remember. 

Everyone  is  bound  to  obey  not  only  the  multitudinous,  arbi- 
trary written  laws  of  state  and  nation  (there  were  45,000  bills 
and  resolutions  introduced  at  a  single  session  of  the  present 


RIGHTS  219 

Congress),  but  also,  in  some  states  at  least,  the  common  law 
(princii)lcs  established  by  court  decisions)  of  Kngland.  And 
if  it  is  consitlered  an  essential  principle  in  law  that  ignorance 
of  the  law  is  no  excuse  for  its  infraction,  why  is  it  not  a  sound 
principle  of  morals  that  ignorance  of  the  moral  law  may  not 
be  oflfcrcd  in  exculpation  of  an  infraction  of  the  moral  law? 

The  above  mentioned  principle  of  jurisprudence  derives  its 
authority  from  the  fact  that  if  ignorance  were  recognized  as 
a  valid  excuse  for  violation  of  governmental  law,  all  law  would 
become  practically  a  dead  letter.  Similarly,  the  principle  of 
ethics,  that  ignorance  of  the  moral  lay  may  not  be  pleaded 
as  a  valiil  excuse  for  its  violation,  derives  its  sanction  from 
the  fact  that  unless  that  rule  be  enforced,  the  moral  law  be- 
comes a  dead  letter. 

Everywhere,  on  all  sorts  of  occasions,  and  among  all  sorts 
of  people,  the  educated  as  well  as  the  uneducated,  we  hear 
controversies  over  opinions  without  a  pretence  of  reference 
to  principles.  So  habituated  are  most  people  to  tliinking  with- 
out reference  to  principles,  that  they  are  unable  to  distinguish 
a  true  i)rinciple  from  an  idea,  belief  or  opinion. 

Now,  the  longer  the  lines  of  opposing  arguments  (with  no 
real  principles  as  tlieir  basis)  become,  the  further  apart  the 
controversialists  find  themselves,  for  the  obvious  reason  that 
no  question  can  be  settled  right  unless  it  is  settled  by  the 
dictates  of  natural  principles  of  right  or  justice. 

There  is  no  avoiding  the  conclusion  that  no  one  has  the 
right  to  promulgate  opinions  which  are  a  menace  to  the  natural 
rights  of  others,  opinions  contrary  to  principles  of  justice, 
wrong  opinions.  One  has  no  more  right  to  incite,  by  wrong 
opinions,  wrong  actions  by  others,  than  he  has  to  commit 
wrong  acts  himself.  And  one  has  no  less  right  to  commit  a 
wrong  act  than  he  has  to  give  expression  to  an  opinion  in 
justification  of  that  wrong  act. 

It  is  also  a  cardinal  principle  of  law  that  he  who  incites 


220  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

by  word  or  action  the  commission  of  a  crime  or  misdemeanor 
by  another,  being  an  accessory  before  the  fact,  must  be  held 
to  be  at  least  equally  responsible  with  the  actor,  and  that 
under  some  circumstances  he  should  be  held  to  be  the  princi- 
pal, while  the  actor  should  be  treated  as  his  less  responsible 
dupe. 

Here  the  principle  of  jurisprudence  coincides  with  the  prin- 
ciple of  morality,  and  if  he,  who  by  written  or  spoken  word 
prompts  another  to  violate  the  written  law,  is  held  responsible 
for  its  vicarious  violation,  is  there  any  reason  why  one  who,  by 
the  propagation  of  immoral  opinions,  vicariously  commits  an 
overt  violation  of  the  moral  law,  should  not  also  be  held  re- 
sponsible for  its  violation  ? 

But  who  is  to  be  the  censor  of  opinions,  and  who  is  to  de- 
termine what  are  the  principles  of  morality  by  which  opinions 
are  to  be  judged?  Certainly  no  official  should  be  invested  with 
discretionary  power  in  a  matter  of  such  vast  importance  as  the 
freedom  of  speech  and  publication.  No  official  should  be  per- 
mitted to  exercise  discretionary  power  over  any  natural  right 
of  any  individual.  Neither  should  any  official  be  clothed  with 
the  power  to  determine  what  are  natural  rights,  nor  to  formu- 
late any  rules  of  conduct,  for  all  these  things  are  determined 
or  regulated  by  natural  principles  which  can  neither  be  created 
nor  annulled  by  man,  but  can  only  be  discovered  and  put  to 
use  by  him.  Man  could  as  easily  create  another  world  as  he 
could  invent  a  principle. 

For  the  reason  that  in  the  nature  of  things  the  majority 
must  be  the  final  arbiter  of  all  social  arrangements,  and  for 
the  further  reason  that  the  consensus  of  opinion  of  the  major- 
ity may  with  far  greater  assurance  be  relied  upon,  particu- 
larly in  matters  relating  to  individual  rights,  than  the  judg- 
ment of  any  individual  or  of  any  selected  group  of  individuals, 
the  censorship  of  opinions  must  necessarily  repose  in  the  will 
of  the  majority  commonly  designated  as  public  opinion.     And 


KKJIITS  221 

we  may  rest  assured  that  the  nearer  the  majority  of  the  peo- 
ple come  to  a  correct  understanding  of  their  true  self-interest, 
the  nearer  correct  will  beconic  their  censorship  of  opinions. 

It  only  remains  for  the  people  to  learn  Ikjw  vitally  inii)or- 
tant  to  their  true  self-interest  is  the  repression  of  opini(jns 
generative  of  social  injustice,  in  order  that  a  virile,  deter- 
mined uncompromising  censorship  of  opinions  respecting  so- 
cial affairs  shall  be  inaugurated.  Once  the  peojilc  thoroughly 
realize  that  all  economic  injustice  is  the  result  of  unjust  social 
arrangements,  and  that  all  unjust  social  arrangements  are  the 
direct  product  of  ideas  and  opinions  at  variance  with  the 
moral  law,  they  will  see  the  necessity  of  challenging  not  oidy 
every  erroneous  opinion  respecting  social  matters  but  also 
of  challenging  the  right  to  utter  such  opinions. 

The  whole  ([uestion  of  the  right  to  free  speech  and  free  pub- 
lication will  be  seen  in  a  new  aspect  when  due  consideration 
has  been  given  to  the  significant  fact  that,  in  the  repression  of 
the  freedom  of  speech  or  press,  the  purpose  has  seldom  been 
the  suppression  of  ideas  or  opinions  because  they  were  morally 
wrong;  because  they,  in  effect,  infringed  upon  the  natural 
rights  of  others,  but  rather  because  the  ideas  or  opinions 
usually  menaced  the  interests  of  the  privileged  or  ruling  class, 
or  conflicted  with  ideas  which  bore  the  seal  of  authority. 

The  ruling  class  has  ever  been  ready  to  employ  all  the  means 
at  their  disposal  to  prevent  the  propagation  of  ideas  inimical  to 
their  privileges.  When  they  could  no  longer  use  the  arm  of 
government  for  that  i)urpose,  they  have  used  some  form  of  boy- 
cott, such  as  cutting  off  bank  accommodations  from  a  merchant 
whose  opinions  were  not  orthodox. 

On  the  ground  of  public  expediency,  the  rulers  have  habitu- 
ally suppressed  just  opinions  held  by  common  folk,  and  at  the 
same  time  have  endeavored  to  induce  the  people  to  adopt 
immoral,  unjust  opinions,  and  have  punished  the  recalcitrant. 
It  having  been  the  practice  of  rulers  to  suppress  the  propaga- 


222  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

tion  of  opinions,  right  or  wrong,  which  conflicted  with  their 
interests,  the  opposition  of  the  people  to  governmental  re- 
striction of  the  freedom  of  speech  or  press  took  the  form  of 
intolerance  of  any  sort  of  interference  with  that  freedom,  and 
therefrom  sprung  the  notion  that  every  man  has  as  valid  a 
right  to  his  opinion,  though  wrong,  as  any  other  man  has  even 
to  a  right  opinion;  provided,  only,  he  does  not  slander  his 
neighbor  or  betray  his  country  in  time  of  war. 

Now,  from  an  ethical  point  of  view,  the  attitude  of  the  indi- 
vidual who  claims  the  privilege  to  voice  opinions  injurious  to 
the  natural  rights  of  others,  simply  because  they  are  his  opin- 
ions, is  no  less  reprehensible  and  positively  the  attitude  of  the 
ruling  class  when  they  undertake  to  repress  the  utterance  of 
morally  sound  opinions,  or  spread  broadcast  morally  unjusti- 
fiable opinions. 

While,  therefore,  official  consorship  of  opinions  would  not 
accomplish  the  desired  object  of  repressing  the  utterance  of 
wrong  opinions  respecting  matters  which  involve  the  natural 
rights  of  individuals,  it  is  the  duty  of  every  man  and  his  right- 
eous self-interest,  to  cause  him  who  undertakes  to  propagate 
an  idea  subversive  of  the  rights  of  others,  to  feel  the  weight 
of  his  displeasure.  For  he  who  espouses  a  wrong  idea  con- 
cerning social  affairs,  aggressively  attacks  the  rights  of  others, 
while  he  who  attacks  the  aggressor  is  but  defending  his  rights. 

It  is,  of  course,  of  primary  importance  that  one  should  know 
what  are  his  rights,  but  of  what  practical  use  is  it  for  him  to 
know  his  rights,  unless  he  insists  upon  having  and  retaining 
them?  And  how,  in  the  name  of  reason,  can  just  relations 
between  men  ever  prevail,  so  long  as  the  most  pernicious 
ideas  and  opinions,  of  which  correspondingly  pernicious  ac- 
tions are  the  natural  offspring,  may  be  spoken  or  printed 
with  impunity? 

I,  myself,  once  thought  that  freedom  of  speech  and  press — 


RIGHTS  223 

tlie  freedom  to  utter  just  opinions — necessarily  involved  the 
freedom  to  utter  wrung  as  well  as  right  opinions.  I  did  not 
see  how  there  could  be  an  elTectual  and  just  ccusDrship,  nor 
(lid  I  (|uite  understand  how  there  could  be  an  infallible  test 
b)'  which  opinions  might  be  judged.  But  after  having  given 
the  matter  studious  consideration,  I  found  that  my  former  be- 
lief was  entirely  wrong,  f'y  simply  applying  the  natural  laws 
of  justice.  1  was  unavoi<1ably  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
most  obstructive  obstacle  to  progress  toward  justice  is  not  a 
lack  of  knowledge  of  the  fundamental  ])rinciijles  of  right,  but 
the  prevalence  of  the  belief  that  every  man  has  the  right  to  his 
opinion  on  any  subject,  social  matters  included,  even  though 
his  opinion  does  violence  to  the  natural  rights  of  others,  and 
that  that  belief  proceeds  from  ignorance  of  the  relation  of 
cause  and  effect  existing  between  opinions  and  actions,  and  of 
the  possibility  of  an  efficient  and  just  censorship  residing  in 
enlightened,  self-interested  public  opinion. 

It  shoukl  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  only  opinions 
which  affect  the  natural  rights  of  others  are  properly  subject 
to  public  censorship.  One  may  entertain  any  opinion  he 
pleases  concerning  the  composition  of  the  moon,  yet,  however 
wrong  his  opinion  may  be,  the  utterance  of  it  in  no  wise  in- 
fringes on  any  one  of  my  rights.  He  may  publish  his  belief 
that  animals  have  souls,  yet.  by  doing  so  he  does  not  abridge 
my  rights  a  particle. 

But  when  he  advocates  an  opinion  respecting  social  ar- 
rangements which,  if  embodied  in  the  law,  would  curtail  or 
annul  any  of  my  natural  rights,  he  breaks  the  moral  law. 
seeks  to  deprive  me  of  my  dearest  possessions,  and.  in  self- 
defense.  I  have  the  moral  right  to  first  protest,  and  if  he  per- 
sist, to  then  insist  that  he  shall  cease  to  give  further  utterance 
to  that  opinion ;  and,  of  course,  all  persons  whose  natural 
rights  would  suffer  by  the  enforcement  of  that  opinion,  have 
the  moral  right  to  treat  the  sponser  as  a  moral  outlaw,  even 


224  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

unto  visiting  upon  him  social  ostracism,  which  is  a  more  pow- 
erful deterrent  than  any  written  law.  If  he  has  no  right  to 
stop  me  on  the  street  and  to  take  from  me  a  copper,  and  if 
I  have  the  right  to  use  any  means  and  any  force  that  may  be 
necessary  to  retain  possession  of  my  copper,  even  to  the  tak- 
ing of  his  life,  which  is  my  right  under  the  laws  of  the  land, 
then,  according  to  the  same  principle,  those  whose  natural 
rights  would  suffer  by  the  enforcement  of  opinions  concern- 
ing social  arrangements,  certainly  have  the  moral  right  to  treat 
the  proclaimer  of  such  opinions  as  a  moral  outlaw  even  unto 
visiting  upon  him  social  ostracism. 

The  desideratum,  the  requirement  of  the  law  of  justice  and 
its  derivative  rights,  is,  that  there  should  be  absolute  free- 
dom in  the  utterance  by  speech  or  press  of  any  opinion  the 
enforcement  of  which  would  put  the  moral  law  into  practice 
and  would  transgress  no  man's  natural  rights,  and  the  inhibi- 
tion, per  force  of  public  opinion,  of  individual  opinions  the 
enforcement  of  which  would  deprive  any  man  of  any  part  of 
his  natural  rights. 

The  thing  to  be  done  is,  to  bring  all  social  questions  to  a 
decisive  issue,  and  to  insist  upon  their  settlement  in  accord- 
ance with  the  dictates  of  the  moral  law.  Given  the  natural, 
moral  law,  there  is  no  excuse  for  failure  to  reach  a  correct 
solution  of  any  social  question.  The  sum  and  substance  of 
justice  is  the  application  of  the  moral  law  in  practical  social 
affairs. 

Only  by  the  habit  among  the  people  of  settling  all  social 
questions  in  accordance  with  the  prevailing  understanding  of 
what  is  the  moral  law,  can  the  moral  law  itself,  by  being  thus 
subjected  to  constant  tests,  be  firmly  established,  generally 
recognized  and  acted  upon. 

The  moral  law  must  be  our  only  guide.  It  should  consti- 
tute the  premise  from  which  all  arguments  should  proceed 
Whether  our  understanding  of  the  moral  law  be  correct  or  in- 


RIGHTS  225 

correct,  proviiled  it  be  wliat  we  conceive  to  be  a  principle  of 
riglit,  a  logical  anjilication  of  tlie  principle  will  invariably  lea  1 
us  to  the  same  concluiion  an  1  leave  no  room  for  controversy. 
If  then,  by  expcricn:c.  we  fin!  tlie  conclusio:i  to  be  morally 
wrong,  though  logically  light,  we  must  conclu  c  that  our  utnler- 
standing  of  the  moral  law  was  crroncjus.  By  such  treatment 
of  social  questions  our  attention  is  ever  centcrc  1  on  the  final 
determination  of  the  moral  law. 

The  fear  which  some  persons  may  entertain  that  the  pr?- 
vailing  understanding  of  the  fundamental  j^inciplcs  of  riglit 
may  be  at  least  somewhat  faulty,  does  not  justify  them  in  op- 
posing the  practical  application  of  those  principles  to  s^ci.l 
arrangements.  Even  should  experience  show  that  our  con- 
cepts of  justice  were  not  perfect,  it  would  also  show  T\-heroi:i 
the  imperfection  laid,  and  we  would  thereby  be  enabled  to 
arrive  at  a  more  correct  understanding  of  the  fundamental 
principles,  and  then,  by  putting  our  last  acquired  conception 
of  the  principles  into  practice,  we  woidd  make  rapid  stri  'es 
toward  justice;  and,  by  repeating  that  process,  we  should 
soon  arrive  at  a  state  of  social  morality  sufficiently  perfect 
for  all  practical  purposes. 

But  the  fears  of  such  persons  are  not  well  groun'e-'.  The 
moral  law  itself  is  self-evident.  The  only  error  possible  to 
be  made  is  in  our  deductions  from  it  respecting  comparatively 
trivial  matters.  As  I  have  already  remarked,  the  greatest  ob- 
struction to  justice  is  not  the  general  understan'ling  of  what 
is  the  moral  law,  but  is  rather  the  failure  to  apply  t'^.e  law 
in  practice  and  the  substitution  of  expediency  for  the  mo«-al 
law  as  the  criterion  of  proper  social  arrangements.  If  t'  c 
now  prevailing  understanding  of  the  moral  law  were  forth- 
with applied  to  social  arrangements,  our  journey  to  practi- 
cally perfect  social  justice  would  be  short. 

Reverting  to  the  truth,  which  has  been  previously  e'u~t- 
dated.  that  the  will  of  the  majority  is  the  natural  an  '  uiti- 


226  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

mate  source  of  authority  in  all  matters  pertaining  to  the  rela- 
tions of  men  to  each  other,  and  that,  therefore,  there  cannot  be 
at  any  given  time  a  nearer  approach  to  justice  than  the  then 
prevailing  understanding  of  the  majority  of  what  is  their  true 
self-interest  concerning  social  arrangements  will  permit,  the 
necessary  inference  is.  that  there  should  be  freedom  of  ex- 
pression for  every  individual  who  has  attained  the  age  of  dis- 
cretion of  his  or  her  will  concerning  social  affairs,  provided 
the  ballot  is  not  cast  in  opposition  to  the  already  ascertained, 
demonstrated  principles  of  morality.  In  no  other  manner 
can  the  true  will  of  the  majority  be  ascertained.  The  insti- 
tutions and  lavvS  of  a  country  may  for  a  time  thwart  the  will 
of  the  majority,  but  by  persistent  effort  the  majority  will  ulti- 
mately win.  They  never  fail  when  their  purpose  is  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  true  principle  of  justice.  And  as  a  principle 
of  justice  is  the  only  thing  worth  fighting  for,  it  is  also  the 
only  thing  which  can  inspire  that  tenacity  of  purpose  necessary 
to  overcome  strongly  entrenched,  time-honored  institutions  of 
injustice. 

It  has  been  also  previously  pointed  out  that,  in  the  nature 
of  things,  just  relations  between  individuals  can  never  be 
brought  about  except  through  the  enforcement  of  the  will  of 
the  majorit}',  since  the  will  of  the  majority  always  coincides 
v.'ith  their  understanding  of  what  is  their  true  self-interest, 
and  a  correct  understanding  of  what  is  their  true  self-interest 
will  impel  them  to  will  justice. 

Therefore,  the  best  that  can  be  done  at  any  and  all  times 
is  the  enforcement  of  the  will  of  the  majority.  This  conclu- 
sion may  seem  to  imply  that  everyone  has  the  right  to  vote 
his  will,  right  or  wrong,  but  it  does  no  such  thing.  The  ra- 
tional inference  is,  only,  that  the  minority,  hrge  or  small, 
though  they  may  have  a  better  understanding  of  what  justice 
is,  and  a  better  knowledge  of  what  social  arrangements  should 


RIGHTS  227 

be,  iiiiist  suffer  the  injustice  which  the  majority  imposes  botli 
ui)on  thetn  and  U|K)n  themselves. 

Now.  in  the  fact  that  the  majority  catmot.  in  the  natiue  of 
things,  inflict  economic  injustice  on  others,  without  at  the 
same  time  doing  themselves  the  same  injustice,  Hes  the  ho|)e 
of  making  progress  toward  an  ecjuitahlc  state  of  affairs.  It 
teaches  the  more  enhghtened  members  of  society  that  the  only 
way  by  which  they  themselves  may  expect  to  enjoy  the  benefits 
of  their  higher  ideals  of  justice  is  by  demonstrating  to  the 
majority  that  it  will  be  to  their  self-interest  to  adopt  and 
enforce  those  higher  ideals. 

The  more  enlightened  members  of  the  society  who  yearn 
for  justice  for  themselves  are  ever  irresistibly  impelled  to 
enlighten  their  fellow  men  as  to  wherein  their  present  under- 
standing of  their  self-interest  is  faulty,  and  to  give  them  a 
clearer  view  of  their  true  self-interest.  For,  the  true  self-in- 
terests of  all  individuals,  so  far  as  social  arrangements  are 
concerned,  are  identical. 

Herein  lies  the  transendent  beauty  of  the  nature  of  things, 
that  he  who  knows  what  justice  is  and  wants  genuine  justice 
for  himself  needs  not  appeal  to  the  generosity  of  the  majority, 
who  have  the  power  to  will  or  to  deny  justice;  needs  not  ask 
them  to  make  any  sacrifice  in  his  behalf,  but  needs  only  to 
show  them  what  they  desire  to  know  —  how  better  to  serve 
their  own  true  self-interest. 

This  is  not  by  any  means  a  discouraging  task,  provided  the 
desired  reform  is  based  upon  a  fundamental  principle  of  jus- 
tice, and  is  advocated  purely  as  a  matter  of  fundamental  right. 
Majority  rule  is  naturally  the  best  possible  rule,  because, 
in  the  nature  of  things,  the  great  majority  of  the  people  must 
pay  the  penalty  of  bad  government;  whereas,  but  a  small  mi- 
nority can  i)rofit  by  bad  government.  In  order  that  a  minority 
may  profit  through  the  instrumentality  of  the  government,  the 
government  must  be  a  bad  government.    In  order  that  the  ma- 


228  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

jority  may  secure  the  greatest  benefits  which  it  is  possible 
for  the  majority  to  attain,  by  the  agency  of  the  government — 
their  natural  rights — the  government  must  be  an  absolutely 
just  government. 

Therefore,  whatever  the  state  of  knowledge  respecting  just 
social  arrangements  may  be,  there  will  be  less  injustice  under 
a  government  by  the  majority  than  under  any  other  form  of 
government. 

The  first  lesson  to  be  learned  in  the  science  of  government 
is  that  the  road  to  justice  is  along  the  course  to  be  blazed  by 
the  self-interest  of  the  majority  of  the  people,  as  they  acquire 
a  better  and  better  knowledge  of  their  true  self-interest.  Al- 
though majority  rule  is  the  best  possible  rule  under  any  circum- 
stances, although  the  will  of  the  majority  cannot  be  ascer- 
tained except  by  the  free  expression  of  the  will  of  every  mem- 
ber of  the  community,  and  although  all  must  abide  by  the  v.nll 
of  the  majority,  mistaken  though  it  may  be.  it  does  not  fol- 
low that  every  individual  has  the  right  to  vot3  his  will,  right 
or  wrong,  any  more  than  the  principle  of  free  speech  implies 
that  everyone  has  the  right  to  give  expression  to  his  opinion 
concerning  social  afifairs,  right  or  wrong.  In  fact,  the  casting 
of  a  vote  for  a  measure  of  government  at  variance  with  the 
moral  law  is  a  greater  oflFense  than  the  mere  expression  of  a 
favorable  opinion  of  that  measure  would  be.  These  two  acts 
bear  very  much  the  same  relation  to  each  other  as  the  striking 
of  another  bears  to  the  shaking  of  one's  fist  in  his  face. 

The  rule  laid  down  respecting  freedom  of  speech  is  equally 
applicable  to  the  freedom  of  vote.  The  moral  law  obliges 
every  voter  to  learn  the  principles  of  morality  and  their  ap- 
plication to  social  arrangements,  and  to  cast  his  vote  for  such 
measures  only  as  strictly  conform  to  the  requirements  of  those 
principles.  He  has  no  right  to  throw  the  weight  of  his  vote 
in  favor  of  any  other  cause  but  justice.  Ignorance  of  the 
moral  law  is  no  valid  excuse  for  casting  an  immoral  vote.    If 


RIGHTS  229 

we  are  to  have  true  majority  rule,  tlic  prerequisite  is  the 
right  of  the  majority  to  formulate,  enact  and  enforce  all  laws. 
By  the  exercise  of  these  rights  only  is  it  possible  for  the  ma- 
jority to  register  their  will.  Rule  by  the  majority  is  a  right 
of  which  the  right  to  legislate  and  the  right  to  depose  a  de- 
linquent or  corrupt  official  are  corollaries. 

I'^or  the  reason  then,  that  iniHviikials  caimot  otherwise 
assume  and  protect  their  natural  rights  than  by  a  direct  ex- 
pression of  their  will  concerning  all  governmental  affairs, 
the  right  of  a  free  ballot  is  seen  to  be  an  essential  part  of  the 
right  of  life. 

Women's  Rights. 

The  right  of  women  to  vote  is  no  less  valid  than  the  right 
of  men  to  vote.  The  principles  involved  are  no  respecters 
of  sex.  Tiie  man  who  stands  in  the  way  of  woman  suffrage 
is  a  sorry  specimen  of  manhood,  than  whom  it  would  be  hard 
to  imagine  any  one  less  worthy  of  the  franchise.  As  for  the 
women  who  oppose  woman  suffrage,  let  those  who  cnsider 
that  it  would  unsex  them  or  interfere  with  their  domestic 
duties,  stick  to  their  dish-washing  or  social  functions,  if  they 
will,  but  they  ought  to  sec  that  it  is  worse  than  impertinence 
on  their  part  to  oppose  the  exerci.se  of  the  natural  right  to 
vote  by  other  women. 

The  Right  to  Character. 

The  right  to  character  is  a  right  which  is  disputed  by  no 
one.  That  right  is  protected  by  the  written  law  and  is  upheld 
by  public  opinion.  Freedom  from  misrepresentation  of  one's 
true  character  should  be  held  sacre<l.  The  traducer  of  an- 
other's character  is  a  more  wanton  evil-doer  than  he  who  com- 
mits robbery.  The  only  thing  that  is  lacking  is  an  apprecia- 
tion of  the  true  value  and  importance  of  this  right.     Its  value 


230  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

cannot  be  estimated  in  money,  and  at  the  present  time,  when 
the  gold  dollar  is  the  standard  of  all  values,  there  is  a  dis- 
position to  regard  anything  of  little  or  no  value  which  cannot 
be  said  to  be  worth  so  many  dollars  in  the  market. 

We  find  also  that  in  public  estimation  even  the  good  char- 
acter of  a  poor  man  is  not  as  valuable  as  the  character  of  a 
rich  man,  though  the  character  of  the  latter  be  more  or  less 
off-color.  This,  of  course,  is  not  as  it  should  be.  The  right 
to  one's  character  is  quite  as  dear  to  one  man,  even  though 
he  may  be  poor  and  his  character  may  not  be  spotless,  as  to 
any  other  man,  however  rich  he  may  be  or  unblemished  his 
character. 

When  we  shall  have  just  relations  between  men ;  when  every 
man  will  be  economically  independent,  and  will  stand  in  the 
community  on  his  merits  as  a  man,  the  right  to  character  of 
the  weakest  member  of  the  society  vvill  be  as  religiously  safe- 
guarded as  that  of  the  most  eminent  citizen. 

Thus  again  we  see  that  all  specific  rights  hang  together  and 
are  interdependent. 


NOTE — Logically,  Chapter  I  on  Privileges  should  follow  the 
present  chapter  and  it  may  advantage  the  student  if  he  will  reread 
Chapter  I  in  its  logical  connection. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  PPHLOSOPHY  OF  CONDUCT  ILLUSTRATED 
BY  SOCIAL  PMEXOMEXA. 

I  AM  unable  to  cull  to  niiml  any  social  phenomena  of  which 
the  theory  of  human  conduct,  as  expounded  in  the  preceding 
chapters  does  not  furnish  a  lucid,  ])erfectly  natural  and  evi- 
dently true  explanation. 

For  the  purpose  of  inducting  the  reader  into  the  practice 
of  making  applications  of  the  theory  to  actual  social  phenom- 
ena, 1  will  in  the  present  chapter  illustrate  its  a])])lication  to 
some  significant  phenotuena  for  which  there  has  heretofore 
been  no  satisfactory  exi)lanation. 

The  stamlard  of  ethics  in  actual  practice  can  never  reach 
a  higher  plane  than  that  of  the  prevailin^j  abstract  moral 
ideals;  and  the  prevailing  moral  ideals  are  nothing  more  nor 
less  than  the  consensus  of  the  highest  ])erccptions  of  the  gen- 
erality of  individuals  of  what  course  of  con<luct  will  best  sub- 
serve their  interests  respectively.  But  in  fact,  the  standard  of 
morals  observed  in  practice  is  now  at  least  far  inferior  to 
the  standard  of  abstract  morals,  and  it  is  reasonable  to  infer 
that  such  has  always  been  the  case. 

If  we  seek  for  the  reason  why  practical  ethics  lags  so  far 
behind  the  abstract  ethics,  we  will  find  ample  reason  in  the 
fact  that  the  ruling  class  has  persistently  and  insistently  taught 
that  the  realization  of  the  standard  of  abstract  ethics  was  not 
only  inexpedient  but  impossible,  and  never  would  become  ex- 
pedient or  possible  until  human  nature  should  become  very 
different  from  what  it  is,  or  ever  has  been,  anfl  that  the  masses 
of  the  people  have  believed  what  the  ruling  class  has  taught. 

The  ruling  class  has  succeeded  in  training  the  peoi)le  to 
think  that  abstract  ethics  is  not  applicable  to  practical  social 


2Z2  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

affairs ;  that  pure  ethics  beIon2:s  to  the  reahii  of  dreaming  phil- 
osophers, while  the  ethics  of  social  arrangements  belongs  to 
the  realm  of  practical  politicians  an  J  so-calleJ  statesmen; 
that,  until  immutable  human  nature  shall  have  been  reversed 
tie  practical  politicians  and  statesmen  can  make  the  social 
arrangements  better  than   riglit. 

The  people  have  been  taught  to  believe  that  it  is  necessary 
that  the  unjust  social  arrangements  should  be  what  the  ruling 
class  has  chosen  to  make  them,  however  incompatible  with 
abstract  morals  they  may  be,  in  order  to  obviate,  or  at  least 
mitigate,  the  evil  results  which  the  free  play  of  an  evil  hu- 
man nature  under  a  system  compatible  with  abstract  morals 
wouLl  naturally  entail. 

The  morality  or  immorality,  justice  or  injustice  of  social  ar- 
rangements is  given  little  consideration  by  the  lawmakers, 
an  1  none  at  all  by  the  owners  of  the  lawmakers.  They  make 
what  institutions  and  laws  will  best  suit  their  purposes,  and 
then  simply  claim  and  proclaim,  that,  in  view  of  the  imper- 
fections of  human  nature,  such  institutions  and  laws  are  ex- 
pe.'ient  and  necessary. 

Therefore,  w^hen  the  people  take  so  much  trouble  as  to  con- 
template social  arrangements,  it  does  not  occur  to  them  to  test 
those  arrangements  by  the  broad  principle  of  right,  but  they 
consider  only  the  advisability  of  those  arrangements,  in  view 
of  their  belief  that  human  nature,  as  it  is.  is  depraved;  is  so 
disposed  to  do  wrong  that  it  is  the  legitimate  and  necessary 
task  of  the  practical  politician,  frequently  miscalled  states- 
man, to  devise  and  contrive  institutions  and  laws  for  the  pur- 
pose of  counteracting  or  holding  in  check  the  assumed  devil- 
ishne?s  of  human  nature. 

Our  institutions  and  law^s  offer  rewards  for  doing  injus- 
tice, and  because  the  people  do  injustice  in  striving  to  get  the 
rcwar  's.  the  ruling  class,  who  made  the  institutions  and  laws 
wLi..h  induced  the  people  to  commit  injustice,  tell  us  that  the 


THE    I'lULOSOPIIV    OF   CONDUCT  2l}> 

reason  there  is  so  much  injustice,  is,  that  human  nature  itself 
is  bad,  and  that  the  only  remedy  is  to  make  more  laws  to  cither 
punish  people  for  doing  the  wrong  things  which  the  laws  we 
already  have  induced  them  to  do,  or  to  make  new  laws  which 
will  prevent  them  from  doing  some  j)articular  wrong  without 
getting  rid  of  the  ultimate  cause  of  their  wrongdoing. 

Social  arrangements  make  thieves  by  causing  poverty,  and 
we  make  laws  prohibiting  theft  and  vagrancy. 

Social  arrangements  bring  about  relations  between  men 
which  result  in  mur(!er.  and  we  make  laws  to  punish  the 
murder   for  which  laws  are  primarily  responsible. 

When  the  constitution  delegates  arbitrary  powers  to  offi- 
cials, when  it  practically  vests  in  the  supreme  court  the  power 
to  nullify  any  law  it  pleases,  or  to  interpret  any  law  to  mean 
what  the  court  chooses  to  make  it  mean,  the  officials  who 
have  the  discretionary  power  to  make,  interpret,  annul  or  exe- 
cute laws  at  their  pleasure,  will  be  as  certain  to  use  those  dis- 
cretionary powers  in  the  interest  of  a  few  of  the  people,  in- 
cluding themselves,  and  against  the  interest  of  the  mass  of  the 
people,  as  is  the  operation  of  the  law  of  gravitation.  And  all 
the  laws  that  can  possibly  be  written  will  not  avail  to  bring 
about  just  results  under  the  radically  wrong  institutions  set 
up  by  that  constitution. 

I  do  not  desire  to  convey  the  impression  that  the  motive 
which  has  prompted  the  rulers  to  contrive  the  institutions  and 
laws,  which  do  the  people  such  terrible  injustice,  was  to  harm 
the  people. 

They  have  not  been  inspire<l  by  any  feeling  of  hatred  or 
the  desire  to  inflict  injury  on  the  masses  of  the  people.  Their 
only  purpose  was  to  use  the  power  of  government  for  their 
own  benefit.  Rut,  because,  in  the  nature  of  things,  they  couKl 
not  ''ivcrt  the  powers  of  government  to  their  own  enrich- 
ment without  at  the  same  time  and  by  the  same  act  condemn- 
ing the  common  people  to  poverty,  they  have  adopted  that 


234  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

:neans  of  benefiting  themselves  economically  notwithstanding 
the  inseparable  necessity  of  doing  the  great  body  of  the  people 
dire  harm. 

The  constitution  and  lav.s  of  this  country  shamefully  op- 
press a  vast  majority  of  the  people  and  demoralize  the  whole 
society.  Yet,  those  who  are  oppresse:!  have  the  power  to  re- 
write the  constitution,  to  amend  it  afterwards  whenever  they 
choose,  and  to  frame  any  laws  which  their  interests  may 
dictate 

The  masses  submit  to  degrading  economic  slavery,  yet  they 
have  the  power  to  set  themselves  free.  They  beg  for  jobs, 
they  think,  talk  and  vote  as  they  are  told  to  think,  talk  and 
vote.  Though  eager  to  work  for  the  necessaries  and  comforts 
of  life,  which  their  labor  would  provide  them  in  abundance, 
they  lie  idle,  waiting  for  some  privilegist  to  permit  them  to 
work  at  all.  Yet  they  have  the  power  to  arrange  matters  so 
that  none  of  them  need  ask  any  man  for  the  opportunity  to 
v.ork,  anl  so  that  each  of  them  miglit  work  whenever  he 
pleased,  at  whatever  he  pleased,  as  much  as  he  pleased,  and 
not  divide  the  produce  of  his  labor  with  the  mere  privilegist. 

The  masses  of  the  people  have  the  power  to  put  right  social 
arrangements  in  the  place  of  the  wrong  social  arrangements, 
to  remedy  all  of  the  social  arrangements  from  which  they 
now  suffer;  in  short,  they  have  the  power  to  uproot  injustice 
and  plant  justice  in  its  place.  They  have  the  power  to  abolish 
injustice  and  to  establish  a  just  order  of  things,  and  to  do  so 
would  benefit  them  in  ways  and  to  an  extent  which  even  he 
who  were  capable  of  formulating  an  absolutely  just  social 
system,  and  were  possessed  of  the  most  vivid  imagination, 
could  not  begin  to  describe. 

Though  it  would  be  to  the  tremendous  economic  interest  of 
a  large  majority  of  the  people  to  abolish  present  unjust  social 
arrangements,  though  they  realize  that  there  is  something  ter- 
ribly wrong  somewhere,  and  though  they  have  the  power  to 


TMR    PHILOSOIMIV    oF    CONDUCT  235 

establish  just  social  arrangements,  why  «lo  they  not  then  fol- 
low the  (lemaml  of  their  self-interest,  put  down  the  wrong 
and  set  up  the  right? 

On  its  face,  this  silualion  would  indicate  that  ihe  fumla- 
niental  principle  of  human  nature,  self-interest,  may  nut  be 
relied  ujjon  to  impel  conduct  in  accordance  with  >elf-interest. 

The  argiunent  deduced  from  this  superlicial  view  of  the 
matter  would  run  thus:  Environment  fixes  (jur  interests,  hu- 
man nature  prompts  us  to  pursue  our  self-interests,  the  pur- 
suit of  our  self-interests  results  in  wrong  conduct;  therefore, 
human  nature,  instead  of  infallibly  compelling  good  conduci, 
is  the  real  source  of  all  bad  con  luct. 

The  argument  is  perfectly  logical,  and  it  would  be  as  sound 
as  it  is  logical,  if  one  of  the  factors,  which  always  plays  an 
important  part  in  molding  our  conduct,  ha  1  not  been  left  out 
of  consideration. 

There  are  three  factors  which  jointly  mold  our  conduct. 
Environment,  which  determines  what  our  self-interest  is;  our 
understanding  as  to  our  self-interest,  whether  that  understand- 
ing be  absolutely  correct  or  in  any  degree  defective,  and  hu- 
man nature,  which  iiupels  action  in  accordance  with  our  under- 
standing of  our  self-interest  under  our  environment. 

Now,  if  the  people,  besides  knowing  that  they  were  being 
hurt  in  some  manner  through  the  operation  of  our  arbitrary 
and  complicated  system  of  social  arrangements,  knew  also 
precisely  what  was  the  matter  with  the  system,  and  knew  pre- 
cisely what  changes  should  be  made  in  the  system  in  order 
that  their  interests,  which  are  nothing  else  than  the  full  en- 
joyment of  their  natural  rights,  be  heM  inviolable;  then,  if 
human  nature  failed  to  impel  them  to  remedy  the  evils  of  the 
system,  we  would  be  forceil  to  conclude  that  somelhing  ver\ 
serious  was  the  matter  with  human  nature. 

But  since  human  nature  never  fails  to  impel  us  to  act  in  our 
interests  or  in  what  we  conceive  to  be  our  interests,  when  we 


236  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

do  not  act  in  our  true  self-interest,  there  is  no  avoiding  the 
conckision  that  we  so  act  because,  either  we  do  not  know  what 
our  true  self-interests  are,  or  we  lack  the  practical  knowledge 
of  the  means  by  which  to  attain  our  ends,  or  both. 

Thus,  the  worker  who  votes  for  the  protective  tariff  votes 
not  in  accordance  with  any  accurate  knowledge  as  to  his  true 
self-interest  respecting  the  matter,  but  he  votes  in  accordance 
with  his  belief  that  the  effects  of  the  protective  tariff  are 
entirely  different  from  what  they  actually  are. 

He  does  not  knozv,  but  only  believes,  that  the  protective 
tariff  produces  certain  results.  He  cannot  know  that  it  pro- 
duces the  results  which  he  believes  it  produces  because,  in 
fact,  it  does  not  produce  any  such  results.  Therefore,  when 
he  votes  for  the  protective  tariff  he  votes  against  his  own 
interest,  because  he  does  not  know  what  his  interests  are,  and 
because  he  believes  that  what  is  inimical  to  his  interests  is  in 
consonance  with  them. 

If  the  worker  knew  that  the  tariff  question,  as  well  as  all 
other  social  questions,  is  a  question  of  morals,  a  question 
merely  of  what  is  right  and  what  is  wrong,  and  that  the  solu- 
tion of  any  social  question  is  merely  to  learn  the  right  and 
the  wrong  of  it,  and  that  the  right  or  wrong  of  any  social 
question  can  be  determined  in  no  other  manner  than  by  the 
application  of  the  moral  principle  involved,  then,  if  he  knew 
the  principle  involved,  and  made  a  correct  application  of  it, 
there  could  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  validity  of  his  conclusions. 
His  understanding  of  what  his  true  self-interest  was,  would 
not  be  guesswork;  would  not  depend  upon  beliefs  founded 
upon  a  mass  of  irrelevant  assertions,  purporting  to  be  facts, 
about  which  he  had  no  knowledge,  but  he  would  know  with  the 
same  certainty  that  he  knew  the  moral  principle  involved,  that 
he  had  found  the  correct  answer  to  the  question,  and  he 
would  then  know  with  the  same  certainty  that  he  knew  vrhat 
his  true  interest  in  the  matter  was. 


THE  niiLosopiiv  of  conduct        in 

When  the  worker  votes  for  the  protective  tariff  he  votes 
against  his  interest,  and  he  votes  against  his  interest  because 
he  does  not  know  wliat  his  interest  is. 

He  knows  that  the  protective  tariff  benelits  the  owners  of 
the  protected  inchistries,  and  beheves,  as  he  has  been  taught 
to  bcHcve.  that  what  is  good  for  owners  of  tlie  protccte  1  in- 
dustries is  good  for  all  workers,  because  he  believes  that  the 
owners  of  industries  who  are  protected  by  the  tariff  furnisli 
many  jobs  for  workers,  which  jobs  would  not  exist  but  for 
the  protective  tariff,  and  that,  if  those  jol)s  did  not  exist  tliere 
would  be  no  other  jobs  to  be  iiad. 

He  also  believes  that  because  the  protective  tariff  enables 
the  owners  of  protected  intjustries  to  sell  their  wares  at 
higher  prices,  and  therefore  they  can  affortl  to  i)ay  their 
employes  higher  wages,  they  will  pay  them  higher  wages  or, 
at  any  rate,  may  be  forced  to  pay  them  willnnit  crippling 
the  business. 

He  upholds  the  protective  tariff  and  opposes  his  own  in- 
terest for  the  reason  that  he  does  not  understand  that  the 
protective  tariff'  is  morally  wrong;  that  the  protective  tariff 
cannot  benefit  the  owners  of  the  protected  industries  without 
doing  injury  to  the  remainder  of  the  people;  that  the  interests 
of  the  worker  never  coincide  with  the  interests  of  those  who 
profit  by  governmental  favors,  and  that  the  lack  of  jobs,  when- 
ever there  is  such  a  lack,  is  due  solely  to  the  protective  tariff 
and  other  privilege-making  institutions  and  laws. 

When  nien  who  work  for  their  living  vote  against  the  initia- 
tive and  referendum,  and  thereby  vote  to  continue  the  present 
system  of  government  by  and  for  the  privilegists  and  their 
hangers-on,  they  vote  to  continue  their  own  spoliation,  simply 
because  they  do  not  know  that  they  are  now  being  deprived 
of  their  rights  by  the  present  system  of  government,  and  that 
they  will  never  be  able  to  fully  enjoy  all  their  rights  until  there 
is  established  a  system  of  pure  democracy  under  which  each 


238  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

member  of  the  society  shall  have  a  direct  and  equal  voice  in 
all  tiie  affairs  of  government,  large  and  small. 

We  may  have  to  learn  how  to  use  the  initiative  an:l  refer- 
endum in  order  to  secure  all  of  our  rights.  Undoubtedly,  v/e 
will  not  get  all  our  rights  by  simply  having  the  initiative  and 
referendium  at  our  disposal,  but  we  certainly  will  never  get 
them  except  through  the  exercise  of  the  initiative  and  refer- 
endum. 

And  the  sooner  we  begin  to  use  these  instruments,  the  only 
means  by  which  not  only  each  member  of  the  community 
may  possibly  give  explicit  expression  to  what  he  believes  to 
be  his  own  self-interest  respecting  all  social  arrangements, 
but  the  only  means  by  Vi^hich  that  majority  of  the  people, 
whose  interests  respecting  social  arrangements  are  in  the 
nature  of  tilings  identical,  and  identical  with  justice,  may 
directly  express  and  enforce  their  will,  the  sooner  we  v/ill 
learn  what  sort  of  social  arrangements  we  do  not  want,  and 
what  sort  we  do  want. 

Having  once  adopted  the  initiative,  referen-lum  and  recall, 
which  are  indispensable  media  for  both  the  expression  of  the 
v'ill  of  the  majority  and  the  putting  that  v.dll  in  effect — the 
only  methods  b}'-  which  the  desired  end,  justice,  may  be  estab- 
lished— when  the  people  then  realize  that,  if  there  is  anything 
the  matter  with  the  government,  the  responsibility  rest  di- 
rectly upon  them. ;  when  they  will  be  able  to  vote  for  precisely 
what  they  want,  and  get  precisely  what  they  vote  for;  if,  what 
they  vote  for  and  get  does  not  coincide  with  their  interests 
they  will  be  forced  to  conclu-e  that  they  have  not  yet  discov- 
ere  1  their  true  interest  respecting  social  arrangemen<-s,  and 
they  will  naturalS'  set  about  to  discover  wherein  their  opin- 
ions had  been  wrong,  and  be  eager  to  examine  into  the  real 
merit?  of  opinions  different  from  their  own. 

They  will  then  be  in  a  frame  of  mind  to  seriously  desire  to 
know  bv  what  means  their  true  interests  mav  be  advanced. 


THE   I'lilLUSUl'ilV  OF  CUXDUCT  239 

and  therefore  to  weigh  impartially  all  speculative  theories 
respecting  means  to  that  end,  regardless  of  their  source. 

Kach  member  of  the  community  will  consider  the  govern- 
ment as  his  government ;  he  will  endeavor  to  make  hi.^  govern- 
ment such  as  will  best  serve  his  own  interests. 

And  because  the  true  self-interest  of  a  majority  of  the 
people  coincides  with  justice  for  all  the  people,  the  majority 
cannot  make  their  government  such  as  will  serve  their  own 
interests  without  making  a  just  government. 

When  we  condemn  a  social  system  or  a  particular  institu- 
tion or  law  on  moral  grounds,  and  we  cannot  Ic^'^itimately  judge 
in.vtilutions  and  laws  by  any  other  criterion  tl'.an  morality,  if 
we  und.ertake  to  formulate  our  reason  for  doing  so,  we  will 
find  that  it  consists  in  our  conviction  that  the  play  of  human 
nature  under  that  social  system^  institution  or  law,  will  result 
in  one  form  or  another  of  injustice  to  some  members  of  the 
society. 

If  we  have  arrived  at  our  conclusion  by  testing  the  system, 
institution  or  law  by  the  application  of  the  principles  of  jus- 
tice involved,  we  may  be  sure  that  if  we  find  that  the  system, 
institution  or  law  will  do  ourselves  or  anyone  else  injustice, 
it  will  do  the  vast  majority  of  the  people  harm,  and  will  re- 
sult in  unjust  relation^  between  all  the  people;  because,  let  it 
always  be  remembered,  some  of  the  people  can  be  benefited 
by  law  only  at  the  expense  of  the  other  people. 

So,  when  we  commend  a  social  system,  institution  or  law, 
we  do  .so  on  the  ground  that  that  sy.-.tem,  institution  or  law 
will,  through  the  operation  of  human  nature,  result  in  justice 
for  ourselves;  and  if  we  have  reached  that  conclusion  by 
the  application  of  the  principles  of  justice  involvetl  we  may 
be  sure  that  that  .system,  institution  or  law  will  result  in  jus- 
tice for  all. 

If  we  constantly  bear  in  mind  that  the  actuating  jirinciple 
of  human  nature  is  self-interest,  and  if,  when  we  undertake 


240  SOCIAL  JUSTICE 

to  test  the  righteousness  of  an  institution  or  law,  we  keep  in 
view  the  all-important  truth  that  if  the  institution  or  law  makes 
it  to  the  interests  of  people  to  do  injustice,  and  at  the  same  time 
makes  it  possible  for  them  to  practice  injustice,  injustice  will 
be  done,  when  we  find  that  institution  or  law  to  be  of  that 
character,  we  may  be  certain  that  we  will  not  err  if  we  ad- 
judge the  institution  or  law  unjust. 

Therefore,  if  we  w^ould  have  justice,  we  must  see  to  it  that 
all  our  institutions  and  lav/s,  our  entire  system  of  social  ar- 
rangements, shall  make  it  impossible  for  some  members  of  the 
society  to  take  economic  advantage  of  the  other  members,  ex- 
cept by  violating  the  law. 

Now,  there  is  just  one  way  to  accomplish  that  object,  and 
that  io  to  establish  institutions  based  upon  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  justice,  and  to  formulate  laws  in  strict  conformity 
with  the  same  principles  of  justice;  to  make  the  whole  system 
of  social  arrangements  such  that  each  member  of  the  society 
will  be  absolutely  secure  in  the  enjoyment  of  all  his  natural 
rights,  and  that,  therefore,  no  individual,  nor  set  of  individ- 
uals, will  be  able  to  take  economic  advantage  of  their  fellow 
men  without  violating  the  law.  And  when  the  written  law 
has  been  made  to  coincide  with  the  moral  law,  public  opinion 
will  brook  no  infraction  of  the  written  law. 

Under  the  present  system  of  social  arrangements,  which  was 
contrived  regardless  of  the  true  principles  of  morality,  most 
persons  do  not  consider  it  immoral  to  do  anything  which  it  is 
lawful  to  do. 

And  since  all  of  our  institutions,  and  most  of  our  laws,  are 
themselves  gross  violators  of  the  moral  law,  and  therefore 
constitute  no  moral  criterion  of  conduct,  but  rather  set  up 
an  immoral,  indefinite  system  of  arbitrary  regulations,  it  is 
but  human  nature  that  the  people  consider  it  rather  .smart  than 
immoral  to  circumvent  those  regulations,  to  do  anything  their 
interests  may  prompt  them  to  do,  provided  they  can  find  some 


THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    CONDUCT  241 

color  of  law  for  doing  so,  or  some  pretext  for  a  claim  that 
their  acts  are  not  a  specific  violation  of  the  law. 

And  frequently,  if  not  generally,  immoral  acts  wiiich  are 
committed  in  order  to  avoid  effects  of  immoral  institutions 
and  laws,  are  condoned  or  even  apjilauded  hy  public  opinion 
for  the  reason  that  in  the  game  called  business,  where  cheat- 
ing is  the  rule,  cheating  accorcHng  to  the  rules  of  the  game 
is  considered  fair. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  our  institutions  and  laws  were  the 
embodiment  of  the  moral  law,  they  would  constitute  a  per- 
fectly moral  and  defmite  criterion  of  con(hict.  An  infraction 
of  the  moral  law  would  also  be  an  infraction  of  the  written 
law.  There  would  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  law, 
because  moral  ])rinciples  are  a])])licable  to  every  conceivable 
combination  of  facts. 

As  habitual  disregard  of  the  moral  law  demoralizes  the  eth- 
ical sentiments  of  the  people,  so  the  habitual  observance  of 
the  written  law,  if  it  be  perfectly  compatible  with  the  moral 
law.  will  moralize  the  ethical  sentiments  of  the  people.  And 
for  the  reason  that  the  written  law.  .so  far  as  it  refers  to  the 
economic  rights  of  men.  could  not  be  violated  except  by  the 
commission  of  common  theft  or  fraud,  it  would  be  to  the  self- 
interest  of  all  right  thinking  men  to  enforce  a  strict  observ- 
ance of  the  law;  and  furthermore,  in  such  a  state  of  public 
opinion,  each  individual  would  find  it  to  his  own  self-interest 
to  voluntarily  observe  the  law. 

The  method  by  which  human  nature  is  and  always  ha.^  been 
misguided  in  the  economic  field  is  by  the  teaching  of  the  body 
of  the  people,  by  those  who  speak  as  if  by  authority,  that  in- 
stitutions and  laws  operate  in  the  interest  of  the  majority  of 
the  people,  when  in  fact  they  operate  to  the  economic  detri- 
ment of  the  majority. 

The  majority  have  thus  been  induced  to  act  contrary  to 
their  true   self-interest,   in   the   belief   that  they   were  acting 


242  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

in  accordance  with  their  self-interest.  And  since  no  insti- 
tutions or  laws  can  be  maintained  except  by  the  active  sup- 
port or  at  least  the  tacit  consent  of  a  majority  of  the  people, 
we  are  brought  once  more  to  the  important  proposition  that 
it  is  only  necessary  for  the  majority  of  the  people  to  learn 
what  their  true  economic  interests  are,  in  order  to  establish 
a  social  system  which  will  subserve  their  interests. 

And  since  all  economic  injustice  arises  from  the  establish- 
ment of  privileges,  the  denial  of  natural  rights  and  the  crea- 
tion of  law-made  rights,  the  first  thing  which  the  people  must 
understand  is,  what  is  a  privilege,  and  then,  to  get  rid  of 
privileges,  they  must  know  what  sort  of  social  arrangements 
will  make  the  existence  of  privileges  impossible. 

The  power  of  the  ruling  class  lies  in  the  weakness  of  the 
masses,  and  the  weakness  of  the  masses  lies  in  their  ignorance. 
Were  the  people  equipped  with  the  knowledge  of  the  means 
by  which  they  are  enslaved  by  the  few,  the  relative  strength  of 
the  despoilers  and  the  despoiled  would  be  reversed.  The  rul- 
ing class  would  be  even  more  helpless  to  preserve  their  priv- 
ileges than  the  masses  of  the  people  now  appear  to  be  to  get 
their  rights. 

Those  who  actually  direct  the  course  of  governmental  af- 
fairs are  very  few  in  number,  and  the  rank  and  file  of  the 
privilegists  are  but  followers  of  a  few  dominant  leaders.  The 
dominant  spirits  of  the  privilegists  are  those  whose  incomes 
from  privileges  are  the  greatest.  The  rank  anc'  file  follow  their 
lead  with  implicit  confidence  tliat  the  leaders  in  serving  their 
own  interests  must,  in  general,  serve  the  interest  of  their  class, 
because  they  realize  that  the  protection  of  privileges  is  their 
common  cause. 

They  have  no  fear  of  being  betrayed  by  their  leaders.  Th.ere 
is  no  one  whose  interest  it  is  to  bribe  their  leaders  to  desist 
from  contriving  and  carrying  out  schemes  that  will  benefit 
themselves.    Therefore,  we  find  that  when  the  leaders  of  the 


Tiri'.  rini.os(^pii\'  (W  conduct        ji.^ 

privileged  class  themselves,  or  through  their  mouthpieces, 
proclaiui  a  policy  or  propose  a  law,  praclically  the  entire  class 
support  that  ])t)Iicy  or  law  as  one  man,  with  all  the  power 
and  ingenuity   they  i)ossess. 

The  peojjle  never  raise  funds  for  the  purptisc  of  hrihing 
the  legislature,  congress,  cmuts  or  adminstrative  ofticc-rs  to 
enact  just  laws,  to  render  just  decisions  or  to  enforce  the 
law  impartially.  Much  less  do  those  helonging  to  the  unpriv- 
ileged class  suhscrihe  money  to  he  useil  to  hrihe  lawmaking 
bodies,  courts  or  executive  officials,  to  pass  laws  creating 
privileges,  to  render  decisions  unjustly  unfavorable  to  any 
individual  or  any  class  of  individuals,  or  to  practice  any  sort 
of  favoritism  in  the  administration  or  execution  of  the  law. 
But  it  is  shamefully  notorious  that  the  privileged  class  have 
corrui)ted  our  government,  root  and  branch,  and  they  have 
corrupted  our  government  for  the  simple  reason  that  by  no 
other  means  could  they  have  got  most  of  their  juivileges  or 
kept  them  after  they  were  gotten. 

The  owners  of  privileges  have  no  other  political  princij)les 
than  the  preservation  or  extension  of  their  |)rivileges.  an  I 
therefore  the  majority  of  them  always  belong  to  the  party  in 
power,  which  is  another  way  of  saying  that  the  party  in  power 
belongs  to  them,  while  for  the  i)urpose  of  leading  the  people 
to  believe  that  the  privilegists.  like  the  workers,  are  divided 
against  themselves  on  (|uestions  of  pid)lic  j)olicy,  and  in  order 
that  they  may,  as  far  as  possible,  make  its  platforms,  nom- 
inate its  candidates,  direct  its  policies  and  control  the  acts  of 
those  of  its  members  who  happen  to  gain  oflicial  power,  a 
few  prominent  privilegists  belong  to  the  opposition  party. 

The  privilegists  are  intensely  practical  in  their  politics. 
They  are  enthusiastic  advocates  of  the  "best  man"  idea.  They 
are  no  respecters  of  party  names.  They  do  not  .dliliate  with 
this  or  that  f)olitical  party  because  they  believe  in  the  i)ro- 
fessed   platform   principles   of   the   one  or   the  other.     They 


244  '  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

join  parties  and  build  and  grease  the  party  machines  with  the 
sole  view  of  controlling  the  party  nominations  and  of  making 
the  party  as  nearly  principleless  as  possible  in  order  to  direct 
the  actual  workings  of  the  government. 

And  because,  if  all  privilegists  belonged  to  one  party,  the 
masses  would  naturally  take  to  the  opposition  party,  and  be- 
cause it  is  necessary  for  them  to  control  the  party  in  power, 
they  will,  as  their  interests  demand,  as  readily  attach  them- 
selves to  one  party  as  to  the  other.  They  have  a  hankering  to 
be  on  the  winning  side,  in  the  belief,  bordering  on  knowledge, 
^hat  they  will  be  able  to  win  the  winners  over  to  their  side, 
if,  perchance,  the  winners  had  not  been  won  to  their  side 
before  they  entered  the  race. 

And  therefore,  with  cynical  impartiality,  the  privilegists  will 
belong  to  and  contribute  to  the  campaign  fund  of  the  party 
which  is  most  likely  to  win  in  one  state,  and  the  opposition 
party,  if  it  be  the  stronger  party,  in  another  state. 

And  of  late  years  these  same  privilegists  have  discovered 
that  sometimes  it  is  wisest  to  contribute  to  the  campaign  of 
both  the  leading  political  parties  in  the  same  state.  For  it 
has  been  found  that  the  dominant  party  could  not  long  con- 
tinue to  do  the  bidding  of  the  privilegists  and  remain  in  power, 
against  the  honest  and  united  opposition  of  the  other  party, 
and  that  it  was  necessary  to  saddle  the  responsibility  of  the 
acts  of  legislatures  and  congresses,  when  they  were  called 
upon  to  perpetrate  a  palpable  injustice,  on  both  political  par- 
ties, in  order  that  the  people  would  be  unable  to  call  either 
political  party  to  account  at  the  polls. 

The  privilegists  and  their  political  tools  have  secured  the 
enactment  of  laws  which  practically  make  self-perpetuating 
monopolies  of  the  political  machines  of  the  leading  parties, 
and  which  make  it  well  nigh  impossible  for  new  parties  to  be 
organized,  or  for  those  who  repudiate  the  attitude  of  the 
leading  parties   to   in   any   manner  give   expression   to   their 


THE    I'lIlI.oSorilV    ()!''  CONDUCT  243 

opinion  at  the  polls,  unless  the  new  party  be  burn  uf  a  great 
princi[)le  of  justice  and  be  actuated  by  the  burning  desire  to 
put  down  some  terrible  wrong. 

A  new  party,  whose  purjjose  it  is  merely  tt)  ameliorate  con- 
ditions which  are  the  natural  result  of  a  fundamentally  wrong 
social  system,  conditions  which  have  been  deliberately  brought 
about  for  innnoral  purposes;  a  party  which  pnjposes  to  allow 
a  system  to  stand  which  licenses  wholesale  robbery,  produces 
wholesale  poverty,  results  in  the  murder  of  both  adults  and  in- 
fants, and  incites  an  inlinite  \ariety  of  lesser  crimes  and  misde- 
meanors, but  advocates  only  a  tinkering  of  the  tariff  laws,  a  law 
to  establish  an  eight-hour  day.  an  employers'  liability  law,  a  law 
limiting  the  hours  of  labor  for  women  and  children,  or  the  elec- 
tion of  "Honest  John"  to  office,  can  never  win  the  enthusiastic 
support  of  earnest  thinking  men. 

To  cure  the  evils  incident  to  a  protective  tariff,  the  tariff 
schedules  should  not  be  merely  tinkered,  but  the  whole  tariff, 
being  morally  wrong,  a  subversion  of  property  rights,  should 
be  abolished. 

Instead  of  enacting  a  law  limiting  the  day's  labor  of  gov- 
ernment employes  only,  to  eight  hours,  the  social  system 
which  deprives  any  individual  of  his  right  to  work  at  what  he 
pleases  and  as  much  or  little  as  he  pleases,  should  be  abolished. 

Instead  of  an  employers'  liability  law.  any  institution  or 
law  which  imposes  upon  any  individual,  as  a  condition  of  his 
right  to  live,  that  he  must  risk  his  life  or  limb  for  the  profit 
of  an  emj)loyer.  in  the  pursuit  of  his  bread  and  butter.  shouUl 
be  stricken   from  the  books. 

Instead  of  limiting  the  hours  of  labor  for  women  and 
children  by  law,  the  laws  which  make  it  necessary  for  them 
to  work  injuriously  long  hours  should  be  unmade,  and  instead 
of  attempting  to  get  just  government  by  electing  honest  men 
to  office,   matters   should  be  so  arranged   that   the  justice  of 


246  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

government  would  not  in  the  slightest  degree  depend  upon  the 
honesty  of  any  official. 

Those  who  have  or  want  privileges  furnish  practically  all 
the  money  which  is  used  to  influence  voters  at  primary  elec- 
tions and  delegates  to  nominating  conventions.  They  dictate 
who  shall  man  the  political  machines,  because  they  furnish  the 
money  which  keeps  the  political  machine  running.  They  name 
the  men  who  are  to  be  nominated  at  conventions.  They  con- 
trol the  utterances  of  many  preachers,  school  teachers,  college 
professors,  newspapers  and  magazines  and  of  the  hosts  of  their 
employes.  They  write  the  platforms  of  the  political  parties 
and  cunningly  plan  the  speeches  of  the  political  spellbinders. 
They  own  newspaper  and  magazine  property,  not  because 
they  have  any  literary  talent  or  desire  to  engage  in  that  sort 
of  business  as  a  legitimate  business,  but  in  order  that  they 
may  use  the  newspapers  and  magazines  to  mold  public  opinion 
as  they  would  like  to  have  it  molded,  that  is  to  say,  to  spread 
among  the  people  opinions  or  beliefs  that  the  things  which  are 
harmful  to  them  are  good  for  them,  and  what  would  be  good 
for  them  would  be  harmful  to  them. 

The  doctrine,  To  the  victor  belong  the  spoils,  is  productive 
of  immense  evil.  This  doctrine  has  in  practice  engendered 
a  system  of  bribery.  It  is  through  this  system  chiefly  that  the 
political  boss  gains  and  retains  his  power.  He  distributes 
the  favors  at  his  command  among  those  who  are  able  to  bring 
him  the  best  returns  at  the  primaries  or  at  the  election. 

An  elaborate  description  of  the  modes  and  forms  of  po- 
litical corruption  is  beside  the  purpose  of  this  book.  I  have 
only  referred  to  them  in  a  cursory  manner  in  order  to  show 
that  the  ultimate  source  of  the  forms  I  have  mentioned,  as 
well  as  of  all  other  forms,  is  to  be  found  not  in  the  frailties  of 
human  nature  but  in  the  system  of  government. 

Men  will  act  unjustly  and  corruptly  in  the  affairs  of  gov- 
ernment only  when  the  system  of  government  by  the  effect 


THE   PiriLOSUl'IIY    OF   CONDUCT  247 

of  its  rules  and  regulations  on  their  self-interest  in  the  very 
nature  of  things  breeds  economic  injustice,  and  tlirough 
economic   injustice  breeds   political   corruption. 

Because  the  people  now  living  have  always  lived  un<lcr  an 
unjust  system  of  government  which  has  always  produced 
official  and  i)olitical  corruption,  because  they  know  that  there 
always  has  been  political  corruption,  that  political  corruption 
ncnv  runs  riot,  and  because  they  have  lieard  of  no  better  im- 
me(Hate  remedy  for  such  corruption  than  to  elect  honest  men 
to  oflice,  and  Ijccause,  so  frequently,  when  they  have  thought 
they  had  electe<l  honest  men  tt)  oftice,  those  men  turned  out 
to  be  no  more  honest  than  other  men,  they  have  quite  naturally 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  political  corruption  can  never 
cease  until  human  nature  has  been  changed. 

Hence,  we  hear  upon  every  hand,  in  answer  to  complaints 
against  political  corruption  and  tlie  resulting  economic  injus- 
tice, the  rejoinder:  "You  would  do  the  same,  were  you  in 
the  place  of  the  corruptionist,"  or  "Every  man  has  his  price." 

But  these  statements  constitute  no  argument  that  there  can 
be  no  remedy  for  political  corruption  and  economic  injustice 
until  human  nature  has  been  ma<le  over.  These  would-be 
arguments  do  not  show  that  the  fault  is  with  human  nature, 
nor  do  they  show  that  the  fault  is  not  with  the  system  of 
government,  even  though  all  systems  of  government  are  them- 
selves the  product  of  the  operation  of  human  nature. 

H  bad  systems  of  government  are  established  through  the 
operation  of  human  nature,  it  is  erroneous  to  conclude  that 
therefore  the  fault  lies  in  any  defects  in  human  nature ;  for  a 
close  examination  of  the  relations  of  human  nature  to  the 
governmental  system  will  reveal  the  truth  that  where  a  bad 
system  obtains  it  is  due  solely  to  the  fact  that  the  great  ma- 
jority of  the  people  were  ignorant  as  to  what  their  true  self- 
interest    was    respecting    governmental    arrangements.      They 


248  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

simply  believed  that  the  bad  system  of  government  was  a  good 
system  of  government   for  them. 

The  ruling  class,  those  who  control  the  government,  con- 
trive the  institutions  and  formulate  the  laws,  have  always  con- 
sisted of  a  small  minority  of  the  society. 

That  class  has  sought  to  control  the  government,  to  con- 
trive the  institutions  and  to  formulate  the  laws  in  order  that 
they  might  thereby  gain  for  themselves  economic  advantages 
over  the  majority  of  the  community,  that  is,  in  order  that  they 
might  enjoy  the  produce  of  the  labor  of  others. 

They  have  realized  that  if  their  strength  were  squarely 
pitted  against  the  strength  of  the  great  majority,  whom  it 
was  their  purpose  to  despoil,  their  rout  would  be  certain  and 
swift.  They  knew,  therefore,  that  if  they  would  continue 
to  rule  and  despoil  the  majorit}^  they  must  at  all  hazards  avoid 
a  decisive  test  of  strength.  They  must  avoid  such  an  alignment 
of  the  people  into  opposing  bodies  which  would  put  the  de- 
spoilers  on  one  side  and  the  despoiled  on  the  other;  they 
must  at  least  divide  the  house  of  the  despoiled  against  itself 
and  induce  a  considerable  portion  of  them  to  work  and  vote 
on  their  side  of  social  questions. 

The  ruling  class,  at  least,  has  understood  that  whether  the 
attitude  of  the  masses  of  the  people  toward  them  and  the 
government  which  they  have  made  would  be  hostile  or  friendly, 
would  be  determined  solely  by  what  the  people  believed  to 
be  their  self-interest,  whether  they  regarded  their  government 
and  the  institutions  and  laws  provided  by  it  as  beneficial  or 
detrimental  to  them. 

In  all  their  dealings  with  the  people  respecting  social  ar- 
rangements the  ruling  class  have  wisely  acted  upon  the  in- 
dubitable proposition  that  if  they  would  rule  the  people,  they 
must  first  fool  them. 

So  completely  has  the  attention  of  the  people  been  diverted 
from  the  true  sources  of  economic  injustice,  that  when  it  is 


THE    PIIILOSOPIIY    OF    COXDUCT  249 

pointetl  out  that  a  bribed  legislator  has  voted  for  a  law  which 
will  rob  the  people,  who  elected  him  to  office,  of  their  economic 
and  projierty  rights;  wlien  a  judge  renders  an  unjust  decision 
by  construing  the  law  to  mean  what  it  plainly  does  not  mean 
and  what  it  was  never  intentjed  lo  mean,  when  we  see  buch 
judges  accumulate  more  money  than  they  could  accumulate 
if  they  saved  their  entire  salary;  when  we  see  a  district  or 
prosecuting  attorney  quash  a  valid,  just  indictment  of.  or 
smother  incriminating  evidence  against  a  rich  an<l  powerful 
culprit,  or  induce  a  grand  jury  to  indict,  on  some  Hinisy 
pretext,  some  person  who  has  been  troublesome  to  the  great 
interests ;  when  we  observe  an  adminstrative  officer  rigidly 
enforce  the  law  against  some  transgressors  while  notoriously 
allowing  others  to  violate  the  law  with  impunity  and  im- 
munity, we  are  almost  invariably  met  with  the  comment : 
"Weil,  what  can  be  done  about  it?  You  would  probably  do 
the  same  thing,  were  you  in  the  place  of  these  men."  Or  the 
situation  is  epitomized  for  us  in  the  remark:  "Every  man 
has  his  price,"  thus  giving  expression  to  the  prevailing  idea 
that  the  weakness  of  human  nature  is  responsible  for  all 
those  evils,  and  that,  consequently,  there  is  no  help  for  them 
until  human  nature  has  been  reformed,  made  more  honest, 
has  ceased  to  urge  men  to  pursue  their  self-interest,  in  short, 
until  human  nature  has  ceased  to  be  human  nature. 

It  does  not  occur  to  most  people  that  the  system  of  social 
arrangements  can  and  does  manufacture  all  these  evils  by 
making  it  to  the  self-interest  of  men  to  corrupt  those  who  wield 
the  power  of  government,  and  at  the  same  time  making  it  to 
the  self-interest  of  those  who  wield  the  power  of  govern- 
ment to  be  corrupted  or  to  become  themselves  aggressively 
corrupt  by  proposing  in  the  law-making  body  bills,  which  are  in 
common  parlance  called  strike  bills,  bills  which  strike  at 
some  privilege  for  the  purpose  only  of  extorting  money  from 
those  interested  in  the  privilege,  in  consideration   for  which 


250  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

the  bills  will  be  buried  in  committee,  or,  if  need  be,  voted 
down. 

Another  favorite  and  effective  method  of  deluding  the  people 
into  support  of  governmental  policies  or  measures  which  are, 
prima  facie,  unjust,  and  which  the  dictates  of  true  self-interest 
would  cause  a  large  majority  of  the  people  to  oppose,  is  the 
insinuation  of  the  devilish  doctrine  called  utilitarianism  into 
governmental  affairs — the  doctrine  of  the  greatest  good  to 
the  greatest  number — the  doctrine  that  the  rights  and  interests 
of  the  individual  must  be  subordinated  to  the  welfare  of  the 
greatest  number. 

This  doctrine  requires  no  other  sanction  for  any  act  than 
the  assumption  that  it  will  redound  to  the  greatest  good  to 
the  greatest  number. 

While  it  leaves  each  individual  to  guess  whether  he  is  com- 
prised in  the  greatest  number  who  are  to  be  benefited,  or  in 
the  smaller  number  who  are  to  be  harmed,  that  fact  has  not 
prompted  the  individual,  at  least  the  working  individual,  to 
seriously  undertake  to  learn  into  which  class  he  would  fall. 
It  has  seemed  perfectly  rational  to  him,  that,  because  a  great 
majority  of  the  people  are  workers,  whatever  would  benefit 
the  greatest  number  would  necessarily  benefit  him,  and  that 
if  any  portion  of  the  community  were  to  be  harmed  by  the 
greatest-good-to-the-greatest-number  project,  it  must  of  course 
be  the  small  class  to  which  he  does  not  belong — the  class  of 
bloated  capitalists  whom  he  would  be  much  pleased  to  get  the 
better  of. 

Now,  is  it  not  perfectly  plain  that  it  is  for  the  reason  that 
the  masses  of  the  people  have  fallen  prey  to  the  fallacies  of 
the  doctrine  of  utilitarianism  that  every  tool  of  the  privileged 
class,  every  politician  whose  business  it  is  to  serve  the  priv- 
ilegists  by  befooling  the  people,  invariably  puts  the  greatest- 
good-to-the-greatest-number  label  on  every  measure  contrived 
for  the  benefit  of  the  privilegists  and  for  the  injury  of  all 


THE    PHILOSCMMIV    OF    CONDUCT  251 

others,  ami  appeals  to  the  working  men,  who  constitute  tlie 
greatest  number,  to  vote  and  root  for  the  measure? 

Many  unjust  institutions  and  laws  have  been  foisted  upon 
the  people  on  the  pretext  that,  although  they  might  harm  some 
members  of  the  community,  they  would  nevertheless  promote 
the  greatest  good  to  the  greatest  number. 

If  I  object  to  the  so-called  protective  tariff  on  moral 
grounds;  if  I  point  out  that  a  tax  on  imports  abrogates  my 
natural  right  to  exchange  my  own  property  with  whom  I 
please,  which  is  an  inseparable  part  of  my  right  to  the  prop- 
erty itself;  if  I  further  show  that  the  tariff  on  imports  re- 
sults in  compelling  me  to  exchange  my  own  goods  or  money 
for  a  less  quantity  of  money  or  goods  than  I  could  get  if  there 
were  no  tax  on  imports,  anfl  that  thereby  I  am  robbed  of  my 
property  to  the  extent  of  the  difference,  I  am  told  that  that 
may  be  all  very  true,  but  that  the  tariff  works  for  the  greatest 
good  to  the  greatest  number. 

For,  I  am  told,  that  while  I  may  have  been  unjustly  de- 
prived of  my  property  in  that  manner,  I  have  been  at  least 
recouped  and  probably  benefited  by  participating  in  the  benefits 
which  the  tariff  bestows  on  the  community  at  large.  And, 
I  am  taught  to  believe,  that  even,  if  per  rare  chance,  I  do 
not  fall  within  the  ranks  of  "the  greatest  number,"  who  are 
in  any  event  benefited  by  the  tariff,  it  is  necessary  in  a  civilized 
society  or  necessary  to  civilization  itself,  that  I  should  sub- 
ordinate my  individual  interests  to  the  interests  of  the  great- 
est number,  and  furthermore  that  whether  I  desire  to  be  thus 
robbed  or  not  "the  greatest  number"  is  justified  in  robbing 
me,  if  their  purpose  is  to  promote  the  greatest  good  to  the 
greatest  number. 

But  how  are  we  to  determine  whether  a  protective  tariff, 
or  any  other  device  contrived  ostensibly  to  promote  the  greatest 
good  to  the  greatest  number,  does  actually  consummate  tiie 
greatest  good  to  the  greatest  number? 


252  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

How  can  we  know  whether  the  protective  tariff  benefits  or 
injures  the  greatest  number,  without  first  ascertaining  to 
what  extent  each  individual  of  the  entire  community  has  been 
either  harmed  or  helped  by  it? 

How  the  infinite  number  of  facts  involved  in  the  calcula- 
tion could  ever  be  compiled,  I  do  not  think  a  high  priest  of 
protection  himself  could  tell. 

But  if  any  reader  has  an  adumbration  of  a  notion  that  the 
precise  effect  the  protective  tariff  has  on  the  greatest  number 
of  the  people  is  an  ascertainable  fact,  let  him  undertake  to 
figure  out  the  precise  effect  the  protective  tariff  has  had  on 
his  own  pecuniary  interests  for  the  period  of  one  year. 

Let  him  undertake  to  put  on  paper  how  much  more  he  has 
had  to  pay  for  every  article  he  has  bought  than  he  would 
have  had  to  pay  in  the  absence  of  a  tariff,  taking  into  ac- 
count all  of  the  direct  and  indirect  effects  that  free  trade 
with  foreign  countries  would  have  had  on  the  price  of  each 
commodity  in  this  country.  Then  let  him  undertake  to  ascer- 
tain how  much  more  wages  or  how  much  greater  income  he 
has  enjoyed  under  a  protective  tariff  than  he  would  have  en- 
joyed under  free  trade,  taking  into  account  all  the  different 
conditions  that  would  have  existed  under  free  trade.  If  he 
is  able  to  obtain  all  the  facts  involved  in  the  calculation,  he 
will  then  be  able  to  strike  a  balance  and  to  definitely  deter- 
mine whether  the  protective  tariff  has  been  profitable  or 
unprofitable  to  him,  and  to  what  extent. 
.  The  utter  impossibility  of  making  such  a  calculation  as 
has  been  described  above  will  be  apprehended  by  every  one 
the  moment  he  begins  to  think  how  he  would  go  about  it.  He 
would  find  it  to  be  impossible  to  learn  just  what  the  effect 
of  the  tariff  has  been  on  the  price  of  a  single  commodity. 

But  let  us  suppose  it  were  possible  for  one  individual  to 
arrive  at  a  correct  estimate  of  the  effect  the  protective  tariff 
has  had  on  his  interests  for  one  year,  then  we  would  have  the 


THE    rillLC)S()I^ll\'    OU    CONDUCT  253 

data  of  its  effect  on  one  individual  alone  out  of  many  mil- 
lions, and  in  order  to  show  by  facts  and  figures  that  the  pro- 
tective tariff  has  benefited  the  greatest  number,  it  would  be 
necessary  for  each  and  every  individual  to  make  the  same 
calculation.  Then  it  would  be  necessary  to  collate  the  results 
obtained  by  all  of  the  individuals  severally,  enter  the  gains 
on  one  side  of  the  balance  sheet  and  the  losses  on  the  other, 
and  thus  strike  a  final  balance  which  would  definitely  show 
whether  or  not  the  tariff  has  produced  the  greatest  good  to 
the  greatest  number. 

Whatever  will  do  good  to  anyone  appears  to  be  a  desirable 
thing,  and  what  will  do  the  greatest  good  to  the  greatest 
number  would  seem  to  be  about  the  most  desirable  thing 
possible. 

But  why.  let  me  ask,  the  greatest  good  to  the  greatest  num- 
ber? Why  not  the  greatest  good  for  all.  which  implies  the 
greatest  good  to  each  and  everyone?  Ijecause  that  slogan 
would  not  square  with  the  admiltetl  fact  that  greatest-good- 
to-the-greatest-number  measures  do  harm  some  of  the  people. 

The  greatest  good  to  the  greatest  number  is  one  of  the  many 
high-sounding  phrases,  imidying  extremely  virtuous  intention, 
which  are  used  by  the  ruling  class  to  so  flisguise  the  real  intent 
and  purpose  of  bad  institutions  and  laws,  that  the  people  to 
be  harmed  by  them  will  become  their  eager  advocates. 

Thus,  the  people,  on  account  of  their  ignorance  of  their  nat- 
ural rights  and  of  what  sort  of  social  arrangements  will  pro- 
tect or  destroy  their  rights,  are  induced  to  give  to  the  priv- 
ileged class  most  of  their  parsnips  for  a  collection  of  fine 
phrases  which  will  not  even  ])uttcr  the  ])arsiii|)s  they  have 
left. 

The  les.son  here  taught  is  that  the  greatest  enemy  of  the 
masses  of  the  people  is  not  the  ruling  class,  the  capitalist 
class,   the   landlord  class,   nor  all   of   these  classes  combined 


254  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

into  what  constitutes  the  privileged  class,  but  their  own  ignor- 
ance as  to  their  self-interest  concerning  social  affairs.  It 
has  been  discovered  that  the  holding  of  a  false  belief  will 
induce  the  people  to  persistently  consummate  their  own  spoli- 
ation, to  deprive  themselves  of  their  precious  and  priceless 
rights  and  to  condemn  themselves  to  all  of  the  indescribable 
miseries  which  the  loss  of  those  rights  entails. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 
PIIILOSOniY  AND  CIVILIZATION. 

In  all  societies  the  accepted  philosophy  of  the  time  es- 
tablishes the  criteria  by  which  all  conduct  is  ]udge<l.  Hence 
the  form  of  government,  the  social  arrangements,  the  con- 
ceptions of  individual  riy^hts,  the  ideas  of  right  economic 
relations  between  men,  and,  in  truth,  the  state  of  civilization 
in  all  respects  which  appertain  to  morality  are  determined  b> 
the  prevailing  philosophy. 

For  all  men,  even  the  illiterate,  are  philosophers,  in  that 
they  always  philosophize  about  their  own  conduct  and  predi- 
cate their  judgments  of  the  conduct  of  others  on  their  phil- 
osophy. 

One's  philosophy  determines  his  understanding  of  what  is 
good  for  him  and  therefore  it  molds  his  conduct. 

If  his  philosophy  be  true,  his  conduct  will  be  self-beneficial, 
and  therefore  wise  and  as  just  as  his  environment  will  permit. 

If  the  moral  philosophy  of  a  majority  of  the  members  of 
the  society  be  true,  the  philosophy  of  all  the  individuals  com- 
posing that  majority  must  be  identical.  Their  philosophy  be- 
ing the  same,  they  will  think  alike  and  come  tj  the  same  con- 
clusions as  to  their  self-interest  respecting  social  affairs.  And 
since  mental  conclusions  decide  the  course  of  conduct,  they 
will  act  in  unison  and  harmony  with  the  conscious  purpose 
of  abolishing  all  institutions  and  laws  which  are  incompatible 
with  their  philosophy,  and  set  up  in  their  stead  such  institu- 
tions and  laws  as  strictly  conform  to  its  requirements. 

The  state  of  morals,  the  degree  of  justice  obtaining  in  the 
relations  between  the  members  of  the  society,  therefore,  de- 
pend upon  the  degree  of  truth  contained  in  the  prevailing 
philosophy. 


256  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

The  moral  civilization  of  any  association  of  men  has  always 
been  the  direct,  inevitable  product  of  their  philosophy. 

Had  the  philosophies  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans  been  true, 
those  nations  would  have  continued  to  advance  in  civilization, 
they  would  have  grown  richer  and  stronger  and,  instead  of 
being  overrun  by  barbarians,  they  would  have  spread  their 
civilization  over  all  Europe. 

Even  back  at  the  time  when  Sophistry  was  the  "philosophy" 
in  vogue — when  victory,  not  truth,  was  the  aim  of  all  con- 
troversy— it  was  seen  and  openly  charged  by  Plato  that  such 
teachings,  devoid  of  all  principle,  as  they  were,  were  demoral- 
izing and  vicious  and  produced  unprincipled  conduct. 

This  country,  like  Rome  at  the  zenith  of  her  wealth  and 
power,  and  France  preceding  the  revolution,  is  headed  toward 
destruction,  all  on  account  of  an  insane,  vicious  philosophy. 
And  the  only  thing  which  will  save  this  country,  and  which 
would  have  saved  Rome  and  France,  is  the  advent  of  a  true 
or  at  least  a  truer  philosophy. 

But  it  must  be  understood  that  no  country  will  ever  be  safe 
from  decadence  until  a  true  social  philosophy  has  been  dis- 
covered and  adopted. 

Not  only  are  all  recognized  philosophies,  ancient  and  mod- 
ern, vulnerable  to  rational,  convincing  criticism,  but  they  have 
been  proven  to  be  false  by  the  fact  that,  in  so  far  as  they 
have  been  adopted  and  practiced,  they  have  utterly  failed  to 
exert  the  sort  of  influence  on  the  conduct  of  men  which  their 
sponsors  held  up  as  the  recommendation  for  their  adoption. 

One  false  philosophy  after  another  has  been  tried  and  found 
wanting.  Each  of  them  has  been  tinkered  ?nd  patched  to 
cure  some  recognized  defect,  first  by  one  writer  and  then  by 
another,  and  it  was  still  found  wanting. 

All  philosophies  of  ethics  have  had  some  dogma  or  some 
idea  which  constituted  their  theorem  and  gave  them  their 
color   and   distinguishing   characteristics,   and   all   theories   of 


nilLOSOPHV    AND    CIVILIZATION  257 

ethics  have  of  necessity  been  based  on  some  conception  of 
human  nature. 

Thus  we  have  had  philosophies  of  which  \n\rc  hedonism 
was  the  central  idea,  philosophies  which  applied  the  doctrine  of 
hedonism  to  the  individual,  and  other  [)hilosophies  which  ap- 
plied that  doctrine  to  the  commimity  or  mankind.  The  former 
is  exemplified  in  the  philosophy  of  Epicurus  and  the  latter  in 
the  doctrines  of  Hume,  Rentham  and  Mill. 

We  have  had  philosophies  founded  upon  the  idea  of  a 
"moral  sense,"  which  was  assumed  to  be  an  inborn  faculty, 
independent  of  the  reason,  and  supposed  to  be  the  supreme 
authority  as  to  what  is  right  and  wrong,  and  there  have  been 
philosophies  which  totally  repudiated  that  idea. 

Some  philosophers  have  taught  pure  rationalism,  while 
others  have  taught  the  direct  opposite,  pure  empiricisin.  and 
still  others  have  taught  a  mixture  of  these  two. 

Dogmatism  has  been  the  foundation  of  soine  philosophies, 
while  scepticism  has  been  the  dominant  idea  of  others.  Like- 
wise, Pessimism  has  been  opposed  by  Optimism,  Egoism  by 
Altruism,  Dualism  by  Monism.  Stoicism  by  Eudemonism.  Real- 
ism by  Idealism,  Socialism  by  Individualism,  Monarchism  by 
Anarchism.  And  because  none  of  these  philo.sophies  or  theo- 
ries, which  were  built  on  the  assumption  that  their  basic  ideas 
were  fundamental  truths,  proved  to  be  satisfactory,  they  gave 
rise  to  a  number  of  mongrel  philosophies  or  theories  devoid 
of  any  basic  idea  but  consisting  of  compromises  between  two 
or  more  of  the  single  idea  theories. 

Now.  it  is  self-cvidently  true  that  no  two  philosophies  which 
have  for  their  premises  opposite  ideas  can  both  be  true.  And 
when  two  such  philosophies  subsist  side  by  side  for  any  length 
of  time,  it  is  fairly  reasonable  to  conclude  from  that  fact 
alone  that  both  of  them  are  false.  And  we  may  with  even 
greater  certainty  assume  that  any  philosophy  which  essays  to 
reconcile  and  harmonize  two  antagonistic  ideas  or  principles  is 


258  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

absolutely  false,  necessarily  illogical  and  not  entitled  to  the 
name  of  philosophy. 

But  when  we  once  know  that  a  philosophy  has  been  evolved 
out  of  an  erroneous  conception  of  human  nature,  we  know 
with  absolute  certainty  that  that  philosophy  is  not  only  false 
but  that  it  must  be,  in  the  nature  of  things,  mischievous  in 
its  effects  to  the  extent  to  which  it  is  adopted  and  acted  upon. 

The  low  degree  of  morals  now  obtaining  in  the  world  is  the 
product  of  the  combined  handiwork  of  the  world's  philosophies. 

All  philosophies  on  morals,  jurisprudence  and  economics 
which  have  thus  far  been  promulgated  have  been  false,  be- 
cause they  were  conceived  and  reared  in  ignorance  of  the 
fundamental  principles  of  human  nature,  which  necessarily  are 
the  very  seed  of  any  true  philosophy  respecting  human  con- 
duct and  human  interests. 

At  the  present  time  the  atmosphere  in  the  United  States 
as  well  as  in  Europe  fairly  rings  with  false,  im.moral,  vicious 
teachings,  the  animus  of  which  is  to  prolong,  if  not  to  per- 
petuate, the  unspeakable  injustice  being  perpetrated  on  the 
great  mass  of  the  people  by  the  paltry  few. 

Power,  privilege  and  injustice  feed  upon  themselves.  They 
wax  strong  on  their  own  milk.  To  retain  the  power  they 
have,  the  rulers  must  use  it  to  usurp  more  power.  To  hold 
the  people  in  bondage,  the  rulers  must  strengthen  the  bonds 
and  make  the  slavery  more  abject. 

Therefore,  to  temporize  with  the  forces  now  in  the  saddle, 
is  to  barter  away  all  hope  of  avoiding  a  cataclysm. 

Our  only  hope  for  salvation  is  an  utter  repudiation  of  the 
present-day  philosophy  of  commercial  expediency  and  the 
raising  in  its  place  a  philosophy  of  true  morality — a  philosophy 
of  natural  justice. 

Even  now  Socrates,  Plato  and  Aristotle  bear  the  reputation 
of  great  philosophers,  and  it  is  considered  to  be  a  part  of 
higher  education  to  have  more  or  less  knowledge  of  what  they 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    CIVILIZATION  259 

said  and  to  he  able  to  quote  some  of  their  apJKjrisnis.  tnaxinis 
and  precepts.  Hut  tliese  supposedly  wise  sayings  upon  which 
their  reputations  chicny  depend  were  purely  dogmatic — they 
were  not  the  expression,  or  the  application,  of  any  principle. 
Their  ignorance  of  the  principle  of  human  nature  made  it 
impossible  for  them  to  con.struct  a  systematic,  conclusive  phil- 
osophy of  human  conduct  or  morality. 

Aristotle,  who  is  regarded  as  the  greatest  of  ancient  phil- 
osophers, and  who  is  held  by  some  to  be  the  greatest  phil- 
osopher who  ever  lived,  was  nothing  more  than  a  master  of 
dialectics.  His  .so-called  philosophy  was  a  principleless  com- 
promise betv.cen  the  Socratic  and  the  Platonic  schools  and 
other  doctrines  which  carried  some  of  the  fundamental  ideas 
of  those  two  philosophers  to  their  logical  extremes.  1  le  was 
something-  of  an  idealist,  but  more  of  an  empiricist  and  always 
an  expedientist.  A  certain  amoimt  of  eudemonism  he  re- 
garded as  a  good  thing,  provided  it  was  alloyed  with  asceticism 
in  various  proportions  as  occasion  might  require,  and  he  was 
apparently  most  careful  to  avoid  such  precision  in  the  state- 
ment of  his  teachings  as  would  enable  one  to  grasp  just  what 
he  was  driving  at. 

The  sum  and  substance  of  what  he  specifically  and  intel- 
ligibly taught  was.  be  virtuous  and  you  will  be  haj^py.  Rut 
in  what  being  virtuous,  the  means  of  attaining  happiness,  or 
happiness  itself,  the  final  aim.  consists,  Aristotle  says  not 
in  intelligible  terms.  One  of  his  teachings  of  virtue,  and 
therefore  one  of  the  means  by  which  what  he  calls  happi- 
ness is  to  be  produced,  is  to  make  expediency  the  fundamental 
principle  of  the  science  of  politics  or  government,  and  the 
highest  ideal  of  the  rulers,  the  adoption  of  the  means  best 
suited  to  their  en<ls.  In  this  sort  of  philosophy  Aristotle 
found  justification  for  slavery,  which  proves  conclusively  that 
he  had  a  totally  false  conception  of  what  social  justice  is. 
and  that,  of  course,  he  had  not  the  slightest  idea  of  the  ab- 


260  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

solute  dependence  of  virtue  and  happiness  of  the  people  in 
general  on  social  justice. 

In  order  to  show  specifically  wherein  the  errors  of  the 
Greek  philosophers  lie,  one  must  first  know  not  only  precisely 
what  they  said,  but  also  exactly  what  they  meant  by  what 
they  said.  There  have  been  many  translations  of  Plato  alone, 
several  lexicons  of  his  writings,  several  works  on  the  language 
of  Plato,  a  half  dozen  books  on  his  manuscripts,  and  scores 
of  volumes  of  literary  and  philosophical  criticism  on  his  com- 
positions and  teachings.  The  more  of  these  works  one  reads, 
the  more  he  will  not  know  in  what  Platonic  philosophy  of 
ethics  consists. 

The  same  thing  may  be  as  truly  said  of  Aristotle. 

It  was  because  what  fragments  of  the  philosophies  of  Plato 
and  Aristotle  could  be  understood  by  others,  did  not  com- 
port with  common  sense  and  common  experience,  that  those 
philosophies  did  not  take  root,  but  rather  provoked  the  bring- 
ing out  of  philosiphies  which  went  to  opposite  extremes,  such 
as  the  Sceptic,  Cynic,  Epicurean  and  Stoic  philosophies. 

In  his  fundamentals  Epicurus  came  nearer  to  the  truth  than 
all  other  ancient  philosophers,  or  than  any  single  modern 
philosopher.  While  Epicurus  grazed  the  truth,  he  did  not  hit 
it,  and,  therefore,  he  also  failed  to  produce  a  systematic,  true 
philosophy  or  to  formulate  a  criterion  by  which  conduct  could 
have  been  unerringly  judged,  just  social  arrangements  attained 
and  thereby  the  foundations  laid  for  continuous  progress 
toward  a  civilization  under  which  a  higher  and  more  ennobling 
character  of  happiness  would  be  possible. 

Now,  it  was  simply  because  the  Greeks  as  well  as  the 
Romans  had  no  true  system  of  philosophy  to  g^iide  them,  that 
those  nations  drifted  to  destruction. 

The  ancient  like  the  modern  philosophers  undertook  to  tell 
the    people    what    they    ought    to    do.    either    for    their    own 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    CUIIJ/ATIOX  261 

happiness   in   this  world,  or   for   their  own   well-being  after 
death,  or  as  a  duty  to  their  fellow-men  or  to  Ciod. 

But,  at  the  same  time,  all  of  their  philosophies  sanctioned 
social  systems  which  made  it  to  the  self-interest  of  the  people 
to  act  contrary  to  their  precepts.  Therefore,  their  philosophies 
could  not  do  otherwise  than  engender  wron^  conduct. 

It  would  be  a  waste  of  time  and  would  no  doubt  tire  the 
reader  to  enter  into  any  extensive  analysis  of  even  tliose 
philosophies  which  have  contributed  to  modern  thought  some 
particular  idea  or  ideas.  It  will  serve  every  purpose  to  call 
attention  to  those  ideas  which  form  the  basis  of  every  indi- 
vidual's philosophy  at  the  present  time ;  for  every  man  has  his 
own  philosophy,  peculiar  to  himself. 

If  one  wishes  to  discover  the  chief  causes  which  have  re- 
tarded or  arrested  progress  toward  social  morality,  and  which 
have  sometimes  caused  moral  retrogression,  let  him  go  to  the 
writings  of  some  of  the  most  celel)ratcd  philosophers,  and  he 
will  find  them  there.  He  will  find  them  comprised  in  a  few 
general  "principles"  upon  which  have  been  erected  vast  systems 
of  moral  philosophy  for  the  guidance  of  individual  and  col- 
lective conduct. 

William  T.  Stead,  the  London  editor,  once  enunciated  in 
an  article  on  the  moral  retrogression  of  nations  a  great  truth 
when  he  declared  that  the  present  degradation  of  national 
moral  standards  is  largely  due  to  the  introduction  into  politics 
of  the  barbarous  doctrine  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest. 

Now,  let  it  be  understood  that  the  oilium  of  dragging  that 
doctrine  into  practical  politics  belongs  not  to  Darwin  but  to 
Herbert  Spencer.  Darwin's  writings  were  purely  speculative 
and  referred  exclusively  to  physical  nature.  Therefore,  they 
exerted  no  ill  effect  in  the  realm  of  ethical  thought.  But 
Spencer  manufactured  out  of  Darwin's  idea  what  he  repre- 
sented to  be  a  universal  philosophy,  as  ai)plicable  to  lunuan 
nature,  human  conduct  and  governmental  arrangements,  which 
are  themselves  products  of  human  conduct,  as  to  the  origin 


262  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

of  species.  And  the  world  was  to  be  cursed  for  a  period  by 
another  false  philosophy,  more  pernicious  than  most  other 
philosophies,  because  it  taught  that  there  was  no  criterion  of 
absolute  morality  or  absolute  justice,  and  that,  in  fact,  there 
was  no  such  thing  as  absolute  justice. 

It  would  be  impossible,  even  in  this  age  of  invention,  to 
invent  a  tool  which  would  better  conserve  the  interests  of 
the  privileged  class,  or  more  effectually  thwart  wholesome 
social  improvement,  than  the  theory  of  evolution  applied  to 
social  affairs. 

The  doctrine  that  social  progress  is  social  evolution,  that 
social  evolution  depends  upon  the  evolution  of  the  in'lividual, 
and  that  the  evolution  of  the  individual  means  the  imper- 
ceptible evolution  of  human  nature  out  of  an  egoistic  into 
an  altruistic  state,  is  not  only  entirely  false,  but  it  is  positively 
and  extremely  mischievous  in  its  consequences. 

What  could  be  more  potent  in  retarding  social  progress 
than  the  general  belief  among  men  that  progress  toward  social 
justice  can  be  made  only  as  altruism,  of  which  there  is  not 
an  atom  in  human  nature,  shall  become  the  dominant  principle 
of  human  nature? 

Malthus  was  another  malefactor.  He  evolved  a  theory  of 
population  by  the  inductive  method  of  reasoning,  the  syn- 
thetic method,  which  was  quite  as  pernicious,  as  far  as  it 
went,  as  Spencer's  philosophy  of  justice. 

The  Malthusian  doctrine  teaches  that  war,  famine  or  pes- 
tilence, while  rough  on  the  victims,  are  public  blessings,  in 
that  they  prevent  the  world  from  becoming  overpopulated, 
and  thus  avert  a  still  greater  calamity.  The  land  monopoly, 
trusts,  all  privileges  and  everything  devilish  in  social  arrange- 
ments may  be  logically  sanctioned  on  that  same  ground. 

If  the  Malthusian  doctrine  were  true,  and  there  were  no 
other  way  to  get  rid  of  poverty  but  by  the  death  of  enough 
of  the  unfit  to  remove  the  pressure  of  population  on   sub- 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  CIVILIZATION  263 

sistencc,  the  wonder  is  that  the  devotees  of  that  doctrine 
i\u\  not  demand  the  enactment  of  laws  decreeing  that  wlien- 
ever  poverty  made  its  appearance,  instead  of  waiting  for  a 
certain  nuniher  of  the  untittcst  to  (He  slowly  .according  to  the 
mandates  of  natural  law,  they  should  he  killed  at  once  hy  the 
state,  and  thus  immediately  restore  prosperity  for  the  re- 
mainiler  of  the  community. 

While  all  the  countries  of  Euroj)e  now  have  a  much  larger 
population  than  they  had  when  Malthus  wrote  his  essay  (1798) 
and  the  population  of  ihe  United  States  has  grown  more  ra- 
pidly than  that  of  any  other  country  in  the  history  of  the 
world,  pojiulation  does  not  now  press  upon  suhsistence  as 
much  as  it  did  then,  for  the  production  of  foodstuffs  is  now 
greater,  per  capita,  than  it  was  then. 

And  in  the  face  of  the  Malthusian  doctrine  France  is  ofTer- 
ing  premiums  on  early  marriages  and  large  families,  and  ex- 
president  Roosevelt,  some  college  professors  and  historians, 
are  doing  their  best  to  inculcate  into  the  public  mind  the  fear 
of  race-suicide. 

The  Malthusian  theory  that  population,  according  to  nat- 
ural law,  always  tends  to  press  upon  subsistence  and  conse- 
quently to  cause  widespread  poverty,  is  closely  related  to  the 
beastly  doctrine  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  applied  to  man- 
kind. There  is  not  a  gleam  of  justice  in  either  of  those 
diabolical  travesties  on  nature. 

Another  vicious  doctrine  which  has  done  much  to  obstruct 
progress  is  the  greatest-good-to-the-greatest-number  doctrine. 
That  pernicious  teaching  found  lodgment  in  our  own  consti- 
tution, in  what  is  known  as  the  "  general  welfare  clause.'' 
What  monstrous  injustices  have  been  committed  in  its  name 
and  its  aliases!  In  the  McKinley  regime  one  of  its  names 
was  "Benevolent  Assimilation,"  another  "IVotection."  another 
"Trade  Extension,"  and  another  "Ship  Subsidy." 

Our   social   system   is   tainted,   through    and    through,    witli 


264  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

that  moral  leprosy  called  "  Utilitarianism."  The  utilitarian 
school  of  moral  philosophy  presumes  to  measure  happiness 
and  misery  as  if  they  were  computable  by  the  yard,  bushel  or 
pound.  It  adds  the  quantities  of  happiness  and  misery  into 
sum-totals,  averages  them,  reduces  them  to  all  sorts  of  per- 
centages in  order  to  demonstrate  all  manner  of  preconceived 
conclusions.  It  offsets  the  misery  of  many  with  the  happiness 
of  a  few.  It  approves  and  justifies  the  taking  from  some 
what  rightfully  belongs  to  them,  and  giving  it  to  others  to 
whom  it  does  not  belong,  on  the  plea  that  in  some  mysterious 
manner  the  transaction  will  show  a  balance  in  favor  of  the 
public  weal. 

That  doctrine  has  dominated  not  only  English  jurisprudence 
since  Bentham's  time,  but  this  country  has  fallen  heir  to  the 
malady.  That  false  theory  underlies  and  gives  to  the  theory 
of  protection  its  only  sanction.  It  affords  the  only  osten- 
sibly moral  support  of  the  creation  of  privileges  by  law  and 
the  creation  by  law  of  a  privileged  class.  The  boast  that  this 
"  country "  is  prosperous  and  happy,  notwithstanding  the 
notorious  fact  that  thousands  of  people  are  wallowing  in  mis- 
ery and  actual  want,  while  many  more  thousands  are  being 
tortured  by  the  fear  of  want,  can  be  accounted  for  by  no 
other  hypothesis  than  that  the  minds  of  those  who  make 
that  boast  are  saturated  with  that  same  theory. 

One  of  the  most  serviceable  bulwarks  of  social  injustice 
has  been  the  doctrine  that  all  rights  are  derived  from  gov- 
ernment and  that,  therefore,  there  are  no  natural  rights. 
Whereas  the  reverse  of  that  idea  is  true.  The  truth  that 
there  are  no  other  rights  than  natural  rights  completely  dis- 
poses of  the  whole  doctrine  of  law-made  rights,  including, 
of  course,  the  theory  of  vested  rights. 

Another  device  which  has  been  effectively  used  to  keep  the 
people  in  economic  bondage  has  been  the  teaching  of  blind 
patriotism  —  the    teaching   that    the    people    should    love    and 


PHILOSOPHY    AND   CIX'ILIZATION  265 

uphold  the  institutions  under  wliicli  tlicv  live,  whether  they  be 
good  or  bad.  An  important  part  of  that  teaching  has  been  to 
extol  the  virtues,  real  and  imaginary,  of  the  men  who  are 
responsible  for  our  bad  institutions  and  particularly  those  men 
who  are  responsible  for  the  worst  features  of  those  bad  in- 
stitutions, such  men  as  Alexander  Hamilton  and  Chief  justice 
John  Marshall. 

These  bad  institutions,  and  vicious  philosophies  of  law  fre- 
quently to  be  found  in  Supreme  Court  decisions,  are  based 
upon,  and  sanctioned  by.  some  so-called  moral  philosophy. 

When  the  ruling  class  desires  to  make  institutions  and 
laws  which  will  rob  the  people  of  their  rights,  they  must, 
particularly  in  a  country  where  the  suffrage  is  universal,  be 
able  to  demonstrate  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  people  that  the 
only  object  in  robbing  them  in  the  manner  proposed,  is  to  do 
them  good.  And  some  so-calletl  moral  philosophy  is  brought 
out  to  serve  that  purpose. 

Political  economy,  in  its  last  analysis,  is  a  department  of 
moral  philosophy,  for  its  only  legitimate  object  is  to  determine 
the  right  and  wrong  of  economic  affairs.  Yet,  the  funda- 
mentals of  all  the  different  schools  of  economics  are  the  fiction 
called  "capital,"  the  dogma  that  interest  results  from  the 
operation  of  natural  laws  and  the  dogma  that  land  monopoly 
is  a  natural  monopoly — that  land  rent  is  but  the  manifestation 
of  the  operation  of  natural  laws.  Whereas  the  truth  is  that 
"capital,"  interest,  land  monopoly  and  land  rent  are  all  pro- 
ducts of  man-made  laws,  which,  in  the  presence  of  univer- 
sally enjoyed  natural  rights,  will  disappear  as  the  dew  before 
the  rising  sun. 

Yet,  let  me  remind  the  reader  again,  the  greatest  obstacle 
to  the  attainment  of  justice,  the  idea  which  is  the  germ  of 
most  other  ideas  which  obstruct  moral  progress,  is  the  idea 
that  our  ethical  shortcomings  are  due  to  imperfections  or 
frailties  of  human  nature.     The  logical  conclusion  from  that 


266  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

assumption  being  that  no  progress  toward  social  justice  can 
be  made  unless  some  means  be  found  by  which  to  improve 
human  nature,  all  efforts  directed  to  that  end  are  worse  than 
useless,  for,  so  long  as  that  is  the  aim,  no  rational  means  of 
promoting  morality  will  be  even  sought. 

That  undertaking  is  on  a  par  with  the  attempt  to  create 
perpetual  motion  or  to  make  gold  out  of  the  baser  metals. 

What  ails  most  people  nowadays  is  that  they  do  not  know 
the  simple  truth  respecting  human  nature,  but  do  hold  a  con- 
glomeration of  ideas  on  that  subject  which  are  not  true. 

Knowledge  of  self-interest  is  all  that  is  needed  to  bring 
about  social  justice  and  moral  social  relations  between  men. 

The  people  are  now  suffering  injustice  from  no  other  cause 
than  the  misunderstanding  of  human  nature  and  therefore 
the  acceptance  of  erroneous  conceptions  of  what  their  self- 
interest  is  respecting  social  arrangements. 

Men's  bodies  and  lives  have  always  been  enslaved  through 
the  enslavement  of  their  minds,  by  teaching  them  to  think  or 
believe  that  institutions  and  laws  which  do  them  injustice  are 
good  for  them,  and  that  institutions  and  laws  which  would 
accord  them  justice  would  be  injurious  to  them.  And  in  order 
to  do  that  it  has  been  necessary  to  provide  an  ostensibly  moral 
sanction  for  wickedly  immoral  social  arrangements,  in  the 
shape  of  a  system  of  moral  philosophy. 

The  world  has  been  fairly  cursed,  now  with  one,  and  then 
with  another  brand  of  immoral  moral-philosophy. 


CHAPTER   XIV. 
I'lIILOSOPHV  OF  HUMAN  PROGRESS. 

The  history  of  liuiuan  progress  presents  a  vast  multitude 
of  events  ami  conditions,  differing  from  one  another  sometimes 
but  a  shade  and  sometimes  as  much  as  to  be  tc^lally  unlike. 

To  discover  and  elucidate  all  the  causes,  from  the  immediate 
to  the  most  remote,  which  have  produced  such  an  endless 
variety  of  trains  of  events,  is  beyond  accomplishment  by  any 
man,  though  he  devote  his  whole  life  to  it. 

Naturally,  therefore,  it  has  been  thought  that  the  idea 
that  a  definite  and  comprehensive  statement  of  the  principles 
which  govern  all  human  progress  could  be  made  within  the 
limits  of  a  few  paragraphs  was  preposterous. 

Buckle  spent  seventeen  years  in  producing  two  great 
volumes  which  were  intended  to  be  only  a  part  of  the  intro- 
ductory to  a  history  of  civilization.  In  these  two  volumes  he 
undertook  to  develop  a  theory  of  the  laws  or  causes  which 
produced  the  peculiar  civilization  of  several  countries. 

He  hoarded  great  quantities  of  facts,  and  statistics  in  pro- 
fusion. From  these  social  phenomena  and  statistics  he  hoped, 
by  the  empirical,  inductive  process,  to  adduce  the  laws  of 
human  progress.     He,  of  course,  failed,  utterly  failetl. 

The  laws  of  human  progress  could  never  be  discovered  by 
that  method  of  research.  Buckle  found  that  every  society  of 
people  has  had  a  civilization  differing  in  many  respects  from 
that  of  every  other  society,  and  he  ought  to  have  inferred  that 
important  variations  in  the  character  of  the  civilizations  of 
societies  yet  to  come  would  be  as  marked  and  perplexing  to 
the  mere  observer  and  student  of  phenomena  as  were  the 
(Mfferences  which  characterized  the  different  varieties  of  civil- 
ization of  the  past. 


268  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

If  we  are  to  induce  the  laws  of  civilization  from  social 
phenomena,  we  will,  of  course,  get  as  many  different  laws  as 
there  are  or  have  been  different  sorts  of  civilization.  Be- 
sides, no  writer,  nor  any  number  of  writers,  could  possibly 
collect  and  compile  in  the  order  of  sequence  all  of  the  cir- 
cumstances and  influences  which  operated  in  the  production  of 
the  particular  civilization  of  a  single  country,  and  therefore, 
if  our  ascertainment  of  the  laws  of  human  progress  must 
depend  upon  observation  of  facts  and  phenomena  and  their 
apparent  immediate  causes  (the  immediate  causes  of  social 
phenomena  being  the  only  causes  which  are  observable)  we 
will  fail  to  ascertain  the  laws,  because  it  is  impossible  for 
us  to  obtain  accurate  data  of  all  the  phenomena  and  the  in- 
fluences, immediate  and  remote,  which  produced  them. 

Furthermore,  if  we  set  about  to  discover  the  laws  of  human 
progress  in  this  manner,  the  more  facts  we  bring  together, 
the  more  complicated  and  difficult  becomes  our  problem. 

When  viewing  the  matter  in  the  light  of  phenomena  and 
facts  alone,  there  appears  to  be  absolutely  no  solution  of 
the  question  as  to  what  are  the  principles  the  operation  of 
which  has  produced  such  multifarious  results. 

But  when  we  once  understand  that  the  particular  civilization 
of  any  society  at  any  time  is  nothing  but  the  habitual  conduct 
of  the  individuals  forming  that  society,  taken  as  a  whole,  and 
that  conduct  is  the  result  of  the  operation  of  universal  laws, 
we  find  that  the  complication  and  difficulties  which  overwhelm 
us  when  we  undertake  to  find  these  laws  by  tracing  them  from 
their  very  remote  effects  backward  through  a  long  series  of 
intermingled  effects  and  causes  (which  cannot  be  done)  will 
disappear. 

For  then  we  will  have  discovered  that  our  task  of  reach- 
ing the  true  theory  of  human  progress  is  merely  to  apprehend 
and  formulate  the  natural  laws  which  regulate  human  con- 
duct. 


PHILOSOPHY    Ol     I  UMAX    PROGRESS       260 

When  we  contemplate  the  character  of  tlic  civilization  of 
any  country  at  any  time,  and  we  detect  in  it  any  shortcomings, 
how  are  we  to  learn  what  is  the  cause  of  those  shortcomings? 

Certainly  not  by  studying  the  social  phenomena  of  that 
country,  nor  by  a  consideration  of  the  ()i)inions  and  customs 
of  the  people,  nor  yet  by  digesting  their  institutions  and  laws 
and  noting  the  character  of  their  effects,  since  these  things  are 
themselves  but  effects  of  other  causes,  and  until  we  have  dis- 
covered the  ultimate  cause  we  will  not  have  found  the  cause. 

If  we  learn  that  some  of  the  ill  conditions  are  traceable 
to  the  institutions  and  laws,  we  will  not  have  gaiucvi  any 
information  of  any  practical  value.  The  only  knowledge  which 
would  be  of  use  to  us,  would  be  a  knowledge  of  the  prin- 
ciples which  engendered  the  opinions  which  resulted  in  the 
institutions  and  laws  which  produced  the  ill  effects ;  and,  as 
I  have  already  pointed  out.  these  principles  cannot  be  got 
at  by  beginning  the  search  for  them  at  their  most  remote 
effects. 

The  ultimate  cause  of  the  state  of  civilization  is  the  oper- 
ation of  the  laws  or  principles  of  human  nature  which  govern 
all  human  activities,  including  the  acquirement  of  knowledge 
respecting  self-interest. 

A  demonstration  of  these  laws  or  principles  and  an  elucida- 
tion of  their  operation  and  application  must  therefore  be  the 
substance  of  a  true  philosophy  of  civilization  or  of  human 
progress. 

We  have  seen  in  the  chapter  on  Human  Xature  that  pro- 
gress depends  solely  upon  the  acquirement  of  more  knowledge 
of  things  which  will  subserve  self-interest  and  that  the  ac- 
quirement of  knowledge  is  induced  by  the  interplay  of  self- 
interest,  present  knowledge  and  environment. 

We  have  also  seen  that  the  economic  environment,  the  only 
environment  wliich  has  any  influence  on  economic  conduct 
which  determines  the  economic  relations  between  men,  is  sub- 


270  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

ject  to  the  will  of  man — is  the  work  of  man — and  can  be  made 
to  engender  either  just  or  unjust  social  conduct.  And  we  have 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  attainment  of  social  justice  de- 
pends upon  our  acquirement  of  a  knowledge  of  the  essential 
characteristics  of  the  social  arrangements  which  will  make  it 
to  the  self-interest  of  the  people  in  general  to  deal  justly 
with  each  other. 

This  book  is  primarily  a  work  on  social  moral  philosophy. 
Its  primary  object  is  to  point  out  what  social  justice  is  and 
how  it  may  be  attained. 

I  have  been  compelled  to  deal  so  largely  and  minutely  with 
the  philosophy  of  human  nature,  because  a  correct  under- 
standing of  the  principles  and  attributes  of  human  nature  is 
absolutely  indispensable  to  an  understanding  of  the  means  by 
which  social  justice  may  be  brought  about. 

With  the  history  of  civilization,  the  less  we  have  to  do, 
the  better.  We  need  not  know  the  circumstances  which  re- 
sulted in  the  particular  state  of  knowledge  or  civilization  of 
any  country  at  any  time,  nor  need  we  know  the  circumstances 
under  which  any  individual  came  by  the  particular  set  of 
knowledge  and  beliefs  which  make  up  what  may  be  called 
the  state  of  his  knowledge  or  his  civilization. 

All  we  need  to  know  are  the  principles  and  attributes  of 
human  nature  and  the  character  of  environment  which  will 
permit  these  principles  to  operate,  as  they  w^ere  naturally 
adapted  to  operate,  toward  the  acquirement  of  knowledge 
and  the  furtherance  of  progress. 

Having  ascertained  these  principles  and  discovered  the  man- 
ner in  which  they  operate,  and  having  learned  through  that 
knowledge  what  the  character  of  the  economic  environment 
must  necessarily  be,  in  order  that  justice  may  prevail,  our 
starting  point  is  always  the  present.  Our  whole  attention 
must  be  fixed  on  the  future. 

None  of  the  theories  of  human  progress  which  have  been 


Pllll.OSOrifV    OF    IIIMAN    PROGRESS       271 

presented  to  the  consideration  of  mankind  lias  been  ai  all 
satisfactory. 

Xone  of  tlicni  has  given  a  satisfying  explanation  of  the 
causes  which  have  brought  about  what  progress  has  been  niailc 
in  the  world,  and  none  of  them  has  made  it  clear  what  means 
must  be  adoptetl  in  order  that  further  progress  may  be  con- 
sciously and  systematically  made. 

The  furthering  of  human  progress  has  been  left  by  the 
philosophers  to  mere  chance.  They  have  not  only  utterly 
failed  to  bring  to  view  and  illuminate  the  true  source  of  all 
human  progress,  an  understanding  of  which  is  prerequisite  to 
a  conscious,  intelligent  furtherance  of  progress,  but  they  have 
held  up  to  view  gross  misconceptions  of  its  source  and  pro- 
cess, which  have  rendered  any  deliberate,  practical  efforts 
toward  accelerating  progress  impossible,  and  caused  what 
efforts  have  been  made  at  the  instigation  of  those  miscon- 
ceptions to  be  worse  than  fruitless. 

No  theory  of  human  progress  which  is  not  compatible  with 
the  constitution  of  human  nature  can  be  put  into  practice. 
It  cannot  be  put  into  practice  because  it  does  not  harmonize 
v.ith  the  operation  of  the  inexorable  principles  of  human 
nature — because  it  is  not  true. 

A  false  theory  of  the  process  by  which  progress  is  made 
not  only  fails  to  assist  in  making  progress,  but  is  in  itself 
a  great  obstacle  to  progress.  A  false  theory  respecting  any 
matter  whatsoever  is  not  only  useless  as  a  promoter  of  the 
desired  object,  but  is  a  hindrance  to  its  attainment,  so  long 
as  it  is  believed  in. 

The  only  use  which  such  encumbrances  of  thought  ever 
serve  is  that,  sooner  or  later,  yet  too  frequently  not  soon 
enough,  false  theories  are  found  to  be  false,  are  discarded, 
and  men  are  taught  that  they  must  seek  the  truth  at  least  in 
some  other  direction. 

Great  and   rapid  progress   has  been   made  in  the  sciences 


272  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

and  the  arts,  notwithstanding  the  great  abundance  of  false 
theories  which  have  made  their  appearance  in  those  fields  of 
human  endeavor,  simply  because  it  has  been  practicable  to 
put  their  truth  to  the  test  of  actual  experimentation. 

It  has  not  been  so  with  theories  respecting  the  prinicples 
of  human  nature,  the  attributes  of  man,  the  causes  of  the 
opinions  and  feelings  of  human  beings  and  of  human  societies, 
and  therefore,  the  causes  of  human  conduct,  individual  or 
collective. 

Theories  respecting  these  matters,  both  good  and  bad,  have 
remained  mere  theories,  and  even  though  directly  contrary  to 
the  truth,  many  of  them  have  subsisted  for  long  periods  of 
time  for  the  reason  that  it  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  induce 
any  considerable  number  of  people  to  discard  a  social  ar- 
rangement or  theory  of  social  arrangements  as  soon  as  ex- 
perience has  demonstrated  it  to  be  a  failure,  as  they  would 
discard  an  inefficient  mechanical  device,  and  to  strive  to  work 
out  a  new  theory  which  would  obviate  known  difficulties,  and 
try  out  new  social  arrangements  adjusted  thereto.  The  people 
are  fairly  practical  in  all  matters  except  that  which  concerns 
them  most — the  social  arrangements  under  which  they  must 
conduct  all  their  other  affairs. 

It  seems  that  most  people  consider  it  indispensable  that 
they  should  hold  some  theory  concerning  matters  of  importance 
to  them,  and  in  the  absence  of  knowledge  of  a  true  theory,  they 
will  accept,  believe  in,  and  then  cling  to  a  false  one. 

Therefore  it  is  very  commonly  to  be  observed  that  persons 
believe  in  theories  which  they  would  consider  themselves 
exceedingly  stupid  to  undertake  to  put  into  practice. 

No  department  of  human  concern  is,  at  the  present  stage 
of  civilization  at  any  rate,  so  important  to  human  interests, 
so  intimately  related  to  the  weal  or  woe  of  mankind,  as 
opinions  concerning  the  economic  relations  between  men. 

In   no   other   department  of   philosophy  has   there  been   a 


rHlLOSOPIlY    OF    IlLMAX    PROGRESS       273 

greater  profusion  of  theories,  and  in  no  department  has  there 
been  made  so  Httle  real  advancement  toward  the  truth. 

For  pohtical  economy,  the  science  of  sociology,  or  by  what- 
ever name  the  various  theories  respecting  right  social  arrange- 
ments may  be  called,  taken  altogether  or  severally,  as  they 
stand  to-day,  constitutes  one  stupcndou'*  error. 

Jurisprudence  has  been  regarded  and  treated  as  a  depart- 
ment of  knowledge  almost,  if  not  quite,  distinct  from 
economics. 

The  so-called  science  of  government  has  not  been  closely 
associated  with  the  pretended  science  of  the  production  and 
distribution  of  wealth. 

Nevertheless,  jurisprudence  and  knowledge  of  salutary 
governmental  arrangements  are  but  subsidiary  branches  of 
that  broadest  of  all  philosophies,  the  philosophy  of  human 
conduct  and  of  wholesome  relations  between  human  beings, 
which  is  the  philosophy  of  human  progress. 

Yet,  the  philosophy  of  human  progress  is  comprehended  in 
a  correct  understanding  of  the  few  and  simple  principles  and 
attributes  of  human  nature,  and  the  rational  judgments  respect- 
ing human  affairs  deduciblc  from  the  constitution  of  human 
nature. 

All  laws  and  principles  of  nature,  including  of  course  the 
principles  of  human  nature,  arc  universal,  invariable,  ever 
persistent,  inexorable  and  perfectly  constituted  to  effect  their 
intended  purposes. 

Any  true  philosophy,  therefore,  which  deals  with  the  doings 
of  men  must  issue  from  the  fundamental  principles  and  at- 
tributes of  human  nature.  Philosophies,  treating  of  moral 
conduct,  individual  or  relative,  personal  or  social,  which  are 
not  founded  upon  truths  respecting  human  nature,  are  neces- 
sarily false  and  hence  are  complicated. 

False  theories  are  always  necessarily  complicated.  Theories 
based  upon  the  truth  are  invariably  simple;  for  the  truth  is 


274  '  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

simplicity  itself,  and  therefore  the  least  deviation  from  the 
truth  always  occasions  complications. 

The  moral  philosophers,  the  law-givers  and  the  economists 
have  alike  built  their  theories  on  foundations  of  invented  dog- 
mas, and  consequently  nothing  but  error  could  be  the  issue. 

Like  the  writers  on  political  economy,  psychology  and 
ethics,  the  commentators  on  jurisprudence  have  poisoned  the 
minds  of  the  masses  of  men  with  pernicious  untruths  respect- 
ing the  fundamental  principles  of  that  department  of 
knowledge. 

The  doctrine  that  the  "rights  of  society"  are  paramount 
to  the  rights  of  the  individual  members  of  society,  vitiates 
all  reasoning  on  the  subject  of  jurisprudence  proceeding  from 
that  assumption,  just  as  the  fundamental  proposition  of  poli- 
tical economy  that  land,  labor  and  capital  are  the  three  factors 
of  production,  vitiates  all  economic  reasoning,  and  causes 
it  to  issue  in  utterly  false  conclusions ;  just  as  the  ascription 
of  the  causes  of  conduct  to  pure  inventions  of  the  writers 
instead  of  to  the  principle  of  human  nature — the  instinct  of 
self-preservation — renders  impossible  right  thinking  concern- 
ing the  theory  of  human  conduct,  and  just  as  the  acceptation 
of  the  noxious  doctrine  of  evolution  in  general,  which  in- 
volves the  evolution  of  the  first  law  of  nature,  self-preserva- 
tion, into,  first,  a  rudiment  of  another  alleged  principle  which 
Spencer  calls  pro-altruism,  and  then  into  the  full-fledged  prin- 
ciple conceived  in  the  imagination,  called  altruism,  renders 
futile  all  speculation  respecting  the  theory  of  human  progress, 
puts  out  of  question  deliberate,  consistent  effort  toward  pro- 
gress, and  gives  sway  to  a  sequence  of  inconsistent,  hap- 
hazard effort  w^ith  expediency  as  a  basis. 

When  coldly  contemplating  the  matter  from  a  view  point 
free  from  the  entanglements  of  theories,  there  bursts  into  our 
consciousness  a  feeling  of  profound  astonishment  that  any 
man  should  have  had  the  hardihood  to  promulgate  any  theory 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    human    progress       275 

or  system  of  pliilosophy  having  for  its  basis  any  other  con- 
ception than  that  the  principles  of  human  nature,  like  all 
other  natural  principles,  are  inexorable  laws,  an<l  that  human 
nature  is  precisely  what  it  was  designed  to  be  ami  is  therefore 
perfectly  adapted  to  its  intended  purposes. 

And  when  one  perceives  the  wonderfully  lucid  explanation 
of  heretofore  seemingly  inexplicable  social  phenomena,  which 
a  knowledge  of  human  nature  affords,  he  is  forced  to  con- 
clude that  the  absence  of  that  very  knowledge  has  been  a 
greater  drawback  to  human  progress  than  all  other  causes 
combined. 

Human  progress  consists  in  a  discovery  or  an  achievement 
which  will  minister  to  a  higher  and  completer  life — an  accom- 
plishment which  will  subserve  self-interest  in  a  manner  or 
to  a  degree  in  which  it  was  not  formerly  subserved. 

All  human  progress,  therefore,  depends  upon  the  acquire- 
ment of  knowledge  of  what  will  better  subserve  self-interest. 
It  has  been  explained  in  the  previous  chapters  how  the  ac- 
quirement of  knowledge  is  engendered  by  the  interplay  of  the 
factors  of  conduct,  the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  environ- 
ment and  knowledge. 

It  has  also  been  shown  that  that  part  of  our  environment 
which  alone  exerts  any  inlluence  on  the  acquirement  of 
knowledge  is  itself  man-made  and  is  the  product  of  instinct 
and  the  prevailing  state  of  knowledge. 

We  have  also  learned  that  instinct  is  an  invariable  prin- 
ciple or  law  of  human  nature,  that  knowledge  is  an  accomplish- 
ment and  that  the  state  of  our  knowledge  is  ever  changing. 

We  have  found  that  we  cannot  change  our  instinct  in  the 
least,  but  that  we  may  gain  knowle<lge  without  any  assignable 
limits. 

Hence,  we  reach  the  conclusion  that  all  human  progress 
depends  upon  the  acquirement  of  knowledge.  And  thus  has 
been  evolved  the  theory  of  human  progress. 


276  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

Now,  since  the  environment  is  a  very  powerful  factor  in  the 
acquirement  of  knowledge,  and  our  environment  is  entirely 
within  our  control,  the  one  thing  which  we  are  able  to  do  now, 
which  will  cause  the  greatest  immediate  advancement  in  the 
acquirement  of  knowledge,  is  to  establish  social  justice,  in 
order  that  everyone  who  will,  may  have  the  time,  opportunity 
and  personal  incentive  to  seek  the  discovery  of  facts  which 
will  promote  the  well-being  of  himself  and  of  mankind.  For 
there  is  no  doubt  that  the  more  people  there  are  who  have 
the  time,  opportunity,  and  incentive  to  work  at  the  solution 
of  problems  of  life,  the  sooner  those  problems,  one  after  an- 
other, will  be  solved. 

In  the  present  state  of  the  arts  the  productive  power  of 
labor  is  so  great  that  under  a  system  of  social  arrangements 
which  would  both  impel  and  compel  just  conduct  and  would 
therefore  bring  about  a  state  of  social  justice  the  all-consuming 
struggle  for  food,  shelter  and  clothing  would  be  done  away 
with. 

The  mere  getting  of  a  comfortable  living  would  be  a  matter 
of  course  and  would  not  consume  more  than  four  or  five 
hours  of  daily  labor.  All  of  us  would  have  ample  time  in 
which  to  cultivate  our  intellects  and  to  apply  our  cultivated 
minds  to  the  discovery  of  useful  knowledge — to  the  making 
of  progress. 

The  principles  of  human  nature,  through  the  operation  of 
which  alone  any  progress  toward  improved  economic  condi- 
tions must  be  made,  are  the  identical  principles  through  the 
operation  of  which  alone  any  human  progress,  other  than 
economic,  must  be  made. 

And  the  same  process  by  which  we  arrive  at  the  conditions 
under  which  human  nature  must  operate  so  that  economic 
justice  will  proceed  therefrom,  must  be  employed  to  discover 
the  conditions  under  which  human  nature  must  operate  in 
order  that  progress  may  be  made  in  other  respects. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF    human    progress       277 

The  conditions  which  must  exist,  in  order  that  human 
progress  in  any  particular  (Hrection  may.be  i)ronK)tcd,  must 
invarial)ly  he  such  that  the  play  of  the  princii)le  of  human 
nature,  which  always  prompts  the  pursuit  of  what  wc  under- 
stand to  be  our  self-interest,  will,  by  reason  of  the  very  fact 
that  each  individual  pursues  his  self-interest,  make  for  pro- 
gress in  that  direction,  which  implies  that  we  must  have  a 
correct  understanding  of  what  our  self-interest  is. 

We  come  now  to  the  hnal  conclusion  that  the  philosophy 
of  human  progress  is  nothing  else  than  the  philosophy  of 
human  conduct. 


CHAPTER  XV. 
LABOR  UNIONS. 

That  the  present  unjust  system  of  social  arrangements  en- 
genders a  disregard  for  the  rights  of  others,  demoralizes  con- 
duct in  general  and  distorts  the  ethical  perceptions  of  the  peo- 
ple is  to  be  observed  upon  every  hand. 

How  could  it  be  otherwise  when  the  system  imposes  on 
every  one  the  necessity  of  either  submitting  to  the  appropria- 
tion of  a  large  part  of  the  produce  of  his  labor  by  others,  or 
of  himself  appropriating  a  part  of  the  produce  of  the  labor 
of  others  ? 

Labor  unions  are  sometimes  characterized  as  labor  trusts. 
They  are  denounced  for  their  disregard  of  the  rights  of  those 
who  are  not  members  of  the  union  and  for  the  unjust  methods 
which  they  employ  to  accomplish  their  purposes. 

But  those  who  make  this  criticism  have  failed  to  take  into 
account  the  important  fact  that  were  the  laborers  and  arti- 
sans not  banded  together  into  unions  for  mutual  protection 
and  aid  they  would  certainly  belong  to  the  class  who  would 
be  compelled  to  submit  to  the  appropriation  of  a  very  large 
proportion  of  the  produce  of  their  labor  by  the  class  of  appro- 
priators,  and  even  after  they  had  been  organized  into  unions 
they  would  be  able  to  accomplish  very  little  toward  keeping 
a  larger  part  of  the  produce  of  their  labor  for  their  own 
benefit,  did  they  not  resort  to  the  boycott,  the  strike,  heavy 
initiation  fees  and  dues,  black-listing,  limitations  of  the  num- 
ber of  apprentices  and  other  practices  which,  taken  by  them- 
selves, without  reference  to  the  social  system  which  gave  birth 
to  them,  are  morally  unlawful. 

While,  therefore,  the  present  unjust  system  of  privileges 
exists,   classes  of   workers,   such   as   bricklayers,   carpenters, 


LABOR   UXIONS  279 

metal-workers,  miners,  railroad  employes,  etc.,  are  justified 
in  self-defense  to  unite  themselves  into  permanent,  organized 
bodies  for  the  jjurpose  of  compelling  their  employers  to  pay 
them  greater  compensation  for  a  given  amount  of  labor,  and  to 
otherwise  ameliorate  the  conditions  under  which  they  labor. 

A  union  cannot  be  blamed,  if  it  is  able  to  do  so,  for  forcing 
the  wages  of  its  members  upward  to  a  level  even  considerably 
above  the  current  rate  of  wages  for  non-union  workers,  or  the 
uages  of  members  of  other  unions,  although  by  doing  so  they 
would  indirectly  appropriate  a  part  of  the  produce  of  the 
labor  of  their  fellow  workers  who  do  not  belong  to  their 
union. 

For,  it  is  not  possible  for  one  class  of  workers  through  or- 
ganized and  concerted  action  to  raise  their  wages  above  the 
ordinary  level  of  wages  without,  at  the  same  time,  despoiling 
their  fellow  workmen  who  are  not  organized  or  who,  if  they 
are  organized,  have  not  been  able  to  force  their  wages  up  to 
the  same  level. 

Therefore,  a  labor  union,  the  chief  purpose  of  whose  exist- 
ence is  to  arbitrarily  force  the  wages  of  its  members  above  the 
normal  level  under  the  existing  conditions,  assumes  precisely 
the  same  attitude  toward  all  persons  outside  that  union  as  the 
capital  union  assumes  toward  the  members  of  that  labor  union 
and  all  others  who  do  not  belong  to  the  capital  union. 

But  the  members  of  the  labor  union,  having  been  placed  by 
an  unjust  system  of  social  arrangements  in  such  a  position  that 
they  must  themselves  be  despoiled  or  despoil  others,  are  but 
observing  the  mandates  of  the  first  law  of  nature  in  endeavor- 
ing by  organization — the  strength  which  concerted  action  gives 
them — and  by  any  other  means  within  their  power,  to  prevent 
their  spoliation  by  others,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  such 
action  involves  the  necessity  of  themselves  despoiling  others. 
While  the  appropriation  by  members  of  labor  unions  of  the 
produce  of  the  labor  of  others  is  as  indubitably  wrong  and 


280  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

reprehensible  as  is  the  appropriation  by  capitalists  of  the  pro- 
duce of  the  labor  of  members  of  labor  unions  (which  is  the 
very  thing  which  labor  unions  were  organized  to  combat  and 
prevent)  when  the  members  of  a  labor  union  do  force  their 
wages  upward  at  the  expense  of  other  workers  who  are  unable 
to  protect  themselves,  according  to  the  theory  of  relative  eth- 
ics, though  acting  unjustly,  they  are  acting  as  nearly  right  as 
the  circumstances  will  allow,  and  therefore,  their  conduct  is 
justifiable. 

The  law  of  self-preservation,  operating  under  an  unjust  so- 
cial system  has  made  predatory  trusts  of  the  labor  unions, 
whose  depredations  are  no  less  morally  wrong  than  are  the 
exploitations  by  the  industrial  trusts. 

The  labor  unions  would  stand  on  justifiable  grounds  if  their 
activities  resulted  only  in  preventing  or  minimizing  their  own 
exploitation  by  others.  But  the  difficulty  is,  that  while  the 
anions  may  intend  to  accomplish  no  other  purpose,  the  actual 
consequences  of  their  efforts  are  determined  by  the  operation 
of  natural  laws  over  which  they  have  no  control;  and,  under 
a  bad  social  system,  any  attempt  they  may  make  through  the 
exercise  of  arbitrary  power  to  better  their  own  condition  must 
do  harm  to  their  weaker,  defenseless  fellow  workingmen. 

Therefore,  in  order  to  free  themselves  from  moral  respon- 
sibility for  the  wrongs  they  commit  in  self-defense,  they  must 
make  it  the  chief  and  most  insistent  purpose  of  the  unions  to 
change  the  social  system,  so  that  every  worker  will  get,  not 
a  little  more,  but  all  of  his  rights,  without  having  to  resort 
to  the  unjust  methods  of  labor  unions. 

The  object  to  be  sought  is  not  to  increase  somewhat  the 
number  of  workers  in  some  one  industry,  nor  to  increase 
somewhat  the  number  of  workers  in  general,  nor  to  reduce  by 
a  greater  or  less  per  centum  the  number  of  enforced  idlers, 
nor  to  increase  by  a  greater  or  less  per  centum  the  proportion 
of  the  produce  of  labor  which  shall  go  to  the  producer  and 


LABOR   UNIONS  281 

to  correspondingly  re<luce  tlic  proportion  wliicli  goes  to  the 
non-producing  privilege  owner,  but  it  siiould  be  the  fixed,  un- 
compromising purpose  to  arrange  matters  so  that  the  worker 
will  get  the  entire  produce  of  his  labor.  It  should  be  the  aim 
to  so  i\x  things  that  there  will  be  no  involuntary  idlers,  and 
that  no  one  could  get  anything  without  working  for  it,  except, 
of  course,  by  free  gift  or  bequest. 

And  once  again,  let  it  be  noted  that  the  only  possible  way 
by  which  the  producer  can  secure  a  greater  share  of  what  he 
produces,  and  the  privilege  owner  be  compelled  to  accept  a 
smaller  share,  is  by  weakening  or  destroying  some  privilege. 

The  only  possible  way  by  which  the  producer  can  secure 
the  whole  produce  of  his  labor  and  prevent  the  non-producing 
privilege  owner  from  getting  any  share  of  it  is  to  literally 
destroy  all  privileges. 

Fie  upon  compromising  one's  right  to  what  he  produces ! 
Let  the  cry  be:  Justice,  entire  justice;  yet,  nothing  but  justice! 

So  long  as  the  labor  unions  uphold  the  institutions  and  laws 
which  create  the  privileges  which  enable  the  owners  of  privi- 
leges to  exploit  the  workers,  and  thus  make  it  necessary  for 
the  workers  to  organize  themselves  for  self  protection  into 
divers  unions  (each  bent  upon  looking  after  the  interests  of 
its  own  membership,  regardless  of  the  interests  of  the  mem- 
bership of  other  unions,  and  of  the  interests  of  those  who  be- 
long to  no  union),  which  must,  in  order  to  accomplish  any- 
thing, resort  to  tactics  which  are  in  themselves  morally  wrong, 
the  unionists  must  be  held  morally  accountable  f(jr  their  every 
immoral  act. 

I  am  constrained  to  think  that  the  rigid  holding  of  tlie  union- 
ists to  legal  accountability  for  every  act  which  in  itself  does 
not  exactly  square  with  the  principles  of  morality  will  prove 
to  be  to  the  unionists  a  blessing  in  disgiiise.  For,  the  sooner 
they  learn  that  the  social  system  is  the  real  cause  of  all  their 
troubles,  the  sooner  they  will  turn  their  attention  toward  the 


282  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

reformation  of  the  social  system  as  the  only  effectual  means 
of  getting  their  rights. 

The  labor  unionists  can  never  hope  to  get  their  rights 
through  present  labor  union  policies.  Nor  can  they  hope  to 
change  the  attitude  toward  them  of  the  great  mass  of  work- 
ers outside  the  unions  from  that  of  hostility  to  that  of  sym- 
pathy until  the  unions  deserve  that  sympathy  by  fighting  for 
the  common,  natural  rights  of  all,  instead  of  for  what  they 
now  believe  to  be  their  own  special  interests. 

There  will  be  no  lack  of  mutual  sympathy  and  support 
among  different  orders  of  workers  when  their  cause  is  com- 
mon in  respect  of  self-interest.  But  diversity  of  self-interest 
among  them  cannot  possibly  establish  any  other  relationship 
than  one  of  antagonism. 

Being  actuated  by  the  same  motive,  self-interest,  as  the 
capital  union,  the  labor  union  strives  to  get  as  much  wages 
for  as  little  labor  as  possible.  And  when  the  labor  unions 
have  the  power  to  dictate  terms  to  their  employers,  or  to  the 
papital  union,  the  only  limits  they  will  fix  to  their  demands 
will  be  those  prescribed  by  their  own  interests. 

They  will  not  carry  their  demands  so  far  as  to  so  cripple 
the  business  in  which  they  are  employed  that  their  employers 
would  be  unable  to  carry  on  their  business,  and  meet  the  de- 
mands of  the  labor  union. 

Neither  will  the  capital  union  exert  its  power  to  reduce 
wages  to  the  extent  that  its  employes  will  not  be  allowed  suf- 
ficient wages  to  keep  them  in  good  working  condition.  On 
the  contrary,  employers  will  even  permit  them  to  enjoy  enough 
of  the  simple  comforts  of  life  to  keep  them  docile  and  dis- 
posed to  work. 

When  a  labor  union  places  a  price  upon  membership  or  re- 
stricts the  number  of  apprentices  who  may  learn  a  particular 
trade,  it  makes  a  monopoly  of  that  trade  as  much  as  the  capi- 
tal union  engaged  in  a  particular  line  of  business  makes  a 


LABOR    UNIONS  283 

monopoly  of  that  business  by  joining  together  and  adopting 
means  to  prevent  others  from  engaging  in  the  same  business. 
Even  though  the  labor  unions  are  justified  in  carrying  on  a 
defensive  warfare  against  the  capital  unions,  they  are  not  jus- 
tified in  making  such  warfare  the  sole  object,  nor  even  the 
chief  object,  of  their  organizations,  nor  is  such  a  policy  conso- 
nant with  their  best  interests. 
f 

In  a  contest  of  strength  between  the  workers  on  one  side 
and  the  privilegists  on  the  other,  the  workers  may  make  some 
headway  now  and  then,  but  in  the  long  run,  and  in  most  of 
the  battles  of  the  interminable  war,  the  workers  are  fore- 
doomed to  certain  defeat.  Even  the  victories  the  workers  win 
usually  cost  them  as  much,  if  not  more,  than  they  come  to. 
For  the  privileges  in  the  hands  of  their  employers  are  them- 
selves more  powerful  than  all  the  labor  unions  that  can  be 
organized. 

As  I  write  (1908),  we  are  in  the  midst  of  a  panic,  and  labor 
unions  are  everywhere  receding  from  the  ground  gained  prior 
to  the  panic,  and  they  will  have  to  make  as  hard  and  expensive 
a  fight  to  regain  the  ground  they  are  now  losing  as  they  tiid 
to  gain  that  ground  in  the  first  place. 

Since  the  above  paragraph  was  written  the  cost  of  living 
has  increased  more  rapidly  than  it  ever  did  in  times  of  peace 
in  the  history  of  this  or  any  other  civilized  country.  The 
cost  of  living  has  increased  at  a  far  greater  ratio  than  even 
the  best  organized  labor  unions  have  been  able  to  force  wages 
upward. 

So  that  while  the  wages  of  some  of  the  workers  have  been 
considerably  increased  nominally,  the  actual  wages  of  prac- 
tically all  workers,  including  the  unionists,  have  been  consid- 
erably  reduced. 

The  labor  unions  have  not  been  able  even  to  hold  the  ground 
which  they  once  held,  and  to  avoid  being  forced  to  a  still 


284  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

lower  standard  of  living,  they  have  been  compelled  by  strikes 
to  cut  off,  for  a  time  at  least,  all  their  wages. 

Now,  in  view  of  their  experiences,  it  ought  to  be  clear  to 
the  dullest  among  them  that  if  the  labor  unions  will  devote 
the  energy  and  money  which  they  have  given  to  strikes  to  the 
reformation  of  the  social  arrangements,  they,  with  the  co- 
operation of  the  larger  number  of  non-union  workers,  may 
without  privation,  within  a  very  short  time,  secure  all  of  their 
rights,  all  that  is  coming  to  them,  the  highest  wages  that  under 
any  circumstances  are  possible — the  full  produce  of  their  la- 
bor performed  under  the  most  favorable  conditions. 

Unless  we  assume  that  the  nature  of  the  labor  unionist  is 
constituted  differently  from  that  of  the  capital  unionist,  we 
must  confidently  expect  that  as  soon  as  they  learn  that  to 
hope  to  get  all  their  rights  by  means  of  unequal  contests  with 
the  overwhelming  power  of  privileges  backed  by  the  govern- 
ment is  futile,  and  that  the  only  effective  means  of  gaining  all 
their  rights  is  by  depriving  the  privilegists  of  their  privileges, 
and  of  the  use  of  the  power  of  the  government,  and  learn  how 
to  accomplish  that  end,  they  will  direct  the  power  of  their 
numbers  toward  the  accomplishment  of  that  purpose. 

Their  contention  for  a  little  more  pay  or  a  little  shorter 
day  will  then  become  but  an  incidental  purpose  of  labor  union- 
ism, that  is  to  say,  labor  unionists  will  be  merged  into  one 
compact  political  union,  embracing  all  men  who  are  ready  to 
abolish  all  privileges  and  subject  the  acts  and  functions  of 
government,  including  the  courts,  to  the  will  of  the  majority 
directly  expressed. 

The  very  first  lesson  which  the  labor  unionists  as  well  as 
every  other  man  who  suffers  from  injustice  and  yearns  for 
justice  must  learn  is,  that  he  can  never  get  justice  for  him- 
self by  associating  himself  with  a  number  of  his  fellows  for 
the  purpose  of  benefiting  those  who  belong  to  that  associa- 
tion only,  but  that  they  must  understand  that  they  must  all 


LABOR    UNIONS  285 

stand  together  as  one  man  to  denianil  just  conditions,  not  only 
for  themselves,  but  for  even  those  who  oppose  them. 

Just  now  the  labor  unions  are  threatened  with  annihilation 
by  the  writ  of  injunction  and  decisions  of  courts. 

Knowing  that  they  caimot  enforce  their  demands  by  the 
mere  power  of  concerted  action,  by  simply  declining  to  work 
except  upon  terms  agreeable  to  them,  they  have  been  com- 
pelled to  resort  to  such  means  as  the  boycot,  the  picketing  of 
their  employer's  place  of  business,  and  frequently  tiu'eatening 
personal  violence  to  those  who  would  take  their  places. 

The  courts,  in  recent  decisions,  have  hehl  that  such  prac- 
tices, without  resort  to  which  the  labor  unions  can  accomplish 
nothing,  are  illegal ;  that  labor  unions  which  adopt  such  meth- 
ods are  organizations  in  restraint  of  trade;  and  that  labor 
unions  which  practice  such  methods  are  liable  for  pecuniary 
damages  to  those  who  may  be  injured  thereby. 

It  has  become  an  established  practice  of  the  courts  to  issue 
a  writ  of  injunction  against  the  entire  membership  of  a  labor 
union,  its  aids  and  abettors,  forbidding  them  to  do  all  manner 
of  things,  including  things  which  they  have  both  a  moral  and 
legal  right  to  do,  on  pain  of  summary  punishment  by  the  court, 
in  violation  of  the  constitutional  right  of  trial  by  jury. 

Rut  really,  it  does  not  become  the  labor  unionist  to  anathe- 
matize the  capital  unionist  and  all  his  works,  so  long  as  the 
labor  unionist  upholds  the  system  which  makes  it  possible  for 
the  capital  unionist  to  put  the  labor  unionist  in  the  position 
that  compels  him  to  organize  a  union  to  avoid  being  robbed 
himself  and  to  incidentally  rob  others. 

For  the  landlord  and  the  capital-lord  are  nothing  but  crea- 
tures of  the  social  system,  just  as  the  labor-union-lord  is  a 
product  of  the  same  social  system.  The  attitude  of  the  labor 
union  toward  the  remainder  of  the  community  is  in  itself 
morally   no   less   indefensible   and    reprehensible   than   is   the 


286  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

attitude  of  the  employer  class  toward  the  wage-working  class 
in  general. 

Those  labor  unionists  who  have  been  unable  to  understand 
why  they  do  not  enjoy  to  a  greater  extent  the  sympathy  and 
support  of  the  body  of  the  people,  I  think,  will  find  a  satis- 
factory explanation  of  that  circumstance  in  the  foregoing 
observations. 

The  purposes  and  methods  of  labor  unions,  considered  inde- 
pendently of  the  unjust  social  conditions  which  apparently 
made  them  necessary,  are  in  themselves  morally  unjustifiable, 
and  the  masses  of  the  people  outside  the  unions,  whether  they 
be  workers  or  privilegists,  realize  that  fact,  and  therein  lies 
the  weakness  of  the  labor  unions. 

The  people  at  large  know  that  if  a  labor  union  succeeds  in 
accomplishing  its  purpose,  that  the  result  will  be  not  only 
harmful  to  their  interests,  but  unjust  to  all  workers  outside 
of  the  union. 

The  people  realize  that  their  interests  and  those  of  the 
labor  union  are  not  identical  better  perhaps  than  the  average 
member  of  the  union  realizes  that  the  interests  of  the  land- 
lord and  capital-lord  on  one  hand  and  of  the  working  labor 
unionist  on  the  other  are  not  identical. 

Therefore,  the  people,  in  withholding  their  sympathy  and 
encouragement  from  the  labor  union  are  but  obeying  the  dic- 
tates of  the  same  principle  of  human  nature  which  also 
prompts  the  employer  to  get  out  of  the  worker  as  much 
work   for  as  little  pay  as  possible. 

It  may  be  thought  somewhat  peculiar  that  while  each  indi- 
vidual ever  strives  to  get  as  much  for  as  little  as  possible, 
he  is  inclined  to  regard  everyone  else  who  is  striving  to  do 
the  same  thing  as  more  or  less  mean.  But  there  is  nothing 
peculiar  about  our  proneness  to  condemn  others  for  taking 
economic  advantages  of  us,  while  we  excuse  ourselves  for 
taking  economic  advantages  of  others. 


LABOR    UNIONS  287 

Eacli  individual  knows  that  under  the  present  order  of 
things  men  arc  placed  in  such  economic  relations  to  each 
other  that  some  have  the  power  to  get  rich  at  the  expense  of 
others,  and  having  the  j)ower  to  do  so,  they  commonly  exer- 
cise that  power  to  the  uttermost.  And  when  that  power  is 
exercised  against  the  interests  of  a  particular  individual,  that 
individual  naturally  and  properly  considers  the  exercise  of 
that  power  as  unjust,  and  the  person  who  exercises  it  as 
mean.  He  knows  that  an  injustice  has  been  done  him,  and 
he  resents  that  injustice. 

But  while  he  correctly  reasons  tiiat  the  person  who  docs 
an  unjust  act  is  unjust,  he  fails  to  condone  such  unjust  acts 
by  others  toward  him,  because  he  erroneously  ascribes  the 
primary  cause  of  such  acts  to  the  innate  meanness  of  the  per- 
son perpetrating  them. 

Yet  he  will  readily  admit  that  were  he  in  a  position  to 
exercise  such  power  over  others,  he  would  do  so,  and  not 
consider  himself  at  all  mean. 

Nor  does  any  man  who  has  such  power  and  exercises  it 
consider  that  he  thereby  morally  debases  himself.  On  the 
contrary,  he  usually  congratulates  himself  and  regards  him- 
self as  a  good  business  man,  and  he  frequently  assumes  an  air 
of  superiority  over  the  people  by  whom  he  has  dealt  unjustly. 

And  strange  to  say,  he  is  frequently  held  up  to  the  youth  of 
the  country  as  a  shining  example  of  success,  to  be  emulated 
by  them,  which  teaching  means  that  in  order  to  succeed,  the 
young  man  must  adopt  the  same  course  followed  by  the  bus- 
iness man  who  has  succeeded  by  such  means,  that  is  to  say, 
they  must  by  hook  or  by  crook  acquire  the  same  power  that 
he  has  exercised  in  driving  unjust  bargains  with  his  fellow 
men ;  which  power,  by  the  way,  but  very  few  of  them  can 
ever  possibly  acquire. 

Now,  there  must  be  a  reason  for  the  seeming  inconsistency 
in  our  mental  attitude  toward  the  same  acts  committed  by 


288  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

others  and  by  ourselves.  Why  is  it  that  the  person  who  exer- 
cises the  power  of  an  economic  advantage  over  his  fellow  men 
does  not  consider  that  he  is  acting  unjustly  or  meanly,  but 
contrariwise,  believes  that  he  is  acting  wisely,  laudably,  and 
entirely  within  his  rights? 

Why  does  he  believe  that  his  success  in  driving  profitable 
bargains  is  due  to  his  superior  abilities,  while  he  who  gets 
the  worst  end  of  such  bargains  ascribes  his  plight  to  the  mean- 
ness of  the  other  fellow,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he  wishes 
that  he  were  in  a  position  which  would  enable  him  to  take 
the  same  sort  of  advantage  over  others? 

It  is  simply  because  the  whole  system  of  social  arrangements 
puts  the  economic  interests  of  each  member  of  the  community 
at  daggers'  points  with  the  interests  of  every  other  member 
of  the  community. 

The  social  arrangements  simply  place  each  individual  in 
such  a  predicament  that  as  a  matter  of  self-defense  and  self- 
preservation  he  must,  in  his  economic  dealings  with  others, 
disregard  their  rights  and  hence  the  moral  law,  and  there- 
fore, he  justifies  before  his  own  conscience  the  perpetration 
of  injustice.  Self-preservation  left  him  no  alternative — he 
must  commit  injustice. 

Whatever  one  feels  under  the  necessity  of  doing,  he  feels  that 
it  is  his  right  to  do,  and  therefore  it  is  well  nigh  a  universal 
practice  of  even  those  who  have  what  are  called  sensitive  con- 
sciences and  high  ideals  of  right  to  get  something  for  noth- 
ing in  their  business  transactions,  if  they  can. 

They  feel  compelled  to  conduct  their  business  in  this  man- 
ner and,  therefore,  they  feel  justified.  They  feel  that  in  doing 
these  morally  wrong  acts,  the  responsibility  is  not  theirs, 
but  that  the  responsibility  belongs  to  the  conditions  which 
conspire  to  compel  them  to  act  unjustly  —  conditions  over 
which  they  have  no  control. 

Those  who  have  felt  the  need  of  an  explanation  for  the 


LABOR    UNIONS  289 

existence  of  those  conditions  have  found  it  convenient  and 
easy  to  adopt  tlie  ready-made  explanation  that  those 
conditions  were  brought  about  by  the  imperfections  of  human 
nature.  And  that  utterly  false  diagnosis  of  the  trouble,  even 
though  it  may  not  have  been  satisfactory  to  all  minds,  has 
served  as  an  explanation  which  has  not  heretofore  been 
proven  to  be  false,  nor  even  seriously  questioned. 

It  is  natural  for  thinking  men  to  want  reasons  for  things, 
but  it  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  when  they  are  unable  to  con- 
clusively connect  effects  with  their  causes ;  when  they  are  un- 
able to  know  the  true  explanation  of  things,  they  are  ready 
to  believe  that  some  more  or  less  plausible,  although  entirely 
untrue,  explanation  of  phenomena  which  has  been  presented 
to  their  minds  is  the  true  explanation.  And  too  frequently 
they  do  not  concern  themselves  whether  the  explanation  be 
true  or  false ;  any  explanation,  no  matter  how  idiotic,  seems 
to  satisfy  them,  so  long  as  it  appears  plausible  to  them. 

It  is  because  most  men.  by  reason  of  mental  indolence  and 
indifference,  occasioned  by  ignorance,  prefer  to  get  their  opin- 
ions, the  explanation  of  things,  ready-made,  that  the  ruling 
class  have  established  many  institutions  for  the  purpose  of 
furnishing  them  with  ready-made  opinions,  and  after  the  man- 
ner of  the  leading  dressmakers  and  drapers  of  the  world  who 
set  the  fashions  in  dress,  have  set  the  fashions  in  opinions. 

And,  knowing  that  most  people  are  as  much  slaves  to  fash- 
ion in  opinions  as  in  dress,  they  have,  of  course,  made  fash- 
ionable the  opinions  they  wanted  the  people  to  hold. 

The  above  described  mental  ha])its  of  men  account  for  the 
otherwise  inexplicable  fact  that  so  many  men's  minds  are 
burdened  with  a  host  of  incongruous,  irreconcilably  hostile 
opinions. 

Now,  it  is  because  the  fallacy  of  the  explanation  of  social 
phenomena  has  not  been  detected,  that  greater  progress  to- 
ward the  di.scovery  of  the  true  explanation  has  not  been  made. 


290  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

It  is  because  the  people  have  not  seen  the  error  of  the  ex- 
planations that  have  been  given  to  them  ready-made,  that 
they  have  not  eagerly  sought  -other  and  better  explanations, 
and,  being  ignorant  of  the  cause  of  the  evil  conditions  of 
which  they  complained,  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  know 
how  those  conditions  might  be  changed  so  as  to  relieve  every- 
one from  the  slightest  necessity  of  doing  his  fellow  men  the 
slightest  economic  injustice. 

But,  when  men  once  realize  that  the  social  conditions  which 
compel  them  to  do  injustice  to  each  other  were  deliberately 
made  by  those  who  desired  to  profit  by  unjust  conditions,  as 
they  could  not  do  under  just  conditions;  when  they  realize 
that  socal  conditions  can  be  made  different  from  what  they 
are,  as  well  as  they  were  made  what  they  are;  and  when  they 
understand  that  it  really  requires  less  ingenuity  and  trouble, 
simpler  institutions  and  fewer  laws  to  make  social  arrange- 
ments what  they  ought  to  be  than  has  been  needed  to  make 
them  what  they  are,  and,  finally,  when  they  comprehend  the 
simple  but  thoroughly  effectual  means  by  which  just  condi- 
tions may  be  established,  every  man  will  feel  his  responsibility 
for  every  act  of  economic  injustice  committed  by  himself  or 
by  others  which  has  been  made  necessary  in  the  pursuit  of 
self-interest  by  the   wrong  social   conditions. 

Yet,  although  the  realization  of  responsibility  for  poverty,  the 
great  number  of  premature  deaths,  drunkenness,  all  manner 
of  vices  and  crimes  and  innumerable  forms  of  injustice  which 
are  entirely  due  to  bad  social  arrangements,  may  deter  some 
Avho  profit  by  the  bad  social  arrangements  from  further  sup- 
porting them,  and  may  even  induce  many  of  them  to  put  forth 
every  effort  to  overthrow  them,  it  would  be  foolish  for  us  to 
depend  upon  those  who  profit  by  unjust  social  arrangements 
(who  are  now  the  most  influential  body  of  the  people)  to 
establish  just  social  arrangements. 

That  can  be  done  without  the  assistance  of  a  single  per- 


LABOR  UNIONS  291 

son  who  profits  more  tlian  he  suffers  from  iniquitous  con- 
».1itions,  because  such  persons  are  a  small  minority  of  the  pop- 
ulation. 

If  right  social  arrangements  are  to  be  established  they 
must  be  established  by  those  who  suffer  by  wrong  social  ar- 
rangements; and  since,  in  the  nature  of  things,  bad  social  ar- 
rangements can  never  profit  more  than  a  small  minority  of 
the  people,  and  must  invariably  harm  a  large  majority  of  the 
people,  we  come  again  to  the  self-evident  truth  that  once 
those  who  are  being  harmed  learn  to  what  extent  and  how 
they  are  being  harmed,  and  how  social  matters  may  be  so 
adjusted  that  they  will  be  protected  in  their  rights  instead 
of  being  deprived  of  them,  their  self-interest  will  not  permit 
them  to  rest  until  they  have  destroyed  the  last  vestige  of  law- 
made  economic  advantages,  and  built  upon  the  ruins  a  system 
of  social  justice. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

CLASS  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Recently  there  has  been  an  outbreak  of  complaint  among 
the  great  exploiters  of  labor  of  a  wide-spread  feeling  among 
the  workers  which  is  termed  class  consciousness. 

Such  a  feeling,  the  privilegists  argue,  bodes  no  good  for 
the  country.  The  exploiters  affect  not  to  understand  why 
there  should  exist  any  antagonism  on  the  part  of  the  ex- 
ploited toward  their  exploiters. 

They  contend  that  there  is  no  reason  why  there  should  not 
be  perfectly  amicable  relations  between  themselves  and  those 
whom  they  work  for  profit ;  and  in  support  of  their  contention 
they  offer  the  preposterous  falsehood,  which  will  soon  be  gen- 
erally regarded  as  ridiculous,  that  the  interests  of  the  capi- 
talist and  the  laborer  are  identical ;  that  what  is  good  for  the 
exploiter  is  good  for  the  exploited,  and  that  any  effort  made 
by  the  workers  to  secure  the  right  to  produce  without  asking 
leave  of  others,  and  the  right  to  retain  and  enjoy  what  they 
produce  will  only  do  them  harm. 

The  growth  of  class  consciousness,  instead  of  foreboding 
evil,  is  one  of  the  most  promising  signs  of  the  times. 

The  social  arrangements  have  divided  the  people  into  two 
classes — those  who  profit  by  privileges  and  those  who  suffer 
from  privileges.  The  existence  of  these  classes  is  not  a  ques- 
tion of  opinion,  it  is  a  monstrous  fact. 

Every  man  or  woman  in  this  country  belongs  to  one  or  the 
other  of  these  two  classes,  and  before  injustice  can  be  driven 
out  and  the  people  come  into  their  own,  it  will  be  first  neces- 
sary for  those  who  are  being  robbed  and  whose  lives  are  being 
dwarfed  and  made  miserable  through  the  operation  of  priv- 
ileges to  find  out  to  what  class  they  belong. 


CLASS    CONSCIOUSNESS  293 

Let  it  be  indelibly  impressed  upon  every  one's  mind  that, 
witii  reference  to  natural  rights  and  economic  justice,  there 
are  classes,  and  but  two  classes. 

The  union  carpenters  do  not  belong  to  one  class,  with  one 
set  of  rights;  the  bricklayers  to  another  class,  with  another  set 
of  rights;  the  locomotive  engineers  and  the  members  of  the 
farmers'  granges  to  still  other  classes,  with  other  sets  of  rights. 
The  artisans  of  whatever  sort,  the  clerks  in  offices  and  stores, 
railroad  employes,  longshoremen,  ditch  diggers,  miners,  farm- 
ers, and  widows  and  orphans  belong  cither  to  the  class  of 
slaves  whose  lives  are  ownetl  ami  controlled  in  a  R^reater  or 
less  degree  by  others,  or  to  the  class  that  work  the  slaves  for 
profit. 

The  interests  of  these  two  classes  can  never  be  reconciled. 
There  can  never  be  amicable  relations  between  those  who  be- 
long to  the  one  class  and  those  who  belong  to  the  other  until 
the  causes  which  divide  them  into  two  classes  have  been  re- 
moved and  the  classes  themselves  have  therefore  ceased  to 
exist. 

There  is  no  reason  why  there  should  not  bo  the  same  bit- 
terness of  feeling  on  the  part  of  th(»se  who  are  being  robbeil 
through  the  agency  of  privileges  toward  those  who  uphold 
and  use  privileges  as  a  means  of  robbing  them  that  one  people 
have  toward  another  who  attempt  to  conquer  them  for  the 
purpose  of  ruling  and  enslaving  them. 

The  different  orders  of  people  who  classify  tliemselves  ac- 
cording to  their  vocations  must  learn  that  the  sort  of  class 
con.sciousness  they  now  entertain  is  but  a  source  of  weakness 
and  impotency. 

Such  class  consciousness  divides  tlK)se  whose  interests  in 
this  matter  are  the  same  into  different  camps  which  antagon- 
ize the  interests  of  each  other  and  cause  their  ctmimon  inter- 
ests to  be  altogether  lost  sight  of. 

That  kind  of  class  consciousness   will  never  perform  the 


294  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

service  which  the  right  kind  of  class  consciousness  is  destined 
to  perform  when  the  different  orders  of  people  who  imagine 
that  they  belong  to  different  classes,  economically,  because 
they  do  different  kinds  of  work,  realize  that  they  belong  to 
the  same  class. 

And  since  none  of  the  social  ills  from  which  the  people 
now  suffer  can,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be  remedied  except 
through  the  operation  of  the  principle  of  self-interest,  it  be- 
comes obvious  that  the  masses  of  the  people  will  never  get 
their  rights  until  they  understand  that  they  all  alike  suffer 
from  the  same  cause,  that  they  have  a  common  interest  in 
removing  that  cause,  and  that  so  long  as  there  is  a  single 
social  question  left  unsettled  they  belong  to  one  and  the  same 
class  and  must  act  together  as  one  class. 

The  privilegists  clearly  perceive  that  they  belong  to  a  class, 
and  while  they  organize  into  various  groups,  each  group  and 
practically  all  individuals  of  that  class,  whether  they  belong 
to  any  of  the  organized  groups  or  not,  always  act  in  union 
when  their  common  interests  are  at  stake. 

And  even  when  the  interest  of  only  a  portion  of  them  is 
threatened,  all  of  them  join  in  the  defense,  because  they  rec- 
ognize the  fact  that  the  overthrow  of  any  particular  privilege 
imperils  all  other  privileges. 

The  different  orders  of  producers  are  not  so  wise. 

The  railroad  men  oppose  a  reduction  of  railroad  rates  to  a 
point  which  will  be  customarily  remunerative  only,  which  re- 
duction would  benefit  all  producers  and  all  consumers  of  all 
commodities,  including  the  railroad  workers,  because  the  rail- 
road managers  tell  them  that  their  wages  depend  upon  the 
earnings  of  the  railroads  over  and  above  the  interest  on  the 
outstanding  stocks  and  bonds,  much  of  which  is  water. 

For  similar  reasons  the  steel  workers,  the  coal  miners,  the 
operatives  in  the  cotton  and  woolen  mills,  the  lithographers, 
and  practically  all  other  artisans  employed  in  manufacturing 


CLASS   CONSCIOUSNESS  295 

support  the  protective  taritY,  believing  that  tlie  higher  the 
price  the  wares  which  they  respectively  produce  bring,  the 
higher  will  be  their  wages. 

Tiiey  want  a  protective  tariff  on  tlie  articles  which  they  pro- 
duce, reganlless  of  its  effect  on  the  interests  of  tiicir  fellow 
workers  in  other  lines.  They  join  hands  with  their  employ- 
ers to  secure  as  high  a  tariff  as  possible  on  the  goods  they 
produce,  in  accordance  with  the  delusion  that  their  wages  are 
regulated  by  the  price  their  employer  gets  for  his  goods,  and 
that  in  that  respect,  at  least,  the  interests  of  the  capitalist  and 
of  the  producer  are  identical. 

The  workers  know  that  the  price  at  which  many  commodi- 
ties sell  in  this  country  does  depend  upon  the  amount  of  duties 
levied  on  the  importation  of  those  commodities.  If  the  work- 
ers and  the  capitalists  were  real  partners  in  interest  it  would 
be  perfectly  reasonable  to  conclude  that  the  greater  the  earn- 
ings of  the  business  in  whicli  they  are  engaged,  the  larger 
would  be  the  portion  which  would  fall  to  each. 

But  when  the  workers  know,  as  they  do  know,  that  the 
protective  tariff  increases  the  profits  of  the  capitalists,  they 
also  ought  to  know  that  that  fact  alone  is  conclusive  proof 
that  the  protective  tariff  injures  the  producers  of  the  country, 
in  as  much  as  they  arc  consumers,  to  the  extent  at  least  to 
which  it  benefits  the  capitalists.  For  every  dollar  which  the 
capitalist  acquires  through  the  protective  tariff,  or  any  other 
form  of  privilege,  is  a  dollar  lost  to  the  consumer. 

Each  of  these  different  sets  of  workers  believe  that  they 
are  or  will  be  benefited  by  maintaining  or  extending  the 
privileges  enjoyed  by  their  employers.  .V  slight  examina- 
tion, however,  of  that  belief  will  discover  how  completely 
they  have  been  deceived  into  acting  in  a  manner  inevitably 
and  seriously  harmful  to  their  own  interests. 

If  it  be  assumed  that  all  workers  employed  by  capitalists 
engaged  in  different  lines  of  business,  by   reason   that   each 


296  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

group  of  capitalists  enjoys  a  privilege  at  the  hands  of  the  gov- 
ernment, get  a  somewhat  higher  nominal  wage  (an  assumption 
which  is  far  from  the  truth)  then,  how  does  the  worker,  who 
supposes  he  has  thus  been  indirectly  favored,  come  out? 

If  the  coal  miner  gets  a  few  more  cents  a  day  on  account 
of  the  high  price  at  which  coal  sells  which  has  been  made 
possible  by  a  tariff  on  coal  and  a  monopoly  of  the  production 
of  coal  in  this  country,  which  was  in  turn  made  possible  by 
the  land  monopoly,  the  transportation  monopoly  and  the  mo- 
nopolization of  capital  in  general,  the  coal  miner  must,  on  ac- 
count of  other  monopolies  built  up  in  like  manner,  pay  higher 
prices  for  his  milk,  butter,  eggs,  meat,  clothing,  furniture, 
tools,  powder,  for  the  house  he  occupies,  and  practically  for 
every  article  he  consumes. 

The  cost  of  living  is  thereby  enhanced  to  a  much  greater 
extent  than  his  nominal  wages  have  been  increased,  so  that, 
even  though  his  nominal  wages  have  been  slightly  increased, 
his  actual  wages — the  quantity  and  quality  of  the  necessaries 
and  comforts  of  life  which  he  gets  for  his  work — have  been 
very  much  reduced. 

It  is  the  necessaries  and  comforts  of  life  which  all  men 
work  for,  and  not  the  empty  satisfaction  of  having  their 
wages  increased  from  $1.50  a  day  to  $1.87  a  day,  when  they 
can  buy  less  of  the  necessaries  and  comforts  of  life  for  $1.87 
than  they  formerly  could  for  $1.50. 

If  every  privilege  did  not  occasion  a  loss  to  all  workers, 
as  such,  and  if  all  privileges  taken  together  did  not  occasion 
a  loss  to  all  workers,  it  would  not  be  possible  for  each  and 
every  owner  of  privileges  to  enjoy  an  income  from  profits ; 
nor  would  it  be  possible  that  the  system  of  privileges  would 
result  in  an  annual  balance  of  several  thousand  millions  of 
dollars  in  favor  of  the  privilege  owners. 

Each  privilege  aids  and  abets  all  other  privileges.  It  must 
do   so   as   a   measure   of   self-preservation.      Privilegists   are 


CLASS   CONSCIOUSNESS  297 

thorough  behevers  in  the  maxim:  "United  we  stand,  divided 
we  fall." 

In  imitation  of  the  co-operation  practiced  by  pioneer  set- 
tlers, they  join  forces  in  rolling  one  another's  logs.  But  un- 
like the  log  rolling  of  the  pioneers  who  ren(lere<l,  as  nearly  as 
possible,  service  for  service,  each  set  of  privilegists  strives 
to  get  the  largest  and  most  logs  rolled  for  itself,  while  roll- 
ing as  few  as  possible  for  others. 

The  great  privilegists  demand  as  much  as  they  think  the 
people  will  stand  for.  There  is  only  so  much  to  be  had. 
The  more  the  small  privilegists  get,  the  less  it  will  be  possi- 
ble for  the  great  privilegists  to  get.  Therefore,  the  powerful 
privilegists  allow  the  small  privilegists  just  enough,  and  no 
more,  than  is  sufficient  to  induce  them  to  support  the  demands 
of  the  great  privilegists.  The  small  privilegists  do  gain  some- 
thing by  supporting  the  great  privilegists. 

The  workers,  however,  stand  in  a  very  diflferent  position. 
They  do  not  possess  any  privilege ;  and  when  they  support 
privileges  in  general,  which  belong  to  and  profit  others,  in 
the  hope  that  they  will  be  indirectly  benefited  by  some  spe- 
cially favored  industry,  they  not  only  reduce  the  actual  wages 
of  other  workers,  but  they  reduce  their  own  actual  wages 
even  more  in  the  aggregate  than  the  total  profits  of  the  priv- 
ilege owners. 

The  privilegists  may  wax  rich  by  robbing  the  producers,  but 
the  producers  can  never  pet  more  of  the  necessaries  and  com- 
forts of  life  for  their  labor  by  robbing  one  another — by  en- 
deavoring to  get  their  own  wages  increased  through  helping 
their  employers  to  rob  all  jiroducers. 

It  is  difficult  to  enlist  a  majority  of  the  people  in  opposition 
to  any  single  privilege,  because  many  of  those  who  suffer 
much  from  the  system  of  privileges,  and  who  ought  therefore 
to  throw  their  influence  against  any  privilege  whatsoever, 
imagine  that  they  belong  to  a  class  that  are  not  especially  inter- 


298  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

ested  in  that  particular  privilege.  Therefore,  they  either  do 
not  oppose  it  or,  on  account  of  some  misjudged  consideration, 
they  actually  indorse  the  privilege. 

But  an  attack  on  the  entire  system  of  privileges  will  readily 
enlist  the  sympathy  and  active  support  of  all  persons  who 
come  to  understand  that  they  are  being  terribly  hurt  by  it,  for 
the  simple  reason  that  their  self-interest  will  irresistibly  impel 
them  to  do  so. 

The  abolition  of  all  privileges  depends  altogether  upon 
the  enlightment  of  the  people  concerning  their  true  self- 
interest  respecting  privileges. 

And  when  the  different  orders  of  workers  realize  that  it  is 
privileges,  and  privileges  alone,  which  are  hurting  them,  they 
will  become  conscious  of  the  fact  that  a  vast  majority  of  them 
belong  to  the  same  class,  and  that  it  will  be  to  the  self- 
interest  of  every  man  who  does  not  profit  by  privileges  to  co- 
operate with  all  others  of  his  class  in  the  destruction  of  priv- 
ileges, one  and  all. 

That  is  the  sort  of  class  consciousness  which  will  win  for 
the  people  all  their  rights,  and  without  which  they  can  have 
little  hope  of  getting  any  part  of  their  rights  of  much  value 
to  them. 

Many  of  those  who  even  profit  pecuniarily  by  privileges, 
when  they  come  to  understand  what  enormous  strides  in  civili- 
zation will  be  made  by  the  banishment  of  want  and  the  fear 
of  want,  the  disappearance  of  crime  and  vices,  the  stamping 
out  of  diseases,  the  longed-for  peace  of  mind  and  contentment, 
the  great  augmentation  in  real  happiness  and  all  which  that 
term  implies,  that  will  certainly  follow  the  abolition  of  privi- 
leges, which  would  be  the  establishment  of  justice,  will  realize 
that  they  also  belong  to  the  class  who  are  injured  by  the  sys- 
tem of  privileges. 

For  they  will  see  that  they,  along  with  their  brethren  who 
suffer  pecuniary  loss  by  reason  of  the  existence  of  privileges, 


CLASS    COXSCIOUSNESS  299 

will  gain,  by  the  cstahlislimctit  of  justice,  benefits  which  can- 
not be  bought  with  money. 

If  it  were  not  that  umlcr  the  present  system  of  privileges 
the  right  of  most  people  to  work  at  all,  or  to  get  any  wages 
is  put  within  the  power  of  the  capitalist  to  grant  or  to  with- 
hold, and  if  experience  had  not  shown  that  to  antagonize 
the  interests  of  the  capitalists  is  usually  followed  by  the  dis- 
comfiture of  the  workers,  tiie  mother  wit  of  even  those  who 
lack  the  knowledge  to  reason  out  the  true  relation  between 
capital  and  labor  would  have  directed  them  unerringly  to 
serve  their  own  interests,  and  therefore  the  cause  of  justice, 
by  merely  ascertaining  what  the  capitalists  desired  to  do  in 
order  to  advance  their  own  interests,  and  then  striving  to 
bring  about  conditions  directly  opposed  to  those  desired  by 
the  capitalists. 

It  is  dangerous  to  the  welfare  of  the  wage  slave  to  an- 
tagonize the  interests  of  those  who  dole  out  his  bread  and 
butter.  When  the  wage  slaves  attack  the  interests  of  the 
ruling  class,  the  rulers  do  punish  their  slaves  by  denying 
them  their  bread  and  butter,  or  by  cutting  down  their 
allowance. 

But  this  circumstance  does  not  prove  that  the  slaves  should 
cease  to  contend  for  their  rights  or  oppose  even  some  of  the 
least  harmful  impositions  of  their  masters,  but  it  makes  clear 
the  absolute  necessity  of  making  one  job  of  the  overthrow  of 
all  privileges,  great  and  small,  and  thus  making  it  impossible 
for  any  man  to  have  control  of  another's  right  to  work  and 
his  right  to  the  full  enjoyment  of  the  fruits  of  his  toil. 

To  sum  the  whole  matter  up,  so  long  as  the  people  are 
divided  by  the  institutions  and  laws  of  the  country  into  two 
classes,  the  despoiled  and  the  despoilers,  the  abolition  of 
classes  must  of  course  be  wrought  by  the  despoiled. 

Prerequisite,  therefore,  to  class  efTacement,  is  a  conscious- 
ness on  the  part  of  those  who  are  despoiled  that  they  belong 


300  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

to  the  despoiled  class.  There  must  be  a  rigid  alignment  of 
these  two  classes.  Every  man  must  make  it  his  business  to 
know  to  which  class  his  neighbors  and  all  public  men  actually 
belong,  and  whether  they  side  with  the  class  to  which  they 
really  belong  or  with  the  other  class. 

When  "privileges  or  no  privileges"  is  made  the  burning 
issue,  and  "are  you  for  or  against  privileges?"  consequently 
becomes  the  ubiquitous  question,  there  will  be  no  excuse  for 
any  man  who  suffers  from  the  system  of  privileges  to  claim 
allegiance  to  the  privileged  class  on  the  ground  that  he  be- 
lieves that  his  interests  are  common  with  theirs.  For  the 
class  to  which  every  man  belongs  will  become  palpable  to 
him. 

Every  man  who  then  upholds  any  privilege,  regardless  of 
his  protestations  of  sympathy  for  the  downtrodden,  must  be 
considered  a  personal  enemy  by  everyone  who  is  either  denied 
the  right  to  work,  or  the  fruits  of  whose  toil,  when  he  does 
work,  are  being  filched  from  him  by  the  system  of  privileges, 
and  must  be  treated  accordingly. 

Every  man  must  be  forced  by  class  feeling  to  show  his 
colors.  He  must  get  into  one  camp  with  both  feet  or  into 
the  other  with  both  feet. 

The  man  who  attempts  to  straddle  the  dividing  line  must 
be  regarded  by  the  privilege  sufferers  as  doubly  obnoxious. 
It  should  be  made  particularly  unpleasant  for  the  doughface. 
A  traitor  in  the  camp  is  more  dangerous  than  many  open 
enemies. 

Most  people  go  to  the  public  press  not  only  for  information 
about  the  happenings  in  the  world,  but  when  they  buy  a 
newspaper  or  a  magazine,  they  purchase  at  the  same  time, 
along  with  the  advertisements,  and  the  news  which  has  gen- 
erally been  more  or  less  colored,  distorted  or  garbled,  opinions, 
seldom  true,  sometimes  merely  ignorant,  but  more  frequently 


CLASS    COXSCIOUSNESS  3U1 

tlisingenuous  and  iiisidiious,  calculated  to  make  of  those  who 
absorb  those  opinions  their  own  most  elTective  enemies. 

The  newspapers  and  magazines  do  now  mold  public  opinion, 
put  in  vogue  the  fads  of  current  thought,  and  incite  popular 
interest  in  those  matters  in  which  the  privilegists  desire  the 
people  to  become  engrossed. 

The  privilegists  are  now  able,  through  their  newspapers 
and  magazines  to  mold  public  opinion  simply  because  the 
people  have  no  true  principles  upon  which  to  base  opinions 
of  their  own,  or  by  which  to  test  the  validity  of  opinions 
promulgated  by  the  newspapers. 

The  capitalist  publications  suppress  news  which  is  not  to 
their  liking;  they  put  the  ban  on  all  opinions  which  are  not 
in  consonance  with  their  policies ;  they  shamelessly  sophis- 
ticate on  matters  of  public  concern  with  impunity.  They 
magnify  matters  of  little  importance  to  the  people  and  min- 
imize the  importance  of  matters  of  grave  concern  to  them. 

The  editors  sit  in  their  sanctums  and  put  in  as  j)lausiblc 
a  form  as  possible  pernicious  opinions  whicli  they  boldly 
proclaim  to  reflect  public  sentiment.  And  then  the  foolish 
people  do  hold,  and  claim  as  their  own,  the  opinions  which 
have  thus  been  insinuated  into  their  minds. 

Mow  often  we  have  all  heard  persons  express,  as  their 
own,  foolish  or  vicious  opinions  which  wc  ourselves  have  rca<l 
in  the  newspaper  of  the  day  before! 

It  is  because  the  newspapers  and  magazines  are  the  only 
means  by  which  the  masses  of  the  people  can  be  daily,  weekly 
or  monthly  reached,  and  because  these  publications  have  as- 
sumed to  speak  authoritatively  for  the  people,  and  the  people 
have  regarded  them  as  their  authority,  and  therefore  the 
public  press  dictates  the  opinions  of  the  people  instead  of 
the  people  dictating  the  opinions  of  the  press,  that  the  ])riv- 
ilegists  desire  to  own  or  control,  and  actually  do  own  or  con- 
trol, practically  all  publications  of  large  circulation. 


302  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

The  privilegists  understand  that  in  order  to  retain  what 
privileges  they  already  have,  or  to  acquire  new  ones  for  the 
purpose  of  exploiting  the  people,  the  people  must  be  con- 
tinually fooled,  and  the  privilegists  know  that  newspapers 
and  magazines  are  the  best  possible  instruments  with  which 
to  accomplish  that  end. 

And  these  same  publications  are  supported  and  kept  alive 
by  the  masses  of  the  people  whom  it  is  their  chief  business 
to  harm. 

Now,  the  first  object  of  business  publications  is  to  get  cir- 
culation. They  must  have  a  large  circulation  in  order  to  get 
many  advertisements  at  good  prices  upon  which  they  must 
mainly  depend  for  profits. 

Besides,  without  a  large  circulation  a  newspaper  or  maga- 
zine could  exert  little  influence  on  public  opinion. 

The  capitalists  spend  large  sums  to  work  up  a  large  cir- 
culation by  selling  the  publication  cheap  and  by  diverse  other 
expensive  means  which  tend  to  deter  competition.  By  get- 
ting a  large  circulation  they  get  a  large  line  of  advertising  at 
high  prices  for  which  the  people,  who  buy  the  publication 
cheap,  must  pay  when  they  buy  the  advertised  goods. 

The  large  advertisers  are  also  capitalists  and  employers 
who  are  alert  respecting  their  self-interest.  The  interests  of 
the  large  advertisers  being  opposed  to  those  of  the  mass  of 
subscribers,  the  editor  of  an  advertising-dodger  newspaper  is 
under  the  necessity  of  fooling  the  subscribers  and  actually 
serving  the  interests  of  the  advertisers  and  the  privileged  class 
in  general. 

All  of  which  goes  to  show  that  the  power,  aye,  the  very 
life  of  the  publications  which  are  now  being  used  to  con- 
found and  becloud  the  perception  of  the  people  and  to  de- 
bauch their  political  ideals,  depends  absolutely  upon  the  sup- 
port of  the  very  people  whom  they  are  doing  their  utmost 
to  crush  and  to  make  abject  slaves  of  the  mere  owners  of 


CLASS    CONSCIOUSNESS  303 

privileges  which  could  not  be  owned  by  them  against  the 
people's  will. 

The  nefarious,  insidious  influence  of  a  large  body  of  the 
press  of  this  country  is  at  this  moment  being  displaye<l  by 
the  preposterous,  grotesque,  yet  alarmingly  serious  glorifi- 
cation of  one  Theodore  Roosevelt,  which  has  actually  wrought 
thousands  of  people  into  a  frenzy  of  senseless  adulation  and 
ecstatic  gusto  over  his  purely  imaginary,  newspaper-made 
virtues. 

Was  there  ever  a  more  i)itiful,  heart-rcn(Hng  sight  than  to 
see  a  great  mass  of  people  hypnotized  by  the  suggestion  of 
their  would-be  absolute  owners,  regaled  with  Roosevelt  ban- 
ners, buttons  and  hats,  amid  the  blare  of  trumpets,  elaborate 
decorations  and  monarchical  pomp,  digging  the  grave  for  what 
liberty  has  not  already  been  stealthily  stolen  from  them ! 

But  all  such  bedevilment  of  public  thought  will  cease 
when  the  body  of  the  people  have  become  possessed  of  the 
truth  and  will  therefore  be  competent  to  truly  judge  ideas, 
opinions  and  men. 

When  the  people  become  intelligently  class-conscious, 
when  they  will  know  to  a  moral  certainty  to  which  class  they 
themselves,  their  neighbors  and  all  publicists  belong,  every 
man  and  woman  of  those  who  suffer  from  injustice  will  re- 
ligiously withdraw  his  support  from  every  publication  which 
does  not  stand  for  absolute  justice,  and  will  just  as  re- 
ligiously support  publications  which  do  stand  for  absolute 
justice,  no  matter  if,  on  account  of  the  paucity  or  total  ab- 
sence of  advertisements,  they  must  pay  two,  three  or  four 
times  as  much  for  them  as  the  privilege-supporting  i)ublica- 
tion  could  be  bought  for. 

In  the  people  lies  the  power  to  crush  the  publications  of 
the  privilegists  and  thus  make  it  impossible  for  them  to  give 
wide   circulation    to   their   demoralizing,   critninal   ojjinions. 

Those  who  suffer  from  privileges  so  far  outnumber  those 


304  SOCIAL   JUSTICE 

who  profit  by  privileges  that  should  all  the  people  at  once 
become  conscious  of  the  class  to  which  they  really  belong, 
the  privilegists  would  be  so  few  that  they  would  appear  to 
be  out  of  fashion. 

But  it  will  be  by  no  means  necessary  that  all  the  despoiled 
should  realize  to  which  class  they  belong  before  privileges 
may  be  abolished.  Of  course,  article  V  of  the  Constitution 
must  be  gotten  rid  of,  but  to  do  that  only  requires  the  de- 
mand of  a  majority  of  the  people  in  three-fourths  of  the 
states,  and  it  is  fortunately  unfortunate  that  there  is  no  State 
in  the  Union  where  the  natural  anti-privilegists  do  not  out- 
number the  privilegists  ten  to  one.  It  is  unfortunate  that 
the  great  body  of  the  people  are  enslaved  by  the  few,  but  it 
is  exceedingly  fortunate  that  in  this  country  at  least  the 
slaves  themselves  have  the  power  to  free  themselves  the 
moment  they  make  up  their  minds  to  do  so. 

As  class  consciousness  spreads,  and  a  knowledge  of  the 
way  in  which  just  social  arrangements  may  be  substituted  for 
the  present  unjust  system  grows,  the  use  of  the  initiative,  the 
referendum  and  the  recall  will  be  more  appreciated,  and  the 
demand  for  those  irresistable  weapons  will  become  more 
imperative. 

The  people  have  not  heretofore  made  an  overwhelming 
demand  for  absolute  direct  control  of  social  affairs  through 
the  initiative,  referendum  and  recall,  simply  because  they 
have  not  known  what  just  social  arrangements  are,  an,d 
therefore  they  have  not  understood  how  useful  those  efficient 
implements  would  be  to  them  in  the  cultivation  of  justice. 

Rational  people  want  things  only  because  those  things  are 
useful  to  them,  and  the  intensity  of  their  desire  for  things  is 
in  proportion  to  their  estimate  of  the  usefulness  of  those 
things  to  them. 

From  the  foregoing  dissertation  the  following  conclusions 
are    self-evident    deductions : 


CLASS   CONSCIOUSNESS  305 

The  people  of  this  country  are  divided  through  the  creation 
of  privileges  by  the  institution  and  laws  into  two  classes — 
those  who  possess  privileges  which  always  enable  their  pos- 
sessors to  confiscate  the  produce  of  the  labor  of  others,  and 
those  who  own  no  privileges  and  are  compelled  to  yieUl  up  a 
large  portion  of  the  fruits  of  their  labor  to  the  privilegists. 

The  eflfacement  of  economic  class  distinctions  must  be  ef- 
fected through  the  class  consciousness  and  class  action  of  the 
privilege-ridden. 

The  privilege-ridden,  by  reason  of  their  overwhelming  num- 
bers, have  the  power  to  make  the  social  arrangements  what 
they  please  at  any  time.  The  privilege-ridden  outnumber  the 
privilegists  so  greatly  that  it  matters  little  whether  the  actual 
fact  would  show  the  proportion  to  be  ten  to  one,  twenty  to 
one,  or  fifty  to  one. 

It  is  indispensable  that  a  majority  of  the  people  shall  so 
thoroughly  acquaint  themselves  with  the  nature  and  essential 
characteristics  of  the  genus  privilege  and  the  infallible  tests 
by  which  they  may  determine  whether  any  law  or  institution 
does  or  may  create  or  breed  a  privilege,  that  they  cannot 
be  betrayed  into  supporting  even  the  least  baneful  of  privileges 
or  any  unjust  law  or  institution  by  the  machinations  and  blan- 
dishments of  the  most  deft,  learned,  elegant,  accomplished, 
pious,  charitable,  distinguished  and  high-priced  bunco-steerer. 

A  majority  of  the  people  must  learn  what  their  natural 
rights  are,  and  they  must  be  able  to  determine  by  the  appli- 
cation of  the  fundamental  principles  of  justice  whether  any 
proposed  institution  or  law  will  conserve  or  curtail  those 
rights. 

Not  only  must  a  majority  of  the  people  know  what  social 
arrangements  are  good  for  them  and  what  are  harmful  to 
them,  but  in  order  to  get  rid  of  the  bad  arrangement?;  and 
install  in  their  stead  just  arrangements,  if  they  would  b€ 
able  to  make  their  will  the  law  of  the  land,  the  sufferers  from 


306  SOCIAL  JUSTICE 

law-made  injustice  must  not  only  be  class  conscious  and  act 
as  a  unit,  but  in  order  to  act  effectively  and  swiftly  in  the 
accomplishment  of  their  final  purposes  they  must  first  adopt 
as  a  means  the  initiative,  the  referendum,  and  the  recall. 

Finally,  the  cure  for  all  social  evils  depends  upon  the  ac- 
quirement by  a  majority  of  the  people  of  a  knowledge  of  what 
is  good  for  them.  All  injustice  is  the  result  of  the  lack  of 
that  knowledge. 

In  view  of  the  constitution  of  human  nature,  the  onus  of 
social  injustice  and  the  responsibility  of  rectifying  it  de- 
volves upon  those  who  suffer  from  the  unjust  conditions. 

They  themselves  must  acquire  a  knowledge  of  what  is  good 
for  them,  and  therefore  they  must  have  the  will  to  acquire 
that  knowledge.  It  cannot  be  forced  upon  them,  and  they 
certainly  will  never  gain  it  by  absorbing  the  sort  of  informa- 
tion on  that  subject  which  their  economic  enemies,  the  priv- 
ilegists,  are  ever  over-zealous  in  plying  them  with. 

Knowledge  and  human  nature  are  the  two  forces  on  which 
we  must  rely  for  the  consummation  of  social  justice  and  for 
every  advancement  the  human  race  is  to  make  in  civilization 
and  all  which  that  comprehensive  term  implies. 

Let  the  masses  therefore  not  waste  their  time  in  denun- 
ciation of  the  dominating  class.  The  privilegists  make  and 
maintain  privileges  for  the  purpose  of  exploiting  the  remainder 
of  the  people.  They  act  in  accordance  with  human  nature 
and  their  understanding  as  to  what  is  good  for  them. 

The  few  privilegists  are  more  powerful  than  the  many 
whom  they  exploit  merely  because  of  their  superior  knowl- 
edge concerning  self-interest  in  the  matter  of  social  arrange- 
ments. The  classes  are  able  to  rob  the  masses  not  by  reason 
of  any  inherent  power  they  possess,  but  they  do  so  by  what 
amounts  to  the  consent  of  those  who  are  being  robbed. 

The  people  are  bitterly  complaining  of  all  manner  of  in- 
justice, but  at  the  same  time  they  uphold  by  voice  and  vote 


CLASS    CONSCIOUSNESS  307 

the  system  which  makes  all  this  inju>ticc  inevitable.  It  is 
scarcely  needful  to  say  that  they  uphold  a  system  which  im- 
poses terrible  injustice  upon  them  through  ignorance — merely 
because  they  have  not  understood  the  few  simple  fundamental 
principles  of  morality  and  their  easy  application  to  social 
affairs. 

Nothing  will  serve  so  well  to  disseminate  the  knowledge  so 
sorely  needed  by  the  privilege-ri<lden  as  the  formation  of  small 
clubs  by  those  who  have  learned  the  truth  for  the  purpose 
of  systematically  and  concertedly  impressing  the  truth  upon 
the  minds  of  others. 

Whenever  anyone  complains  about  the  price  of  meat,  of 
having  to  ride  in  street  cars  hanging  to  a  strap,  of  ill  treatment 
by  an  employer,  of  family  quarrels  over  money  matters,  of 
being  unable  to  find  a  job,  of  difficulties  with  the  landlord, 
of  the  charges  and  the  service  of  express  and  railroad  com- 
panies, of  graft,  of  heavy  taxes,  of  the  existence  of  trusts, 
of  the  inability  to  properly  clothe,  feed,  house  and  educate 
the  children,  of  the  prevalance  of  crime,  drunkenness,  suicide, 
marital  troubles,  race  antagonism,  and  all  kinds  of  prevent- 
able diseases,  or  of  any  of  the  ills  which  are  due  to  economic 
dependence  and  poverty,  it  should  be  pointed  out  to  him  that 
one  and  all  of  those  evils  spring  from  a  single  cause — the 
existence  of  privileges. 

All  of  the  petty,  as  well  as  the  great  annoyances  of  life, 
the  despondency,  the  fear  of  what  the  morrow  may  bring 
forth,  the  anxiety  for  the  future  of  our  children,  the  rivalry 
for  power  and  wealth,  international  and  internecine  warfare, 
the  quarrels  between  capital  and  lalxir,  are  all  economic  ques- 
tions, and  they  bear  to  the  existing  system  of  social  arrange- 
ments the  relation  of  effect  to  cause. 

The  system  of  privileges  affects  different  individuals  in 
different  ways.  Every  in<lividual  is  affected  by  his  peculiar 
environment,  which  is  different   from  that  of  any  other  in- 


308  SOCIAL  JUSTICE 

dividual,  and  therefore,  the  combination  of  ills  from  which  he 
suffers  is  peculiar  to  him.  This  fact  alone,  with  the  lack  of 
ability  to  trace  final  effects  back  through  a  series  of  causes 
and  effects  to  their  original  cause,  has  led  most  people  to 
ascribe  their  troubles  to  their  immediate  and  apparent  causes, 
and  therefore  they  have  been  unable  to  see  any  connection 
between  their  sufferings  and  the  social  system.  And,  of 
course,  they  have  failed  to  see  that  the  only  remedy  for  the 
immediate  causes  is  to  remove  the  original  cause  of  which 
those  causes  are  but  the  effects.  Hence,  it  is  also  that  the 
people  have  not  learned  to  which  of  the  two  classes  into  which 
the  system  of  privilege  has  divided  them,  they  belong. 

When  small  groups  of  persons  have  associated  for  the  pur- 
pose of  spreading  the  simple,  self-evident  truths  which  leave 
no  doubt  as  to  what  true  justice  is,  and  to  disseminate  a 
knowledge  of  the  equally  simple,  practical  and  effective  means 
of  applying  those  truths  to  social  arrangements,  these  small 
groups  will  rapidly  grow  in  membership  and  multiply.  It  will 
not  be  long  before  these  small  organizations  will  become  crys- 
talized  into  a  national  organization,  and  there  will  be  in  the 
field  a  new  party,  not  made,  but  born! 

The  appearance  of  that  party  will  radically  change  the 
character  of  all  political  and  economic  discussion. 

It  will  force  the  consideration  of  all  social  questions  upon 
the  grounds  of  fundamental  principles  of  morality  and  jus- 
tice.   It  will  be  a  party  inspired  and  welded  by  principles. 

It  will  not  be  a  party  bent  upon  gaining  power  and  pelf, 
but  a  party  determined  to  destroy  all  corruption  and  the 
last  vestige  of  power  which  enables  some  men  to  rule  and 
exploit  others. 

There  will  be  no  place  in  that  party  for  so-called  leaders 
whose  leadership  consists  of  hunger  for  office  and  the  power 
and  perquisites  of  office. 

There  will  be  many  leaders  in  that  party,  yet  a  party  boss 


CLASS  a).\SCIOUSNKSS  JT.' 

w  ill  l)c  an  impossibility.  Because  the  fullowcrs  will  know  pre- 
cisely what  they  want  an<l  how  to  get  it,  the  leaders,  if  they 
woiiM  continue  to  be  leader^,  nni.st  lea<l  <lirectly  whither 
their  followers  desire  to  go. 

The  leaders  of  that  party  will  not  write  its  platform  nor 
make  dominant  issues  if  inc(>nse(iuenlial  (piestions,  nor  will 
tliey  be  able  to  disintegrate  the  party  by  selling  out  to  its 
enemies,  for  they  will  have  nothing  to  sell. 

The  platform  of  that  party  will  not  change  from  campaign 
to  campaign,  no  more  than  truth  changes  from  season  to 
season. 

There  will  be  always  the  same  platform,  the  same  issuer 
and  but  one  continuous  campaign. 

That  i^arly  will  afTord  a  common  ccjngenial  haven  for  .so- 
cialists, philoso])hic  anarchists,  single  taxers,  women  sutTra- 
gists,  lab(;r  unionists,  temperance  ailvocates,  free  traders, 
municipal  reformers,  advocates  of  the  initiative,  referendum 
an  1  recall,  a<lvocatea  of  universal  peace,  and  all  others  who 
sincerely  desire  to  see  justice  prevail,  whether  th.ey  now  belong 
to  the  republican  or  democratic  party,  or  to  no  j)arty. 

That  that  parly,  f<nm  led  on  recognized  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  morality  and  justice,  held  together  by  the  comnu/n 
an  1  righteous  interests  of  each  and  every  one  of  its  members, 
and.  a  knowie  Igc  tliat  the  realization  of  its  aims  cannot  pos- 
sibly reult  in  the  benefit  of  some  at  the  expense  of  others, 
will  triumph,  over  all  the  op[>osition  which  tliose  who  [trofit 
by  unjust  social  coniitions  are  able  to  tlirow  ia  its  way,  there 
cannot  be  the  slightest  doubt. 

Money  is  powerful  when  pitted  against  ii^norTncc.  but  ii 
is  both  weak  and  cowan lly  when  broufjht  face  to  face  with 
a  knowledge  of  the  iriiili. 

Money  wields  what  power  it  has  by  means  of  the  cor- 
rui)tion  of  the  un<lfr.  tan  Htii^  .-m  '  m  iraN  of  the  people. 

Money  will  be  invested  in  bribery  or  the  manufacture  of 


310  SOCIAL  JUSTICE 

public  opinion  only  with  the  assurance  or  expectation  of  get- 
ting in  return  greater  value  than  the  outlay.  But  the  capi- 
talists will  not  be  able  to  offer  enough  money  to  those  who 
know  what  great  fortune  the  enjoyment  of  their  rights  will 
bring  them,  to  make  the  exchange  of  their  rights  for  the 
money  look  to  them  like  a  good  bargain. 

Now,  the  capitalists  buy  the  people's  rights  from  them 
by  buying  their  representatives  or  leaders  only.  Then  they 
will  be  under  the  necessity  of  buying  from  all  the  people  what 
the  people  will  not  desire  to  sell  at  any  price. 

That  the  people  are  divided  by  the  institutions  and  laws 
of  the  country  into  two  classes,  as  to  their  economic  rela- 
tions, is  a  fact  which  cannot  be  ignored.  There  will  be  more 
or  less  class  consciousness  accordingly  as  there  will  be  a  more 
or  less  clear  understanding  among  the  people  as  to  which 
of  the  two  classes  they  belong  to. 

As  long  as  there  are  classes,  there  will  be  class  conflicts. 
And  there  ought  to  be  class  conflicts.  Not  only  that,  the 
class  which  suffers  by  that  extraneously  imposed  classification 
should  become  ceaseless  aggressors  in  a  war  of  class  abolition, 
for  by  no  other  means  can  economic  justice  ever  be  brought 
about. 

There  must  arise  a  new  abolition  movement  whose  mission 
shall  be  the  abolition  of  classes,  the  abolition  of  wage  slavery, 
the  abolition  of  rent,  interest  and  profits,  the  abolition  of  rep- 
resentative government  which  is  minority  rule,  the  abolition 
of  all  privileges,  which  means  the  abolition  of  all  forms  of 
economic  injustice. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

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